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Abstract
This paper takes as its point of departure the recent publication of Heidegger’s lecture course Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy and focuses upon Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s concept of pathos. Through a comparative analysis of Aristotle’s concept of pathos and Heidegger’s inventive reading of this concept, I aim to show the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger’s reading. It is my thesis that Heidegger’s account is extremely rich and innovative as he frees up pathos from the narrow confines of psychology and incidental change and places it squarely into the center of the fundamental changes affecting a living being’s existence; simultaneously, however, Heidegger sometimes overstates the ties that pathos has with other concepts such as ousia and logos and highlights exceptional rather than common meanings of pathos, thereby risking the charge of being unfaithful to Aristotle’s text.

Introduction
Aristotle’s general influence on Heidegger has been widely acknowledged, certainly by the Meister himself, who once told his students that “[i]t is advisable, therefore, that you postpone reading Nietzsche for the time being, and first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years.” And with the publication of Heidegger’s early lecture courses in the past fifteen to twenty years, we have received deeper insight into the particular “Aristotelian bases” to Heidegger’s thinking. Still yet another aspect of this Aristotelian basis has been unveiled through the publication, in 2002, of Heidegger’s 1924 summer lecture course held in Marburg entitled Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie (GDAP) – i.e. “Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy,” of which an English translation just appeared. This work discusses, among other things, Aristotle’s concept of pathos, which is the precursor for Heidegger’s later concepts of attunement (Stimmung) and disposedness (Befindlichkeit) so central to Heidegger’s Being and Time.
This paper finds its point of departure in the recent publication of the *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* and analyzes Heidegger’s discussion of Aristotle’s concept of *pathos*. Although various publications have appeared that focus upon particularly one part of this discussion in *GDAP*, namely Heidegger’s interpretation of *pathos* in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, as of yet no study has been undertaken that seeks to compare and contrast Heidegger’s *comprehensive* account of Aristotle’s concept of *pathos* in *GDAP* with the meanings of *pathos* in Aristotle’s oeuvre. It is my thesis that Heidegger’s account is extremely rich and innovative as he frees up *pathos* from the narrow confines of psychology and incidental change and places it squarely into the center of the fundamental changes affecting a living being’s existence; simultaneously, however, Heidegger sometimes overstates the ties that *pathos* has with other concepts such as *ousia* and *logos* and highlights exceptional rather than common meanings of *pathos*, thereby risking the charge of being unfaithful to Aristotle’s text.

While it is important to understand that Aristotle’s concept of *pathos* informs Heidegger’s later concept of attunement (*Stimmung*) and disposedness (*Befindlichkeit*), it lays outside the scope of this article to discuss this particular development, as my main task here is to clarify Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, which is already a significantly challenging project considering the difficulty and density of Heidegger’s text. Thus, this essay hopes to offer a helpful comparative analysis in conjunction with the recent publication and translation of Heidegger’s lecture course, and it aims at offering an evaluation of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s concept of *pathos*.

We shall begin by giving an overview of the five main senses of *pathos* as they are found across Aristotle’s corpus. We will subsequently give an overview of
Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s concept of *pathos*, which is followed by an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger’s reading.

1. The five main senses of *pathos* in Aristotle’s corpus

   The concept of *pathos* emerges across Aristotle’s entire oeuvre, in his physics, metaphysics, rhetoric, psychology, and ethics. Within these works, *pathos* shows up with a wide variety of meanings, such as changeable quality, illness, emotion, and excruciating suffering. This spectrum of meanings within Aristotle’s works becomes even larger if we also take into consideration related nouns such as *pathēma* and *pathēsis*, and related predicates such as *pathētikos*. It is exactly this wide spectrum of meanings of *pathos* and its related terms that has made it difficult to provide a comprehensive overview.

   Bonitz’s *Index Aristotelicus* provides a critical starting-point for assessing the various uses of the concept of *pathos* in Aristotle. Bonitz classifies *pathos* into five major spheres of meaning. He shows pivotal distinctions between these five different senses, while also granting correlations between them. It is important to discuss Bonitz’s classification here, since it allows for a helpful comparison with Heidegger’s reading of *pathos*. We will list Bonitz’s account of the five senses of *pathos* below, and we will return to their overlap following this overview.

   1) Bonitz first lists *pathos* as the *ergon* – the work or effect – of the process of being acted upon (*paschein*), i.e., of what is being done and what something is undergoing. This sense explicitly connects *pathos* with the concept of *paschein*, which is one of the categories signifying passive motion, i.e., “being acted upon”; notably, *paschein*’s antonym is the concept of *poiein*, which signifies active motion or “acting.” In
this first sense, pathos signifies the product in which the process of being acted upon (paschein) finds its completion. For instance, in Physics III.3, Aristotle discusses how the (passive) process of being taught finds its end in the effect (pathos) of acquiring knowledge (Physics III.3, 202a21-202b22).

(2) The second sense of pathos emerges in connection with the metaphysical concept of the hypokeimenon, the underlying substrate. In this connotation, pathos acquires the significance of attribute – so much so that at times it is used as a synonym for the term “attribute” (symbebēkos), as, for example, in DA I.1, 402a8-9, where Aristotle distinguishes the soul’s nature and ousia from its incidental attributes or pathē. Similarly, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle distinguishes musical or pale as affections or attributes (pathē) that are to be distinguished from the underlying subject who acquires or loses these affections or attributes (Metaphysics IX.7).

