Muslim Brothers or Overstaying Guests? The Reception of Syrian Refugees in Southeastern Turkey

Irem Karaçizmeli
iremka@gmail.com

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The Reception of Syrian Refugees in Southeastern Turkey

A Thesis Presented to
The Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences
Master’s Program in International Studies

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in International Studies

by
Irem Karaçizmeli
December 2015
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Lindsay Gifford
Thesis Advisor

Lucia Cantero
Date

Date
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Chapter One: Introduction

The civil war in Syria has displaced 11 million people worldwide since its breakout in 2011. Four million of these have dispersed through six continents as refugees, with approximately 100 countries becoming their hosts (UNHCR, 2014a). Three neighboring countries of Syria - Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey - have taken the lead in the number of Syrian refugees hosted during the war. This thesis focuses on Turkey, a country that has been directly shaken by the war in Syria. Turkey had traditionally been a transit country for migrants, refugees and asylees attempting to move to Europe via Greece. The Syrian crisis has become the push factor to shift the country’s position from a historical transit base, into a refugee haven. Its geographical location, multiethnic cities and a welcoming national discourse adopted by the government towards Syrian refugees has made Turkey a popular destination for those seeking safety. Over two million Syrian refugees have arrived in Turkey since 2011, making it the host to the largest refugee population in the world (UNHCR, 2014b).

The Syrian refugee context in Turkey is a multi-faceted issue marked with contradictions. The tension between the Turkish past as a Muslim empire, and Turkish present as a laic\(^1\) nation-state comes to the fore in Turkish refugee policy. The government’s rhetoric towards Syrians arriving at the Turkish border during the Syrian war has been highly Islamicized, with abundant references to the Ottoman era, when Turks and Arabs lived together for three centuries

\(^{1}\) Laicism signifies the separation of religion from state affairs. It is different from secularism mainly because it gives the authority to the state to control the practices of religious organizations to safeguard the regime.
under a Sunni Muslim state, and with cultural notions of hospitality. The founder of Turkey’s ruling Islamist party *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*\(^2\), the AKP, and incumbent president Recep Tayyip Erdogan has often referred to Syrian refugees as ‘Muslim brother’ (Arutz Sheva, 2015). According to Erdogan and his party, it is a religious duty inherited from the Ottoman past to make the ‘brother’ comfortable during the period of his guesthood. Romanticization of the Ottoman era is not peculiar to the ruling party officials in Turkey. It has, in fact, become a rhetorical practice for the Islamists in the country to glorify the Ottoman Empire; life in a Sunni Muslim state, where not nation but religion defined the citizen.

The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 upon different values than those of the Ottoman Empire, with the biggest shift being secular nationalism taking the place of religion as the underlying foundation of the state. The country of Turks was now a nation-state, and a laic democracy which pushed Islam into the private sphere. Under the pro-Westernization founders, Turkey experienced a construction of a new political identity free from religion. However, it was a struggle for this new identity to be accepted by all citizens. The Islamists and Kurds protested, and the state, in return, denounced them as the enemy. The Turkish Islamists were considered a danger for the country’s laicist future, and the Kurds a threat to the homogenous unification of the ethnic Turkish nation.

The year 2002 signified a major shift in Turkey’s political history, declaring the success of the Islamist AKP in the elections and switching the political power-holder in the country from laicists to Islamists. With the AKP’s rule, the manifestation of Muslim identity has reached its strongest position in the political sphere since the establishment of Turkey. The connection

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\(^2\) Meaning Justice and Development Party. The party is both referred to as the AK Party, or the AKP.
between a Muslim and a Turk has been highly promoted by the AKP, especially by its founder Erdogan who has many times voiced his dedication to raise a religious youth (NTV, 2012). Government officials have openly identified themselves as pious Muslims, explicitly distinguishing themselves from the laicists while revealing strong ties back to the wider umma.³ Such an open declaration of religious identity represented at the government level has generated serious concerns among laicists in Turkey over the comeback of Ottoman state tradition and sharia law. Speculations over the AKP’s loyalty to the 92 year-old laicist nation-state rule have remained ever-since.

The Syrian refugee crisis that began as the Islamist ruling party was growing in strength with each election has raised many questions: Could the success of the Islamists mean a comeback of the Ottoman traditions that the Islamists in Turkey have always idolized? Does the government and the Islamists in the country in general see the Syrian refugee crisis as an opportunity to transform the state tradition? Is the 92-year old laic nation-state tradition declining in conjunction with the arrival of 2.2 million Syrians, most of whom are Sunni Muslims? This thesis argues that the Syrian crisis, and the government’s response to it bring these questions about Turkish national identity to the foreground of sociopolitical discourse. The Islamist party’s practice of shaping the state’s refugee response in Ottoman-style politics may reveal a crack in their investment to the laic nation-state tradition. However, the Islamist sense of Ottomanism would require the local integration of Syrians, and superiority of in the eyes of the polity (McCarthy, 1997: 128). The current Islamist government has put for only temporary measures to deal with the crisis, and demonstrated its reticence to fully integrate Syrians into the political

³ Family of all Muslims in the world
fold. While the Islamic rhetoric of the government promised the best for the ‘brother’, the practice has appeared to be in favor of the ‘his’ return.

Turkish engagement with the crisis initiated with building state-of-the-art refugee camps. Turkey was praised for realizing an ideal by the *New York Times* which published an article titled ‘How to Build a Perfect Refugee Camp’ praising Turkey (New York Times, 2014). Syrians have also been allowed to settle freely in urban areas; in fact, 90% of them have chosen self-settlement over these ‘perfect’ camps (Al Jazeera Turk, 2015a). Increasing self-settlement, has generated further problems such as the Syrian expansion in the informal economy, where the employee rights of the refugee are often violated. Syrians’ rejection of settling in the camps has also brought about changes in local host attitudes. In this context, an anti-refugee climate has been born.

This thesis finds that such a turn of events is deeply-rooted in Turkish attempts to locate the larger issue of hosting refugees into cultural notions of ‘guesthood’ rather than a developed refugee rights framework. The 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees defines the refugee as a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (UNHCR, 2010). However, due to a geographical limitation set forth in the Convention, Turkey only grants the refugee status, and the rights that come along with it, to those fleeing persecution in Europe. The limitation requires that other persons with legitimate claims for refugee status are transferred to the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) for third country resettlement. As persons of
non-European origin, Syrians fall under the legal category of those under temporary protection, formally referred to as ‘guests’ or ‘asylees’ under Turkish law.

The cultural norm of guesthood is an extremely valued concept in Islam⁴, but something that remains insufficient as a political response to a major refugee crisis. Islamic ideology requires welcoming the guest unconditionally (El-Abed, 2014: 86); Turkish Islamists explicitly reference this injunction in their public discourse. Double imperative of hospitality, on the other hand, is often neglected. The expression of hospitality is made possible through one side’s superiority that comes as a result of “ownership of place” (Brun, 2010: 347). The ethical form of hospitality, however, is challenged in the presence of a threat to the superior’s control over its territory (El-Abed, 2014: 86).

Permanent stay, or owning property, is not expected of a guest. The protracted nature of the Syrian refugee crisis has indicated to the limits of the applicability of notions of hospitality in an international refugee situation. As refugees have dispersed all over Turkey, they have become more visible. Refugee rejection of camps has remained incomprehensible for many Turks that expected Syrians to behave as guests and to stay in camps, where shelter had been provisioned. Self-settlement has been considered a betrayal to many with contradicting expectations of guesthood rather than understood within a framework of refugee rights. Why were ‘the guests’ not content with the services the Turks had spent so much money to provide? Why were they wanting more and being disrespectful?⁵

⁴ As exemplified by the words of Prophet Muhammad: “Let him who believes in Allah and the Last Day speak good, or keep silent; and let him who believes in Allah and the Last Day be generous to his neighbour; and let him who believes in Allah and the Last Day be generous to his guest.” Imaam An-Nawawi, “An-Nawawi’s Forty Hadith”, BeMuslim at Smashwords. Accessed November, 21, 2015.
⁵ Questions raised by some of the locals encountered during the author’s fieldwork
The government itself has perpetuated such notions of guesthood with its policies. The Islamist government has based its rhetoric for welcoming the refugees on the Ottoman past, but has not fully implemented an Ottoman vision in its refugee policy; as the state neither integrated Syrians into the polity, nor granted them a privileged position in society for being Muslim. While failing to enact on Ottoman mold, the government has also not lived up to modern democratic ideals, by failing to institutionalize international refugee law. By locating refugee rights within notions of guesthood, the government denies refugees an opportunity for full local integration with concomitant links to establishing self-sustaining households. Lack of government oversight and regulation has increased local hostility toward Syrian refugees, severely undermining the guest model.

The Syrian refugee situation in Turkey is fraught with policy ambiguities, while durable solutions remain elusive. Refugees’ ties to Turkey are interrupted, because their stay is time-restricted. Strict laws towards the newcomers of the country render the establishment of permanent residence nearly impossible. The de facto strategy of the government in its response to the crisis has been building refugee camps. This thesis problematizes the notion of a camp that is increasingly referred to as ‘warehousing’ (Smith, 2004). Both the UNHCR, and refugee hosting governments have for a long time favored the camp model to respond to refugee crises. Camps are characterized by the separation of refugees from locals, government control, and easier coordination of relief activities often in a secluded territory. For decades, camps have been the most commonly-used formal strategy for hosting refugees. Although warehousing refugees in a designated area may not be financially advantageous as involving them in the country’s economy, segregation is often favored over inclusion efforts.
Karen Jacobsen has found that camps are favored, because they prevent refugees from enjoying the rights they would not enjoy in their country of origin (Jacobsen, 2002: 111). Refugee camps, therefore, have been viewed as eliminating the obstacles to return of refugees back to their home countries. Camps have also been seen as saving the government from skyrocketing spending while helping refugees retain their own traditions (Kibreab, 1989: 470). As central as camps have been to refugee policies, restricted movement and exclusion from economic and personal independence have rendered these areas in the periphery non-habitable. As a result, some two thirds of the world’s refugees have chosen self-settlement, mostly in the urban areas (UNHCR, 2015a).

