Security Cooperation Poorly Defined

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Security Cooperation Poorly Defined

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In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master’s of Arts in International Studies

By
Nathan L. Fenell
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Security Cooperation Poorly Defined

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

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Nathan L. Fenell

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Under the guidance and approval of the committee, and approval by all the members, this thesis project has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree.

Approved

Professor Keally D. McBride  Date

Professor Anne Bartlett  Date

Professor Marcelo Camperi,  Date
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Abstract

Security cooperation is a vital component to the national security of the United States. Despite this fact, insufficient military or academic attention has been applied to the subject. The academic and professional void created by this inattention has led academic, journalistic, and military professionals to misuse the term security cooperation, and stray from its doctrinal description as defined by the Department of Defense Dictionary and Associated Military Terms. The academic rigor required to properly express the concept of security cooperation as a peace-time strategy has been absent from both the Department of Defense, and the Department of State, and has led executives from each department to attempt to redefine its strategic potential. The National Security Council, the Secretary of State and the Commanding General of Central Command have attempted to redefine security cooperation as a military strategy capable of supporting the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. The erroneous attempt by our strategic leadership to define security cooperation as a strategy necessary to extract the U.S. from its current wars, deviates from the doctrinal definition of security cooperation, and limits its chance of achieving success if and when it is properly defined and executed. A clear understanding, definition and implementation of the term security cooperation are essential to the development of a National Security Strategy and improve the potential benefits inherent in the successful implementation of this strategy.
**Security cooperation:** Security cooperation involves all [Department of Defense] interactions with foreign defense and security establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military and security capabilities for internal and external defense for and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to the [host nation]. Developmental actions enhance a host government’s willingness and ability to care for its people. Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations. [Geographic combatant commanders] shape their [areas of responsibility] through security cooperation activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. The [geographic combatant commander’s] security cooperation strategy provides a framework within which [combatant commanders] engage regional partners in cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, security cooperation activities lessen the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive US military intervention. ¹ [emphasis mine]

**Introduction**

Ten years after commencing military operations in Afghanistan, and seven years after then-President George W. Bush declared, “Mission accomplished!” from the flight deck of the USS Lincoln, the United States continues to engage Afghanistan in a long and costly military operation while simultaneously attempting to withdraw all of its military forces from the country of Iraq. Billions of dollars have been spent and thousands of lives have been lost during the Afghan conflict that, as yet, has no end in sight; and, in recent years, a complex and growing insurgency has threatened to destabilize reconstruction efforts, complicating efforts to craft a viable exit strategy.

At the conclusion of combat operations in Iraq, the United States military experienced significant domestic turmoil in and around the Sunni Triangle due to the disbanding of the Iraqi military and the “de-baathification” process that removed essentially all Baath Party officials loyal to Saddam Hussein. In the wake of massive unemployment that followed the purging of Baath Party loyalists an insurgency

movement formed and took root as a challenge to the United States occupation of Iraq.
In response to the growing insurgency, the U.S. military resurrected and re-purposed a
doctrine designed to combat insurgents and gave it the name COIN or counter-insurgency
doctrine. One of the key components to COIN is the civil-military relationship developed
between the host nation and the U.S.; this relationship was given the label Provincial
Reconstruction Teams and anointed as the process by which the United States would
transition civil authority to the newly developing Iraqi government and gracefully exit the
Iraq War. The strategy of employing Provincial Reconstruction Teams was also adopted
in Afghanistan as the means to achieve military success and set the stage for the United
States to withdraw from Afghanistan.

The self identified requirement of the United States to reconstruct both Iraq and
Afghanistan, after the conclusion of hostilities, as the precursor to the successful
withdraw of military forces, demanded a strategy capable of meeting these self-imposed
restrictions. The Bush Administration developed and employed a reconstruction plan that
used Provincial Reconstruction Teams as a bridge to re-establish the Iraqi and Afghan
infrastructure destroyed during the invasion and occupation of both countries.
Constitutional limitations prevented the re-election of President Bush and limited his
ability to follow through on the implementation of his reconstruction plans. President
Obama’s successful presidential election was in part linked to his promise of ending the
war in Iraq. As the newly elected leader of the U.S., President Obama had to distinguish
himself from the Bush Administration and one of the ways he did so was in the

The 2010 National Security Strategy adopted the philosophy of defensive liberalism
to define the way that the United States would attempt to influence international events. One of the strategies that President Obama articulated in this document was security cooperation; a strategy that was intended to rebuild the damaged infrastructure of a country, serve as the means to remove military forces from Iraq, and establish the conditions necessary to end military operations in Afghanistan. Unfortunately the use of security cooperation as a strategic tool for reconstruction that ultimately supports a military withdraw from post-conflict countries is in direct contradiction with its doctrinal definition. Security cooperation by definition is a strategic military tool intended to be used during times of peace in an effort to prevent future conflict. The faulty terminological use of security cooperation to described a U.S. exit strategy from the Iraq and Afghan wars created a false impression of what a strategy of security cooperation is capable of achieving.

Security cooperation is a compilation of financial, educational, and material resources, that at their foundation are supported by the United States, in particular the Department of Defense, and are used to support the peaceful development of democracies in foreign countries. The resources provided by the Department of Defense are available to foreign countries after the host nation requests the peaceful assistance of the U.S. military in response to systemic deficiencies in the bureaucratic management of a nation state or when a nation state recognizes that its military limitations prevent it from properly defending its geographic borders. The host nation’s request for support from the U.S. is typically an effort by the foreign country to develop its internal capacity to protect its people and limit internal or external threats. The security cooperation exercise Baltic Operation, held in Estonia, is an example of a foreign country using the resources
provided by the United States to improve its national defense capabilities in direct response to a perceived threat to its sovereign borders. In this scenario Estonia is attempting to develop its military capabilities and project an image of strength in an effort to maintain the freedom it earned, from Russia, at the conclusion of the Singing Revolution in 1992 and prevent a future Russian incursion across its borders. In contrast to this appropriate use and definition of security cooperation as a strategy to prevent conflict, the Obama Administration is using the term security cooperation as a way to define a national exit strategy from a two front war, a strategy that at its heart is based on the reconstruction of a damaged infrastructure. The false labeling of reconstruction operations as security cooperation is the foci of this thesis project.

Statement of the Problem

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) form the backbone of the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. PRTs are composed of U.S. military, U.S. State Department, and USAID officials who collaborate with local Afghan leaders to identify and initiate the most needed reconstruction projects at the provincial level. Current events and recent literature suggest, however, that policy-makers and military planners, alike, are struggling to distinguish between security cooperation and the role of the PRT. The failure to properly differentiate security cooperation from stability and reconstruction operations detracts from the capabilities of security cooperation and limits its capabilities as a tool to promote and maintain peace.\(^2\) A particularly concerning trend is the growing propensity of planners to conflate the post-hostilities reconstruction role of the PRT with the pre-

hostilities strategy of security cooperation (SC).³ In an effort to provide clarity on the subject, Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert England drafted a Department of Defense directive that defined security cooperation.

security cooperation. Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.⁴

The directive was published in order to establish a baseline understanding of security cooperation as a mission. A common understanding of Department of Defense expectations with regard to security cooperation ideally would help planners use the strategy in ways that are consistent with the official definition.

This is an issue that has garnered little attention from those whose job it is to employ the strategy of SC, primarily because those same planners are the ones perpetuating the mistake.⁵ The conflation of reconstruction efforts with SC is understandable given that both are strategic tools embedded into the medium of stability operations. Stability operations is an overarching term that spans the breadth of military operations used in peacetime security cooperation missions, crisis response activities, and

combat operations. Stability operations exist in a variety of forms. The chart below taken from Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, illustrates the variety of operational tasks included in stability operations.7

A broad spectrum of operational environments exists in Afghanistan, ranging from the relatively friendly provinces of Panjshir and Bamyan where the Taliban has historically been unwelcome to the Taliban dominated provinces of Helmand and Ghazni. Operational environments that are peaceful and stable like Panjshir and Bamyan could support security cooperation activities if the whole of Afghanistan were at peace. In a stable environment, it would be appropriate to use security cooperation activities that reinforce host nation security efforts to minimize Taliban influence in the region.

7 Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Operations, 36.
Provinces such as Helmand and Ghazni, however, where violent Taliban insurgencies continue to take American lives in large numbers, are operational environments that are not conducive to security cooperation and negate the use of SC as a viable strategy to quell the insurgency.  

Despite the difficulty of simultaneously managing a variety of strategies in the complex medium of stability operations, planners must guard against misunderstanding and misapplying military strategies. SC holds great potential as a tool of military diplomacy that can help to build trust in international relationships where trust has been at a deficit. Yet lack of understanding and misapplication of the term among policy makers and military planners threatens to reduce the effectiveness of security cooperation as a strategy which could potentially strengthen relationships between the United States and host nations, and reduce the possibility that the U.S. may be drawn into armed conflict.

China is questioning the value of Washington's plan to strengthen military cooperation with Australia and update its defense treaty with the Philippines. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin called for discussions about the boosting of American troop deployment in East Asia, questioning just how cooperation would benefit the international community.

In Beijing, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Liu Weimin expressed reservations about the measures. He questioned how the United States will justify the expense of its East Asia military expansion in the face of what he described as the sluggish global financial situation. He also questioned the benefits of such cooperation, saying any "outside interference" would affect the peace, stability and development that both Washington and Beijing say they want.

