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Territoriality, Sovereignty and the Nation-state System in Israel-Palestine: The Creation of the Palestinian Bantustan “state” and Shifting Palestinian Resistance Tactics

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University of San Francisco

**Territoriality, Sovereignty and the Nation-state System in Israel-
Palestine:
The Creation of the Palestinian Bantustan “state” and Shifting
Palestinian Resistance Tactics**

A Thesis Presented to
The Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences
Master’s Program in International Studies

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in International Studies

by
Sara Hughes
December 2011

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in

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

by

Sara Hughes
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UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO

Under the guidance and approval of this committee, and approval by all the members,
this thesis has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree.

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Abstract

The conflict in Israel-Palestine is over the sovereign control of territory and takes place within a global framework made up of clearly defined nation-states. It is within this framework that Israeli colonial expansion and construction of the separation barrier in the West Bank attempt to maximize Israeli annexation of the oPt while creating a Palestinian Bantustan “state” to contain and isolate the Palestinian people in non-sovereign territorial enclaves through the use of territoriality as a strategy for exercising sovereignty. In response to this obvious process of cantonization, Palestinians are resisting by supporting Israeli annexation – of the West Bank *and* its Arab population. That way, the Palestinian people can protect their rights *as citizens of the State of Israel*.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The conflict in Israel-Palestine is, at its core, a conflict over land and its control, regardless of the symbolic or practical connections each group has to this specific piece of territory. Noam Chomsky frames it as a “conflict between two nations that claim the right of national self-determination in the same territory, which each regards as its historic homeland,” and numerous authors and scholars agree with this assessment (Chomsky 2003, 83; Yiftachel 2002; Gelvin 2005, 2007; Zertal & Eldar 2005, 2007; Roy 2006). The present conflict is not over the formation of a Jewish State; such a state exists within the 1949 borders and is going nowhere (despite the fact that some supporters of Israeli policy may say otherwise). Rather, today the conflict centers on the Israeli colonization of the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) (the West Bank and Gaza Strip). This thesis will focus primarily on the West Bank where Israeli expansion is



Image 1: The author in front of a section of the separation barrier (From personal collection).

ongoing through construction of the separation barrier¹. Clearly, the main issue of this conflict is the delimitation of Palestine; according to Gideon Biger, “[t]he whole issue can be summarized by one question—where should the separation line run?” (Biger 2008, 91). The goal of Israeli expansion is the maximization of its territory and the creation of Palestinian Bantustans to house the native Arab population (Biger 2008, 68).

I theorize that construction of the “security” barrier in the West Bank is part of an ongoing process to maximize Israel’s territorial annexation of the oPt. The cantonization of the West Bank Palestinians serves the interests of the State of Israel in that it enables Israel to annex as much of the Palestinian *territory* as possible without annexing the Palestinian *people*, thereby disrupting the demographic balance of the Jewish State. The creation of a Palestinian Bantustan “state” (made up of 3 or more cantons in the West Bank, plus Gaza) would allow Israel to maximize its annexation of the oPt without being responsible for the Palestinian people, who would have their own (*de jure*, not *de facto*) state within which to govern themselves “independently.” Obviously, this Palestinian Bantustan entity would not be sovereign, according to the Westphalian model, but the occupation would continue under another name without Israel being officially responsible for the rights and well-being of the Palestinian people.

When I assert that a Palestinian Bantustan “state” would not be sovereign, I mean this in the sense that it will have no territorial contiguity, no control over the flows of trade, populations or information across its borders (which would all be shared with

¹ Throughout the course of this paper, the scholars cited and I may refer to the barrier/wall interchangeably as: the separation barrier/wall, the apartheid barrier/wall, or the “security” barrier/wall. In the last instance, when I called it a “security” barrier, I’m implying that it really has nothing to do with security. Authors who call it the security barrier, without quotes, believe/assert that it does serve a security purpose. Additionally, some authors may refer to the barrier as the Wall – capitalized to suggest a specific wall: the one being constructed by Israel in the West Bank.

Israel, as the Israeli state would surround the Bantustans), no control over its airspace, etc. The “state” would remain economically trapped and dependent on Israel. As far as security for Palestinians is concerned, it is unlikely that the “state” would be allowed (by Israel) to have a strong standing army. Additionally, the way the Bantustans are emerging, a majority if not all of the water resources and the most viable land will be claimed by the Jewish State, and Palestinians would not have access to these resources (i.e., the “state” could not be self-sufficient). In summation, the Palestinian Bantustan entity would not be able to keep Israel *out*, and therefore “statehood” would not fulfill the requirement of Westphalian sovereignty and its principle of nonintervention: “political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory” (Krasner 1999, 4). The occupation would continue under another name since, as Jeff Halper explains it, Palestinians would remain under Israel’s “matrix of control” (Halper 2006, 63).

The Palestinian people are responding to this trend by calling for complete Israeli annexation of the oPt, so that they might defend their rights as citizens of Israel rather than continue under occupation in a series of non-sovereign Bantustans. Though historically anti-colonial struggle has aimed at pushing back from the colonizer and creating a separate, sovereign entity where the native inhabitants could enjoy their right to self-determination, Palestinians are resisting in a way that breaks with most struggles for decolonization. Palestinians are pushing for annexation into Israel because they recognize that a Palestinian “state,” as being modeled by Israel, would never be truly sovereign. Therefore, instead of pursuing national self-determination as an independent state, they are attempting to protect their natural rights *as citizens of the state of Israel*.

Not all Palestinians are choosing annexation – this is a new trend. In fact, this year the Palestinian Authority, purportedly representing the Palestinian people, went to the United Nations to unilaterally declare Palestinian statehood – a move that could have very negative ramifications for the Palestinian people if that state should be formed on the territory currently unoccupied by Israel. This push for statehood could, in fact, irreparably damage the Palestinian national cause, ensuring their cantonization in numerous non-sovereign, discontinuous, and isolated territorial enclaves.