Referred to as urban refugees, refugee self-settlers challenge the traditional construction of a nation-state. The nation-state legitimizes the construction of an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’, the former being a member of the body politic, while the latter does not have member status or the rights that go with it. As a group having different historical and cultural values, urban refugees bring heterogeneity into the country, contradicting with the nation-state ideal of a homogenous unification within the claimed territory. The isolating nature of the refugee camps, on the other hand, ensures the continued purity of the state. The camp model suggests that what is expected of a refugee is to passively wait in the periphery until conditions improve in the country of origin and repatriation begins. These expectations are interlinked to the nation-state construction of the immobility of identity (Malkki, 1992: 29). Refugees are considered to have placed their identity on hold, for identity is increasingly pictured as something that stays within the boundaries of the nation-state.
This thesis is based on field research conducted in the summer of 2015 in southeastern Turkey. With electricity, hot water, playgrounds, schools and job training courses provided in the camps, the government of Turkey has undoubtedly built exceptional camp infrastructure. Almost all of the Syrian refugee participants in this study compared Turkey with Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan and expressed their gratitude for Turkish efforts. The findings of the fieldwork illustrate, however, that the quality of camps does not make the conditions of encampment more attractive for the refugee. The services provided in camps have not changed the constraining nature of a refugee camp, or concealed the effort of the Turkish nation-state to keep the city ‘sterile’. With obscure policies, and transient approaches to the Syrian refugee issue like building refugee camps, the government of Turkey has indicated that it is reluctant to allow refugees to integrate within the country. Enhancing the quality of camps while failing to improve quality of life for urban refugees indicates that Turkey - despite being hailed as a model for refugee reception - exhibits characteristic of a failed host policy. This thesis refers to these characteristics as the international refugee host complex, which will be explained in detail in Part II.

There is growing evidence that Turkey’s refugee policy is inadequate. The life of refugees living in urban or semi-urban areas is extremely difficult. Out of the 20 interviewed Syrian refugees for this study, almost all indicated a contrast between past and present, referring to the past in Syria as ‘normal’ while characterizing the present in Turkey as ‘abnormal’. UN reports have illustrated the will of a considerable number of refugees to depart from Turkey in life-jeopardizing ways, showing the desperation that refugees in Turkey feel. The number of refugees who undertake illegal maritime journeys to European soil has significantly increased.
Within the first 10 months of 2015, 600,000 people have taken a smuggler boat from Turkey; approximately 200 of those were dead as a result (UNHCR, 2015b).

**Methodology**

This thesis is based on field research conducted in the summer of 2015 in southeastern Turkey. The field research location was chosen due to the significant number of refugees hosted in the area. A total of 20 interviews were conducted with self-settled Syrian refugees with the assistance of an Arabic interpreter. Throughout the process, the research relied primarily on qualitative methods using a semi-structured interview techniques. Questions asked during the interviews included: ‘Can you define difficulties of life in a non-camp setting?’, ‘Have you had access to aid coming from national or international resources?’, ‘Why have you chosen self-settlement over camps?’, ‘How has your overall experience been with the host community?’, and ‘Have you suffered from prejudice or acts of aggression?’ along with unstructured interview interactions. In addition to the interviews with Syrians, ethnographic observations of the locals in southeastern Turkey were recorded through note-taking. An online survey was also conducted with Turkish citizens via SurveyMonkey, through which 164 responses were collected. The questions in the matrix-question-survey included the age and sex of the participant, their location, concerns about having Syrians in Turkey, security issues with the presence of Syrians, refugee camps, begging, effects on the Turkish economy, and on Turkey’s laicism (see Appendix A).

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6 The researcher is a native Turkish speaker.
This thesis contextualizes the Syrian refugee issue in Turkey, and aims to provide a deeper understanding of the underlying motives behind the national rhetoric and practice adopted towards the country’s new demographic. The research question it addresses is stated as ‘How does the Syrian refugee crisis intersect with competing formulations of Turkish politics and national identity?’

Part II will address the literature on major concepts this thesis problematizes: the nation-state and the refugee camp. A comparison of refugee situations throughout the world has also taken place in order to better locate Turkey in the worldwide discussion of refugee and host community relations. The patterns - mostly signifying a set of failures - found in the acts of major refugee hosts in the world which entails patterns of exclusion, abuse and false assumptions will be investigated. Part III will cover the history of Turks - which includes the country’s deeper connection to Syrians. The section will also study the data obtained from the fieldwork to provide the context of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Part IV includes conclusion remarks, highlighting that the contradicting nature of Turks’ past within an Islamic empire and present in a laic nation-state further obscures the present and future of Syrian refugees in Turkey.
Part Two: Literature Review

This section will review the literature surrounding three main subjects: the nation-state, international refugee host complex, and refugee camps. The question of how these three are interlinked, and their significance will be addressed.

Turkish engagement with the 2.2 million Syrian refugee population should be evaluated under two areas - rhetoric and practice - and in two different time periods - the beginning and later days of the crisis. The government’s rhetoric towards Syrians arriving at the Turkish borders during the war has been highly Islamicized, with references to the Ottoman era and cultural notions of hospitality. The government’s strong Islamic rhetoric and concerns over how the Syrian refugee population may be used as a political tool have heightened tensions among Turks. A year-long study of the media coverage of the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey has found that the newspaper representing the view of the laicists, the Cumhuriyet, criticized the government for its Syrian refugee policy:

The general attitude of Cumhuriyet newspaper is to criticize the government over Syrians. The common concern of Turkish public on Syrians such as ‘they are becoming Turkish citizens’; ‘they will be able to vote in elections’; ‘they are allowed to establish private enterprises’; were reported as problematic issues and the government is blamed for opening the doors to Syrians (Karakus and Yaylaci, 2015: 244).

Despite these concerns over de facto integration of Syrian refugees, government policy is in fact oriented toward exclusion, through both camp segregation and urban marginalization. Today, 90% of Turkey’s Syrian refugees live in urban and semi-urban areas. Urban refugee policies, however, have been extremely vague and non-responsive to the needs of Syrians. Poor
regulation in the city has caused numerous problems both for Syrians themselves and for the local community. Begging as a strategy of survival has increased among Syrians; though rare, some Syrians have taken part in cases of burglary and stealing (Cumhuriyet, 2015). Such events have led to hostility and a negative representation of the Syrian population for many members of the local community. A major shift in public discourse on Syrians is now apparent: from empathy into resentment. Such a change of attitude in the Turkish community translates to a strong division between the early and later days of the crisis, the former referring to a relatively stable environment, and the latter to increasing unrest.

Because the Syrian refugee crisis is on-going and relatively new, the literature focusing on the refugee context in Turkey is very sparse. With data drawn from interviews with local agents of refugee settlement, observations, survey and an analysis of history, this thesis endeavors to reveal the refugee experience on the ground while also highlighting its connection to the larger tensions and contradictions in Turkish political history. The case in Turkey has in fact been very similar to what this thesis defines as the international refugee host complex, the tendency of host communities to repeat unsuccessful approaches in refugee situations.

The Nation-state

The nation-state is a fairly new political model, dating back to the demise of empires in the 19th century. Benedict Anderson begins to codify the motives of a nation-state by first defining what a nation is. His definition suggests that the nation is something imagined existing in the minds of those that believe in it:
The members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. (Anderson, 2006: 22)

The nation-state, then, is the idealized unification of an imagined community claiming sovereign territory. The nation-state legitimizes its power in terms of territorialization of a shared culture and history of a dominant population; the state is tied to a particular ethnic identity (Basch et al. 1994: 40). Anthropologist Liisa Malkki writes that the-now-territorialized concept of a nation encourages the construction of a notion of “rootedness” (Malkki, 1992: 27). Nations naturalize their ties to territory through botanical metaphors, in which people are likened to plants which grow in certain land. Identity is thus spatialized value, becoming immovable beyond the boundaries of the nation-state (Malkki, 1992: 28). Those who cannot claim ancestral ties to the territory with its shared history and language are presumed to have rootedness in other territories and are thus excluded. These claims intersect with ethnocentric notions of national superiority, so outsiders in the nation-state are perceived as interior, burdensome and threatening. The nation-state thus legitimizes the construction of an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’, the former being a rightful member of the state, while the other constitutes a threat. Hannah Arendt points out the problematic construction of ‘the other’ for the acquisition of rights by human beings in their capacity as citizens of the nation-state. Since rights are guaranteed by the state, refugees find themselves in a precarious position, being outside the country of their nationality due to persecution; therefore forced to seek rights through the vehicle of another state in which he or she is not a citizen. Arendt says that human rights becomes a questionable topic in the presence of the clear-cut boundaries within the nation-state on what makes one a rightful insider or a threatening outsider. She warns that the nation-state approaches human rights as a question of
national rights, protecting the insider but remaining passive for the outsider; a tendency she refers to as ‘perversion’ (Arendt, 1973: 230-231).

The Refugee Camp

The dysfunctional human rights in the presence of the other, as theorized by Arendt, intersects with the traditional ways of engaging politically with refugee crises around the world. The refugee camp is a physical representation of ‘human rights versus national rights’ discussion, as perhaps the most controversial strategy to host refugees. Refugees are traditionally considered as a threat to the nation-state ideal to a homogenous unification of the nation. Refugees bring heterogeneity into the host country as a result of their distinct rootedness in a different territory, while the nation-state dreams of purity (Diken, 2004: 92). The refugee camps are an attempt to maintain purity, enclosing refugees in a space characterized with extreme restriction of movement. With the nation-state legitimizing the construction of the refugee as ‘the outsider inside’ (Diken, 2004: 88), refugees are isolated in camps. Usually located in the periphery, refugee camps are criticized for transgressing the doctrine of international human rights, since they violate the internationally recognized human right to freedom of movement (UDHR, Article 13).

The UNHCR and national governments have for a long time favored the camp model based on a political calculation. Gaim Kibreab describes this calculation, arguing that letting refugees enjoy the rights of the locals would encourage them to stay even when the conditions in their country of origin improved (Kibreab, 1989: 472). Thus, harsh reception policies become a
tool to ensure the temporary nature of refugee stay. Kibreab also justifies the camp model presuming that integration is an idea based on the wishful thinking of resource-rich Europe (Kibreab, 1989: 474). Some portray a milder approach to refugee camps, thinking that camps do not always represent the worst option where the real question is “not whether or not there should be camps but to ensure that camps meet the highest possible standard and provide refugees with optimal living conditions” (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 27). The Turkish example, however, stands as a case that refutes such argument. With power, hot water, schools, playgrounds, and job training courses provided in the camps, Turkey gained international praise for building the “perfect refugee camps” (The New York Times, 2014). Irrespective of the conditions within, however, 90% of refugees in Turkey have chosen self-settlement mainly in urban areas, rejecting the camp option. The Turkish case, therefore, suggests that restriction of movement, isolation and a passive life render camps undesirable; and there is no such thing as a perfect camp.