(3) Thirdly, pathos acquires meaning with respect to quality, and more particularly, qualitative change (alloiōsis). Here, pathos signifies that quality which is currently changing, or which is changeable. For instance, the coldness of a stone is a pathos since it is able to be changed to its opposite, namely warmth, through heat.

(4) Fourthly, misfortunes and pains of considerable magnitude are also called pathē (Metaphysics V.21, 1022b15-22). The harmful changes with which pathos is associated in this sense refer to the misfortunes and pains that happen “on a large scale,” such as those portrayed in Greek tragedy. The pathē referred to here are not just any sufferings, rather, they are “great afflictions” that are overwhelming and entirely out of proportion, such as being deprived of one’s children.
In Bonitz’s fifth and final listing, *pathos* is taken as affection or upheaval of the soul (*animi perturbatio*).\(^{17}\) In this last rendition, *pathos* should be understood as (painful or pleasurable) affect or emotion of the soul. It is in this connotation that Aristotle speaks in the *Rhetoric* about the *pathē* as “all those sources of change on account of which people differ in their judgments that are accompanied by pain and pleasure” (*Rhetoric* II.1, 1378a20-21).\(^{18}\)

Bonitz’s overview of the different senses of *pathos* is an extremely helpful tool to assess the range and the complexity of Aristotle’s uses of *pathos*. His classification shows important distinctions between the different senses, while also granting correlations between them. For instance, *pathos* as attribute to be distinguished from an underlying substrate is sometimes used in the context of qualitative change (e.g. *GC* I.4, 319b8-13) – thereby allowing for interlacing of the aforementioned second and third spheres of meaning of *pathos*. Also, *pathos* may be used as a “passive” attribute that is to be distinguished from its “active” counterpart (*poiēma*; e.g. *Metaphysics* VII.3 1028b33), thereby evoking overlap between the spheres of meaning of *pathos* as effect of *paschein* and that of *pathos* as attribute. Finally, another instance of connection is that between *pathos* as end-product of *paschein* and *pathos* as quality: *pathos* sometimes emerges as that quality that can change or is changing under the influence of a process of being affected (*paschein*), as *Categories* 8, 9b33 ff. illustrates.

### 2. Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s concept of *pathos*

While Bonitz establishes overlap between some of the spheres of meaning of *pathos* for Aristotle, the virtue of Heidegger’s reading is that it aims at finding far more
cohesive correlations between almost all the different senses of *pathos* in Aristotle. Indeed, Heidegger connects many of the different senses of *pathos* in a new and inventive way, and establishes three “fundamental meanings” of *pathos*. Much more than Bonitz or other commentators, Heidegger shows that *pathos* is not an incidental concept or a mere “byproduct” of other concepts, such as substance (*ousia*) or being (*to einai*). Instead, Heidegger pulls *pathos* out of the (traditional) shadows and shows its intricate connection with the groundbreaking concepts of being, movement, disposition, embodiment, and *logos*.

2.1 *Pathos* as way of being

In his analysis of Aristotle’s concept of *pathos*, Heidegger grants it to have a wide variety of meanings, but he also distinguishes three “fundamental meanings” (*Grundbedeutungen*) of *pathos* in Aristotle. These three main senses are: (1) the “average, immediate” meaning of *pathos* as “changeable quality”; (2) a “specifically ontological” meaning of *pathos* important for the understanding of *kinēsis*, which correlates *pathos* with the ontological concept of being affected (*paschein*); and (3) a more “focused” or “specialized” (*zugespitzte*) meaning: that of *pathos* as a changeable quality with relevance to a definite “being-region of life” (*Seinsgebiet des Lebens*) – passion (*Leidenschaft*) (*GDAP* 167). In this last rendition, *pathos* should be understood as powerful (painful or pleasurable) emotion, affection, or passion.

Compared to Bonitz’s classification, we can establish that Heidegger condenses Bonitz’s five spheres of meaning to three. More specifically, Heidegger omits here the spheres of meaning of *pathos* as attribute and that of *pathos* as misfortune or painful
suffering. Although *pathos* in the latter sense emerges further on in Heidegger’s notes,\(^{21}\) it is important to bear in mind that the sense of *pathos* as attribute does not emerge in Heidegger’s notes, and we will speculate in Section 3 about the reasons for this omission.

Furthermore, in Heidegger’s tripartite classification we can discover a particular hierarchical and interpretative emphasis. The important interpretive step that Heidegger makes is to correlate the third sense of *pathos* – that of a powerful emotion or passion – to the first and second sense of *pathos*. By making *pathos* as emotion or passion the more “specialized” sense that is, simultaneously, connected both to the more common or average sense of *pathos* in the domain of change, and to the “ontological” sense of *pathos* as the effect of the process of suffering or being affected, *pathos* as emotion finds itself grounded in a far broader context: by correlating *pathos* as emotion to physical change and ontology, *pathos* as passion or emotion leaves the narrow domain of psychology and is instead situated within the broader domain of life and its movements.