Things look bleak for Palestinians because a Palestinian state will never be truly independent of Israel and is more likely to take the form of a collection of non-sovereign Bantustans. However Israel should be wary, because it is an “essential condition” that “[n]o battle... takes place as those who planned it anticipated” (Tolstoy quoted in Scott 1998, 309). Israel has planned for the cantonization of the West Bank Palestinians, but Palestinian resistance may have found a new tactic that Israelis did not anticipate: annexation as a means for procuring Palestinian rights as citizens. This tactic recognizes that a Palestinian Bantustan “state” would never be truly autonomous, so while historically “[o]vercoming [the historical trajectory set up by the forces of imperialism] required the exertion of force by the inhabitants of the territory,” this new trend in resistance aimed at reversing the trajectory of Israeli colonization, but is instead calling Israel’s bluff by continuing on this trajectory towards total annexation (Kohn & McBride 2011, 110). The danger is that “even achieving the status as citizen [is] not tantamount to self-determination” and there is no telling what the outcome for Palestinians will be (Kohn & McBride 2011, 57).

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The conflict in Israel-Palestine is over the sovereign control of territory and takes place within a global framework made up of clearly defined nation-states. It is within this framework that Israeli colonial expansion and construction of the separation barrier in the West Bank attempt to maximize Israeli annexation of the oPt while creating Palestinian Bantustans to contain and isolate the Palestinian people in non-sovereign territorial enclaves. In response to this obvious process of cantonization, Palestinians are resisting by supporting Israeli annexation – of the West Bank *and* its Arab population. That way, the Palestinian people can protect their rights *as citizens of the State of Israel*.

Below I will lay out the significance of sovereignty and territoriality in the nation-state system in order to discuss how Israeli expansion into the occupied Palestinian territories represents an attempt to redraw the map of sovereignty in such a way that the “state” of Palestine consists of Bantustans surrounded by Israeli territory. Since territory is commonly regarded as an aspect of sovereignty in international relations theory, and sovereignty is commonly understood as being endemic to the state, it should be clear how these three theories overlap. Sovereignty is based on and bounded by territory, territoriality is a process aimed at creating and controlling a territory, and once this territory is expressed it is embodied by the modern nation-state. All of these commonly accepted assumptions place “Palestine” on shaky ground – without sovereignty, territory, or statehood. However, Palestine does not lack popular resistance, and in the final pages of this literature review I will explain a common pattern of anti-colonial resistance and how Palestinians are breaking from it.

Sovereignty

First I will discuss sovereignty, which is a concept often taken for granted in the contemporary world comprised of bounded nation-states. It is a difficult concept to pin down: every state wants it, is assumed to have it, yet what is it? For Max Weber sovereignty means the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a territory (Weber 1980, 29). Michel Foucault, in *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978*, describes sovereignty as being first of all exercised within the borders of a territory – this is, in fact, its primary characteristic (Foucault 2009, 11). The common thread throughout the literature on sovereignty is that it requires and is bounded by territory. As David Delaney states, “modern sovereignty is inextricable from modern territory” (Delaney 2005, 36).

I will return to this idea of the mutuality of sovereignty and territory towards the end of this section and into the next, but first I would like to outline two forms of sovereignty of particular interest to this study: international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty. According to Stephen D. Krasner in his book *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, sovereignty is “an institutional arrangement associated with a particular bundle of characteristics—recognition, territory, exclusive authority, and effective internal and transborder regulation or control” (Krasner 1999, 227). Not all of these characteristics are always present and sovereignty is regularly compromised and/or violated. The fact that sovereignty has explicit rules that are so often violated is why Krasner refers to it as “organized hypocrisy” (Krasner 1999).

Sovereignty is understood to have four basic components: territory, recognition, autonomy and control. These aspects of sovereignty can be arranged (with varied

emphasis) to produce four different forms of sovereignty: (1) international legal sovereignty, (2) Westphalian sovereignty, (3) domestic sovereignty, and (4) interdependence sovereignty (Krasner 1999). The first form of sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, refers to “the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence” (Krasner 1999, 3). Note the qualification that entities with international legal sovereignty only *usually* are territorial and independent. The second, Westphalian sovereignty, is described as “political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory” (Krasner 1999, 4). Territory, in this instance, is a requirement. The third, domestic sovereignty, concerns “the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity” (Krasner 1999, 4). This closely aligns with Weber’s definition of sovereignty, which tends to focus inward with little reference to other polities, as a state is understood to have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force *within* a given territory. And finally, interdependence sovereignty refers to “the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state” (Krasner 1999, 4). This is the form of sovereignty that is considered threatened by processes of globalization and its associated flows. Krasner makes it very clear that these four forms of sovereignty are not necessarily coterminous, and that a state can have one form of sovereignty and not another. The two forms of sovereignty that are most relevant to this paper are international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty.

The basic principle of international legal sovereignty is recognition, which is extended to entities (usually states) “with territory and formal juridical authority” (Krasner 1999, 14). However, recognition could be granted without territory or autonomy – that is, without the existence of a physical state. As such, international legal sovereignty is the only of Krasner’s four forms of sovereignty that can be present at all without the existence of a clearly defined territory. For example, though the main rule of international legal sovereignty is recognition of a state with a territory, “[s]tates have recognized other governments even when they did not have effective control over their claimed territory” (Krasner 1999, 15). This is part of the ‘hypocrisy’ of sovereignty that Krasner points out: rules are often broken. Krasner explains that in practice, “international legal sovereignty does not guarantee the territorial integrity of any state or even the existence of a state,” (Krasner 1999, 19). This will become important when discussing the declaration of Palestinian statehood in front of the UN in September 2011.

There is an understanding that, even in its non-territorial shape, international legal sovereignty can function and provide a source of power to its holder. Krasner explains that for “rulers with limited material strength, international legal sovereignty, recognition, was valued because it could provide external resources and enhance internal legitimacy” (Krasner 1999, 38-39). In fact, he specifically uses the Palestinian case as an example, pointing out that the “Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was given observer status in the United Nations in 1974 and this status was changed to that of a mission in 1988 coincident with the declaration of Palestinian independence even though the PLO did not have any independent control over territory” (Krasner 1999, 15-16). The PLO was recognized despite the absence of defined borders and territorial autonomy.