The majority of scholars criticize the camp model of engaging with refugee crises. Merrill Smith has referred to the refugee camp as the “warehousing” model where “refugees become spectators to their own lives rather than active participants in decision-making” (Smith, 2004). Critics have mentioned that “the confinement of refugees to camps, are not in the interest of the refugees, local populations, host governments or donor states” (Kuhlman, 2002: 7), highlighting that refugees can be self-sustaining and contribute to the vitality of the host country’s economy (Campbell, 2006). Using the Foucauldian idea that restriction of movement is an ensured way to discipline the body (Foucault, 1979: 136), Barbara Harrell-Bond describes refugee camps as places of discipline and control (Harrell-Bond, 2002: 57). As Harrell-Bond found earlier, the dominance of soldiers and security personnel is also a reality of the refugee
camps in Turkey. Turkish soldiers and security personnel are involved in the every-day life of a camp-settler, sometimes imposing violence, as Senay Ozden reports from the Kilis camp in Turkey:

Some Syrians had complaints about the presence of Turkish soldiers at the camp gates. The soldiers are not allowed to walk around in the camp, but they are responsible for the security at the entrance. Besides hearing stories from Syrians residing in the camps, I have also observed that soldiers sometimes treat the Syrians in a non-humanitarian fashion, for example, insulting them, shouting at them and waving their guns at them. Camp residents argue that the presence of armed soldiers have negative psychological effects, especially for children, who have witnessed and escaped from violence in Syria. (Ozden, 2013: 7)

While approaching the refugee camp as a space of control that reifies the power of the host, Barbara Harrell-Bond also points to the politics of gift-giving within these structures. The passive refugee is further infantilized with the ‘giving’ nature of the camp that does not allow its settlers to be productive (Harrell-Bond, 2002: 54). The refugee is considered the constant consumer of the gift - in this case the camp services and aid; whereas the gift giver - the UNHCR and the host country - are rendered the generous provider, and controlling structures requiring obedience.

The International Refugee Host Complex

Reviewing the literature of refugee studies from multiple countries, this thesis finds that three main issues appear to remain unresolved in host community-refugee relations: exclusion, abuse and false assumptions. Similar cases around the world suggest that refugee hosts worldwide tend to manifest three phenomena. This thesis suggests the term international refugee
host complex in an effort to capture these complex patterns in refugee-host community encounters.

Host communities have many times turned into places of discrimination, rights violation, and stigma for refugees, but the current literature does not identify a widespread pattern of unsuccessful host community practices. Many scholars have agreed that local integration should be a key policy objective in engaging with refugee crises (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil, 2004; Ward, 2014; Morris, 2010; Smith, 2004; Bakewell, 2000; Rantac, 2014; Kuhlman, 2002; Campbell, 2006). Local integration is in fact one of the three durable solutions along with resettlement and repatriation suggested by the UNHCR. Host countries and the UNHCR have a major role in promoting integration-oriented projects within sectors such as education, employment and health. Lack of sufficient funding, however, presents great obstacles to achieving success. Africa, for example, has been home to cancelled integration-promoting projects as a result of financial difficulties (Ward, 2014: 87). Even mature democracies, such as the UK, Australia and Sweden have not been able to avoid the trap of exclusion, abuse and false assumptions in hosting refugees (Ager and Strang, 2008; Kampmark, 2006; Eastmond, 1998). The problems instigated by inefficient and unsustainable refugee policies are especially evident in the case of the world’s biggest refugee hosts. The case of Yemen sets one of the greatest examples.

The UNHCR describes the refugee context in Yemen as an “extremely delicate” case (UNHCR, 2012: 23). The refugee population of Yemen is highly diverse including Somalis, Iraqis and Eritreans (UNHCR, 2015c). Although the country is signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the government of Yemen is strongly against integration as a
durable solution. Tim Morris explains the refugee context in Yemen as abundant in acts of hostility for a “once-welcoming host community” (Morris, 2010: 36). He points out the presence of abuse, where Somalis are not allowed to enjoy the same rights as nationals in society, especially at the workplace (Morris, 2010: 37). A one-month research study finds that the government turns a blind eye to the abuse of refugees at the workplace in order to “maintain a supply of low-wage labor for the economy and protect higher wage jobs for Yemeni nationals” (Hughes, 2002: 28). Stopping refugees at checkpoints and asking for bribes is not uncommon among the Yemeni police, because refugees fear deportation and thus are unlikely to resist authorities (Hughes: 2002: 35). The report also reveals that arbitrary actions of the police and government officials are interlinked with the assumptions that refugees are criminals (Hughes, 2002: 42).

Another example is provided by the Pakistani case. With the second largest refugee population in the world, Pakistan shows a significant shift over time in locals’ behaviour towards Afghan refugees. Sanaa Alimia writes that the Pakistani - although at first welcoming toward Afghans - has structured a “good Muslim” and a “bad Muslim” conception, the former Pakistani, and the latter Afghan (Alimia, 2014: 163). Characterizations that portray the Afghan refugee as malevolent legitimates policies such as arbitrary detention and mass arrest of Afghans by the police, at considerably high rates (Alimia, 2014: 163). In this case, Western perceptions and portrayals of Afghans affected Pakistani public discourse. After 9/11 the Afghan was suddenly considered a terrorist, a negative representation also perpetuated by the media. As a result, Afghans were excluded from society. Fear of harassment by the police led many Afghan men to sequester themselves at home and retreat from public life (Alimia, 2014: 164).
Jordan, another major host of refugees as a historic home for Palestinians after the creation of Israel and now Syrians since 2011 also falls prey to the international refugee host complex. Jordan is in many ways similar to Turkey in its response to Syrian refugees. The government and the public of Jordan also frames refugee status as legal ‘guests’ within cultural notions of hospitality. Jordan has a firm stance on anti-integration policies (Ward, 2014: 87). Jordan has also chosen to implement the camp model to house refugees; although Jordanian camps have previously been found to negatively affect the psychological well-being of Iraqi refugees (Crisp, 2009). Legal employment is not a possibility for refugees in Jordan; so that refugees are compelled to find work in the informal economy where they are vulnerable to workplace abuses (Arneberg, 1997:7). Literature also indicates that false assumptions shape Jordanian opinions towards refugees. Mercy Corps reports that Jordanians mistakenly assume that Syrians are thriving financially in Jordan supported by international aid:

The Syrians’ coping strategies for earning income have had the unintended consequence of further provoking Jordanian resentment; the sight of Syrian refugees selling food received from aid organisations, and household goods has generated the impression that many Syrians in Mafraq are doing quite well – much better, in fact, than the majority of local residents (Mercy Corps, 2012: 4).

Lucy Hovil finds similar experiences in the case of Uganda. Although settlement outside the refugee camps is forbidden in Uganda, there are many refugees that illegally do nevertheless. Excluded from local economy and society within Uganda, refugees here also suffer from similar problems of abuse in the job environment. Some of the members of the local community argue that “refugees are better off at camps for the country’s security, and their own security” (Hovil,

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7 It should also be noted that refugee participants of this study mentioned that Syrians had been excluded from Jordanian society greatly. “Turkey provided a safer haven,” said the 50 year-old participant Safa Said, who had been to Jordan before coming to Turkey.
2007: 604-605). Refugees in Uganda are seen as a burden and, therefore, a body deserving containment. Like many other scholars working in Africa (Campbell, 2006; Bakewell, 2000) Hovil refutes this argument with data from ethnographic fieldwork indicating the economically self-sustaining practices of refugees (Hovil, 2007).

The construction of the other, with its negative image in the eye of the nation-state, has encouraged government passivity to prevent exclusion, abuse and false assumptions towards refugees. The state itself is a source of these divisive practices. With perpetuated notions of the refugee as a threat to the idealized homogenous nation, the nation-states of the world, even those countries with welcoming discourse, have continued to isolate refugees in camps. Camps are places of absolute exclusion from society often located in the periphery. These places are built on an assumption that refugees would not return if they are allowed to incorporate in city life. Camps are also places that abuse the vulnerability of refugees as a result of the politics of gift-giving within these structures, a way of reiterating the power of the host. As a country that also utilizes the camp model to engage with a refugee crisis, Turkey exhibits the features of the international refugee host complex, as well. The next section discusses the presence of these features in the case of Turkey more broadly, as well as exploring the government’s investment to the nation-state model.
Part Three: The Case of Turkey

This section focuses on the ways the Syrian crisis intersects with Turkish state and society, drawing on fieldwork conducted in the summer of 2015. The Turks originated as nomadic tribes in Central Asia. As a result of close contacts with Arabs and Persians, Turks started converting to Islam in the 10th century, but tribal independence and lack of a state concept made Turkish Islamization a gradual process. The first concept of a state was introduced with the Seldjiks. Themselves once a Turkish tribe, the Seljuks founded and ruled the Great Seljuk Empire which considered itself a Sunni Muslim power. Defeating the Byzantines in Mazikert (or Malazgirt) in 1071, they helped move Turks from Central Asia to Anatolia. Other tribes were allured by this constantly expanding state; as a result, conversion to Islam gained great popularity. One of the reasons of supporting Turkic conversion was the commonality Islam shared with Turks’ indigenous mystic Goktanri beliefs.8 The Great Seljuk Empire and its counterpart Rum Seljuks, were shaken by the difficulties of preserving military-based rule, taxing each tribe within their borders, and a growing Mongolian threat (McCarthy, 1997: 12).

After the fall of the Seljuks, Mongols invaded Anatolia, breaking down the empire into smaller pieces. Referred to as beyliks, these pieces of land functioned like small emirates that were ruled by beys.9 With inherited war skills from the Seljuks, the emirate that was named after

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8 Both religions have one superior God and a belief in the afterlife, with similar concepts of heaven and hell
9 Beys can be considered as counterparts to feudal lords in Europe.
its ruler Osman rose to power. It obtained other Turkic emirates as well as surrounding states with Jewish and Christian populations, and eventually transformed into an empire referred to as *Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye* (meaning the Great Country of Osman’s Dynasty), later translated into English as the Ottoman Empire.

Ottomans shared a major commonality with the Seljuks: the religion. The Ottoman regime was formed around religion; state rule and policy decisions about the country’s subjects were based on Islamic sharia law. Religion was central to the regulation of internal affairs; the empire established the institution of *millet* in order to define the citizen (Chatty, 2013: 38).