Moreover, as we will see, Heidegger argues that the lively movement that *pathos* manifests is anything but incidental to who we are as living beings. Rather, *pathos* is to be regarded as one of the ways in which *being* comes to fruition and actuality. To argue for this point, Heidegger proposes a distinct reading of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* II.5. Aristotle’s text states:

> Since there are three *ginomena* in the soul – emotions (*pathē*), capacities (*dynaimēs*), and dispositions (*hexēs*) – virtue (*aretē*) must be one of these (*EN II.5, 1105b19-21*).\(^{22}\)

In his analysis, Heidegger determines that the meaning of *pathos* is directly dependent upon the fact that *pathos* is a *ginomenon* in the soul. Here Heidegger reads the Greek verbal noun *ginomenon* as “that which comes into being,” thus arguing that “*pathos*
belongs to that, which becomes in the soul” (GDAP 168; my italics). However, it is questionable whether ginomenon should be translated in this way, and it may be more reasonable to render it in the commonest sense of “that which is,” in which case we ought to understand pathos as “one of the things which is in the soul.” Especially since there is no question here of an aorist use of the verb gignomai, which would indicate the start of an activity, Heidegger’s translation of pathos as that which “becomes” in the soul could be contested.

Notwithstanding the above critique, Heidegger’s interpretation of pathos as “that which becomes” is a crucial stepping-stone for his interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of pathos, since he argues that pathos is a “way of becoming” (Weise des Werdens) of the soul (GDAP 168, 169). Heidegger argues that the soul, for Aristotle, determines who we are, and is most essentially the being (ousia) of who we are. This means that pathos is not just one of the ways of becoming, but one of the ways of the becoming of being (GDAP 168; my italics). In Heidegger’s words: “Thus, being has three different ways of becoming: p£qh, dun£meij, ›xeij” (GDAP 168). As additional support, Heidegger posits that pathos is a “way of being itself” (Weise des Sein selbst), because pathos in its semantic dependence upon the concept of being acted upon (paschein) signifies “being in the sense of being-moved” (GDAP 172). Heidegger summarizes this argument by stating that pathos is a “being-concept” (Seinsbegriff) (GDAP 172).

By establishing that pathos does not just signify any movement, but is rather to be designated as an essential movement of being, Heidegger frees up pathos from the narrow confines of incidental change, and places it squarely into the center of the
fundamental changes affecting a living being’s existence. The following section will discuss further what kind of movement pathos signifies for Heidegger.

2.2 Pathos as movement

As we saw in the preceding, the axis around which Heidegger’s notion of pathos turns is his interpretation of pathos as movement. To clarify this specific kind of motion, Heidegger quotes Aristotle’s definition of pathos in Metaphysics V.21, where pathos is defined in the following way:

Pathos means in one sense a quality (poiotēs) in virtue of which a thing can be altered (alloiousthai), such as white and black, or sweet and bitter, or heaviness and lightness, or whatever else is of this sort. And in another sense it means the actualizations (energeiai) and the alterations (alloiōseis) of these. Of the latter, it implies especially harmful alterations and motions (blaberai alloiōseis kai kinēseis), and of these most of all those which are painful. Also, misfortunes and pains of considerable magnitude are called pathē (Metaphysics V.21, 1022b15-22).²⁵

In his reading, Heidegger gives a schematic outline of the four senses of pathos that can be distinguished in this passage (GDAP 194-196).²⁶ (1) With regard to the first sense, that of pathos as potentially changeable quality, Heidegger indicates that this is the “broadest and plainest” meaning. Here, pathos characterizes the vulnerability of a being: the fact that something can be affected (betroffen) by something. There is the possibility that something may happen (passieren) to me (GDAP 194/5). (2) Pathos may also signify the actual change of quality. Here, Heidegger reads energeia as being-there (Dasein), thus writing that such pathos is the “being-there of such a shifting occurring-to-one” (umschlagenden Mit-einem-Geschehen; GDAP 195).²⁷ (3) In the third connotation of pathos as harmful change, we find, according to Heidegger, an even narrower meaning,
namely “that which happens to me, is harmful (abträglich) to me in its happening” (GDAP 195). In addition, Heidegger notes that pathos is also painful insofar as one’s attunement (Stimmung) is affected through this happening. (4) In its fourth sense, pathos designates the ‘size’ or the ‘measure’ (Ausmaß) of that which happens to one. Heidegger characterizes pathos in this connotation through the expression “That is a blow (Schlag) to me” (GDAP 195).28

The changeable nature of pathos that emerges in Aristotle’s texts – ranging from potential, neutral changes to life-altering, dramatic events – reveal, according to Heidegger, the “genuine relatedness of pathos” (GDAP 195): the fact that pathos is always related to the being of living things (das Sein des Lebenden; Heidegger’s italics), and particularly to their being disposed in a certain way (Je-und-je-sich-so-Befinden) (GDAP 195). According to Heidegger, pathos befalls one and strikes one into (schlägt einen in) this disposedness (Befindlichkeit).

By emphasizing the relationship between pathos as lively movement and its underlying disposedness, Heidegger takes a clear stance in his reading of pathos. Instead of seeing pathos as an isolated event to be observed in abstraction from the being that undergoes such pathos, Heidegger draws the change together with the condition of the being that undergoes such change. In this manner, Heidegger seeks to highlight a crucial issue that may be easily overlooked: that of the relationship between the affects that a being undergoes and the underlying disposition that makes those affects possible, either in an obstructing or in a facilitating way. For this reason, Heidegger writes that “pathos is not a turning around or changing that has its course set for itself, but a mode of being disposed (Sichbefinden) in the world that, at the same time, stands in a possible relation
to *hexis*” (*GDAP* 171). In this regard, Heidegger makes clear that our dispositions are not to be isolated from the way the world affects us, and neither can our affections be isolated from our dispositions or *hexeis*. As Heidegger highlights, there is a fundamental correlation between our dispositions and our affections. Just as the *pathē* are characteristic of our entire human being and our *Befindlichkeit* in the world (*GDAP* 192), similarly our susceptibility or *hexis* can only find expression through and in the actual *pathē* with which it is connected. Thus, *pathos* confronts us with the fact that we are always already disposed in a particular way. Simultaneously, a disposition or *hexis* forms the “guiding thread” for grasping the being-structure (*Seinsstruktur*) of *pathos*” (*GDAP* 191).