The other form of sovereignty that is most relevant to this study is Westphalian sovereignty, which is based on two principles: “territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures” (Krasner 1999, 20). Territory in Westphalian sovereignty is a requirement, because even if the purported holder of sovereignty is given recognition (as in international legal sovereignty) how can it be said to exclude external actors if it is not enclosed in a clearly-defined territory? For this form of sovereignty, “the fundamental norm... is that states exist in specific territories” – an idea which I will take up again when discussing the nation-state (Krasner 1999, 20).

The primary rule of Westphalian sovereignty is “preserving the *de facto* autonomy of a territorial political entity” (Krasner 1999, 25). Notice that what must be preserved is *de facto* (actual) autonomy, not *de jure* (legal) autonomy. This does not refer to an entity’s *legal* right to exercise sovereignty within a territory, but its *actual* ability to do so. In this way Westphalian sovereignty differs dramatically from international legal sovereignty, which can mean recognition of the *right* to sovereignty without *actual* autonomy within a territory. Palestinians are pushing for international legal sovereignty in the United Nations in September 2011 because it is what they realistically can achieve (they can be recognized, despite the fact that they have no borders and autonomy from Israel), but how much good will it do without Westphalian sovereignty? Westphalian sovereignty seems to be the more powerful and meaningful of the two forms; it is more concrete (in part because it is anchored in territory) and therefore less an abstract concept.

Territory is a necessary condition of autonomy, and both are requirements of Westphalian sovereignty, if not always international legal sovereignty. Though there are benefits to recognition, *de jure* autonomy without *de facto* autonomy will only go so far

in an international legal system in which sovereignty bounded by a nation-state (which is territorial by definition) is the respected and accepted norm. Territory is a powerful component of sovereignty, exemplified by the fact that the principle common thread identified by a review of the major conceptual literature on sovereignty is the centrality of territory (Weber 1980, 29; Krasner 1999; Philpott 2010; Delaney 2005; Walker 1993, 165-166). The underlying theme throughout characterizations of the concept of sovereignty is territoriality: the idea that sovereignty is exercised within and bounded by a specific territory.

Territoriality

Since the common linkage between the various definitions of sovereignty is territory, it is important to explore territoriality and its (political) function. Many writers on territoriality and sovereignty note the close, and often implied, connection between the two concepts (Krasner 1999; Mendlovitz & Walker 1990; Delaney 2005). For example, David Delaney states: “Formally, to be ‘sovereign’ is to have absolute authority within a territorial space and to suffer no interference by parties outside of that space” – a definition very much in line with Krasner’s explanation of Westphalian sovereignty (Delaney 2005, 36). It is clear that Delaney is referring to Westphalian sovereignty, and that his understanding is that sovereignty and territory go hand in hand and that territory is a requirement of sovereignty at the same time as it is a means of gaining and exercising it. Below I lay out the definition and function of territoriality as expounded first by Robert David Sack and then by David Delaney.

In his book *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History*, Robert David Sack defines territoriality as “*the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area*” (Sack 1986, 19). This ‘assertion of control’ could easily be conceived of as sovereignty, and territoriality as an attempt to exert it. Sovereignty, conceived here as an attempt to affect, influence or control people by controlling a geographic area, seems to refer to domestic sovereignty, though asserting control over a geographic area also means excluding external actors, as with Westphalian sovereignty.

According to Sack, territoriality has three requirements, namely: (1) “territoriality must involve a form of classification by area,” (2) “territoriality must contain a form of communication... a marker,” and (3) “each instance of territoriality must involve an attempt at enforcing control over access” (Sack 1986, 21-22). These three requirements translate to (1) the identification of a territory, (2) the drawing of its borders, and (3) the exercise of sovereign power over it. Sack asserts that “territoriality in humans supposes a control over an area or space that must be conceived of and communicated... a spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area; and, as a strategy, territoriality can be turned on and off” (Sack 1986, 1-2). In other words, territoriality is a strategy ‘to affect, influence, and control’ – a strategy for exercising sovereignty.

Focusing on the conceptualization of territoriality as a *strategy*, Michel de Certeau says that strategies “conceal beneath objective calculations their connection with the power that sustains them from within the stronghold of its own ‘proper’ place or institution” (de Certeau 1984, xx). I interpret this to mean that since territoriality, as a

strategy, is such a taken-for-granted concept (much like sovereignty), it conceals its true goal beneath the obvious and superficial aim of territorial control. This reinforces a claim by David Delaney that “one important aspect of how territoriality commonly works is through its being regarded in a rather taken-for-granted way as an almost natural phenomenon”:

To the extent that territory (e.g. nationalist territory, or private property) appears to be self-evident, necessary, or unquestionable, it may obscure the play of power and politics in its formation and maintenance. Actions based on or in furtherance of territory may be easily justified by “communal” or universalizing claims. But, to the extent that it – or any given manifestation of it – is seen as contingent, socially constructed, ideologically informed, and, when push comes to shove, enforced by physical violence, then the forms of power which are inherently connected to territory may become more visible, and justifications, more clearly partial or partisan (Delaney 2005, 11).

The aim of territorial control is accepted as an end in itself, rather than as a means to another end, such as the marginalization of the “other” – i.e., the marginalization of other inhabitants of that space. The taken-for-granted nature of territorial control aids Israel’s annexation of most of the occupied Palestinian territories. In laying out its future borders through territorialization, Israel is creating a Palestinian Bantustan state with no real autonomy – a process that is going largely unnoticed by the international community. As Certeau states, “[s]trategies do not ‘apply’ principles or rules; they choose among them to make up the repertory of their operations” (de Certeau 1984, 54). The strategy of territorialization and the possibility of redrawing borders do not follow international rules, but violate them in ways that are considered “normal.”