Though the literal translation of *millet* is ‘nation’, it refers to peoples rather than the nation-state familiar to the post-19th century world. The empire encompassed as many as 60 ethnic and linguistic groups in its golden years (Karpat, 1974: 2), but the law did not recognize notions of ethnicity. Instead, the institution of *millet* was used, and it referred to each religious group within the empire. Jews, for example, constituted a separate *millet*, as well as Catholic Christians and the Orthodox Christians (McCarthy, 1997: 128). Dawn Chatty explains the concept of *millet* and how it played out among Muslims:

> A Muslim, of any ethnic background, enjoyed precisely the same rights and privileges as any other Muslim. The various sects of Islam such as Shi’a, Alawi, and Yazidi had no official status and were all considered being part of the Muslim millet (Chatty, 2013: 40).

As central as Islam was to Ottoman rule, the Ottoman state was nevertheless known for the relatively pluralistic environment it fostered toward its non-Muslim subjects in an era of widespread intolerance (McCarthy, 1997: 127). Though Muslims were certainly superior in terms of acquiring job positions at state-ruled institutions and in the eyes of the law, religious

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10 A legal order developed by Islamic scholars in reading with the Qur’an, and prophet Muhammad’s words and experiences.
belief was a matter of individual choice. The importance given to tolerance in society can be considered a product of Turkish forms of Islamic practice. Turks are highly influenced by Sufism, or mystical Islam. In Sufi practice, Muslims are enjoined to work on their heart as a way of getting closer to the Divine (Baldick, 2012: 44). Sufism teaches the merit of having a harmonious system which promoted respect to other faiths in society (Begum and Awan, 2015: 23). In many ways, Sufi practice lies in contrast to other powerful branches of Islam such as Wahhabism, which developed in 18th century Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism is highly focused on outward form and practice rather than inner spiritual life. It also rejects the doctrine of Sufism, and approaches it as a practice of infidels (Armstrong, 2014: 26).11

Ottomans experienced a golden age after the acquisition of Istanbul in 1453. Istanbul was of great importance for the umma because Prophet Muhammad is believed to have said that the city would be conquered by Muslims. The conquest signified a success both embraced by the Turks and the world of Islam in general as a validation of Muhammad’s prophecy. By this time, Ottomans were acknowledged as the leaders of the umma. The years 1516 and 1517 solidified Ottomans’ leadership as they defeated the Mamluks, acquiring Egypt and laying claim to the Caliphate (Deringil, 1991: 346). By defeating the Mamluks, the Ottomans also acquired Syria. These years, therefore, also signify Turks’ first interaction with Syrians under the Ottoman Empire. Turkish history depicts those days as peaceful, with significant respect paid to the Arabs as the people who were given the holy book of Muslims, the Quran. Kathleen Reedy’s findings in her 2010 study reveal that Syrians do not necessarily romanticize those days as a result of the

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11 Many of the violent self-proclaimed religious fighters of the 21st century - like ISIS - have roots in Wahhabism (see Armstrong, 2014).
autocratic nature of the Ottoman rule, while also pointing to the relative unity and harmony of that period:

The Ottoman era was also described by my informants as “400 years of oppression.” However, these negative descriptions were meant to characterize the rulers rather than the general populace, which was portrayed instead as unified and peaceful. (Reedy, 2010: 94)

Beginning with a failed siege of Vienna in 1683, growing disorder in the army and rising nationalism eventually precipitated the weakening of the Ottoman empire. Secession of non-Muslim nations from the Ottoman Empire began with the Greeks (1829) and continued with the Serbs (1877), resulting in a loss of Ottoman influence in Europe (McCarthy, 1997: 337). In a major shift from the Ottoman golden age, the country now associated non-Muslims with the curse of disintegration. Eventually, a strong focus on the umma to bring back the years of success prevailed. However, the nationalistic wave hit the Arabs, too. With Arabia separating from the Ottomans in the 20th century, the hopes of umma unification reached a dead-end.

**Turkish Nationalism**

The heavy defeat of World War I brought and jeopardized Turkish rule even on the relatively circumscribed territory remaining under their control, and brought the 600-year reign of Ottoman supremacy to an end. The Ottomans were compelled to accept the conditions of a punitive treaty by the Allies, the Treaty of Sevres, which mandated the dismemberment of the empire. Provisions of the treaty stipulated that the control over the majority of Ottoman land would be transferred to English, Greek, Armenian, Italian and French control (McCarthy, 1997: 374). The Ottoman sultan at the time, Mehmed VI (rule between 1918-1922) sent a committee to Paris to sign the treaty against the objections of the Turkish public, leading protesters to organize
militarily (McCarthy, 1997: 376). As a result, Kuvay-i Milliye (The National Salvation Army) was established on a wave of heated Turkish nationalism. The Salvation War started by this army soon gained success under its commander Mustafa Kemal, who later assumed the name Ataturk - father of the Turks. The war changed Turks’ fundamental markers of identity, as explained by historian Justin McCarthy:

Turks themselves had changed in the wars. They now identified themselves as Turks. Through the Ottoman centuries the Turks had been the mainstay of a great empire. The Ottoman Empire long had been called ‘Turkey’ in the West, and the sultans were indeed proud of their Turkish nomadic ancestors, but the Ottomans never identified themselves as a Turkish empire. They were an Islamic Empire, the last in a succession of great Muslim empires that had begun with the Prophet Muhammad’s successors. (McCarthy, 1997: 388)

Ataturk became the founder of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. A number of reformations followed the establishment of the country, starting with the abolition of the sultanate and caliphate; an end to the leadership status Turks had held for centuries among Muslims; and finally, elimination of the phrase in the new constitution that had identified Islam as the state’s religion. In its place, a new article was added, which stated that the Republic of Turkey was a laicist country. In the French-imported laicist order, religion cannot influence a state’s decisions and approach to its citizenry, but the state does possess control of the acts of religious institutions in order to safeguard the political regime (Kadioglu, 2010: 489). The country was thus founded on a widely diverging set of values compared to its antecedent. A form of Turkish nationalism that flared in the Empire’s final years was more dominant in government rule. The definition of a Turk was now in transition. Furthermore, in the eyes of the state, a Turk should have now be defined as a modern laicist individual.
The Turkish nation-state held an image of itself as freeing the dominant social group, the Turks, but this was not the case for ‘the other’. As revolutions heighten tensions between various social groups one’s revolution become another’s nightmare, particularly for the Kurds, and pious Turks in this case. The disappointment of the Kurds began when they were not ceded the land they had been promised as a result of their participation in the War of Salvation in alliance with Turks. Kurds, long-term native inhabitants of Anatolia, were also disappointed with Westernization movements happening at an extreme pace, for they strongly identified themselves as pious Muslims (Gunter, 2004: 199-200). Another group that was considered problematic for the state were the pious Turks who did not embrace the elimination of Islam as the state’s religion. Protests were staged by both groups which were suppressed by the state with extreme measures. One such measure included the establishment of Independence Tribunals, which gave enormous power to military personnel to judge and execute designated enemies of the new Turkish state (Barkey and Fuller, 1997: 63).

After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the country was ruled by Ataturk’s party, the Republican People’s Party, for 23 years. A shift to a multiparty policy did not take place due to intense protests and fears of a return to sharia law. The first free elections were held in 1950, when the winner was announced as Adnan Menderes and his Democrat Party. Adnan Menderes was interested in voicing the expectations of the pious. However, Menderes’ execution following a coup d’état in 1960 and a subsequent period of martial law defied a long-romanticized image of a stable democratic Turkey. The influence of the army affected every segment of society but laicists were allowed to possess power in the political arena because they represented the army’s values that it claimed to be protecting. Bloody clashes
among the left and right, and the establishment of an armed Marxist organization by the
long-oppressed Kurds, the PKK, further kept Turkey from reaching its democratic ideals. The
strong Ottoman idealization of Turkish Islamists today is highly linked to this period. In the
Ottoman Empire, expression of Islamic identity could be practiced with great liberty. Under the
Ottomans, Islam permeated and regulated daily life. Muslims were expected to perform
individual religious duties such as praying five times a day and fasting during Ramadan, along
with communal and political responsibilities like abiding by Islamic law in public behavior and
governance. Since Islamic law integrates all aspects of life - from religion to politics - freedom of
Islamic expression can be tied to an Islamic state under sharia law.

Another reason for the idealization of the empire is its association with political and
economic success. The nation-state of Turkey has never been as wealthy as the Ottoman Empire.
For Turkish Islamists, therefore, being subjects of a religious state signified an era of political
and financial glory as well as complete religious freedom. The Turkish nation-state has limited
religious freedom for the pious and excluded them from public life. For years the Islamists were
not allowed to be represented at the government level; their parties were closed, and their
participation in Turkish democracy was continuously interrupted.

The Islamic struggle in Turkey continued in the 1990s with perhaps the most Islamist
prime minister Turkey had ever seen, Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan had to step down due to army
pressure after only one year in office. One of his students Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the mayor at
the time, was jailed because he read a poem that compared religious values with those of the
army’s. After Erdogan served his jail time he founded a new Islamist party in 2001, and named it
the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party), or the AKP. The AKP was
elected as the ruling party for four successive elections. The party became not only the strongest Islamist party in the country, but the overall winner among all parties, Islamist and laicist. This victory was historic for shifting political power in Turkey from laicists to Islamists.

The incorporation of religion into national and political narratives has been tangible with AKP rule. Islam now enjoys increased importance and visibility in state and society; the manifestation of Muslim identity has reached its strongest position in the political sphere in the history of Turkey. Erdogan has often made references to controversial topics such as his dedication to raise a religious youth, as well as targeting laicist protesters and referring to them as ‘looters’ (The Independent, 2013). He also openly supported the idea of eliminating the position of the prime minister, voicing his willingness to become the first President of Turkey. With his explicit intent to switch into a one-man executive model, Erdogan’s rule has become increasingly autocratic. His actions have raised questions about Turkey’s return to an Ottoman age in which Muslim identity brought about a privileged position. The Syrian civil war was catalyzed in the same period when Turkish public suspicions over Erdogan and his party’s loyalty both to the laicist regime and the nation-state model were high. From the beginning of the crisis in Syria, Erdogan’s administration practiced an open-door policy toward Syrians fleeing as a result of the war. Erdogan also heavily criticized Syrian President Bashar al Assad for attacking his people, and started openly supporting - with arms and training - the Free Syrian Army opposition fighters (Reuters, 2015). The Turkish state became increasingly linked with Syrian refugees politically, because it was now militarily involved in the crisis. Turkey’s policy was not just a humanitarian mission to host the Syrians as a reaction to the war; it was also a consequence of Turkey’s implication in the conflict itself.
Erdogan’s opponents have linked his autocratic practices to his Islamist politics, and are suspicious of the political instrumentality of his welcoming messages to ‘Sunni Muslim brothers and sisters’ embodied by Syrian refugees. When asked why he had preferred involvement with the crisis, Erdogan referred to the Muslim Ottoman past, saying “Because we are a country established upon the remnants of the Great Country of Osman’s Dynasty. We are the grandsons of Seljuks and Ottomans” (Hurriyet, 2012).