*Pathos* constitutes a change that can be painful and destructive to the being that undergoes it, specifically as we saw in the fourth connotation listed by Heidegger, where *pathos* is associated with the ‘size’ or ‘measure’ of such painful events. Yet, Heidegger also notes that *pathos* does not necessarily have this destructive effect: it can also have the character of salvation (*Retten*) in the sense of the Greek *soidzein* – saving oneself and coming into oneself (*GDAP* 196). In support of this reading, Heidegger cites the discussion of being affected (*paschein*) in *De Anima* II.5, where Aristotle argues that there are two senses of *paschein*: one that implies change and thus the “destruction of something by its contrary” (II.5, 417b3) and the other implying the actualization of something. This latter sense involves “the salvation (*sōteria*) of that which is potential by something actual which is like it” (II.5, 417b4-5). It is this latter sense of *sōteria* that Heidegger wants to highlight, since it indicates that *pathos* in its connection with *paschein* can have a very positive meaning in contrast to the sense of destruction and pain
that we find in *Metaphysics* V.22. *Pathic* movement can lead to destruction, but can also mean the coming to fruition and full actualization of something. To illustrate, Heidegger gives Aristotle’s example of the builder who, by building a house, does not become different than what he was, but actually becomes what he is through building. It is not accurate to describe the builder as being “changed” through his building, rather it is more accurate to state that the builder fully becomes what and who he is through building. More precisely, it seems that through the activity, the disposition of the builder is *preserved*. As Heidegger phrases it: “the *hexis* is being saved (*gerettet*)” (*GDAP* 196).

What this explanation of Aristotle’s *De Anima* does is show the fluency with which Heidegger connects the various senses of *pathos* and *paschein*. Heidegger seeks to complement the destructive sense of *pathos* in *Metaphysics* V.21 with the enriching sense of *pathos* as finding fulfillment and completion of one’s disposition, thereby showing *pathos*’ ambiguity: on the one hand, a process whereby one can be deprived of one’s own disposition (as in aging and losing particular dispositions) and, on the other hand, a process of sublation (*Aufhebung*) to a higher, authentic state of realizing oneself (*GDAP* 197, cf. 242). Thus to truly ‘have *pathos*’ in Heidegger’s terms is the opposite of fleeing from one’s being. The pleasure that *pathos* brings consists of being opened up (*Aufschluß haben*) to one’s being-in-the-world (*GDAP* 247).

### 2.3 *Pathos* as embodied life

Heidegger also points out that, for Aristotle, *pathos* as way of the becoming of being is not only limited to the soul, but includes the *entire* human being. As Heidegger writes: “the originary unity of the phenomenon of the *phq* lies in the being of human
beings as such” (GDAP 177). To demonstrate that Aristotle himself saw the pathē as a unified phenomenon encompassing both body and soul, 29 Heidegger turns to De Anima I.1, where Aristotle states that “all pathē seem to be with (meta) a body” (DA I.1, 403a16; cf. GDAP 203 ff.). In Heidegger’s words, the pathē are always the pathē of a body (GDAP 206).

This holistic aspect of pathos also emerges in the inclusion of pleasure and pain in Aristotle’s formulation in the Nicomachean Ethics that the pathē are “accompanied (hēpetai) by pleasure or pain” (EN II.5, 1105b21-24). Thus, with each pathos that one experiences, one’s own personal well-being is affected, either in terms of a “higher” or “lower” sense of well-being, which Heidegger characterizes as a “higher-or lower-being-attuned” (GDAP 170). 30 Heidegger stresses that we should read the Greek verb hēpetai as “accompany” instead of the common translation “follow,” since pain and pleasure do not “follow” the pathē, but are simultaneously present with the emergence of the pathē. 31

Heidegger translates the pain and pleasure of which Aristotle speaks here as a form of being-situated or being-disposed (Befindlichkeit, Sichbefinden, GDAP 243, 244), since it is in pleasure and pain that our own being-in-relation is disclosed in either a pleasurable or a painful way. Heidegger emphasizes that since the quest for pleasure is given with living itself (GDAP 245), pleasure is not just a temporary phenomenon (GDAP 245), but fundamental to life itself. This implies that we, as living beings, can only be interested in particular pathē because we are fundamentally affective beings, i.e. situated and invested in our existence.

With this latter designation of pleasure as being inherent to life, which makes pathos inherent to life, we find that Heidegger once again pulls pathos squarely into the
center of the living human being. Similar to his assessment of *pathos* as ‘way of our being,’ his assessment of *pathos* as being-disposed locates *pathos* in the core of our being, and thereby circumvents the understanding of *pathos* as a merely temporary phenomenon. In addition, Heidegger views *pathos* as given with life as such, and does not place *pathos* in the narrow framework of cause and effect.