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It is, therefore, important to identify how the issues associated with the inconsistent and inappropriate applications of the term, security cooperation in the conflict in Afghanistan has raised concerns with potential adversaries such as China.

In summary, the problem that motivated this thesis is the recognition that there is confusion in the definition and recent application of security cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and concerns that the confusion will lead this valuable strategy to be dismissed before it is properly articulated. This problem will be addressed by describing a research based and effective application of security operations that supports host nation autonomy and minimizes the possibility of the United States being drawn into armed conflict.

**Background and Need for the Study**

The precise use of words by Department of Defense officials is critical to formulating and executing military strategy.\(^{11}\) When developing a plan of action, loosely defined military terms can affect planners’ abilities to properly understand the actual capabilities resident in a proposed course of action.\(^{12}\) In Afghanistan, the misapplication of the military term security cooperation fostered a climate that caused the Department of Defense and State to underestimate the significant role of SC in fostering the diplomatic relationships that contribute to international peace and stability.

As a major in the Marine Corps, I planned and participated in a security cooperation exercise with Estonia. It was important to the United States European

\(^{11}\) Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, *Joint Operation Planning*.

\(^{12}\) Ibid.
combatant commander and the commanding general Estonian Self Defense Force that communication with the media specifically addressed our operation as a security cooperation exercise. Eighteen countries participated in the exercise, to include the United States and Estonia, and sixteen other countries that are part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, this exercise, named BALTIC OPERATIONS, was not officially a NATO exercise.

This distinction between security cooperation exercise and NATO exercise may seem like nothing more than semantics. However, a misunderstanding of the semantic nuances had potential negative strategic consequences. Estonia shares a border with Russia and former Soviet military forces occupied Estonia prior to the 1991 Singing Revolution. Diplomatic tensions between Estonia and Russia remain tense, and Estonia is constantly defending its territorial waters in the Baltic Sea against Russian naval vessels. During the exercise a Russian frigate and a Russian submarine attempted to violate Estonia’s territorial water. In response, Estonia deployed a small portion of its Navy to block the Russian vessels and force a return to internationally recognized neutral waters shared by countries bordering the Baltic Sea. This level of international tension between Estonia and Russia is constant. If the participants of a security cooperation exercise were to describe the event as a NATO exercise, it would be interpreted by Russia as a signal that NATO forces, led by the United States, were rehearsing air, land, and sea strategies in the Baltic Sea that would support an amphibious assault against the Russian city of St. Petersburg. This instance and many others like it demonstrate that the improper use of military terminology can have unintended negative consequences.

According to the authors of a paper written for USAID, the reconstruction strategy
in Afghanistan, is often mislabeled as security cooperation, and designed to support the withdraw of United States military forces from Afghanistan. This example demonstrates the tendency to confuse Afghan reconstruction with SC. SC is a pre-hostilities strategy to effectively and peacefully resolve emerging problems prior to the eruption of violence and the need to commit U.S. forces to a contingency operation. This is contrasted with reconstruction, a term that describes aid provided during and after military conflict. This contrast highlights the need to protect the integrity of the SC and the importance of identifying operations where SC is confused. Indeed one of the basic assumptions under which I will proceed with this thesis is that SC, properly defined, occupies a critical role in the overall strategy to prevent the United States from entering into armed conflict rather than a strategy employed after hostilities have commenced.

Military doctrine, national strategy, and specialized dictionaries for military professionals and government policy makers, present a precise definition of and specific criteria for the strategic application of security cooperation. Yet a review of case studies by organizations like the United States Agency for International Development and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs that focus on Provincial

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Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, demonstrates that the current application of security cooperation is inconsistent with its doctrinal definition. Moreover, my professional military experience with the doctrinal application of security cooperation and Provincial Reconstruction Teams provides a first hand account that reinforces the observation that doctrinal definition and contemporary practical application of Security cooperation are inconsistent.

The literature review will establish the premise that security cooperation as an academic area of study receives little attention. The paucity of literature on the subject contributes to the current misunderstanding of the definition as well as its improper strategic utilization. Authors who participate in scholarly conversation on the topic fall into one of two categories, doctrinal use or modern misconception. The contradictory nature of the literature further supports my hypothesis that the definition of security cooperation is frequently not applied in Afghanistan.

The history of security cooperation provides an unambiguous storyboard that details the inception and proper application of the foreign relations strategy. Current events in Afghanistan and elsewhere appear to reflect a distorted image of historical precedent for security cooperation. However, the evidence will show this distortion not only to be the fault of a poor understanding and application of security cooperation by

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planners, but also to be the fault of United States foreign policy that compounds the problem of achieving clarity because it confounds the doctrinal definition and implementation of security cooperation.\(^{19}\)

Indeed, actions taken by the Department of Defense in an effort to shorten the duration of the war in Afghanistan, coupled with foreign policy statements made by the Secretary of State, demonstrate the extent to which misunderstanding and a misapplication of the term has permeated the vested departments of the government. I will attempt to illustrate how far the Department of Defense and State Department planners and policy makers have wandered from the precepts developed at the strategy’s inception by providing examples of case studies that depict an unvarnished execution of security cooperation strategy when it is properly centered on its seminal concepts.\(^{20}\)

Additionally, I will reinforce the critical concept that security cooperation was devised as a powerful tool meant to promote international peace and to prevent the necessity of the United States entering into armed conflict.

**Purpose of the Study**

Words have meaning and the unique ideas that are transmitted through the use of military vocabulary demand that the author and the orator communicate with specificity and clarity. In the case of security cooperation, my research indicates that military professionals, government officials, and academics appear to be equally guilty of failing to limit their use of the term to its correct context. Most egregiously, the term is being

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improperly used as an important element that describes the United States exit strategy from Afghanistan. An example of the recent comments made by the Secretary of State as she described the current state of affairs in Washington, D.C. and Afghanistan, that the State Department convened an interagency team, including DOD, USAID, and the NSC and held discussions that resulted in an agreement that included strong commitments on economic/social development, democratic institution-building, human rights, anti-corruption, and other important long-term reforms. Mrs. Secretary follows up on this statement by saying; “Ambassador Crocker and General Allen are still working through some of the security cooperation issues with President Karzai”. To place these comments into context, the Honorable Mrs. Clinton was incorrectly describing the peace process in Afghanistan and the withdraw of U.S. forces as security cooperation.

Doctrinally, security cooperation is unrelated to a military withdraw from a country at the conclusion of armed conflict. I was caught by surprise; therefore, to discover that despite the efforts of the Department of Defense to accurately articulate its professional lexicon via a dictionary of military terms and doctrine, basic concepts and their associated framework of action were being misused. Initially I thought that I was encountering isolated instances of misuse, but further reading led me to believe that the

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misapplication of this particular term was widespread.25

What I perceived to be endemic failure in the correct use of vocabulary led me to question my own professional knowledge and personal experience with security cooperation. During my thirteen years in the Marine Corps I have often been involved in security cooperation operations. From 2002 to 2004 I lived in Okinawa, Japan where I participated in security cooperation exercise throughout the Japanese archipelago, Thailand, and Korea. In 2010, I was involved in security cooperation activities in Estonia and in 2008 I was involved in reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The commonality between all my experiences in the Asian Pacific, and my involvement in security cooperation in Europe, is that the United States was participating in a professional exchange of ideas and capabilities with stable countries during a time of peace for each country. Yet, the understanding I had of security cooperation as an active participant was not bearing out in the policy statements issued by the State Department and the United States Central Command; nor was it reflected in the National Security Strategy.26 My professional experiences placed the execution of security cooperation as a peacetime strategy whereas current policy and strategy were defining security cooperation as a means to exit Afghanistan.

The conflicting relationship between my professional experience with security cooperation and the contemporary conversation regarding security cooperation and a

26 Ibid.
successful exit strategy from Afghanistan were the seeds for a burgeoning cognitive dissonance. The purpose of this study is to identify how the term security cooperation is being applied to operations in Afghanistan as well as to assess the extent to which it is misunderstood. As a corollary to these questions, I will also discuss the specific definition of security cooperation and evaluate the doctrinal use of the term within the context of national strategies designed to promote national security.

**Research Hypotheses**

1. The doctrinal definition of security cooperation is being used as a synonym for reconstruction in the National Security Strategy.

2. The use of security cooperation as a synonym for reconstruction in Afghanistan has led to a common misconception of its strategic capabilities.

3. When security cooperation is appropriately applied outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, it will be perceived as a threat by outside observers because it is currently being used as a combative tool to quell a counter-insurgency and support a transition of authority in Afghanistan and Iraq.