As Erdogan continues to refer to a romanticized image of the Ottomans in the context of Syrian crisis, uncertainty has remained high over the AKP’s loyalty to the 92 year-old laicist nation-state model. Are the Islamists engaged in a project to resurrect the Ottoman religious state model that they have long idolized? Do the Islamist government and its supporters see the Syrian refugee crisis as an opportunity to generate a transformation in state tradition? The rhetoric of the Turkish government seems to support this hypothesis. State have spent millions out of the treasury responding to the needs of Syrian refugees. Erdogan consistently refers to Syrian refugees as the ‘Muslim brother’. According to Erdogan and his party, it is their religious duty inherited from the Ottoman past to make the ‘brother’ comfortable during his guesthood. In the first years, Turkey even rejected the UN offer for assistance in registering Syrians because the country saw the problem as related to its inner politics, which gave Turkey a reason to avoid international intervention or meddling (T24, 2013). This thesis argues, however, that the practices of the Turkish government has signaled its commitment to nationalism, and the nation-state.
The Syrian Refugee Crisis

Before the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, Turkey had not been a traditional destination for fleeing populations but, rather, a migrant-sending country into Europe (Alimia, 2014: 159). The last four years have brought Turkey the biggest refugee flow in its 92 year history; it now hosts the greatest number of refugees worldwide with its Syrian population of 2.2 million. UNHCR statistics (Table 1) illustrate the small number of refugees and asylum seekers - 16,260 individuals - Turkey hosted in 2009, just before the conflict in Syria began.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons of concern</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Of whom assisted by UNHCR</th>
<th>Per cent female</th>
<th>Per cent under 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic Rep. of Iran</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum-seekers</td>
<td>Islamic Rep. of Iran</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless</td>
<td>Stateless persons</td>
<td>2,740</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others of concern</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees (refugees)</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>19,140</td>
<td>16,260</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Persons of Concern in Turkey 2009
Source: UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/4c08f2f69.html

Nevertheless, researchers have indicated that better planning for an influx of refugees does not necessarily come with greater experience. Countries like Jordan, Uganda, and Pakistan have hosted refugees numerous times, but their refugee regimes have remained relatively weak, particularly in regards to law and policy. These countries are reticent to include the refugee
population into their economic development strategies, and they have not come up with strong integration solutions (Hovil, 2007; Ward, 2014; Alimia, 2014). Inexperienced as it is, Turkey has not fully lived up to its potential, either. Though appreciation for the country’s leadership was expressed by nearly every one of the Syrian refugee participants of this study, Turkish engagement with the crisis has been problematic in many ways. Officials say Turkey has delivered $7.6 billion in aid to Syrian refugees (Al Jazeera, 2015). The amount is clearly generous for a country whose per capita GDP is less than one-quarter that of strong European states like Germany and France. However, sustainability of this major financial support is highly questionable. Reports reveal that much of that amount has been spent on state-of-the-art refugee camps that most of the refugees reject (Brookings Institution, 2013). It is also a matter of consideration that Turkey’s strict laws disallow permanent residence to its refugees; plans oriented towards the integration of refugees has not been of priority from the outset.

Turkish impediments to affording full refugee rights begin with the country’s relationship to international refugee law. Turkey became signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which specifically dealt with the plight of European refugees from World War II (UNHCR, 2010). In 1967, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees designed to eliminate the geographic and temporal constraints of the 1951 Convention was put in force (UNHCR, 2010). Although Turkey ratified the 1967 Protocol, it retained the geographical limitation that it would only accept refugees from Europe. Turkey has integrated international refugee law on non-refoulement into state law (Law on Foreigners and International Protection,

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12 Turkey’s GDP per capita between the years 2011 and 2015 is reported to be $10,529.6; whereas that of France is $42,732.6, and of Germany is $47,627.4. “GDP per capita (current USS)”, World Bank, accessed November 3, 2015. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
13 Not sending any persons to countries where they are going to be persecuted
2014), but the geographical limitation it retained requires that someone of non-European origin cannot stay permanently in Turkey. In this case, persons with legitimate refugee claim would be transferred to the UNHCR for third-country resettlement.

Syrians in Turkey who arrived as a result of the Syrian civil war are referred to as ‘refugees’ in this thesis, but as persons of non-European origin these individuals are classified only as misafirler (guests) or siginmacilar (asylees) under temporary protection in Turkish law. The lack of the legal refugee designation entails a lack of rights, and therefore is extremely problematic. Persons granted refugee status have internationally-recognized rights including the right to cross an international border without documentation while seeking protection, right to work, housing, education, public relief and assistance, fair trial, freedom of movement, and the issuance of identity and travel documents (UNHCR, 2011). Syrians in Turkey are not granted these rights, and often have their rights violated on a daily-basis. One of the consequences of this policy, for example, is that Syrians are compelled to seek work in the informal economy, which is unregulated and in which they have no rights or protections.

Establishing camps has been the model Turkey focused on in its refugee response. The 24 camps built by the Turkish government are unlike standard refugee camps around the world. The Brookings Institute writes of the surprising capacity of camps:

Camps were designed to have primary and secondary education facilities, health clinics, supermarkets, playgrounds for children and laundry rooms. Refugees were given refrigerators and heaters along with hot water. Some even had televisions and air conditioners. (Brookings Institute, 2013)

Turkish reception of Syrian refugees has demonstrated the government is influenced by the history and religion Syrians shared with Turks in its welcoming rhetoric and open-door policy. Its practice, however, has suggested its commitment to the nation-state ideals that exclude
social groups considered to be rooted somewhere else. Irrespective of the conditions within, 90% of Syrian refugees in Turkey have chosen self-settlement mainly in urban areas, rejecting the camp option. The Turkish case, therefore, has indicated that restriction of movement, isolation and a passive life within render camps uninhabitable. The policy of building camps for refugees belies an endeavor to keep Turkish cities sterile or pure. Although Syrian refugees are referred to as ‘Muslim brothers and sisters’, the shared past and religion is not considered sufficient to render refugees free from the ‘threat’ that is associated with such a designation.

No matter how comfortable or enriched the camp facilities may be, camps are places of control. In the Turkish model, too, the character of a refugee camp remain unchanged. Movement in camps is extremely restricted: leaving and entering the camp is only possible during certain hours. Keeping order inside the camp is of extreme priority; Turkish soldiers and security personnel are constantly involved in the every-day life of a camp-settler. Eager refugee men and women are given professional training, but even the easiest jobs in the camps are outsourced and not allowed to be executed by refugees, so no chance of self-sustainment is rewarded to camp-settlers (UNHCR, 2013). In Diken’s terms, the Syrian in the case of Turkey has become the “outsider in the inside” (Diken, 2004: 88). The fact that Syrian refugees are pacified and confined to camps - rather than being used as a political tool to increase the Islamist population in the country and eventually setting the stage for a comeback of an Ottoman state model - illustrates that even the Islamists are invested in a Turkish nation-state project, rather than a universalizing a Muslim state.

The fact that Turkey is not transforming into an Ottoman state culture started to reveal itself as the crisis turned into a protracted one. After ISIS expanded its actions, the number of
Syrians at the Turkish border reached millions and Turkey was caught off-guard. Turkey moved from a rejection of international help to address the problem internally, towards criticism of world leaders for not giving enough support and leaving Turkey alone in this now-global-problem. This change in rhetoric demonstrates that Turkey had viewed the crisis as temporary, and had not calculated for a resistant or durable Assad, nor an expanding ISIS threat. Turkey has not changed the geographical limitation that prevented it from accepting Syrians as legally-designated refugees. In this way it has forced Syrians into an informal economy where Syrians themselves complain because their rights are many times violated, and Turks complain because Syrians tend to yield to lower salaries and ‘steal’ jobs.

Fieldwork in Şanlıurfa

Şanlıurfa is a small city in southeastern Turkey that shares a border with Syria. Referred to as ‘Urfa’ by the locals, the city has shouldered a great density of the Syrian population in Turkey due to its geographic location (Map 1). Many Syrians, in fact, have been able to walk to Urfa. The climate is very similar to bordering Syrian cities, and there are a great number of Arab speakers in the city. In the Ottoman era, Urfa was included within the larger province of Aleppo; it has historically hosted Arab-speaking populations. Urfa is not an industrial city, nor is it characterized by many employment opportunities. Turkish Statistical Institute has found that the employees in the larger region where Urfa is located (Diyarbakir-Urfa) represent only 1.77% of

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A total of 20 interviews were conducted with Syrian refugees in Urfa through an Arabic interpreter. The participants of this study were of diverse backgrounds: some were Kurdish and hardly spoke any Arabic, but proudly identified themselves as ‘Syrian’. Others were highly educated and had completed master’s degrees, while others had completed little formal schooling. Male participants were more dominant in this study because if a house included a male figure, he would be informally nominated by the family to answer the interview questions - an expression of Middle Eastern gender norms and patriarchal social structure. Among the 20 participants, only four were women, each of whom had experienced a major shift in her economic status. Karen Jacobsen theorizes this change of role as a widely-experienced phenomenon:

Crisis situations can lead to the remaking of roles and opportunities for affected communities. For women, in particular, their efforts to survive mean they engage in trade and other economic activities that give them more control, autonomy and status at both the household and community level (Jacobsen, 2002).
Being productive members of the household, for Syrian men and women in Turkey, is most of the time not possible in refugee camps. Professional and commercial activity is open for those who choose to self-settle. This type of settlement is risky because material goods and services are not regularly provided by the state or international organizations, therefore self-settled refugees face different challenges than those living in camps. High rents, host community hostility, and a competitive job market are challenges peculiar to the city-life of a self-settled urban refugee. On the other hand, the city is often perceived as the only way to ‘be alive’ again by urban refugee dwellers. Camps are seen as stagnant, delaying life in the hopes of repatriation. Self-settlement, on the other hand, is seen as a way of engaging oneself with everyday concerns like work and continuing education; acting instead of waiting. Self-settlement thus represents an opportunity and a risk. 45 year-old Abdul Hakeem Aziz\textsuperscript{16} has found kinship networks as the determining factor in the urban settlement. “There are two types of people at the Syrian border of Turkey. Those who have relatives and those who don’t. The ones who don’t, go to camps,” he said, revealing that camps are places that refugees settle in by mandate or lack of alternatives. Interview responses support the above anecdote, as ‘Having relatives in Urfa’ was the top reason given for self-settlement, tied with ‘Wanted to have a job/ education’ (Table 2).