### 2.4 *Pathos* as basis for *logos*

For his interpretation of the relationship between *pathos* and *logos* in Aristotle, Heidegger turns to the definition of the *pathē* given in *Rhetoric* II.1:

> The *pathē* are those sources of change on account of which people differ (*metaballontes*) in their judgments (*kriseis*) that are accompanied by pain and pleasure (*Rhet.* II.1, 1378a20-21).³²

In Heidegger’s reading of this passage, three things stand out. First, he again emphasizes that *pathos* is to be associated with movement or change – as expressed by the term *metaballontes* (*GDAP* 170). It is through the *pathē* that we radically change from one mode of being disposed (*Befindlichkeit*) to another. Secondly, through this change of mood, we take in or adopt another stance or position (*Stellung*), thereby reading Aristotle’s “judgment” in the broad sense of stance or position (*GDAP* 170). Thirdly, Heidegger emphasizes that pain or pleasure is constitutive of *pathos* and not just an after-effect (*GDAP* 170). With regard to the second point, Heidegger reads the “change of judgment” that follows *pathos* in a broad sense, as pertaining not just to a singular, isolated judgment, but to our entire being positioned towards the world (*GDAP* 170). Drawing upon Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, Heidegger sketches a vivid picture of a speaker
addressing his audience, appealing to their pathē and thereby allowing them to “take in a stance” towards the world (Stellungnahme zur Welt; GDAP 170).

In Heidegger’s view, by obtaining greater clarity about the fundamental role that the pathē play with regard to our being positioned and directed towards the world, we also acquire more clarity about the “soil” or ground (Boden) for logos (GDAP 169). More specifically, Heidegger argues that the pathē are the fundamental possibilities according to which Dasein primarily orients itself about itself (GDAP 262), since the pathē “are the ground (Boden) out of which speaking grows (erwächst) and into which what has been spoken or expressed (das Ausgesprochene) grows back (wieder wächst)” (GDAP 262).33

As an example of the fundamental role that the pathē play in the formation of speaking (logos), Heidegger cites Rhet. II.5, 1383a6 where Aristotle argues that people who become anxious approach others to deliberate and to obtain advice. He concludes that fear is the kind of disposition (Befindlichkeit) that brings one to speak (GDAP 261); especially when we are not simply fearful, but when we experience dread (Angst) and a sense of uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit) we begin to speak, according to Heidegger (GDAP 261).

The important insight that can be drawn from Heidegger’s reading is that pathos is not a particular isolated phenomenon occurring in one’s mind, but one that grounds us in a far deeper and more fundamental way, as the foundation of our own speaking – both the beginning of speaking, and the speaking with each other. This also implies that speaking or logos does not occur in isolation, but is grounded in a far-wider orientation originating with our affectedness. In addition, logos gains broader appeal than that of just
“thinking,” as Heidegger associates it with a general “attitude” or stance towards the world.

3. The strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger’s reading

The overall strength of Heidegger’s reading is the ease and versatility with which he correlates various passages on *pathos* in Aristotle’s corpus. By seeking connections between the different senses, the isolated notions of *pathos* (such as *pathos* as emotion or *pathos* as qualitative change) acquire underpinnings in a far wider Aristotelian metaphysical project than is usually surmised. Moreover, Heidegger expands the scope of meaning of *pathos* by showing its interconnections with fundamental concepts of Aristotelian ontology and physics, such as substance, soul, movement, matter, disposition, and *logos*.

As for the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger’s *specific* analyses above, we would do well to consider these individually:

1. The strengths of Heidegger’s reading of *pathos* as “way of being” is that it highlights the fact that *pathos* as mood or emotion finds broader metaphysical grounding in the concept of change and being affected (*paschein*), which shows that *pathos* is central to understanding the process of becoming who we are. The weakness of this reading, however, is that his interpretation of *pathos* moves extremely quickly through Aristotle’s concepts without showing the fundamental connections in Aristotle’s text. For instance, Heidegger’s conclusion that *pathos* is a “way of being” hinges upon the argument that *pathos* must be a way of becoming of being, since it is a movement that takes place in the soul, which is an *ousia* (*GDAP* 168, 169). This deduction is made too
swiftly though, and needs more explanation, especially since we know from Aristotle’s works that *pathos* is often *not* associated with the coming-into-being of a substance (*ousia*), but is used to indicate qualitative change, which is sometimes explicitly opposed to substantial change.\(^{34}\) The fact that Heidegger overstates the relationship between *ousia* and *pathos* goes hand in hand with Heidegger’s failure to mention that *pathos* can mean attribute. In my view, Heidegger does not discuss this sense of *pathos* since it does not fit with his overall project of showing the important connections that *pathos* has with other fundamental concepts of Aristotelian ontology and physics.

(2) With regard to Heidegger’s reading of *pathos* as movement, we can fully endorse the emphasis that Heidegger places on movement and being-moved as the central core of *pathos*, as this thesis finds ample proof in Aristotle’s texts. Yet, a weakness of this reading is Heidegger’s focus on the human being (*GDAP* 169, 177) as the main one to undergo these *pathic* movements. When Heidegger speaks about how painful *pathos* may affect our (human) attunements (*GDAP* 195), it would have been interesting to hear how painful *pathē* affect other living beings such as animals. Especially given the fact that we do find instances in Aristotle’s works mentioning, for instance, illness\(^{35}\) in animals (e.g. *Parts of Animals* III.4, 667a33-34), it would have been worthwhile to hear Heidegger’s take on the use of *pathos* in this more inclusive framework.\(^{36}\)

Moreover, we find Heidegger’s focus on *pathos* as salvation or rescue (*sōteria*) a bit skewed, especially since in Aristotle’s *De Anima* Aristotle leaves open the option that the process of actualization with which salvation is associated may not be called *paschein* properly speaking (*DA* II.5, 417b13-14). In addition, this instance of salvation is mostly discussed in *DA* within the context of sense-perception. The implications that Heidegger
draws for our general understanding of pathos as allowing us to truly become who we are (GDAP 196), and to be open (Aufschluß) to our own being-in-the-world (GDAP 244), seem to stray too far from Aristotle’s own textual context, which focuses upon the actualization of sense-perception. In addition, we need to note that pathos is often discussed within the context of very painful and destructive events (e.g. Poetics 11, 1452b10-13). Heidegger’s emphatic reading of pleasurable and salvatory pathos seems to highlight an exception rather than the rule.