**Theoretical Framework**

The philosophical underpinning of security studies is recognized by and informs the choices made by policy makers. Security studies provides a common theoretical framework that helps support the decisions necessary to develop the foreign policy and

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the strategic plans that employ security cooperation as a means to meet policy goals.\textsuperscript{28}

The National Security Strategy published by the current President of the United States and his National Security Council, elevates security cooperation to one of the primary means toward achieving U.S. security abroad.\textsuperscript{29}

Prevent the Emergence of Conflict: Our strategy goes beyond meeting the challenges of today, and includes preventing the challenges and seizing the opportunities of tomorrow. This requires investing now in the capable partners of the future; building today the capacity to strengthen the foundations of our common security, and modernizing our capabilities in order to ensure that we are agile in the face of change. We have already begun to reorient and strengthen our development agenda; to take stock of and enhance our capabilities; and to forge new and more effective means of applying the skills of our military, diplomats, and development experts. These kinds of measures will help us diminish military risk, act before crises and conflicts erupt, and ensure that governments are better able to serve their people.\textsuperscript{30}

The Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Military Strategy make the same statement that security cooperation is a critical component in achieving U.S. security abroad. The Quadrennial Defense Review and National Military Strategy state:

Build the Security Capacity of Partner States
Since the United States assumed the role of a leading security provider after the end of World War II, DoD has worked actively to build the defense capacity of allied and partner states. Doing so has also given the U.S. Armed Forces opportunities to train with and learn from their counterparts. These efforts further the U.S. objective of securing a peaceful and cooperative international order. Security cooperation activities include bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, foreign military sales (FMS) and financing (FMF), officer exchange programs, educational opportunities at professional military schools, technical exchanges, and efforts to assist foreign security forces in building competency and capacity. In today's complex and interdependent security environment, these dimensions of the U.S. defense strategy have never been more important. U.S. forces, therefore, will continue to treat the building of partners' security capacity as an increasingly important mission.\textsuperscript{31}

Our foremost priority is the security of the American people, our territory, and our way of life. In the current operational environment, this means each component of our Joint Force will remain aligned to achieve success in our ongoing campaign in Afghanistan and security cooperation efforts with Pakistan, and against violent extremism.

\textsuperscript{29} United States, \textit{The National Security Strategy of the United States of America}.
The U.S. military understands the actions needed to achieve strategic success using security cooperation as the means to preserve international security, but what is missing is a foreign policy that provides a consistent definition of security cooperation. The international security studies theories of realism and liberalism described below provide a framework to assist the decision making process of policy makers and can guide their development of a security strategy that consistently applies the doctrinal definition of security cooperation.

Realism and liberalism are major theoretical foundations that reach across the disciplines of international relations and international security studies. In this case, the term “theory” is a little misleading. The study of international relations and international security studies cannot support the development of a predictive policy that, if applied time and again would net the same result. Theory is best viewed as a philosophical framework that offers suggestions on how and why a particular foreign policy should be crafted. As philosophies that inform the development of foreign policy, realism and liberalism are reasonable points from which one can both anchor a discussion that is trying to bridge the gap between philosophy and strategy, as well as find the middle ground of policy development.

Realism centers on the use of power, a tenet central to the use of military

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35 Ibid.
organizations, and seeks to balance power in an effort to prevent or limit the actual use of force in order to maintain order.\textsuperscript{36} The doctrinal definition of security cooperation is centered on the military’s use of its non-violent power to influence the decisions of foreign countries in an effort to establish regional stability and security.\textsuperscript{37} Liberalism focuses on the pursuit of international security and peace through the exportation of ideology when viewed through the lens of proactive actions used by the military to achieve its goals.\textsuperscript{38} Peacetime goals that are achieved by partnering with foreign countries using security cooperation align with liberalism and its suggestion that cooperative relationships between countries is necessary to maintain international peace and stability.\textsuperscript{39} The security studies concepts of realism and liberalism provide two dominant theoretical narratives that challenge each other and paradoxically support the use of non-violent military operations to achieve international security. Realism and liberalism serve as the theoretical underpinning of this thesis project.

**Methodology**

The first course of action I took to verify that there is an emerging conflict between the definition and use of specific military terminology was to conduct an in-depth review of military doctrine. Like the civil sector of society, the military has developed a


\textsuperscript{37} Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, *Joint Operations*.


dictionary to define the words it employs. As a matter of efficiency and accuracy the Department of Defense issues both written and verbal orders to compel action from its subordinate commanders and personnel. The language of orders draws heavily from the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* as a means to communicate complex ideas using words that are understood universally across the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. I use the Department of Defense dictionary to identify the precise and accurate definition of security cooperation. After establishing a baseline definition for the military term security cooperation I transitioned to military operation manuals to verify that the common definition of security cooperation was consistent with its proscribed use.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the titular head of all four branches of the military service. As the appointed leader over all United States military forces, the chairman must be able to provide a standard model of communication that unites the efforts of the military departments. Joint publications, which form the backbone of military doctrine, are the means by which the chairman achieves the daunting task of developing a shared vision across the Department of Defense. *Joint Operations* is the seminal document, published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which sets the standard vision for all branches of the military service to follow. I reviewed the doctrine and discovered that security cooperation is a component of *Joint Operations* and its definition and strategic use was consistent with the dictionary

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definition of the term. I cross-referenced the strategic concept of security cooperation with other manuals in the joint publication series and found that the planning and implementation of strategies connected to security cooperation remained anchored to the dictionary and *Joint Operations* explanation. While I was cross-referencing the term I was surprised to find that the perceived usefulness of the capabilities inherent in Security cooperation was limited to peacetime operations. I was surprised to discover that the perceived usefulness of security cooperation was limited to *peace time operations* because as I was developing a research question last year I initially examined security cooperation from the contemporary, but incorrect perspective. I considered the application of security cooperation using the Afghanistan model as a post-conflict strategy to achieve conflict resolution.

As I examined the joint publication manuals, it became clear that the Department of Defense holds a linear view on the conduct of military operations. Additionally the way that the Joint Chiefs of Staff graphically depicts military operations suggests that campaigns are infinitely repeating on the x-axis. The figure, *Notional Operation Plan Phases Versus Level of Military Effort* provides a pictorial representation of linear military operations. Since military operations are linear, and doctrine outlines when Security cooperation is useful, I was able to draw a conclusion from my research that I could specifically identify points on the x-axis where the employment of security cooperation was consistent with dictionary definition and doctrinal employment of the

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43 Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, *Joint Operations*.
44 Ibid, 6.
strategy during times of peace. I wanted to test my conclusion, so I also used the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy to validate or disprove my initial findings.

The National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy are documents that establish a common vision for the United States and the Department of Defense. The flow chart (Figure II-1) is an illustration of how the documents interact with each other.

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All of the documents use vocabulary from the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terminology and Associated Terms*, and apply concepts discussed in the joint publication series that is distributed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The majority of the National Security Strategy document employed the use of the term security cooperation appropriately with one significant exception: the strategy to transition authority to the Iraqi government as United States forces withdraw from the country.47

The improper use of the term security cooperation seemed like an anomaly or, better yet, poor word selection given that the broad scope of the National Security Strategy left its authors considerable room to make errors. However further research into this apparent outlier using policy statements issued by General James N. Mattis, commanding general United States Central Command, and documents chronicling the

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development of an Office of Security cooperation-Iraq, provided compelling evidence that the National Security Strategy was using the wrong vocabulary to convey how the United States would transition authority to the Iraqi government.\(^{48}\)\(^{49}\) I studied the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy documents to determine if the faulty use of the term security cooperation was translated into the bodies of these documents, and I came to the conclusion that both strategies appropriately applied the term security cooperation in its definition and strategic action.\(^{50}\)

Reviewing my findings, I wondered if the named strategy to withdraw from Iraq had been poor wording, and I decided that I should compare the exit strategy from Iraq to the exit strategy for Afghanistan to determine if there were similarities in the words selected to communicate the ways in which the United States would withdraw its military forces. My review of policy statements made by the Secretary of State, as well as and studies conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies Institute and the United States Central Command, led me to believe that the term security cooperation was deliberately selected to define the process employed by the United States to exit Afghanistan as well as Iraq.\(^{51}\)\(^{52}\) This discovery further supported my hypothesis that the term security cooperation...
cooperation is being misappropriated in the National Security Strategy and the exit strategies for both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The unanswered conundrum of my research is why, when terms such as reconstruction and stabilization operations exist to accurately describe the United States exit strategies from Iraq and Afghanistan, planners and policy-makers persist in incorrectly using the term security cooperation to describe the process of a responsible withdraw of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. The misuse of the term security cooperation to describe the means by which the United States will leave Iraq and Afghanistan erodes the true strength of such a strategy, the prevention of war.

Limitations of the Study

My research is limited in its scope to properly identifying the military term security cooperation and it does not seek to correct the greater problems that emerge from identifying an error in the use of military vocabulary. Identifying the greater problems falls outside the scope of this project because it would encompass unraveling the complexity of the National Security Council and its process of developing foreign policy and it would require an untangling of the relationship formed by the State Department and Department of Defense as a result of foreign policy developed around the misapplication of the term security cooperation. It is also my hypothesis that the United

States Government suffers from systemic problems in the way that it crafts its strategies and policies, problems that are specifically embodied in the misconceptions of security cooperation. Neither does my research provide corrective measures to contemporary policy and strategy; it merely identifies the root cause of the problems that military commanders and civil servants experience as a result of misapplication of the concept of security cooperation. Second, the complexity of the medium of stability operations that runs across the range of military operations, (see figure I-2) and influences the employment of security cooperation receives only a surface treatment. Stability operations, by doctrine, are simultaneous and continuous throughout all phases of military operations, and they use security cooperation and reconstruction as the means to accomplish its assigned missions. The compounding factor of stability operations significantly contributes to the misunderstanding of security cooperation; however, my research does not specifically address the ways that stability operations lead to a misuse of the term security cooperation. In the attempt to demonstrate how security cooperation is misunderstood I do not want to risk adding a confusing element to this paper by parsing out the nuances of stability operations across the range of military operations.