\textsuperscript{16} All of the names of the participants have been changed due to security concerns.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for self-settlement</th>
<th>Number of people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Having relatives</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanted to have a job/education</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard bad things about camps</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a good financial status</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health-related reasons</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finding camps honor-staining</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. “Why self-settle?”

Syrian refugees in Turkey do not perceive settlement in camps as oriented towards leading a normal life, but rather a response to the desperation of some refugees who are not fortunate enough to have local or family connections, or the financial means to settle in urban areas. Camp structures are places where only the extremely vulnerable go because of the urgency of their particular situation. Syrian refugees are thus internally divided between those who are circumscribed in camps, and those who are not.

Fieldwork conducted in Şanlıurfa during the summer of 2015 has demonstrated that Turkey exhibits many features of what this thesis identifies as the international refugee host complex. Around the world, refugee and host community relations exhibit a common set of patterns informed by social, economic and political structures. Three critical issues are highlighted by the international refugee host complex: abuse, exclusion, and assumptions. This
thesis will explain how each of these phenomena characterized by a set of failures play out in the case of Turkey.

Abuse

The Turkish government has not openly discouraged Syrian refugees from settling in urban areas. It has, however, failed to enforce a working urban policy for the two million self-settled refugees. This study has found high levels of disappointment among Syrians grounded in the lack of a strong legal structure regulating the lives they pursue in the city. One of the main problems of not having a clear national policy is selective obscurity for some refugees but not others. For example, this thesis has found incredibly vague policies surrounding the taxation system for refugees. Out of the 20 Syrians interviewed in Urfa, a full half (10) were business owners. Seven of these stated that the state had not asked them to pay taxes, and that they had not come across any legal or bureaucratic difficulties while starting their respective businesses. On the other hand, three Syrian business owners claimed that they were paying taxes, and the burden was too heavy to shoulder. An essential difference between the business owners that paid taxes from those that did not was the touristic location of the enterprises. It can be inferred that the government only taxes the visible, either to avoid negative reactions from surrounding Turkish business owners, or it assumes that refugees running shops in downtown areas are financially privileged and capable of paying taxes. With no Turkish speakers employed, and no Turkish signboards in sight, Syrian businesses in commercial areas operate for a restricted target audience and pay high rents for their central location. They must also compete
with their established Turkish counterparts. 34 year-old participant Ibrahim Ahmad Hamadi who ran a dessert shop in downtown Urfa was frustrated with inconsistent taxation policies for Syrians:

We heard that Syrians would not pay taxes before we opened this shop but then we saw that we were responsible for going through each procedure a Turkish citizen does… When we came here from Syria, we transitioned from a faster death into a slower one. Only the air we breath is free, and even for that we are paying a heavy price with our worsening psychology.

This selective obscurity, exemplified by the taxation conundrum, causes other problems for Syrian employees, including time abuse and labor exploitation. During the fieldwork the research team observed a tendency of some local businessmen to request from their Syrian employees more work hours with much less pay. Since Syrian refugees are not granted work permits in Turkey, they enter the workforce as part of the informal economy, without legal or labor protections. Senay Ozden writes that this abuse sometimes happens at refugee camps, in front of the eyes of government officials:

Many Syrians state that farm and factory owners exploit Syrian workers due to their vulnerable situation. They also claim that employers prefer to employ Syrians over local workers since they are cheaper. This view has credibility as one of the factory owners I interviewed said: “Thanks to Bashar al-Assad, we now have cheap labor.” Not only are the Turkish authorities not taking any precautions against the exploitation of refugee labor, they are actually indirectly encouraging it. Even though initially Islahiye camp residents were not allowed to leave the camp, once the red pepper season approached, they were allowed to stay outside the camp from 9am to 5pm. Early in the morning, there are hundreds if not thousands of Syrians standing in front of the camp, waiting to be picked to go to work in farms and factories (Ozden, 2013: 8).

The data this research collected in the summer of 2015 were in line with what Ozden found in her 2013 study. The most commonly given answer to the question ‘What are the difficulties of city-life?’ was job-related. Eight participants said that the biggest challenge they faced in Turkey was ‘severe underpayment,’ as well as finding a job and keeping it. One
example was provided by Fatima Adeen, a 32 year-old Syrian woman with 7 kids. Her economic status sharply changed when she became expected to provide for her family as a result of the war. She worked next to a wood-fired kiln for 12 hours a day, including weekends. Her salary was not hourly but rather 25 TL per day (approximately 8 USD).\footnote{The hunger threshold in Turkey is 1,334 TL for a family of four. \textquotedblleft Kasım 2012 Açlık ve Yoksulluk Sınırı (November 2015 Hunger and Poverty Threshold)", Turkiye Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions), accessed December 26, 2015, http://www.turkis.org.tr/KASIM-2015-ACLIK-ve-YOKSULLUK-SINIRI-d878} “We endure this so that our children won’t have anything lacking” she stated. Another example was given by 21 year-old Ayman Majid. He said his brother had once worked for a week but found that the 25 TL daily wage promised by the employer turned out to be 25 TL for the entire week. Many of the Syrian participants in this study verified significant wage inequalities in the Turkish labor environment, some adding that even if Syrians accepted lower salaries, there were also businesses which would not hire any Syrian, simply due to discrimination.

Conceptions of Syrian identity in Turkey have thus mutated from one of ‘Muslim sister/brother’ into a pathologizing ‘disorder’ especially in cities with an overwhelming number of Syrians. During the fieldwork, as the researcher team took notes of ethnographic observations, a Turkish businessman was noted as saying the number of drug dealers, prostitutes and trouble-makers in general increased since the arrival of Syrians. His personal experience was found to be legitimating his frustration. He said at first he opened his house to a group of Syrians, but they acted disrespectfully by contaminating his house and secretly using it for engagement in illegal activities. While the corroborations of this experience transgresses the purpose of this thesis, it should be considered that local tradesmen complaining about the wrong-doings of Syrians is commonplace. Ozden’s fieldwork, however, has found that almost all
of these based their stories not on personal experience but on what they heard from others (Ozden, 2013: 11).

Counterintuitively, a similar pattern of variable wages was being implemented by certain Syrian businessmen. Restaurant owner Jamal Qodrat Fahim had four Turkish men, along with many other Syrians, working for his business. When he was asked if the salaries of Turkish and Syrian employees were the same, he said he would pay 35 TL a day for his Turkish employees and 25 TL for Syrians. He justified this unequal distribution by saying “This is the land of the Turks; their share should be bigger.” Thus, establishing rootedness in a certain territory was given equal importance by Turks and Syrians, and used as a way to legitimize superiority for the dominant class, and exclusion for the other.

The abuse of Syrian refugees was not solely encountered in the workplace. Three participants in this study indicated that pricing varied for food stamps provided by the government at the point of refugee registration. Dessert shop owner Ibrahim Ahmad Hamadi said: “They give you a 90 lira shopping card but as soon as the merchant sees that you hold that card he doubles the price of the thing you’re buying.” His experience, was echoed by two female participants, and points to the lack of regulation in the urban life of a refugee.

Assumptions

Although all of the participants were well aware of the rights that refugee status entailed, and although all accepted that there was hostility from some segments of the Turkish public, Syrians were found to be appreciative of Turkish efforts. Two Syrian interviewees used the exact
phrase of “We do empathize with the Turks,” while evaluating the tense environment between locals and Syrians. The majority also pointed out that they felt their overall experience in Turkey as positive. Their evaluation - almost always - included a comparison of Turkey with Arabic states, especially Jordan and Lebanon, both of which they found extremely disappointing in responding to the crisis. The number of false assumptions shaping the local opinion on Syrian identity and behavior, however, was extremely high. Every single Syrian refugee participant of this study pointed out to a shift in attitude towards them and the public’s departure from facts to assumptions. 45 year-old Abdul Hakeem Aziz explained the reaction to Syrians switched from a brotherly approach into a condescending one:

Before, when the number of Syrians in Turkey was relatively lower, Turks would look at us in a merciful way and help more. In general the Turkish public is an eager-to-help public. However, there is more tension compared to past.

Another element commonly found in the statements of Syrians self-settling in the urban areas of Urfa was the lack of access to relief operations and provisions, primarily as a result of false assumptions surrounding the status of various Syrian refugees. Two Syrian participants stated that they were interested in receiving aid and completed aid applications at Danish, German, Japanese and American organizations within the city. 50 year-old Safa Said expressed that he was rejected by the organizations because his area of settlement was among the neighborhoods listed as ‘rich’. He was frustrated to be residing in an area where all residents were assumed to be wealthy, adding that his home was provided by a relative. Abdul Hakeem Aziz also stated that he was not considered eligible for aid because he wasn’t living in downtown, so he was triaged as not in need of urgent attention. Ibrahim Ahmad Hamadi had a
similar experience; he described what he saw as the superficiality of aid policies by underlining that he needed help but could not get any because he runs a shop:

Whenever there is aid to be delivered some Turks come, say ‘You have a shop,’ and then they leave. They never ask if there is a family behind me that I need to support. What should I do, then, beg in the streets?

He also said relief organizations had a strange bureaucratic procedure that is not proper-behaviour for handling an emergency situation:

There were two relief organizations, one was Danish and the other was a Turkish one called Support to Life. You go there, fill in an application and then they say “We are going to send this to Istanbul and then if they approve, we are going to help you.”

This superficiality and miscoordination was expressed by another Syrian participant who experienced the converse side of what other participants came across. He said he was constantly offered aid although he is a wealthy person. “They deliver aid without researching well,” he said. “Somehow aid reaches the rich but it won’t reach the poor.”