(3) Heidegger’s reading of pathos as embodied life is extremely valuable, as it gives back to the human being that which has been overlooked in philosophy for a long time, namely: the body. Furthermore, if it is true that Aristotle’s notion of pathos gives rise to Heidegger’s notion of attunement, and if Aristotle’s notion of pathos includes that of embodiment, we find in Heidegger’s analysis of pathos at the same time the body of Dasein, which, according to critics of Heidegger, has been famously absent from his analyses.37

(4) The strength of Heidegger’s analysis of pathos as the basis or ground for logos lies in his strategic reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, which draws attention to the correlation between pathos and speaking, pathos and taking a stance, and pathos and co-deliberation with others. Yet, we can also detect a weakness in this reading, since Heidegger only focuses upon a few passages in Aristotle’s Rhetoric to justify his claim that pathos is the basis or ground for logos. The narrow focus of his reading is especially problematic, since we can point to numerous passages elsewhere that would contradict the idea that pathos is the foundation for logos. For instance, in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics we find important textual evidence that argues that pathos can sometimes act
completely on its own – without any collaboration with choice (prohairesis), and thus without attendant logos. Again, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle gives the example of a man who acts completely out of anger (V.6, 1134a21), arguing that in such a case no logos was involved in the man’s actions. For this reason, the person acting in such a manner is less culpable or perhaps not even culpable at all (cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* V.8, 1135b19-27).38

Admittedly, the passages just cited (which emphasize the possibility of a disconnection between pathos and logos) do not imply that a connection between the two is impossible. On the contrary, Aristotle argues in the *Nicomachean Ethics* precisely for the proper interaction and intertwinement of logos and our affectivity or pathos. This emerges particularly prominently in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle shows that practical wisdom or phronēsis works in close collaboration with moral virtue, and thus with our affectivity or pathos. Yet, one wonders whether Aristotle would approve of Heidegger’s claim that pathos is the ground for logos, and would not rather want to argue that logos and pathos necessarily complement each other. The claim that one would be the basis or ground (Boden) for the other may serve Heidegger’s polemic against rationalism nicely by arguing that attunement is more primordial than logos,39 but it may not work so well when viewed against an Aristotelian background. For Aristotle, our pathē have to be shaped through our logos, and our logos finds shape in and through our pathē. Put simply, for Aristotle, pathos and logos complement and co-constitute one another, instead of one founding the other, as Heidegger boldly claims.

**Conclusion**
Having assessed the specific strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger’s account, we should reach the conclusion that Heidegger’s analysis is extremely rich and innovative in its reading of Aristotle’s concept of *pathos*. For Heidegger is the one who puts *pathos* back on the “Aristotelian map” by showing the fundamental interconnections between the various senses of *pathos* as well as its connections with crucial concepts such as being, movement, disposition, embodiment, and *logos*. Indeed, Heidegger is very keen on showing how important affectivity is for all these strands of Aristotelian thought, and the recent surge of studies investigating *physis*, *kinēsis*, *dynamis*, and *energeia*\(^{40}\) in Aristotle’s works is testament to the visionary role that Heidegger has played in pursuing *pathos* and movement as central to Aristotle’s thinking.

At the same time, this article has also shown that Heidegger’s analysis has some weaknesses too, insofar as it moves at times rather swiftly through Aristotle’s texts and fails to mention that *pathos* can also play a more subsidiary role in Aristotle’s universe – where *pathos* sometimes merely means attribute or incident. Moreover, at times, Heidegger overstates connections between *pathos* and other concepts, or is too invested in the positive aspects of *pathos*, which leads him to overemphasize its role as rescue or salvation, whereas the context of Aristotle’s works points to something far more humble or prosaic, such as the simple actualization of sense-perception.

Despite the problems with Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s concept of *pathos* however, we think the strengths of Heidegger’s analysis win out over the weaknesses. Heidegger’s reading has opened up the dynamic, fluid world of Aristotle’s thinking of affectivity, and forces us to look more carefully both at Aristotle’s individual works and at the oeuvre as such in search for conceptual understanding and intertwining.\(^{41}\)

2 Cf. Thomas Sheehan: “The ‘secret’ of the Aristotelian bases to Heidegger’s thought lies hidden in Heidegger’s courses from 1919 to 1952”; T. J. Sheehan, 1975, p. 87. Importantly, before the publication of these courses, T. Kisiel gave access to the main ideas of these courses through his clear summaries in his book *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1993.

3 M. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie* (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann) 2002 (from hereon GDAP); an English translation by Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer was published in June 2009 under the title *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* with Indiana University Press.

4 Since the meaning of the term *pathos* is under investigation here, we will often use the transliteration *pathos* instead of working with translations. Notably, the Greek term *pathos* has many meanings, which we will discuss further in subsequent sections of this paper. Cf. Liddell & Scott, *Greek and English Dictionary*, revised & augmented by H.S. Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1996, p. 1285.