David Delaney’s interpretation of territoriality is built upon the shoulders of Sack. In *Territory: a short introduction*, Delaney describes territoriality as a verb, an activity; specifically, territoriality is “a social (and political, economic, cultural) *process* that unfolds not only in place but through time” and territories are its resulting “social

products” (Delaney 2005, 2). Since territoriality is a verb it has a subject, which entails “deliberation, intentionality, or strategy” in its use (Delaney 2005, 16). Territory is not neutral. It is a tool, a ‘device,’ and one of its most important functions is that it is “commonly understood as a device for simplifying and clarifying something else, such as political authority, cultural identity, individual autonomy, or rights” (Delaney 2005, 9). In other words, it is a device for simplifying sovereignty. Israeli control over the West Bank is concerned with *de facto* sovereignty, or creating enough “facts on the ground” that the occupied Palestinian territories are effectively annexed and impossible to negotiate in the future. “What makes an enclosed space a territory is, first, what it signifies, and second, that the meanings it carries or conveys refer to or implicate social power;” territoriality in the occupied Palestinian territories signifies Israel’s *de facto* sovereignty over all of historical Palestine (Delaney 2005, 17).

Delaney also discusses processes of re-territorialization, or the re-drawing of borders. First, using the example of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he states that the invasion/occupation of territory, “a method by which the government of one nation-state attempted to annex to itself the territory of another, and with no better justification,” is one of the ways the map of sovereignty is redrawn (Delaney 2005, 3). If the occupying power is successful in annexing the land, then “[i]ts manifest destiny, its unquestionable supremacy, were validated on the field of battle, and the map of sovereignty was redrawn” (Delaney 2005, 3). Israeli settlement expansion and the path of the security barrier, cutting deep into the West Bank in places, should be understood in these terms: as an attempt to redraw the map of sovereignty. In this instance ‘sovereignty’ refers to Westphalian sovereignty, which requires autonomy within a territory. Furthermore, “[t]he

boundary of a territory may be expressed by physical structures – fences, walls, gates or doors.... The point here is that a territory and its boundary are *meaningful*. They are significant in so far as they signify” (Delaney 2005, 14). Michel de Certeau refers to this exercise as “bornage” – “an ‘operation of marking out boundaries’” (de Certeau 1984, 122).² As Delaney states, boundaries are meaningful, they signify, and “[t]erritories are not only spatial entities but also communicative devices” (Delaney 2005, 15). What Israel is communicating with its boundaries and territorialization of Palestine is “this is ours.” Richard Falk describes Israeli expansion as “part of a psychological war being waged against the Palestinian people on behalf of a vision of Greater Israel” because “it casts doubts as to whether Israel ever intends to withdraw, and by so doing creates an uncertainty in Palestinian minds” that the occupation will ever end (Falk 2003, 100; Reuveny 2003, 368).

Delaney conceives of territoriality as being more than a strategy for controlling space: “It is better understood as implicating and being implicated in ways of thinking, acting, and being in the world – ways of world-making informed by beliefs, desires, and culturally and historically contingent ways of knowing. It is as much a metaphysical phenomenon as a material one. Territory, in turn, informs key aspects of collective and individual identities. It shapes and is shaped by collective social and self-consciousness” (Delaney 2005, 13).³ Territoriality is “the relationship between territories *and some other social phenomena*. It draws attention to the territorial aspects, conditions, or implications of something else. So, the territoriality of state authority focuses on the spatial aspect of

² For information on the use of maps in creating and delineating territorial space, *see* Leuenberger & Schnell 2010; Scott 1998; de Certeau, 1984.

³ For the purposes of this paper, I focus on territoriality as a means of controlling space and inscribing it with sovereignty, but for more on the spatial component of identity formation, *see* Glaeser 2000, Malkki 1992 and Redekop 2002.

formal political power” – political power meaning sovereignty (Delaney 15). Territory and sovereignty seem to have a cyclical relationship; each is a requirement of the other because for space to be territory it must be *territorialized*, or have power (sovereignty) exercised on it, and for Westphalian sovereignty to exist, it must be expressed in a territory.

The cyclical relationship between sovereignty and territory finds its expression in the modern nation-state. As Michel Foucault expresses: “What is a sovereign? What is territory? these things began to be thought of as elements of the state” – and still they are regarded as such (Foucault 2009, 286).

Nation-State System

The notion of sovereignty combined with that of territoriality finds its expression in the overwhelming prevalence of the modern framework of the nation-state system, which is assumed in much of the literature on nations and nationalism to be an almost natural and implicit phenomenon (Gellner 1983; Giddens 1987, 116, 119; Hobsbawm 1990, 9-10; Delaney 2005, 35, 58; Anderson 2006, 3, 1351; Walker 1993, 165-166; Foucault 2009; Van Der Pijl 2011). This observation is reiterated by Krasner:

Most observers and analysts of international relations have treated sovereign states as an analytic assumption or a well-institutionalized if not taken-for-granted structure. The bundle of properties associated with sovereignty—territory, recognition, autonomy, and control—have been understood, often implicitly, to characterize states in the international system (Krasner 1999, 220).

Westphalian sovereignty, with its basic rule of territorial autonomy, takes as its fundamental norm that “states exist in specific territories,” and modern territoriality refers to “the capacity to conceive of the entire planet as a single place carved up into mutually exclusive, putatively sovereign states” (Krasner 1999, 20; Delaney 2005, 23). According

to Benedict Anderson, “nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Anderson 2006, 3). Therefore, the nation-state is taken as an analytical given, embodied with both sovereignty and territory.

This accepted framework of a world made up of bounded, autonomous nation-states aids in the Israeli annexation of Palestine and the redrawing of the map of sovereignty, as “the proliferation and dispersal of the territorial nation-state as the sole legitimate expression of political identity and authority” leaves no room for entities that are not formal states (Delaney 2005, 21). “For the English school [of international relations] the defining characteristic of the present international system is that ‘the independent state has everywhere become the standard form of territorial political organization and all conflicting standards have been discredited and in most cases abandoned’” (Krasner 1999, 46).