It was also not rare to overhear assumptions over the Syrian’s assumed ‘abuse’ of the support provided to them. Many Turks think that Syrians are here to stay, further manipulating the government’s resources and avoiding a self-sustaining life. However, 18 out of 20 Syrians spoken to in this project mentioned at least once how much they wanted to go home. They asked for prayers, and answered the question ‘What is your expectation from international or national organizations’ with “Help us go back home”. Six participants used the exact phrase “There is no place better than home.”
Exclusion

Exclusion - either by verbal harassment and incivility, or discrimination from society - is the third major tendency of the international host community complex; and it is also found in the case of Turkey. The increasing association of Syrians with various forms of bad behaviour has led to scapegoating that affects how Turkish locals perceive and interact with Syrians. Though most of the Syrian participants of this study said they had only heard about such scapegoating, as the crisis turns into a protracted one the situation becomes more alarming. The camp strategy embraced by the government and the lack of a clear policy to integrate or regularize the life of urban refugees is indicative of the fact that even though the majority of Syrians are Sunni Muslim (as are Turks), the Syrian refugee community is not being used as a political tool by the dominant Turkish Islamist political party. All of the refugees participating into this study stated that they observed maltreatment against Syrians, even not personally experienced. Yet only three out of 20 Syrian participants said they experienced verbal abuse personally, such as being accused of ruining Turkey. One of the female participants, Asma Shaikh, who works as a teacher at the Syrian school said that the way Syrian women wear their hijab made them vulnerable targets of exclusionary behaviour:

When I’m on my way to work, people understand that I’m Syrian by the way I put on my headscarf. Sometimes when I pass by, I see them clap their hands, shouting “Syrians, go back home.” Sometimes they throw stones into the classroom. Kids get scared, trying to hide because they think it is a bomb.

It is also noteworthy that some Syrian participants associated acts of societal exclusion with Kurds, rather than Turks. Four out of twenty participants mentioned this in their statements.
26 year-old dentist Jalaluddin Malik stated that “Alawites and Kurds want to get rid of Syrians,” implying that exclusion was not coming from Turks but rather from other minority groups who were active in the Syrian conflict. 22 year-old former student Hisham Abdullah thought that Kurds were responsible for Syrian exclusion from society, basing his argument on misinformation. He said he heard that the authorities of the Kurdish party Halklarin Demokratik Partisi (People’s’ Democratic Party), or the HDP, said they would ‘kick out’ the Syrians once they come to power. While this was a statement voiced publicly, it was actually from the leader of Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party), or the CHP, not a representative of the Kurdish party.\(^\text{18}\)

In general, the Turkish approach to the Syrian refugee crisis started with Turkish society’s positive approaches, but has become more negative with time. Turkey was lauded early on for creating ideal refugee camps. Refugee participants of this study, however, have not found Turkey to be an ideal host. A comparison of Turkey with European countries was commonplace in the rhetoric of participants. Almost all Syrian interviewees talked about Europe as the ideal destination. Ibrahim Ahmad Hamadi’s remarks explained why any refugee in Turkey would risk their life on a boat while trying to reach Europe:

> When we speak to our friends who have gone to Europe we hear that they are picked up at the airport in the most welcoming way, they are given monthly wages and a shelter. You never get to see people begging there! Here, when a Syrian is about to rent a place [property owners] double the amount and then ask for commission, deposit…

> 22 year-old Hisham Abdullah also had a freeing image of Europe. He said he would consider risking his life if the smugglers asked less money:

As a Syrian youngster I would love to go to the US or France for my education. But because we are Syrian they see us as pro-ISIS there. You can’t go to the US even if you wanted to… You’re a terrorist! France, Germany, Denmark… these are all nice places but you can only go there illegally. If you want to go the trafficker ask 10,000 EUR and you risk your life. You put your life at risk trying to go there by water. Hard stuff! If the traffickers wanted less money like 3,000 EUR maybe I’d work here for one year and save up. I would risk my life to save my future. But when they ask for 10 thousand… I would need to work here for years and years to save that much.

Just as Ibrahim Ahmad Hamadi and Hisham Abdullah were, almost all refugee participants of this study were knowledgeable of what it meant to be a refugee, and the rights coming along with it. Turkey takes pride in its first class refugee camps, but the quality of refugee camps in the country becomes an irrelevant topic in the refugee question, since an overwhelming number of Syrian refugees live in urban and semi-urban areas. The rising number of Syrians taking the dangerous maritime way from Turkey to Europe - 600,000 people in 2015 - is a sufficient marker that Turkey’s hospitality and notions of guesthood are not sufficiently responsive to the urban refugee reality. Once a safe environment for the refugee, the country has now turned into a hub of false assumptions and acts of abuse and exclusion.

Survey Data

In order to conceptualize the public opinion on Syrian refugees, an online survey was conducted with Turkish citizens via SurveyMonkey in the summer of 2015. 164 responses were collected. The questions in the matrix-question-survey included the age and sex of the participant, their location, concerns about having Syrians in Turkey, security issues with the presence of Syrians, refugee camps, begging, effects on the Turkish economy, and on Turkey’s
laicism. The majority of the participants were comprised of young professionals; more than 40% were between 26-32 years old.

71.9% of those who took the survey said that they either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement ‘I think the civil war in Syria will end soon,’ revealing the likelihood that Syrians will stay in Turkey for a long time. In fact, the majority believed Syrians will not leave even if the conditions improved in Syria, 63% of survey participants said that they either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement ‘I think Syrians in Turkey will return their country when the war is over’. However, 18 out of 20 Syrians interviewed mentioned at least once how much they wanted to go home. They asked for prayers, and answered the question ‘What is your expectation from the international or national organizations’ with “Help us go back home”.

Apart from the presumption that Syrians will stay longer and not leave when the war is over, most of the responses collected indicate to differentiating thoughts Turks have about Syrians. Data illustrates that the number of the government’s open-door policy supporters are almost as many as those who are not in favor of the policy. The responses reveal that 69 people taking the survey agreed or strongly agreed with the statement ‘I find the open-door policy adopted by the government towards Syrian refugees right.’ The number of those who disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, on the other hand, was 70. The difficulty of inferring a dominant opinion of Turks on Syrians was also demonstrated by other questions in the survey. The statement that was included in order to measure whether the majority of Turks felt that begging was a Syrian refugee problem in Turkey, for example, is a case in point. Those who agreed with the statement (65) was very close to the number of those who did not (79).
One of the purposes of the survey was investigating whether political affiliation influenced Turks’ patterns of thought on the Syrian issue. The answers of chosen statements were, therefore, analyzed according to the party the participants voted for in the national elections held in June 2015. Two parties were taken into consideration in this matter, the AKP as the representative party of the country’s right-wingers and the CHP as the representative of left-wingers. The survey found a positive relation between political affiliation and public’s thoughts on Syrians. 64% of the AKP supporters that took the survey said that they were not concerned with the presence of refugees; whereas the ratio was the opposite for the supporters of the laicist party. As many as 86% of CHP voters agreed or strongly agreed with the statement ‘I am concerned about having Syrian refugees in Turkey.’

Political affiliation also played a role in the safety concerns of Turks as a result of hosting Syrian refugees. 60% of CHP participants of the survey said they felt insecure at the presence of Syrian refugees; whereas the AKP supporters did not agree with the sentiment. 64% of the AKP voters said they disagreed with the statement ‘I feel insecure at the presence of Syrian refugees.’ The majority of CHP voters also said Syrians should go back to their country immediately, where only a minority of AKP supporters shared this opinion (Table 3).
AKP and CHP supporters also had a disagreement over the inclusion of Syrians in the efforts of developing the Turkish economy. 44% of the AKP supporters said they either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement ‘I believe that Syrian refugees will contribute to the Turkish economy in the long term’, whereas the ratio was only 10% for CHP supporters. One of the few points where the two polarized groups agreed on was the refugee camps. The majority of both AKP (64%) and CHP (80%) supporters said they agreed with the statement ‘Syrians should live in camps’; so both wanted Syrians excluded (Table 4).
The Islamist and laicist in Turkey have traditionally opposed each other in the social and political arena as an expression of ideology and identity. Responses collected in the survey demonstrate that political affiliation shapes public opinion towards Turkey’s Syrian refugees. A particularly interesting result of the survey is illustrating that supporters of AKP and CHP agree on the use of refugee camps as an appropriate policy to deal with Syrian refugees in Turkey. Although Islamists did not feel insecure in the presence of Syrians, or believe that the open-door policy was correct, they were surprisingly in favor of Syrians’ isolation in camps. It can therefore
be argued that the religious duty of accepting the ‘guest’ is still of importance, but Turks in general are no more likely to hold positive views of Syrians.

**Limitations**

This study does not claim to be a complete representation of the thoughts and opinions of all Turks or Syrians in Turkey. The crisis is an on-going one at the time of the writing of this thesis. Turkey can therefore be the stage of a major change than what this study argues, or transgress the expectations of the argument presented here. The interview process and the survey was conducted with many challenges emerging, the biggest of which was the dependence of an interpreter during the interviews. Out of 20 Syrian refugee participants to the study only one spoke English and was able to communicate directly with the researcher. Most of the time, the location was not eligible to take notes, so the interpreter had to consecutively interpret the conversations where the main objective was transferring the main message rather than going too much into detail. This field study also had Syrians with Kurdish origins as participants. Two of the Kurdish Syrian participants needed one of their relatives to interpret for the Arabic-Turkish interpreter, turning the research environment into a multilingual one. As a notarized translator, the researcher translated the interviews from Turkish to English once the tape-recording procedure was complete, which further increased the potential meanings lost each time a language was interpreted or translated into other languages used in this study, Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish and English.
Throughout the fieldwork, one of the biggest challenges that limited the data collection was maintaining privacy. The locals, especially the ones who helped the researcher team of two spot the locations of self-settled Syrian refugees did not want to leave during the interview procedure. The local interest to the study was very high, a lot of times it was impossible to have an environment free from a local who wanted to hear what Syrians were going to say and contribute to the research with their idea. Though locals were only present when the interviewees had granted them permission, it can be presumed that lack of complete privacy had an effect on the participant’s answers, perhaps forcing the participant to self-censor.

One of the objectives of the study was contacting with refugees who previously lived in a refugee camp in Turkey in order to hear more about the conditions of the camps. However, the research team did not find anyone who lived in camps before. Three of the participants did say they never thought of living in the camps because they heard ‘bad things about them’ and asked not to share more information. This can be interpreted as a safety issue for them.