6 Translators have chosen to translate *Befindlichkeit* in different ways. For example, Macquarrie and Robinson choose to translate it as “state-of-mind,” while Wrathall opts to translate *Befindlichkeit* as “disposedness”: M. Wrathall, *How to Read Heidegger* (New York: Norton) 2005, p. 32 ff. We have chosen here to translate *Befindlichkeit* as disposedness, which although awkward in English prevents the misunderstanding that *Befindlichkeit* implies a turn to consciousness as suggested by “state-of-mind.” As for the meaning of the term *Befindlichkeit*, Owsley argues that the crucial aspect of *Befindlichkeit* is that you *find* yourself in a particular state, which is not something chosen or invented: R.M. Owsley, “Heidegger: Being, Moods and Feelings,” in *Southwest Philosophical Studies*, pp. 61-69, Spring 1990, p. 63. Notably, Heidegger also sometimes uses the term *Befindlichkeit* to translate the Greek terms *hexis* or *diathesis* (as when Heidegger speaks of the *Befindlichkeit* of the hearer, which can change; GDAP 170).


9 Unfortunately, hardly any contemporary scholars have researched the different senses of *pathos* across Aristotle’s corpus. An important exception is A. Oksenberg-Rorty, “Aristotle on the Metaphysical Status of *Pathē*,” *Review of Metaphysics* 38 (March 1984), pp. 521-546.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.


16 Alexander Aphrodisias speaks of the case of “one who has been deprived of his children or fatherland” as one who is “*en pathei*.” Alexander Aphrodisias, 1994, 418,32-33. He also speaks in this same line of the one who suffers some extraordinary grief (*ti ekasaiton lupēron pathōn*).

17 Bonitz, 1955 [1870], p. 557.


19 The translation of Metcalf and Tanzer uses “resulting” for *zugespitzte*, which in our view is incorrect, especially since Heidegger indicates that the third sense of *pathos* pertains to a particular, definite context, thus making the translation “specialized” or “focused” more fitting within this passage. Cf. R.D. Metcalf and M.B. Tanzer, 2009, p. 113.

20 In his overview of the different meanings of *pathos*, Heidegger’s analysis seems to reflect Bonitz’s entries of the different meanings of *pathos* very closely. Cf. Bonitz, 1870, pp. 555-557.

21 *Pathos* in the sense of painful suffering is discussed on p. 199 of *GDAP*.

22 This translation is my own, partly based on M. Ostwald, Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill) 1962.


24 By contrast, Aquinas, in his interpretation of the same passage, chooses to speak here of *ginomena* as “principles,” thus translating the above passage in this way: “There are three principles in the soul: passions, powers, and virtues” (II.I.V.: C 290). Aquinas regards the emotions, capacities, and dispositions as *principles of operation* – arguing that we may sometimes act on the basis of the principle of emotion, sometimes on the basis of mere potentiality, and sometimes on the basis of an established disposition.

Aquinas writes: “Now no principle of operation is found in the soul outside these three. Sometimes a man seems to act from passion, for example, anger; sometimes from habit, as when he works by art, sometimes from mere potentiality, as when he begins a new activity” (II.I.V.: C 290). Vis-à-vis Heidegger’s interpretation, Aquinas’ interpretation would not deny that *EN II.5 1105b19-21* needs to be taken in the context of movements that emerge from the soul, but Aquinas also makes clear that the emphasis should not be on the movements themselves, but on the *sources* that underlie the soul’s movements and activities. That Aristotle, in this account, omits other aspects related to the soul, is also admitted by Aquinas, who writes: “it is obvious that not absolutely everything is included in this division – the essence of the soul, and the operation of the intellect do not belong here – but only the things that are principles of some operation are considered” (II.I.V.: C 290); St. T. Aquinas, *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by C.I. Litzinger, O.P. (Chicago: H. Regeney Company) 1964.


26 Heidegger’s outline can be compared to Carvallo’s outline, which is added to Bonitz’s translations of *Aristoteles’ Metaphysik*, 2 vols. translated by H. Bonitz & newly edited, with introduction and commentary by H. Seidl (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag) 1982. Carvallo distinguishes between three sub-categories: changeable quality (*poiotēs*), change of quality (*alloiōs*), and harmful change of quality (*blabera alloiōsis*) (1968, p. 120). The advantage of Carvallo’s outline is that one can clearly see the interrelations between the various definitions, while also emphasizing the main association of *pathos* with change of quality. Bonitz and Carvallo, however, omit the fourth listing in Aristotle’s outline, that of *pathos* as great misfortune.

Heidegger, by contrast, mentions this fourth listing explicitly.

27 An alternate translation for this might be “a happening-with-one that turns one around.”

28 Note here that Heidegger makes use of many variations of the German term “Schlag,” as becomes apparent in his usage of *schlagen, einschlagen, umschlagen, “das ist ein Schlag für mich”* etc. (*GDAP* 195).
Heidegger’s definition of *pathos* in terms of higher or lower well-being strongly echoes Bonitz’s assessment of *pathos*. Cf. H. Bonitz, *Aristotelische Studien, Fünf Teile in einem Band* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag buchhandlung) 1969, p. 348

Dirlmeier notes, however, in his commentary to the EE, that this definition of *pathos*, by including pain and pleasure, is rather *unspecific*, since actions are also accompanied by pleasure and pain. F. Dirlmeier, *Aristotle’s Eudemische Ethik*, translated by F. Dirlmeier (Berlin: Akademie Verlag) 1962, p. 239 ff.