Liisa Malkki, in “National Geographic: the Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity Among Scholars and Refugees,” comments on the hegemony of the nation-state system, stating: “That the world should be composed of sovereign, spatially discontinuous units is a sometimes implicit, sometimes stated premise in much of the literature on nations and nationalism” (Malkki 1992, 26). She states that the global map is made up of clear-cut boundaries and does not allow for “fuzzy spaces” or the bleeding of boundaries (Malkki 1992, 26). In some ways Palestine is the ultimate “fuzzy space”: it doesn’t exist on the world map, its borders are constantly in flux, and it is populated by two nations (Israelis and Palestinians). By annexing the land and creating a Palestinian Bantustan “state,” Israel can erase the “fuzzy space” that currently exists and does not fit accepted models of statehood in a world in which the

nation-state is “the overwhelming norm” (Anderson 2006, 135). In line with Delaney’s assertion that the state is “[c]onventionally regarded as a quasi-natural ‘container’ of its associated ‘society’” (Delaney 2005, 35), Malkki states:

The national order of things... usually passes as the normal or natural order of things. For it is self-evident that ‘real’ nations are fixed in space and ‘recognizable’ on a map. One country cannot at the same time be another country. The world of nations is thus conceived as a discrete spatial partitioning of territory; it is territorialized in the segmentary fashion of the multicolored school atlas (Malkki 1992, 26).

Borders cannot be vague if the world of nations is conceived as discrete spatial partitionings of territory. In Israel-Palestine there is not a discrete border, and this fact allows Israel to exercise sovereignty in the oPt. “Sovereignty exists both at the normative and factual level. States assert sovereign rights and ‘they also actually exercise, in varying degrees, such supremacy and independence in practice. An independent political community which merely claims a right to sovereignty (or is judged by others to have such a right) but cannot assert this right in practice, is not a state properly so-called” (Krasner 1999, 47). Therefore, any Palestinian Bantustan state that takes shape, lacking as it will any real sovereignty, will never be a proper state and will never have independence.

Tying sovereignty, territoriality and the nation-state system together, sovereignty can be conceived of as “a ticket of general admission to the international arena,” but this admission is dependent on whether the holder of sovereignty is a territorial state (Krasner 1999, 16). A territory is “a bounded social space that inscribes a certain sort of meaning into defined segments of the material world” – these ‘segments’ are modern nation-states, and if the modern policy is the state “the fundamental characteristic of authority within it [is] sovereignty” (Delaney 2005, 14; Philpott 2010). In this way, sovereignty, territory, and the nation-state system intertwine to create the conditions

favorable to the creation of a Palestinian Bantustan state surrounded by (annexed) Israeli sovereign territory.

Resistance

Historically, postcolonial resistance has entailed the colonized pushing back against the colonizer, responding with a counterforce in order to obtain some degree of autonomy or self-determination. As stated by Rafael Reuveny, “[h]istorically, colonialism involved states’ expansion beyond their borders and indigenous populations’ eventual rejection of this expansion” (Reuveny 2003, 352). This counterforce can take many forms, but generally entails a rejection of the colonization.

Briefly, I feel it is necessary to draw a distinction between the international legal principle *occupatio bellica*⁴ and settler colonialism because, as Richard Falk says, the Palestinians “find themselves being ‘colonized’ by an alien power against their will and under the pretext of ‘belligerent occupation’” (Falk 2003, 114). Many other scholars and observers also assert, to varying degrees, that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is characterized by Israeli colonialism (Reuveny 2003; Parry 2011; Beinun 2011; Delaney 2005; Hochberg 2006; Gelvin 2005, 2007; Aaronsohn 1996; Van Der Pijl 2011). Therefore, a brief discussion of Israeli colonialism will serve as a point of departure for an exploration of anti-colonial resistance – resistance in the form of “national liberation in opposition to imperialist domination” (Cabral 1994, 54-55).

The principle of international law known as *occupatio bellica* is founded on “the sharp distinction between a change of sovereignty, i.e., a territorial change, and the provisional change of a military occupation” (Schmitt 2003, 206). Under the doctrine of

⁴ Belligerent/military occupation.

occupatio bellica, “the occupying state exercised state power in the occupied enemy territory; however, it did not exercise its own power, but rather that of the state of the occupied territory, and this exercise of foreign state power was based not on empowerment of the enemy state’s authority, but rather on its own original legal title in international law” (Schmitt 2003, 206). Because Israel is not exercising sovereignty in the name of the Palestinian inhabitants of the oPt, but rather in the name of Israeli settlers, the Israeli presence in the oPt is a project of settler colonialism and not belligerent occupation.

First, the Israeli occupation of the oPt is aimed at a permanent territorial change, or a change of sovereignty, not at “the provisional change of a military occupation” (Schmitt 2003, 206). As Thomas Hobbes recognizes, conquest is a way to exercise “sovereignty by acquisition,” as it is “the process whereby the colonial power uses its military superiority to conquer a weaker society and exploit the native people and resources for its own benefit” (Kohn & McBride 2011, 91). *Occupatio bellica*, as opposed to settler colonialism, is merely a provisional change; but clearly the building of permanent settlements in the Palestinian territories and construction of the separation barrier cannot be described in any way as “provisional.” Second, the occupying state (Israel) is attempting to exercise its own power in the oPt, based on empowerment of its own authority; Israel is not exercising the power “of the state of the occupied territory” based on “its own original legal title in international law” (Schmitt 2003, 206). Therefore, Israel is clearly not engaged in *occupatio bellica*, but rather in settler colonialism in the oPt.

The key resource of settler colonialism is land, and therefore I do not feel that annexation is an unintended side-effect of settlement and construction of the barrier, but that both are built explicitly to expand the Israeli power structure over the territories, creating a situation in which the Israeli state can exercise *de facto* sovereignty in the West Bank (Kohn & McBride 2011, 99). According to Kohn and McBride, “colonial rule based its legitimacy on force rather than on consent, mutual benefit, or tradition” (Kohn & McBride 2011, 91). Construction of the barrier and the cantonization of the Palestinian people represent Israel exerting sovereignty in the oPt through territorial acquisition achieved by the use of force.