During the data collection portion of my research I began to feel like the main character from George Orwell’s novel *1984*, Winston Smith, who worked for the Ministry of Truth. Joint Publications provide a very clear definition for security cooperation as well as the time and places where it should be used. Yet my research seemed to be painting a picture of policy-makers and military strategists discarding these concrete definitions for a creatively interpreted version of security cooperation. Security cooperation became “newspeak”, instead of a term used to describe a strategy that could prevent war. Security cooperation became the phrase for picking-up-the-pieces after the United Stated finished its military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The “newspeak” term for security cooperation was adopted by contemporary authors who used it in their articles to describe exit strategies from Iraq and Afghanistan that were published in military journals. The pervasive linguistic misuse of security cooperation led the wider audience to adopt the incorrect use as the correct definition. My research will not immediately correct this common misconception; one that has been reinforced and perpetuated in various media over the past few years, but it is my expectation that bringing the situation to light will be the first step towards reinvesting the term security cooperation with its rightful strategic and diplomatic capital.

**Significance of the Study**

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56 Rosenau, *Acknowledging Limits Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*. 
The strategy of security cooperation, if properly defined and employed, can result in foreign policy that uses all aspects of the government to address its national security concerns by providing assistance to foreign nations while minimizing the need to employ combat power. The United States has shouldered much of the financial and personal cost of fighting war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Did the choice to enter into armed conflict with both Iraq and Afghanistan serve the national security interests of the United States? Did the United States seek to exhaust all resources within the government, to include security cooperation, prior to entering into armed conflict? These questions are debatable. The negative fiscal impact of these military ventures is not debatable, nor is the requirement to provide a credible national defense.

Internal and external economic crises threaten the financial stability of the United States and forces lawmakers to consider ways to reduce the cost of running the country. In the wake of the financial problems confronting the United States, problems that are partially a result of its foreign policy decisions, the Constitutional obligation in Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States still exists and Congress must continue to provide for the common defense of the country. My research on the misapplication of security cooperation suggests that the United States has inappropriately vested its resources in a false understanding of security cooperation. The result has led to policymakers, both civilian and military, to place an unrealistic expectation on what can reasonably be

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57 Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, *Joint Operation Planning.*
achieved by misusing security cooperation when actually engaged in reconstruction.  If the current use of security cooperation were to return to its doctrinal roots and become distinct from reconstruction and stability operations, U.S. policy makers could align security cooperation as a tool for developing alliances and preventing war. In doing so, a national security strategy could be developed based on security cooperation activities, and that would maintain a credible defensive posture that actively sought to prevent war and the economic costs associated with participating in international conflict.

Review of the Literature

Introduction

Security cooperation is a strategy that meets the requirements of securing America’s national defense as outlined in the National Security Strategy. As a strategy SC is the use of national power with the stated goals of improving, strengthening, and reinforcing relationships with foreign countries. SC involves the use of diplomatic, informative, military, and economic means to create cooperative relationships. A strategy of SC is carried out by the Department of Defense (DoD) with the cooperation of the Department of State. SC has not been thoroughly addressed as an area of interest within the academic field of security studies, nor has it been widely written about in

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60 Rosenau, *Acknowledging Limits Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.*
military literature. SC does not garner much attention because it does not use the military
in traditional ways and it does not seek to achieve political goals through the use of direct
violence.\textsuperscript{65} The Strategic Studies Institute published a white paper in 2007 written by
Lieutenant Colonel Clarence Bouchat titled \textit{An Introduction to Theater Strategy and
Regional Security}. In his forward to the white paper, Douglas Lovelace, Director of the
Strategic Studies Institute, made the following observation, “While the Strategic Studies
Institute does not normally publish curricular material, this is the second time a subject
has been deemed of sufficient importance and utility that it is now offered to a wider
audience.”\textsuperscript{66} Lovelace further expands on the importance of SC and the limited
publications that address this important subject, saying “…[d]espite [the] importance [of
SC]…little current, concise, and comprehensive guidance is available on how they [SC
strategies] are planned and implemented.”\textsuperscript{67} LtCol Bouchat echoes Lovelace’s concerns
when he states in his introductory paragraph, “…[d]espite [security cooperation’s]
importance to military and national strategy…there is little definitive or comprehensive
information available on theater strategy”.\textsuperscript{68} The author also reveals in his endnotes that
the military manual used by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for Theater Engagement
Planning was rescinded on February 17, 2006, and that other document has taken its
place. The official reason for this decision was that the Department of Defense
determined that security cooperation is nothing more than common sense, and that it does
not require a comprehensive document to guide the actions of generals who supervised

\textsuperscript{65} Bouchat, \textit{An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security}, 99.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid, iii.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid, iii.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid, 1.
diplomatic relationships across continental landmasses.\textsuperscript{69} My research into SC will expand the understanding of this topic by identifying how the doctrinal definition of the term is misused as a strategy to exit from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Security cooperation: Misused, Abused, and Always too Late

Although I agree with Director Lovelace and Lt Col Bouchat in their assessment that security cooperation has not received serious attention, it is still prudent to review the key points of the few articles that have been written on the topic of security cooperation. I elected to only include articles describing security cooperation during the past ten years because of the Title X authority directing the Department of Defense to carry out security cooperation activities as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2011.\textsuperscript{70} It was my assessment that contemporary literature would be of greater value to my research because the misuse of the term security cooperation emerged during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{71} Contemporary literature also simultaneously treats security cooperation activities as strategic policy, operational art, and tactical necessity. This unfocused treatment of the topic allows me to point out how the term security cooperation can be easily misinterpreted and misapplied.

If I were critiquing the Bouchat article, I would report that a bureaucracy has been

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{69} Ibid, 48.
\item \textsuperscript{71} U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Clinton's Remarks at House Hearing on Afghanistan, Pakistan, 1; United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America; Rosenau, Acknowledging Limits Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.
\end{itemize}
created around the management of security cooperation activities. From a strictly technical stance this criticism would be correct. The principle components of security cooperation, from a Department of Defense perspective, are, Foreign military sales (FMS); Foreign military financing (FMF); International military and education training (IMET) programs, and; Excess defense articles (EDA) transfers to define security assistance. Figure 8 (below) provides examples of each security cooperation activity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Typical TSC Activities</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Multinational Exercises</td>
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<td>- Field Training Exercises</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Command Post Simulations</td>
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<td>Multinational Training</td>
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<td>- Joint Combined Exchange Training</td>
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<td>Multinational Education</td>
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<td>- Regional Center for Security Studies</td>
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<td>- Senior Service Colleges</td>
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<td>Security Assistance</td>
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<td>- Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<td>- International Military Education and Training</td>
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**Figure 8. Samples of Theater Security Cooperation Activities.**

The use of any one of the activities would constitute a component of a comprehensive strategy based on a policy to employ security cooperation as a method of achieving the national security goals of the United States. The point that my criticism would miss is that a whole government approach rather than a piecemeal one is required.

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to realize an effective strategy based on security cooperation.\textsuperscript{73}

Contemporary authors like Kapstein, and Lind, who write on the subject of security cooperation consider security cooperation as a strategy or ground level tactic that takes place at the conclusion of war time hostilities but prior to the departure of United States and allied forces from foreign soil.\textsuperscript{74} These authors also discuss the six basic activities associated with security cooperation; however they also include strategic and tactical contributions to the cooperative strategy by the Department of State and its subordinate and independent branches, United States Agency for International Development, United States Agricultural Department, the United States Department of Justice, and other similar organizations.\textsuperscript{75}

Kapstein’s article is an assessment of security cooperation and its practical limits. The author is actually discussing the concepts of reconstruction. However, he incorrectly uses the term security cooperation rather than reconstruction. The author centers his assessment on the acronym 3D’s or Defense, Diplomacy, and Development, the 3D’s used by both the State Department and Department of Defense to describe a grand strategy of security cooperation that is designed to support the reconstruction of Iraq and


\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
Afghanistan. It is Kapstein’s opinion that like so many other acronyms this is a hollow catch phrase that lacks a thoughtful, disciplined approach necessary to actualize the intended goals of the strategy or foreign policy that embraces the 3D’s. His primary criticism is that the 3D’s are a means to achieve a strategy, not a complete strategy in themselves. The words Defense, Diplomacy, and Development are not a strategy, they are organic tools used by most government in the execution of foreign policy.\(^{76}\)

Kapstein makes the appropriate assessment of 3D’s as a tool to carry out an as of yet to be formulated foreign policy strategy. Highlighting the validity of security cooperation as a grand strategy places the concept in an appropriate arena that will influence the action of strategic, operational, and tactical leaders.\(^{77}\) Temporally however, Kapstein misses the mark, in his article, the 3D’s are assessed as hollow words that are applied to post conflict, reconstruction operations.\(^{78}\) In placing the notion of 3D’s as a post conflict tool for supporting reconstruction operation, Kapstein fails to see that his imprecise use of the terms, security cooperation and reconstruction, blur the utility of developing a thoughtful foreign policy that uses the 3D’s as its tools to achieve success. In his analysis the tools become nothing more than mop, bucket, and broom, utility items that clean up messes rather than defining strategy.

