Title

The Trouble with Tracing

Authors

Manuel R. Vargas, University of San FranciscoFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2005

Abstract

Many prominent theories of moral responsibility rely on the notion of "tracing," the idea that responsibility for an outcome can be located in (i.e., "traced back to") some prior moment of control, perhaps significantly antecedent to the proximate sources of a considered action. In this article, I show how there is a problem for theories that rely on tracing. The problem is connected to the knowledge condition on moral responsibility. Many prima facie good candidate cases for tracing analyses appear to violate the knowledge condition on moral responsibility. So, either we need to dispense with tracing approaches or we must refine our understanding of the knowledge condition or we are responsible less frequently than we suppose.

Comments

Article published in Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 2005, Vol. 29 Issue 1, p269-291, 23p.

DOI:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2005.00117.x.

The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com

Recommended Citation

Vargas, Manuel R., "The Trouble with Tracing" (2005). Philosophy. 3.
https://repository.usfca.edu/phil/3