Israeli colonization, like other colonial projects, gives rise to a rejection of this colonization by the native inhabitants. Historically this rejection has entailed a pushing away of the colonizer and an attempt at achieving separate independence. Resistance should be viewed as the natural response to conquest and annexation; since Israel is a colonial state, Palestinians should be seen as “fighting a legitimate struggle” (Sayigh 1979, 8). The legitimacy of this struggle, termed a “right of resistance” by Richard Falk, derives from Israel’s failure to abide by the rules of belligerent occupation (Falk 2006, 316). Falk states that, “in international law, Palestinian resistance to occupation is a legally protected right,” and as far as he is concerned it is “Israel’s seizure of land in violation of Palestinian rights that provokes Palestinian resistance” (Falk 2006, 315, 321). In other words, resistance does not take place in a vacuum, but occurs as a response to another force that has been exerted; Amilcar Cabral terms this “counterforce,” and typically counterforce involves an attempt to push out the colonizer (Kohn & McBride 2011, 110).

While resistance does not occur in a vacuum, it is interesting that in *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978* Michel Foucault asserts that “if resistance were nothing more than the reverse image of power, it would not resist; in order to resist one must activate something ‘as inventive, as mobile, as productive’ as power itself” (Foucault 2009, xxi). The inventive power of resistance is the greatest threat to the colonizer. Touching on the natural drive to resist in the face of oppression, Foucault defines resistance as being “‘coextensive and absolutely contemporaneous’ to power; resistances exist within the strategic field of relations of power and relations of power themselves only exist relative to a multiplicity of points of resistance” (Foucault 2009, xx). Since Foucault is not completely satisfied with the term “resistance,” he posits a new term: “counter-conduct.” This term is interesting in what it adds to resistance, as a concept: counter-conduct, building upon the notion of resistance, adds “an explicitly ethical component” and the ability “to move easily between the ethical and the political” (Foucault 2009, xxi). Foucault settles on the term “counter-conduct” (as opposed to possible alternatives such as “misconduct”) because it has the “sole advantage of allowing reference to the active sense of the word ‘conduct’—counter-conduct in the sense of struggle against the processes implemented for conducting others; which is why I prefer it to ‘misconduct (*inconduite*)’, which only refers to the passive sense of the word, of behavior: not conducting oneself properly” (Foucault 2009, 201). What Foucault is stressing here is the active sense of counter-conduct – it is an attempt not to reduce it to a passive and involuntary response to oppression. Additionally, because it is active, counter-conduct is inventive and adapts to whatever form the resisters deem best to achieve their goals. The best way to achieve independence may not

be to push out the colonizer. In Cabral's mind national liberation was only achieved when "national productive forces are completely free of all kinds of foreign domination" (Cabral 1994, 56). Often, even once the colonizer had physically left the previously colonized territory, foreign domination continued by other means and "independence" was only illusory.

Foucault touches on the natural disposition of people to resist unjust treatment and oppression. Similarly, Amilcar Cabral defines struggle as "not exclusively apply[ing] to organized resistance or violence.... He points out that struggle is not necessarily a revolutionary condition; instead it is the natural condition of people, of all objects on the earth" (Kohn & McBride 2011, 110). As a natural response to oppression, the Palestinian resistance movement has "situat[ed] itself as an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist liberation struggle like others in the Third World," (Sayigh 1979, 7). The form resistance would take, however, not as obvious as the fact that it *will* occur, as "every colonial context did produce different responses and strategies of resistance" (Kohn & McBride 2011, 4). It is the inventive power of resistance alluded to by Foucault that explains this variance. As Williams and Chrisman note, campaigns of resistance take many forms, "ranging from legal and diplomatic manoeuvres... to wars of independence" (Chrisman & Williams 1994, 3). Andreas Glaeser says that "human beings are always completely absorbed in the social context in which they find themselves in any particular instant," and I believe that it is in response to this social context that resistance takes shape (Glaeser 2000, 332). Therefore, it is in the specific context produced by oppression that resistance takes form, and it must take whichever form would best insure the freedom and well-being of those resisting.

Amilcar Cabral and Franz Fanon are “grouped together as postcolonial thinkers because of their common endorsement of revolutionary violence” (Kohn & McBride 2011, 107). Asserting that violence embodies taking control of one’s life and exercising agency, “Fanon believed violence allows the previously colonized person to begin to be an agent instead of an object or victim in her history” (Kohn & McBride 2011, 107). According to Kohn and McBride, “Fanon sees violence as providing a rupture with past psychology because it provides for a physical release of the internalized violence of colonialism, thereby creating a new trajectory of history and personality” (Kohn & McBride 2011, 69).

Similarly, Cabral endorsed violence “as a way of interrupting the progression of history in a given space;” in other words, “he believed in revolution in order to free the land and its inhabitants from external control” (Kohn & McBride 2011, 107). According to Cabral:

The important thing is to decide what forms of violence have to be used by the national liberation forces, in order not only to answer the violence of imperialism but also to ensure, through the struggle, the final victory of the cause, that is true national independence (Cabral quoted in Kohn & McBride 2011, 109).

However it is not certain that violent resistance is the best way to achieve the final victory of the cause. Cabral states that “armed liberation struggle requires the mobilization and organization of a significant majority of the population... [and] the efficient use of modern arms and of other means of war” (Cabral 1994, 64). He does not recognize that armed liberation is difficult, if not impossible, when the power disparity between the resister and the oppressor is so great that the resistance cannot employ efficient use of arms. Under these circumstances, armed resistance may not be an option. In fact, in a lecture he gave at UCLA titled *Settler Colonialism Past and Present*, Joel Beinin said

that there are many examples of armed struggle against settler colonialism, but this method is rarely successful (Beinin 2011).

Following this logic, resistance is not always violent and outward. Though James C. Scott mentions that there is an ideological struggle “which underwrites resistance,” his book *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* focuses on everyday forms of resistance, or the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups (Scott 1985, xvii). According to Scott, all historical resistance by subordinate classes begins “close to the ground, rooted firmly in the homely but meaningful realities of daily experience” (Scott 1985, 348). In fact, he asserts that “[m]ost of the forms this struggle takes stop well short of collective outright defiance” and peasants “typically avoid any direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite norms” (Scott 1985, 29). Instead they engage in “a quiet evasion that is equally massive and often far more effective” (Scott 1985, 32).