William S. Lind is a military thinker and author of great renown. His thoughts on maneuver warfare have shaped the way that the Marine Corps has equipped itself and

\(^{76}\) Kapstein, *Do Three Ds make an F? the Limits of "Defense, Diplomacy, and Development"*, 21.
\(^{77}\) Ibid.
\(^{78}\) Ibid.
trained to fight the wars of this country.79 A recent contribution on the development of future Marine Corps doctrine is his article titled *Fourth Generation War, 2007*.80 Lind’s article describes a future battlefield that is simultaneously, strategic, operational, and tactical. In this battlefield he sees a Marine Corps that uses a sociological approach that understands the emergence of feelings of hatred, anger, and resentment that develop in foreign populations. This knowledge is used to work more effectively with the populace to achieve United States National objectives.81 To contrast his vision of the future Lind describes how the Marine Corps successfully used his philosophy of maneuver warfare to quickly defeat the Iraq and Afghan forces during the initial stages of each conflict. At the conclusion of conventional fighting the Marine Corps transitioned to reconstruction operations while continuing to apply the doctrine of maneuver warfare. Using maneuver warfare in reconstruction operations required a defined enemy that could be suppressed and then attacked. In reconstruction operations however this proved to be a fatal flaw that sparked a determined insurgency. It is only now, nearly a decade after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began, that the Marine Corps has adjusted to the notion that it must approach this new phase of warfare from a sociological perspective.82

In his approach to solving the problem of fourth generation warfare, Lind incorporates the strategy of security cooperation. Lind does not explicitly express his solution to fourth generation warfare as the six activities associated with security cooperation. Instead, Lind speaks to removing the current focus from population-centric

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81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
warfare in occupied countries to the identification of policy decisions that cause feelings of hatred and resentment to well up in foreign populations and that are expressed through violence. The ways in which the Marine Corps might be able to achieve this objective is through partnering with local populations, the key component to security cooperation.  

Lind’s use of security cooperation as the means to address the complex problem of fourth generation warfare is visionary. Unlike Kapstein, Lind uses the tools that support a strategy of security cooperation correctly. Lind does not focus on reactive measures to solve the social problems present in fourth generation warfare, instead he uses the tools of security cooperation to assess problems and address them before they reach the point of violence. Unlike other authors cited in this review, Lind applies the tools of security cooperation as a preventative tactic. Unfortunately Lind, like Kapstein, temporally places his social warfare tactics in phases two and four on the warfare phasing model. The graph below depicts the phasing model.

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83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Operation Planning, 41.
Lind’s approach to fourth generation warfare is an attempt at normalizing relations prior to initiating combat operations or an ameliorative to be used in an effort to prevent an insurgency at the conclusion of conventional warfare. Although Lind does not place the use of security cooperation in its appropriate place, phase zero, the prevention of hostilities, he has placed necessary emphasis on using the tools of security cooperation as a measure to avoid war and as a tactic to identify and mitigate insurgencies that form at the conclusion of combat operations.

Lind, and Kapstein, are important contributors to the emerging body of literature focused on security cooperation. This literature review has identified security cooperation as both a reactive tool that supports the withdraw of military forces from foreign soil that has been previously categorized as a war zone and as a comprehensive strategy implemented, prior to political maneuvers in preparation for war, that can potentially prevent the initiation of armed conflict.

**Security cooperation Poorly Defined**

The tendency of authors of recent articles as well as combatant commanders is to place security cooperation activities at the conclusion of armed conflict. This leads to confusion with regard to what security cooperation is and what it is designed to achieve. The Phasing Model shown in Figure III-17 below is composed of six phases ranging from Phase 0 to Phase V. On this scale domination of the enemy during war is indicated at Phase III. Security operations are designed to be used as a shaping tool to avoid armed conflict and is employed during Phase 0.

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86 Ibid.
Instead of using the precise technical definition provided by the Department of Defense on military operations, contemporary authors are using security cooperation to describe the action taken during phase IV, establish security, and phase V, transition to civil authority. Authors like Kapstein and Menkhaus are applying the wrong definition to security cooperation when they incorrectly define security cooperation activities as the actions taken at the conclusion of armed hostilities. The term reconstruction is more appropriate and it incorporates the notion that nations that are victorious in war, have a moral obligation to support and restore order and functionality to the defeated state.

Reconstruction is a requirement for U.S. military forces that occupy foreign

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territory at the conclusion of hostilities. In light of the political sensitivities surrounding both the Iraq War and the Afghan War, the notion of the United States as an occupying force was unacceptable. In order to implement the requirements associated with reconstruction, without acknowledging the United States as an occupation force, politicians had to find politically acceptable terminology in order to shape the discussion on how the United States should restore the defunct governments of both Iraq and Afghanistan. An example of the use of politically acceptable terminology is the Provincial Reconstruction Teams that have proliferated throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. In title they are serving as an occupying force engaged in reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan while in practice they are addressing the litany of requirements outlined in the Joint Publication Stability Operations. In practice and as discussed by authors on the subject, the military has shouldered the responsibility and authority of occupation and reconstruction and then given it the incorrect title: security cooperation. The actions taken during security cooperation and reconstruction are vastly different and as such must be kept separate in order to appropriately align organizational capacity and capability.

In his book, Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill, Rietjens uses the work of the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan as a case study to investigate the level of cooperative behaviors between the Dutch Military, Afghan police, military, and civil leaders. Rietjens’ case study is again

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situated after the conduct of hostilities. In his analysis of Dutch participation in civil-military activities with the people and institutions of Afghanistan, Rietjens concluded that the cooperative actions taken by both Dutch and Afghan parties were necessary and successful. However, it required an environment akin to a natural disaster in order for local participation to reach a level of participation that could achieve a measure of self-sustainment. Rietjens described effective civil-military operation as a response to a complex emergency. He believed that the strategy for civil-military cooperation should be developed as if a country were responding to a natural disaster. His theory further suggests that security cooperation activities are an intervention to be used after combat has subsided rather than a developmental peace-keeping strategy implemented before combat ensues. Linking the Dutch military response to the Afghan civil structure and focusing on the cooperative actions between the Dutch and the Afghans kept his case study rooted in the basic activities that define security cooperation and again was based on the misuse of the definition of security cooperation.

In contrast to Rietjens incorrect placement of security cooperation activities at the conclusion of armed conflict between countries, Hager appropriately identifies security cooperation as a strategy carried out in peacetime prior to the onset of hostilities. In Hager’s analysis security cooperation is a strategic tool used by the United States that creates formal and informal social exchanges between the United States and other foreign countries. Social connections created between host nation countries and the United

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94 Ibid.
States, during peacetime, through peaceful military interaction served well for the United States national security strategy. The Department of Defense used the strategy of security cooperation to carry out the six basic functions of the security cooperation activities in addition to other significant actions not covered by the doctrinal definition of security cooperation.\textsuperscript{96}

Hagar’s article describes the development, coordination, and execution of a security cooperation plan that was delegated to combatant commanders; generals who had achieved the highest rank in the military and were assigned a region of the globe and given authority by Senate confirmation to lead all military affairs in their assigned area of responsibility. The social exchange between the United States militaries and foreign militaries gave the combatant commanders the opportunity to engage foreign countries in the following areas, military professionalization, support of democratic values, humanitarian assistance, counter-drug, and counter-terrorism.\textsuperscript{97} For the most part none of these areas are part of the doctrinal activities associated with security cooperation. An argument could be made that military professionalization and the counter-terror and counter-drug interactions could be aligned with traditional security activities but at the present these activities fall outside that scope.

The important point that should be taken away from Hager’s article is that with the exception of humanitarian assistance, all of the actions that the combatant commanders were taking were preventative measures. The combatant commanders, according to Hager, understood the utility of shaping perceptions and attitudes while simultaneously

\textsuperscript{96} Bouchat, \textit{An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security}, 99; Robey and Vordermark, \textit{Security Assistance Mission in the Republic of Turkey}, 1.

\textsuperscript{97} Hager, \textit{Supporting and Integrating Theater Security Cooperation Plans}, iii.
building diplomatic relationships to overcome challenges that threatened civil-military interaction with the United States. The commanders recognized that security cooperation strategies implemented during Phase 0 operations were in the best interest of the United States and its national security interests. Hager’s article also highlighted that the strategic guidance provided by the President of the United States in his 1995 National Security Strategy officially recognized security cooperation operations as “a formal peacetime engagement planning process”.

The formalized planning process was unfortunately doomed from the beginning as a result of poor funding. This unfortunate ending to an otherwise proper temporal placement and strategic execution of security cooperation is the ideal framework from which to implement a national security strategy based on security cooperation.

**Interagency Cooperation: The Road to Success**

Abbot, Grossman, Meese, and Rosenwaser materially contribute to the topic of security cooperation via their discussion of interagency cooperation. These authors believe that security cooperation was necessary to achieve success in developing and executing United States foreign policy. The authors recognize that the United States will typically place the burden of diplomacy on the military and expect the Department of Defense to craft interagency solutions that involve other government agencies to create political and social stability within a proscribed area. Unfortunately like Rietjens and

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98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
Menkhaus, these authors frame the need to develop an efficient and effective interagency process in the backdrop of post conflict operations. In situating the need for interagency cooperation as a result of the post-conflict, reconstruction environment the implication is that interagency cooperation is most needed at the conclusion of armed conflict. Abbot and his co-authors frame his argument in the following way; the complex nature of capacity building in a post conflict environment requires that the Department of Defense invest in the education of its officer corps. The specific point made is that officers should be trained as experts in an assigned geographic region and then stationed and employed in such a way as to maintain the officer’s regional cultural expertise. Abbot is not suggesting a revamp of the current Regional Area Officer program that results in careers that cap out as a Colonel. Instead he is recommending that the Department of Defense create command opportunities for the regional experts that enable them to reach the rank of General and use their cultural knowledge and political influence as a General to support security cooperation strategies and improve international relationships between the United States and other foreign governments.