Leighton examines in his essay “Aristotle and the Emotions” how we should read “accompaniment” here as accompaniment in the sense of “frequent occurrence” (p.217) or as a necessary, conceptual link. Similar to Heidegger, he argues that pain and pleasure are a necessary and conceptual part of the emotions. Leighton concludes that “pleasure and pain is part of the concept of the emotion; neither is separable from the emotion. For each emotion-type there is a type of pleasure or pain peculiar to that emotion” (S. Leighton, “Aristotle and the Emotions,” in: A. Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric*, (Berkeley: University of California Press) 1996, p. 220.

By using the terms *Boden* and *wachsen*, Heidegger seems to hint at the fact that speaking grows naturally in and out of *pathos*. In Section 29 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger expresses the correlation between *pathos* and speaking in a very similar manner. He argues how Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is an important systematic engagement with “the everydayness of Being with one another,” and that this everyday kind of Being “not only has in general its own way of having a mood, but needs moods and ‘makes’ them for itself. It is into such a mood and out of such a mood that the orator speaks” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (New York: Harper), 1962, section 29, p. 178/ H.138-9. In his assessment of Heidegger’s understanding of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in *GDAP* and *Being and Time*, P.C. Smith argues that Heidegger continues Plato’s and Aristotle’s suspicion of rhetorical speech as being associated with “the many,” and de-acoustifies and de-vocalizes practical rhetoric in his turn to theoretical dialectic and the voiceless call of conscience: P.C. Smith, “The Uses and Abuses of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology: The Lecture Course, Summer 1924,” in: B.E. Babich, *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire* (Dordrecht: Kluwer) 1995, pp. 315-333. For an interesting argument regarding the relationship of attunement and thinking in Heidegger’s corpus as such, see M. Haar, “Attunement and Thinking,” in: H. Dreyfus & H. Hall (eds.), *Heidegger: A Critical Reader* (Cambridge: Blackwell) 1992, pp. 159-172. Haar asks whether there is a place in the later Heidegger for non-historical moods, and concludes that it is anxiety, in fact, that is “trans-epochal” (p. 170) and that forms “the pathos in and out of such a mood that the orator speaks” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (New York: Harper), 1962, section 29, p. 178/ H.138-9. In his assessment of Heidegger’s understanding of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in *GDAP* and *Being and Time*, P.C. Smith argues that Heidegger continues Plato’s and Aristotle’s suspicion of rhetorical speech as being associated with “the many,” and de-acoustifies and de-vocalizes practical rhetoric in his turn to theoretical dialectic and the voiceless call of conscience: P.C. Smith, “The Uses and Abuses of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology: The Lecture Course, Summer 1924,” in: B.E. Babich, *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire* (Dordrecht: Kluwer) 1995, pp. 315-333. For an interesting argument regarding the relationship of attunement and thinking in Heidegger’s corpus as such, see M. Haar, “Attunement and Thinking,” in: H. Dreyfus & H. Hall (eds.), *Heidegger: A Critical Reader* (Cambridge: Blackwell) 1992, pp. 159-172. Haar asks whether there is a place in the later Heidegger for non-historical moods, and concludes that it is anxiety, in fact, that is “trans-epochal” (p. 170) and that forms “the background tonality of our age and of the thought of passage” (pp. 170-171).

As discussed in Section 1 of this paper. Cf. Bonitz, 1955 [1870], p. 556

Cf. Bonitz, 1969, p. 347. Note that in the English language there is also a close semantic relation between *pathos* and illness, as words such as *pathology*, *pathogenic*, and *patient* indicate.

In this regard, the 1924 summer lecture course foreshadows the same focus and strategic concern of *Being and Time*, in being foremost interested in Dasein’s understanding of being.

Cf. Bonitz, 1969, pp. 349-53 and 359-70. Haar argues that *Stimmung* has a privileged relationship with the body, and that our dispositions are always accompanied by physiological modifications. Nonetheless, these physiological modifications never determine our attunements, but are always subsumed under Dasein’s *Stimmung* and its general situatedness (p.71, our italics). Citing Heidegger’s *Grundfragen der Philosophie* GA 45, p. 145, Haar shows how Heidegger aims to include the body in his account of affectivity, without making it the determining factor in Dasein’s understanding of the world.

Whereas *pathos* may, on its own account, sometimes lead to unjust actions, *pathos*’ effects may also be positive. For instance, when young people act purely on the basis of spirited temper (*thumos*), their actions resemble those of courageous people (*EN* III.8, 1117a3-8).

This reading of Aristotle, which emphasizes the fact that *pathos* precedes something like rational judgment, resonates in Heidegger’s own evolving theory of the attunements. For instance, in his 1929...


41 I would like to express my gratitude to my colleagues at USF, and specifically Gerard Kuperus, for their critical comments on an earlier version of this paper. In addition, I would like to thank the Philosophy Dept. of MSU for inviting me to present a version of this paper within their colloquium series and I am particularly grateful to Christian Lotz and Corinne Painter for giving me feedback on this paper in both its incipient and later stages. In addition, I benefited from critical comments I received at the 2010 meeting of “Continental Philosophy in the Desert” at the University of New Mexico. Finally, I am indebted to Kristin Drake and Heather Fox for their assistance with the final edits and to the anonymous reviewer of *Epoché* whose excellent suggestions helped me clarify my writing.