Resistance might also follow a middle ground between outright violence and quiet evasion. Hegemonic power consists of “frameworks [from which] the individual detaches himself... without being able to escape them and can henceforth only try to outwit them” (de Certeau 1984, xxiv). The Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories mirrors this hegemonic framework: Palestinians cannot escape Israeli expansion without abandoning their homeland, so they must find a way to outwit it. According to Michel de Certeau, the practice of everyday life concerns “the ingenious ways in which the weak make use of the strong” (de Certeau 1984, xvii). In order to protect their human rights, Palestinians must find a way to make use of the Israeli power structure. Everyday life consists of having the power “of turning the tables on the powerful by the way in which they made use of the opportunities offered by the particular situation” (de Certeau 1984, xx). The

situation in Palestine is embodied by an expansionist colonial state and the creation of Palestinian Bantustans, an outcome I will discuss further later in the paper. As one of my favorite quotes graffitied on the Israeli separation barrier states: “To exist is to resist.” Resistance is a tactic, and “[t]he space of a tactic is the space of the other. Thus it must play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized by the law of a foreign power... it is a maneuver ‘written within the enemy’s field of vision’.... It operates in isolated actions, blow by blow” (de Certeau 1984, 37). As such, resistance must use its inventive power to overcome the oppressor. As Michel de Certeau says, “[m]any everyday practices... are tactical in character. And so are... victories of the ‘weak’ over the ‘strong’” (de Certeau 1984, xix). In order for Palestinians to be victorious in their resistance they must utilize new and unexpected tactics.

Summary

Understanding the significance of sovereignty, territoriality and the predominance of the nation-state system will help me make sense of Israeli expansionism through the construction of the security barrier and the cantonization of West Bank Palestinians. From the literature review I infer that a Palestinian Bantustan “state” would fit accepted models of statehood by erasing the “fuzzy space” that is the Palestinian territories and replacing it with clearly defined Palestinian Bantustans surrounded by Israeli sovereign territory. This “state” would have international legal sovereignty without ever having Westphalian sovereignty, and would allow the State of Israel to maximize its territorial annexation without being responsible for the Palestinian people.

The discussion of resistance will lead to an exploration of a new tactic in Palestinian counter-conduct: a push for complete Israeli annexation of the oPt to head off the creation of a non-sovereign and territorial discontinuous Palestinian Bantustan “state” that would not provide for Palestinian rights.

Chapter 3: Methods

This project is significant, in part, because the Israeli-Palestinian struggle “might be regarded as the quintessential struggle of the modern age” (Gelvin 2005, 2007, ix). Though the conflict takes place on a relatively small piece of land, it has been significantly long-lived, lasting for over a century (Gelvin 2005, 2007, i). The construction of the security barrier between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory is yet another phase of this hundred year war, part and parcel of a long history of conflict and colonization in Israel-Palestine as it “furthers Israel’s decades-old expansionist objectives by controlling land, corralling the Palestinian population into disconnected cantons, and preventing the emergence of a viable, independent Palestinian political entity in the West Bank” (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 339).

In the literature review I ultimately concluded that, in the nation-state system, territoriality is a strategy for exercising (Westphalian) sovereignty over a geographic space. In the data and discussion of findings section of my thesis I support my assertion that Israeli expansion and construction of the “security” barrier represent Israel’s use of territoriality to exercise sovereign power over the West Bank by tracing the meandering path of the barrier and continued settlement expansion in the West Bank. To do this I utilize United Nations reports and several secondary sources that describe the route the barrier takes, carving deep into the West Bank. Statistics on the length and route of the wall will clearly show that it does not follow the Green Line (the internationally recognized border between Israel and the Palestinian territories). I also make use of the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on the barrier. Several secondary

sources cited here explain that the barrier does not serve security purposes, and may in fact hinder the security of Israeli citizens.

After providing evidence that the wall does not serve a security purpose (citing retired Israeli generals, UN reports and several notable scholars) I show that its path is instead aimed at encompassing the settlements, territorial annexation and the creation of Palestinian Bantustans. To back up these claims I again use reports by the United Nations as well as several reputable secondary sources. The data and discussion of findings section is also interspersed with several comments made to directly me by Palestinian, Israeli and international activists, scholars, political party representatives, refugees, students, settlers and even government figures during my time in Israel and the West Bank, from June 23 to July 30, 2011. These sources explain that the route of the wall goes around the majority of the settlements, and around the largest settlements, and even goes wide of them to allow for future settlement growth. Several sources here will also assert that expansion of settlements and population dispersal are strategies long utilized by Israel for controlling land. The major irony here is that an illegal wall (according to the ICJ) is being used to encompass illegal settlements (since the occupying power is legally prohibited from transferring population into the occupied territory). The fact that the path of the barrier encompasses large settlement tracks and underground water resources shows that the path of the barrier is meant to permanently transfer land and other resources to the State of Israel. Using reports by the UN and other sources I also support my claim that the path of the barrier is intended to isolate Palestinians from one another in disconnected cantons.


Obviously I do not have Israeli policy documents stating that the purpose of the barrier is annexation and cantonization; rather, I am deducing that this is the policy behind the barrier based on the route the barrier follows: several sources state it does not serve a security purpose *as it is being built* and it clearly encompasses illegal Israeli West Bank settlements and vital natural resources. Additionally, a few sources have cited statements by Israeli officials that would lend credence to my claims concerning the barrier's purpose beyond providing security from suicide bombers. If the barrier was being built along the Green Line it would be more plausible that it is being constructed first and foremost to address Israeli security concerns; as it is emerging, however, I do not believe security is the primary objective of the barrier's construction.

The trends and perspectives I am identifying in my critique of Israeli expansion into the West Bank are not meant to be representative of the entire Israeli population; in fact, I met with a number of Israeli citizens during my time in Israel who are very active politically in their own critique of the separation barrier and the occupation and who are promoting human rights for both Israelis and Palestinians. I do, however, stand by my observations concerning the ultimate goals of Israeli expansion and construction of the security barrier and believe that these goals are understood at a policy level and are not random or accidental effects of a "security" barrier.