The need for interagency collaboration is not new to the military. In fact the Goldwater-Nichols act, created the senior U.S. military command position, Chairman of

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Ibid.

Abbot, Educate to Cooperate Leveraging the New Definition of "Joint" to Build Partnering Capacity, 16-23.
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to more efficiently man, equip, and train the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces that comprise the United States military environment. Meese and Abbot offer similar points of view. Instead of approaching the topic of interagency cooperation as a means of achieving a national security, via Department of Defense wide personnel restructuring, he believes the structures currently in place are sufficient and advocate for enhanced interagency cooperation. The Goldwater-Nichols Act changed the military so that it actively addressed the needs for interagency cooperation by encouraging the development of a joint warrior culture through joint education and joint assignments. Joint education and assignment are important to the successful implementation of security cooperation strategies because the responsibility to execute security cooperation strategies does not belong to a single military service nor does the responsibility belong solely to the Department of Defense.

Meese takes his argument a step further and comments on the impact of a joint environment, interagency cooperation, and the career path of military officers. Like Abbot, Meese points out that there are clear roadblocks in the career path of a military officer that must be overcome if the officer is to achieve success beyond the rank of Colonel. Meese demonstrates that Title X (ten) of the United States Code places a prohibition on officers attaining the rank of general if the officer has not served in a joint billet. The Department of Defense, as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols act, has placed a premium on operating in joint and interagency environments. In order for an officer to

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104 Ibid.
achieve the rank of general they must be able to work and thrive in jobs that place them outside the comfort zone of their specific military department. Selection to the rank of general, predicated on a successful job performance in joint or interagency environments, should mean that officers selected to the rank of general would have the necessary interagency experience to develop and influence security cooperation strategies.

Interagency cooperation is important in light of the need to integrate the Department of Defense and Department of State when dealing with stability and reconstruction operations and in developing a national security strategy based on security cooperation. Rosenwasser believed that interagency cooperation is vital not only to the success of peacetime foreign policy but also post conflict stability and reconstruction. Rosenwasser described United States Diplomat Robert Murphy, as an instrumental representative of State Department during World War II. Robert Murphy’s diplomatic efforts during World War II were vital to the successful invasion of French North Africa. The ability of Robert Murphy to work with United States Army General Clark, despite the belligerent atmosphere fostered by General Clark, demonstrated the great need for interagency cooperation between the Departments of State and Defense.107

**Nesting Security Cooperation in the field of International Security Studies:**

**Philosophy and Policy Decisions**

Why did the United States enter into a state of war with Iraq and Afghanistan? Did the U.S. have an alternative to deploying its resources into combat? Depending on who

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you ask the answer will vary. The military thinker, Clausewitz, is famous for making the observation that war is an extension of politics by other means.\textsuperscript{108} This leads us to ask what political reasons did the U.S. use for entering into armed conflict? Going one step further we ask the more fundamental question what were the philosophical underpinnings that caused the U.S. to make the decision to engage in armed conflict? The answer is the philosophies of international relations and the academic field of study international security studies.

International relations (IR) examines the foreign policies of countries and the thought process that drives foreign policy decisions. The need to study and examine the decisions and actions of international leaders evolved from the global consequences of World War I and World War II. This is not to say that a general interest in how leaders at the international level formulate their decisions did not exist. The opposite, in fact, is true. As early as the Greek state of Athens and the author Thucydides, historians, scholars, and leaders have been interested in the decisions made by states and their leaders. The classic philosophers have extensively covered the methods, and decisions of states and their leadership.\textsuperscript{109} The comprehensive cataloging and categorization of each philosopher and separation of their thoughts and concepts into specific decision making arenas did not occur until the 20th Century. The process of systematically cataloging and analyzing the various philosophies that inform and influence the decisions and actions of


state and leaders is the field of IR.\textsuperscript{110}

The result of organizing the intellectual driving force that fuels the decision making cycle of countries emerged as two competing philosophies. Realism and liberalism are the two primary IR philosophies that influence the problem solving efforts of national leaders. Before outlining each major IR philosophies it must be stressed that these philosophies are ‘isms’ and not theory.\textsuperscript{111} To clarify, states and other international actors do not make decisions based on realist theory, nor is there a set of replicable steps that if applied to realism theory could be repeated time after time and expect the same results. Instead these two IR categories should be viewed as a way of thinking that helps shape and support the decisions made by states and their leaders. Understanding IR categories as philosophies helps to highlight both the capabilities and limitations of each.

Philosophies inform thought and help structure decisions, no more or less. Choosing a philosophy, like Realism for example, provides a framework for types actions and expected consequences that result from specific policy decisions. The capability to identify an expected outcome based on actions derived from a thought process fed by Realism is the strength of IR. Philosophy as previously noted is limited to an intellectual


exercise and not a substitute for policy. Continuing with the example of realism; a policy analyst would not be able to use the philosophy of realism and pre-determine the specific actions a policymaker must employ to achieve a desired policy result based on the conceptual framework of realism. Instead of using a philosophy to gauge the future results of the policy maker, the analyst must observe the policymaker develop his plan of action based on the available resources of his nation-state as opposed to the philosophy that influenced his choices. The inability of a philosophy to provide a template solution to support the policy making process is the weakness of IR.

Morgenthau, the author credited with developing the field of IR, authored the concept of realism that became the cornerstone of IR. The philosophy of realism is centered on the point that states act in their own self interests and are always seeking ways to accumulate power in an effort to secure their survival and meet their needs, defined as interests. The state, governed by a set of laws rooted in human nature, focuses on its own self-interests and gives primacy to power. The actions of a state are free from moral judgment and the political leaders of the state, when acting in the capacity as a representative of the state, are also free from moral judgments and constraints.¹¹²

Morgenthau’s work inspired Kenneth Waltz to contribute to the philosophy of realism. Waltz’ contributions to realism were the foundations of neorealism. Neorealism drew from the Realist vision that a state seeks power to satisfy its self interest and added a twist. Neorealism situated the state within an arena of international actors who were not governed by any set of laws and sought to establish a balance of power between nation

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states.\textsuperscript{113} World War II is an example of states seeking a balance of power. During World War II Germany threatened the balance of power. Two weaker nations, the United States and the Soviet Union, who were ideological enemies, combined their powers to topple Germany. After Germany was defeated the threat to balance was eliminated. The alliance between the United States, and the Soviet Union dissolved and a balanced international power structure was restored. Like neorealism eloquently points out, chaotic space seeks balance, so to did the study of IR. The introduction of liberalism as a competing conceptual thought process provided balance to the IR field.

Liberalism emerged at the conclusion of World War I as a challenge to realism. The study of liberalism emphasizes observing how leaders use the writing of established thinkers to shape their decisions. Classic liberal thought valued freedom, individual rights, morality as a guide to individual and state actions, patriotism, nationalism, private ownership, and free market principles. Philosophers who placed a premium on individual morality, limited governments founded on democratic principles, and economic systems that subscribed to the principle of free markets exemplify liberalism. The realist notion that the state is the primary actor in the international relations arena is challenged by the IR philosophy of liberalism. A policy maker who forms their thoughts based on the philosophy of liberalism contend that the body politic has a voice in the actions of the state and the state must conduct its affairs with regard to morality.

At its core liberalism seeks ways to create a more peaceful society and is predicated on the notion of championing moral ideological concepts.\textsuperscript{114} The export of moral ideas is

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, 19.
\textsuperscript{114} Kay, \textit{Global Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Quest for Power and the Search for Peace}, 58.
thought to create social structures as barriers to violence. An example of social structures as barriers to violence is the American aphorism that democratic countries do not go to war against each other. The development of barriers that restrict the use of force is then another way to interpret liberalism. Ironically the opposite is also true, liberalism can induce the use of force. Vietnam and the first Gulf War are examples of the U.S. projection of moral values, based on the philosophy of liberalism, that resulted in the United States participating in combat. As liberalism matured the idea of neoliberalism emerged and provided a counter the ideas of neorealism. Neoliberalism challenged the concept that anarchy drives nations to seek balance of power via competition. Instead of anarchy equaling balance via competition, neoliberalism views anarchy as a means to create a network of interdependence between nations that fosters relationships that build on cooperation and mutual interest.\footnote{Ibid, 60.} The competing philosophies of liberalism and realism gave birth to an academic field of study know as International Security Studies (ISS).

The ISS field seeks to define the actions taken by a state that support the achievement of a particular policy. The security studies field adopted the language, and structure provided by IR as its starting point. Like IR, security studies has two distinct and competing branches of thought realism and liberalism. The security policies of the U.S. have at varying times be shaped by realism and liberalism. Paradoxically liberalism and realism are both consistent with the values of the U.S. and provide policy makers significant latitude when considering the future safety concerns of the nation.

