Title

Revisionism about Free Will: A Statement and Defense

Authors

Manuel R. Vargas, University of San FranciscoFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

5-2009

Abstract

This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection to the distinctiveness of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism and (4) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about moral responsibility.

Comments

Article published in Philosophical Studies May 2009, Vol. 144 Issue 1, p45-62, 18p. DOI:10.1007/s11098-009-9366-x.

The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com.

Recommended Citation

Vargas, Manuel R., "Revisionism about Free Will: A Statement and Defense" (2009). Philosophy. 8.
https://repository.usfca.edu/phil/8