The data this study has collected is also based on an online survey created, the title being *Turkiye’nin Suriyeli Misafirleri Hakkinda Anket Calismasi* (Survey on Turkey’s Syrian Guests). The choice behind conducting an online survey via SurveyMonkey was related to an effort to avoid the negative effects of unfamiliarity in face to face surveys while asking sensitive questions like ‘What political party did you vote for in the last (June 2015) elections?’ However, the number of survey takers that answered the political affiliation question was also low; out of the 164 people that took the survey only 112 of them answered the election question that would disclose the political affiliation of the participants. Many people taking the survey expressed their frustration to the researcher for asking them to disclose their political affiliation, as well.
Conducting an online survey only allowed the researcher to reach the people within her circle, most of whom voted for the same party, came from similar backgrounds and similarly-opinionated families, with similar lifestyles that are not quite representative of all layers of Turkish society. It is possible to say that the results have been more representative of the educated and laicist Turkish classes than others.
Part Four: Conclusion

With the Middle East region a growing generator of instability and violence, relatively stabilized countries in the region have become major refugee hosts in the world. As a result of the civil war in Syria that broke out in 2011 Lebanon hosts over a million Syrian refugees today (UNHCR, 2015d); almost one in every four people in its borders is a Syrian refugee. Jordan hosts approximately 630,000 (UNHCR, 2015d), and almost one out of every ten people there, is a Syrian refugee. In Turkey, the number of Syrian refugees hosted has hit 2.2 million (Al Jazeera, 2015a). It is a matter of consideration that the overwhelming number of refugees arriving in these countries since the beginning of the war in 2011 is a disadvantage in devising efficient refugee response plans. As this thesis focuses on Turkey, it suggests that the $7.6 billion Turkey has spent for refugee crisis management, most of which has been used for building high capacity refugee camps, could have been directed to plans that regulate the urban life of a refugee. 90% of Syrian refugees have preferred self-settlement in urban and semi-urban areas, some for having a job and education, and some for finding refugee camps honor-staining. This study has found that the burden the refugee shoulders as a result of self-settlement in urban areas is extremely heavy due to the Turkish government’s vague policies and increasing local abuse. It has been found that, for example, there is a major taxation conundrum among refugees and locals. Seven of the Syrian business owners taking part in the semi-structured interviews that took place in Şanlıurfa stated that they were not asked to pay taxes by the state, and that they had not come across any legal or bureaucratic difficulties while starting their businesses. On the other
hand, three Syrian business owners said that they were paying taxes as much as Turks did, adding to their frustration for not being protected with affirmative action. The fieldwork has found that life was even more difficult for Syrians that did not own their own businesses. There is a growing informal economy based on the capital the Syrians provide; the daily payment of an illegal Syrian worker has converged at 25 TL. The price is lower than what Turks earn. With small allowances, Syrians try to cope with property owners that double the price of their home as soon as they find out their tenant will be Syrian, or merchants that increase the price when they find out that the customer holds government-provided food stamps, as the participants of the fieldwork have voiced. As these examples demonstrate, Turkish policy on the Syrian refugees becomes vague as soon as there is a departure from the camp environment. The Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority’s (AFAD) comprehensive fieldwork in 2013 has shown the failure of the government to provide refugees in urban areas with basic services. The study indicates to a major health disparity between refugees in camp and non-camp settings. The study suggests that as much as 90% of the male and 94% of the female refugees in camp settings have used medical facilities (AFAD, 2013). However, only 60% of the male and 58% of the female population that live in non-camp settings have accessed them (AFAD, 2013).

The fieldwork conducted in the summer of 2015 has explored an increasing level of hopelessness among Syrian refugees in southeastern Turkey, a type of hopelessness of not having a future neither in Syria due to the on-going war, nor in Turkey due to a lack of refugee designation, and the rights entailed in it. The appreciation level for Turkey’s actions was high among refugees, especially when they compare the discourse of the Turkish government with its

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19 The minimum monthly wage in Turkey is 1000 TL, approximately 350 USD
20 See “Part Three: The Case of Turkey”
counterparts in Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt. Their frustration, however, is inevitable with the knowledge of what it means to be a recognized refugee in Europe. This knowledge separates them from the Turkish community, members of whom voiced many concerns over ‘the guest being improper’ as a result of increasing level of subjective discrepancies.

The government of Turkey has welcomed refugees, referring to them as the ‘Muslim brother’. The welcoming rhetoric adopted towards the Syrian refugees by the Turkish government, especially by president Erdogan, has its roots in Islam. It got its strength, however, from a long tradition of Muslim isolation from the political and social life in Turkey. Turks’ rule saw a fast transformation from the Ottoman model of a Sunni Muslim state tradition into the establishment of Republic of Turkey, a laicist nation-state. The new state tradition and the values it was based on a Westernization program imposed top-down by the elite. It is difficult to address the top-down-imposition of democracy in Turkey as a flawed model, especially with the notorious examples set by the negative effects of communal movements in search of democracy in the Middle East. One thing is for sure, however, that the elite imposed a set of Westernizing revolutions with coercion. Such a policy has been the determining factor in the creation of two polarized groups in Turkish society, at the one end stands the Islamist, at the other the laicist. Segregating policies towards the Islamist was a reality, so was the protest of the Islamist with pure positive depiction of the Ottoman era in mind. 2002 represented a major change in this matter; now the romanticized image of the Ottoman era has been carried into the political sphere with the rule of the AKP. This meant an exposure of the Islamist and Ottoman ideals to all layers of society, including the other polarized end of the laicist. Ever-since the Islamists came to power in 2002, the fear of the laicist has been tangible. The fear is that the tight hold of the AKP
onto political power represented a comeback of the old Sunni Muslim state tradition, and the sharia law. This thesis argues that the Syrian crisis, and the government’s response to it should be regarded as a major tool to measure such hypothesis, the concern of the ‘comeback’. Turkey’s Islamist government has welcomed refugees but shown unwillingness to regulate their lives in the city as a way of promoting the life in camps. The results of the online survey conducted among Turks have demonstrated that the government’s policy was in line with public opinion. The majority of the online survey takers revealed their support of the camp model of housing the refugees, although refugees were acknowledged as long-term settlers.

With fuzzy policies, and a failure to address to increasing local hostility, there is growing evidence that Turkey cannot be a good host, at least from the lens of international laws. There has been a considerable number of refugees trying to depart from Turkey on dangerous maritime journeys. UNHCR statistics illustrate that within the first 10 months of 2015, 600,000 people have taken the smuggler route across the Aegean, and approximately 200 of those perished (UNHCR, 2015b). As a result of the death of many in the smuggler boats, many Syrian refugees in Turkey protested. Al Jazeera has reported that many Syrians with imaginings of rights in Europe tried taking a bus to Bulgaria, waiting for days in the terminal, but the ministry of interior did not issue a travel grant, and took them back to camps (Al Jazeera, 2015b). With such attempts, Syrians have revealed the deficiencies of Turkish management but Turks have not changed their policy. The geographic limitation that disallows Turkey from recognizing persons of non-European origin as refugees, for example, remains in the Refugee Protocol. Failing to reach the modern democratic ideals of the 21st century in its refugee response, Turkey also refrained from the actions of its Ottoman idol. Current party officials refer to the Ottoman glory
and see Turks as proud successors of the Ottomans, but such rhetoric has not made its way into practice in the case of Syrians.

The Ottoman way of internalizing the newcomer has not been the case in Turkey. Ottomans defined the citizen based on their religion; and the Muslim *millet* had superiority. However, the religion of Syrians has certainly not given them superior status in Turkey to the contrary. The Turkish government’s practice has been more oriented towards the ideals of a nation-state. According to Benedict Anderson the nation-state is based on the territorialization of an imagined community with shared language and history. The nation-state legitimizes the construction of an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’, the former being a member of the dominant class, and the latter being the other. In the case of Turkey, the Syrian has become the outsider the nation-state excludes; in Diken’s terms, ‘the outsider inside’ (Diken, 2004: 88).

The *de facto* strategy of the government in its response to the refugee crisis has been building refugee camps, a product of the nation-state in search of homogeneity. While perpetuating the power structure between the gift-giver and receiver (Harrell-Bond, 2002: 54), refugee camps are detrimental for the mental well-being of the residents. The AFAD agency has revealed that the refugees living in Turkish camps report to be more in need of psychological treatment services compared to urban refugees. As 50% of the male and 55% of the female refugee population who live in camps said that they would need psychological support, the rate was 46% for male and 49% for female refugees living in urban areas (AFAD, 2013).

The current refugee situation in Turkey is multifaceted. On one hand, the refugee has become living evidence of the effects of a history of polarization in Turkey. On the other, the refugee has shown Turks that Islamists were experiencing a change and leaning towards
nationalism rather than a worldwide umma. Such a change did not bring with it a transformation to modern laws, especially in the case of international refugee laws. The interviews with and actions of Syrians have demonstrated that Syrians are losing hope. Although this hopelessness is shown to the government and the public with increasing number of deaths in smuggler boats neither the officials nor Turkish society has taken action. The government has still not regulated the urban life of a refugee. The public has not stopped situating the Syrian issue within notions of guesthood, and it has kept on legitimizing the practice of putting refugees in camps. Turks have chosen to locate themselves somewhere in between Islam and modern state tradition, which is extremely blurry for the refugee.
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Appendix A

In the online survey created via SurveyMonkey, participants were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with the below-mentioned statements:

- I am concerned about having Syrian refugees in Turkey.
- I think practicing an open-door policy towards Syrians is a humanitarian mission.
- I find the open-door policy adopted by the government towards Syrian refugees right.
- I feel insecure at the presence of Syrian refugees.
- Syrians should live in camps.
- Syrians should stay in the southeastern provinces of Turkey.
- I think the government should spend more money to help Syrian refugees.
- Begging is a Syrian refugee problem.
- I think Syrians beg because they can’t find jobs.
- The government must act as soon as possible to prevent the practice of begging among Syrians.
- I think the civil war in Syria will end soon.
- I think Syrians in Turkey will return their country when the war is over.
- Syrians should go back to their country immediately.
- I believe the Syrian refugees in Turkey will start contributing to the Turkish economy soon
- I believe that Syrian refugees will contribute to the Turkish economy in the long-term.
- I think Syrian refugees are detrimental to Turkey's laicism.
- Which party did you vote for in the last elections?