Political leaders who use the concept of realism to craft their decisions are focused
on power. Nations collect power via strong militaries capable of imposing a credible obstacle to foreign powers. National power is also achieved through an economy that sustains vibrant production, and markets geared to support trade. This power can be used in two way offensively or defensively. Defensive realism seeks to maintain a balance of power between nations, offensive realism involves expanding its power.\textsuperscript{116} The two subsets of Realism seek to maintain state power in two distinctly different ways. The policies of containment championed by George Kennan, and detente by Henry Kissinger during the Nixon administration are examples of Defensive Realism influencing the decisions of national and international leaders.\textsuperscript{117} Offensive Realism on the other hand focuses on the survival of the state by primarily using military means to secure an international advantage that will guarantee a states supremacy in the international arena.\textsuperscript{118} Mearsheimer cites the expansion of Japan, Germany, and the former Soviet Union from 1800-1945 as examples of Offensive Realism. Although both offensive and defensive realism achieve their means in significantly different ways; both operate on the premise established by the philosophy of Realism that a state seeks to achieve a greater level of relative power over it peer competing states.\textsuperscript{119} The dominant opposing argument to realism is liberalism and its quest for security through peace.

Liberalism is the philosophy of developing security via the exportation of democratic values and economic free market systems. Like Realism, Liberalism can be both offensive and defensive. Offensive liberalism is best described as nations exporting ideology by means of force, specifically military force. As noted above the Vietnam War

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid, 17.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
and first Gulf War are examples of offensive liberalism. Defensive Liberalism is best defined as the use of soft power, or diplomacy to export ideology. Theater security cooperation consists of bilateral exercises, foreign military sales, and diplomatic cultural exchanges and is an ideal example of defensive liberalism.

Returning to the original question posed at the beginning of this section, the competing philosophies of realism and liberalism are the underlying intellectual framework that policy makers used to lead the U.S. into war. Both realism and liberalism provide an alternative to war however the options presented to our policy makers did not include the options of balancing power or seeking diplomatic resolution. The rational for involving the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan are in the past and should be used as cautionary tales to future policy makers. In the future however it should be noted our policy makers have options, regardless of philosophical leaning, to prevent the commitment of U.S. resources to the task of war.

Discussion

Why Security cooperation Matters

The United States economy is currently under great strain. The U.S. debt is $15 trillion and the defense budget for fiscal year 2012 is approximately $670 billion. In a

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fragile economy it is imprudent to continue to expend national treasure at this rate. Regardless of cost, U.S political leadership is constitutionally obligated to provide for the common defense. The executive and legislative branches of government are presented with a riddle; how do you save money and provide for the common defense simultaneously? By developing a U.S foreign policy that supports the implementation of a security strategy based on Security cooperation Activities. A foreign policy developed around the properly defined tenets of SC can meet the demands of national defense and remain economically viable.

Although I argue against the use of SC as a post-conflict reconstruction strategy, the positive financial and resource impact of using a SC strategy cannot be ignored. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) reports that 90,000 U.S. personnel are serving in Afghanistan and the Congressional Research Service Report for Congress reported the 2010 cost of the Afghan war was $104.9 billion dollars. Provincial reconstruction teams are the physical expression of a security strategy based on security cooperation activities. The economic and personnel cost of all 12 provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan is $240 million and approximately 1,000 U.S. personnel. ISAF has linked its withdraw strategy from Afghanistan to the success of provincial reconstruction teams. In essence what this means is the U.S. has needlessly


Lennon et al., Democracy in U.S. Security Strategy from Promotion to Support.


Ibid.
deployed 88,000 service members and is wasting $104.6 billion dollars in defense spending. In light of an impending debt crisis, the military must consolidate its forces, reduce spending, and simultaneously maintain a credible defensive posture. Security cooperation strategies are the way that the United States of America can achieve this requirement.

Security cooperation has been an integral part of the military for the past 65 years. Almost since its inception, the United States military has interacted with foreign militaries during peacetime. Each of the military services regularly conducted exchanges, formally and informally, to improve military capability or interoperability. Geographic commanders found engagement to be a useful tool to establish security cooperation and continue to conduct military interaction activities to support national security objectives during peacetime.  

Security cooperation (SC) is an intra-agency, defense strategy that in its most basic form identifies common concerns between nations and develops local solutions to solve shared problems. An example of SC in phase zero operations is the strategic relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines and their combined efforts at resolving Muslim extremism on the Philippine island of Mindanao. Philippine National Leaders are concerned that Muslim extremism on the island of Mindanao diminishes the economic viability of the island and creates a negative public opinion of the country. The U.S. is interested in maintaining its economic freedom of movement through the international waters off the coast of the Philippine archipelago and sees the Muslim extremists as a threat to economic freedom of the seas. Working together, the U.S. and Philippine governments develop a plan to address the extremist threat. The U.S. provides the resources to train and equip the government to defeat the Muslim extremists. The Philippine government uses its newly developed capabilities to solve the problem of Muslim extremism.

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Muslim extremists inhibiting economic stability on the island of Mindanao. The success of this strategy is measured by the development and implementation of a solution to the problem of Muslim extremists by the Philippine government. In this example both the Philippine’s public image is improved and the U.S. concern for economic freedom of movement off the coast of the Philippine archipelago has been addressed. A second order effect is the U.S. has maintained a credible defense posture in the Pacific Rim without the expense of deploying the full weight of its military resources.

In describing SC through this example, it is important to recognize that the U.S. did not assume the lead role in solving a domestic concern in the Philippines. Assuming direct control of foreign domestic concerns is antithetical to the true definition of SC. It is significant that the DOD and DOS worked together with the Philippine government to develop a solution to the problem of Muslim extremism. The fact that the DOD and DOS collaborated with the Philippine government to develop a holistic solution indicate a willingness on all parties involved to seek alternatives to direct violence. The most critical aspect of this example is that the relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines was voluntary. An equally important aspect of this case study is the solution to Muslim extremism on Mindanao was developed and implemented by the Philippine government. Participation by the U.S. was in building the capacity within the Philippine infrastructure to successfully implement a plan crafted by Filipino leadership. Voluntary participation combined with the development and implementation of local solutions by indigenous leadership is the cornerstone of SC.

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In contrast to security cooperation activities taking place during phase zero operations, William Rosenau provides his assessment of security cooperation activities that takes place during phase four operations in Afghanistan. *Acknowledging Limits: Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency In Afghanistan* is a monograph published by the Marine Corps University Press that explores police mentoring in Afghanistan from 2007-2009. On the surface mentoring police and security cooperation do not seem to be related. IMET however is one of the principal assignments in security cooperation and a critical aspect of security assistance. The very essence of police mentoring in Afghanistan is rooted in IMET, which in turn is a manifestation of security cooperation. Rosenau points out in his monograph that conducting police mentoring in the midst of a violent counterinsurgency netted few lasting results.

But in many cases, progress appeared to be fleeting. As mentioned above, the police frequently slipped back into their old patterns. The nature of the environment in which they operated was part of the problem. In areas with particularly high levels of insurgent activity, such as southern and southeastern Afghanistan, policing was a high-risk profession, with ANP [Afghan National Police] casualty rates far surpassing those of the ANA [Afghan National Army].

Given these perilous circumstances, it was hardly surprising that the police were reluctant to go out on patrol and perform operations that placed their lives at risk. Drugs were readily available to relieve boredom and alleviate despair. Opportunities to augment their salaries through crime and corruption were plentiful.

Rosenau did an admirable job of capturing the heart of the mentoring experience during the reconstruction and transition to civil authority phases of combat operations. The difficulty that each police mentor team encountered was magnified by the fact the

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129 Ibid, 5-6.
International Security Assistance Force was still actively engaged in combat operations against the Taliban.

The lessons that Rosenau pointed out were not lost in the milieu of authors, policy makers and military professionals. Two personalities, James Gibney and United States Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates acknowledged the lessons of improperly applying security cooperation strategy.

Finally the lessons identified in this study have utility beyond Afghanistan. Afghanistan (and Iraq) may have what one scholar terms a “strong inoculative effect on future interventions,” and according to U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, “[t]he odds of repeating another Afghanistan or Iraq-invading, pacifying, and administering a large third-world country—may be low.” Acting early to prevent what Gates terms “festering problems” from spinning out of control will obviate the need for large-scale military intervention later, in his view. Building the capacity of local police-and, in some circumstances, the capacity of irregular, tribal and informal policing structures—has an obvious role to play in a preventative approach to violent sub-national conflict.130

In this quote the Defense Secretary nearly quoted verbatim the definition of security cooperation while simultaneously acknowledging that the cart before horse approach, with regard to security cooperation, that the United State took in both Afghanistan and Iraq was wrong. Framing security cooperation activities like police mentoring as a preventative approach, which was described by Secretary Gates, is the correct doctrinal approach to security cooperation.

Conclusion

Policy and Strategy Must Align

Currently a foreign policy that points to the doctrinal use of SC as the means of

130 Ibid, 40.
achieving U.S. foreign policy goals does not exist. A U.S. foreign policy that draws from
defensive liberalism is an ideal way to shape the proper employment of a SC strategy.
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the first place where security cooperation
emerges as a means to achieve security goals and the placement of SC in the NSS is
appropriate; however, without a clear understanding of the definition of security
cooperation, the DOD and DOS are improperly executing SC activities. The most visible
SC strategy, executed improperly, is the PRT in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{131} The use of SC as a
means to achieve post reconstruction goals improperly aligns means and ends. SC is
designed as a means to prevent armed conflict not as a means to resolve the conflict at the
conclusion of hostilities.

\textsuperscript{131} Abbaszadeh Nima, Mark Crow, Marianne El-Khoury, Jonathan Gandomi, David
Kuwayama, Christopher MacPherson, Meghan Nutting, Nealin Parker, Taya Weiss,
Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations. Provincial
Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations, 02 April 2011; Ciminelli Paul,
Morris Sharon, Muncy Donald, Nugent Al, Stephenson James, Wilson Tod, Provincial
Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan an Interagency Assessment; Richard G. Lugar,
"Stabilization and Reconstruction: A Long Beginning," Prisim 1, no. 1 (2009), 3-8.;
Rietjens, Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just another
Drill?, 253; Rosenau, Acknowledging Limits Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency in
Afghanistan.
A lack of foreign policy that properly defines a strategy of security cooperation has led to its inappropriate use. If SC is going to achieve any measure of substantial success, the practitioners of foreign policy at all levels must clearly and precisely articulate the policy that would lead to the proper use of SC as a strategy. Author Colin Gray illustrates the point that strategy and policy are not synonyms in one of his monographs.

Strategy and policy are not synonymous. However, a sustainable strategy can serve only a sustainable policy. If the latter oscillates, the former becomes impractical. This monograph targets primarily the national, or grand, strategic level of analysis, but it cannot ignore the challenge of ascertaining and sustaining a coherent national security policy. Carelessly or for stylistic variety, many politicians, analysts, and commentators employ the terms policy and strategy interchangeably. This malpractice does not scar these pages. The distinction matters crucially and needs to be maintained rigorously. Policy sets goals, indeed may well change goals, while strategy is always instrumental. In the absence of a reasonably stable policy, strategy becomes literally meaningless; it must lack political direction.\(^{132}\)

When the United States entered into the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, President George W. Bush was in power and used the events of September 11, 2001 to declare a war on terror. In a series of speeches at the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002

President Bush established the Bush Doctrine, a foreign policy that embraced pre-emptive strike and unilateral action against perceived enemies of the United States. The Bush Doctrine embodies the philosophy of offensive liberalism and its goal of exporting the values of the United States through the use of military might. Declaring war on Afghanistan and Iraq was the strategy employed by the United States to achieve the policy goals outlined in the Bush Doctrine. Policy and strategy were complimentary in this case and would continue to remain so during George W. Bush’s time in the White House. In the final year of the Bush administration a concerted effort was made to develop a responsible exit strategy from the Iraq war. One of the requirements that the United States had to meet in order to support an exit from Iraq was the rebuilding of the infrastructure that was dismantled immediately after the invasion and the Provincial Reconstruction Team was the tool that the United States would use to rebuild Iraq. The election of President Barack Obama in 2008 and his promise to end the war in Iraq led to the disassociation of policy from strategy.

President Obama’s grand proclamation to end the war in Iraq was hollow rhetoric because he did not have a coherent foreign policy to replace the ideas expressed in the Bush Doctrine that were fertilized by the philosophy of offensive liberalism. In the absence of a substantive foreign policy, President Obama and his National Security Council began to repurpose the existing reconstruction strategy that was implemented by Provincial Reconstruction Teams and give it the label of security cooperation in an effort to distance himself and his administration from the Bush legacy. Perhaps unwittingly the 2010 National Security Strategy adopted language that expressed the cooperative philosophy of defensive liberalism and inappropriately selected peacetime strategies to
carry out the mission of reconstruction that was established during the Bush Administration.

Policy that expresses the cooperative philosophy of defensive liberalism and a strategy of security cooperation are complementary. The United States could use security cooperation as a means to export its democratic ideals peacefully and distance itself from the improper use of security cooperation as a tool for reconstruction in Afghanistan. To begin with, realistic expectations of SC capabilities must be formed during key leader engagements. During key leader engagements both the Department of Defense and State Department could participate in conversations with political leadership from the host nation on policy and strategy. During these executive level meetings the expectations of what SC can achieve are discussed, policy expectations are presented as goals, and resources from both countries are allocated to achieve agreed upon goals. During these engagements leadership from both countries are developing a shared vision on the future of the host nation. Importantly the U.S. has been invited to participate in the realization of the host nation’s vision. Key leader engagements ultimately manage the expectations of both countries and define agreed upon realistic and achievable goals. The U.S. policy and strategy toward Afghanistan does not achieve this and results in the current unrealistic expectation that security cooperation will achieve the goal of reconstructing Afghanistan.

Two basic tenets of a SC strategy are voluntary participation and Phase 0 implementation. A country that voluntarily participates in a SC strategy with the U.S. is deliberately choosing to invest its resources in achieving common goals that benefit both the U.S. and the host nation. Implementing a SC strategy prior to the onset of conflict
allows both the U.S. and the participating country to focus on agreed upon goals instead of conflict. Vested interest on behalf of a host nation is critical to the success of SC, when a country acts as equal partner with the U.S. and is not distracted by the fall out of conflict it is reasonable to expect common desires shared between two countries will be achieved. Estonia and Philippines are two examples of successful voluntary participation in U.S. SC strategies that were implemented during phase 0. The current Afghanistan reconstruction plan and the establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq that are paraded around as SC does not meet either one of these basic tenets.

The strategy of SC was foisted onto Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan did not ask to be invaded by the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The reconstruction obligation placed on the U.S., as a result of its invasion, forces Afghanistan to participate in a process it does not embrace. The U.S. has placed Afghanistan in a dilemma. Afghanistan can reject current U.S. policy and use its sovereignty to eject the U.S. and all countries participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. This course of action may be emotionally satisfying to the Islamic Republic however logically it would cause a power vacuum to form and the country would revert to a state of civil and tribal war. Alternatively Afghanistan can prevent a power vacuum by allowing the U.S. and ISAF to remain in Afghanistan. By continuing to support the current U.S. policy Afghanistan tacitly allows the U.S. to apply the wrong strategic resources in an effort to achieve the policy goals identified by Secretary Clinton. Based on the current situation it appears that Afghanistan will allow the U.S. and ISAF to remain in Afghanistan and execute its faulty SC strategy.

Given the choice between allowing Afghanistan to fall into chaos or allow the U.S.
to stubbornly continue on a wrong strategic course of action the political leadership in Afghanistan truly has no choice at all. The government of Afghanistan has little if any input into the policy and strategy described by the Secretary of State. The U.S. has shackled Afghanistan to its strategy and denied the political leadership any opportunity to freely participate in the misidentified SC strategy to reconstruct Afghanistan. At its very core the current policy and strategy that identifies SC as the way to successfully reconstruct Afghanistan is antithetical to the accurate definition of SC.

Accepting the fact that both Iraq and Afghanistan were wars engaged in as a result of offensive liberalism and using the tools of reconstruction to put an end to the current conflicts will best preserve the potential good that can emerge from a properly employed strategy of security cooperation. Ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provide the National Security Council an opportunity to redraft the National Security Strategy and employ security cooperation as it was intended. Policy rooted in the philosophy of defensive liberalism could be used to peacefully export the ideals of democracy through security cooperation activities. As a strategy that is properly aligned with policy goals, security cooperation is an effective method of promulgating friendly international relationships that are mutually beneficial to the host nation and the United States, and has the potential to prevent war.
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Appendix

Definition of Terms

area of responsibility — The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. See also combatant command. 133

combatant command — A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. See also specified command; unified command. 134

combatant command (command authority) — Nontransferable command authority established by Title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, Section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces, as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. See also combatant command; combatant commander; operational control; tactical control. 135

combatant commander — A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called CCDR. See also combatant command; specified combatant command; unified combatant command. 136

133 Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Operations; Director for Joint Force Development, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 601.
134 Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Operation Planning; Director for Joint Force Development, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 601.
136 Ibid.
Department of Defense (DOD) components — The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Department of Defense agencies, field activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{137}

DOS — Department of State.\textsuperscript{138}

host nation — A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN.\textsuperscript{139}

national defense strategy — A document approved by the Secretary of Defense for applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with Department of Defense agencies and other instruments of national power to achieve national security strategy objectives. Also called NDS.\textsuperscript{140}

National Military Strategy — A document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and national defense strategy objectives. Also called NMS. See also National Security Strategy; strategy; theater strategy.\textsuperscript{141}

National Security Council — A governmental body specifically designed to assist the President in integrating all spheres of national security policy. The President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense are statutory members. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs serve as advisers. Also called NSC.\textsuperscript{142}


\textsuperscript{142} Ibid, 238.
NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization.\textsuperscript{143}

**provincial reconstruction team** — An interim interagency organization designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a host nation local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services. Also called PRT.\textsuperscript{144}

**reconstruction** — The process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer-term development.\textsuperscript{145}

**security assistance** — Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Also called SA. See also security cooperation.\textsuperscript{146}

**security cooperation** — All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Also called SC. See also security assistance.\textsuperscript{147}

**stability operations** — An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid, 486.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid, 426.
\textsuperscript{145} The JCA “Joint Stability Operations” defines reconstruction as “the ability to rebuild the critical systems or infrastructure (i.e. physical, economic, justice, governance, societal) necessary to facilitate long-term security and the transition to legitimate local governance. It includes addressing the root cause of the conflict. Reconstruction is likely to be a civil led effort.”
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid, 306.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid, 307.
\textsuperscript{148} Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Operations; Director for Joint Force Development, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 601.
USAID — United States Agency for International Development.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid, 539.