My claim that the creation of a Palestinian Bantustan "state" serves the interests of the State of Israel is supported, first, by the fact that Israel identifies as a Jewish State and the inclusion of a large number of West Bank Palestinians into the state would destroy the demographic balance that makes that identity a reality; several sources cited in the data and discussion of findings section say as much. Therefore, the two-state

solution is supported by Israel with the adjustment that the resulting Palestinian “state” will not be sovereign by Westphalian standards.⁵ Sources used here explain that the path of the barrier and settlement expansion, viewed from above, can be seen to outline what will become pockets of Palestinian land and isolated economic centers. Images showing the general outlines of the Palestinian Bantustans will also be utilized (such as Figure 1, below).

To further support my claim that the goal of continued Israeli expansion and the construction of the separation barrier is the creation of a Palestinian Bantustan “state” I outline other Israeli benefits of such an entity. For example there is the annexation to Israel of the majority of the West Bank to further the vision of “Greater Israel”. Second, as stated above, is the protection of the demographic balance in the Jewish State, which would be disrupted by the absorption of the West Bank Palestinians that would come with complete annexation of the West Bank. And third, terming this entity a “state” would allow Israel to maintain sovereign power over the entire West Bank while passing the burden of the rights of Palestinians off onto the new Palestinian entity. The sources I use to support these claims show that the



⁵ Refer to introduction for explanation.

path of the barrier annexes large sections of land, describe Israeli demographic fears, and show that Israel would maintain control over the whole of the West Bank.

Also in the literature review I pointed out that anti-colonial resistance generally entails the colonized pushing back from the colonizer in an attempt to exercise sovereignty and determination as a separate entity. This is nearly impossible in the Israeli-Palestinian context due to Israeli expansion into the Palestinian territories. Recognizing that a Palestinian “state” would not be sovereign, Palestinians have shifted tactics to press for complete annexation of the West Bank; the Palestinian population would be absorbed into the State of Israel where they could fight for their rights as Israeli citizens. First in the data and discussion of findings section on resistance I describe other forms of resistance utilized by Palestinians that follow the typical model of anti-colonial resistance: pushing back against the colonizer to create an independent space for self-determination. Then, other sources used here explain that the two-state solution is ill-advised and will entail the continuation of occupation under another guise. As Reuveny states, this would mean the creation of a Palestinian state without decolonization ever taking place; to address this reality Palestinians are aiming at achieving decolonization through annexation (Reuveny 2003). In Palestine, the push for annexation is making use of the strong ingeniously because the endgame (as being shaped by Israel) is clear: a Palestinian Bantustan state without Westphalian sovereignty. Rather than supporting independent Palestinian statehood, scholars such as Noam Chomsky argue for a kind of socialist binationalism which would better achieve the rights of the Palestinian people.

While I am presenting the push for annexation as an interesting shift in anti-colonial resistance tactics in Palestine, I cannot claim, much less prove, that the

Palestinian people as a whole support this move. This should be clear, first, by the other examples of counter-force outlined in the resistance section of the chapter on data and discussion of findings, and second, by the actions taken by the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the United Nations this September. The move by the Palestinian Authority to unilaterally declare Palestinian statehood in the UN clearly shows that many Palestinians have not given up on having a state of their own (or at least that the PA hasn't). I address the PA's move to declare statehood in the chapter on data and discussion of findings, and cite sources there that claim such a move plays right into the hands of the Israelis, aiding in their creation of a Palestinian Bantustan state. Therefore, while this project is not able to examine the extent to which Palestinians, as a unity, are moving toward support of annexation as an anti-colonial tactic, it is important to understand that this tactic is being considered in some circles and may be the best option considering Israeli actions in the West Bank. This leaves an opening for future research to explore and compare the extent of resistance through annexation to other forms of more traditional resistance tactics.

What this study does accomplish is to explore the relationship between territoriality and sovereignty and how the perception of that relationship drives Israeli expansion and construction of the security barrier in the West Bank. Furthermore, this study opens up a question about the nature of anti-colonial struggle; if pushing away from the colonizer (for example, by forming a state without decolonization) does not result in sovereign independence then resistance tactics must shift, perhaps to push for inclusion in the system that already exists.

Chapter 4: Data and Discussion of Findings

Background

Before beginning my argument, for readers less acquainted with Israel-Palestine, I include a working definition of both “Israel” and “Palestine,” as both are often contested entities, as well as a brief background of events relevant to my topic. Most scholars trace the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s origins back to Palestine under the Ottoman Empire and the birth of modern Zionism in Europe, and would say that the conflict between Israel and Palestine boils down to a conflict over territory. Though hard to pin down an exact date, this conflict first began, roughly, with the Jewish aliyot (waves of immigration) between 1882 and the onset of WWII (Gelvin 2005, 2007, 56). Historically, this conflict has not been isolated to Israelis and Palestinians, but has directly involved the Arab states in the region, the United States, the United Nations and other Western and non-Western states. For the purposes of this thesis, I will trace the conflict from the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and will focus on the major land-transfers (usually through war) since that time.

The State of Israel came into existence with the 1948 War, known to Israelis as the “War of Independence,” and to Palestinians as “*al-Nakba*” (the catastrophe). Prior to the war, the United Nations had put forward a partition plan for the creation of two states: one Jewish and one Palestinian. This plan was not accepted by the Palestinian representatives due to the perception that the allocation of lands and resources was unfair and disproportional to population size. During the 1948 War, the newly-declared state of Israel claimed even more land than had been allocated by the (already disproportionate) UN partition plan. The armistice agreement reached by Israel and its Arab-state

neighbors following the war created the 1949 Armistice Line, or Green Line, which is the internationally recognized border of the state of Israel.

Skipping ahead a bit, in 1993 the first protocol of the Oslo Accords called for letters of mutual recognition to be exchanged between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin. In his letter, Arafat recognized the state of Israel, therefore conceding that the pre-1967 borders of Israel are non-negotiable – that the land claimed by Israel in 1948 is forever lost to the Palestinians. Therefore, all future negotiations over the border between Israel and a future Palestinian state would concern the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories (Gelvin 2005, 2007, 234). This will serve as my working definition of “Israel” and “Palestine” – Israeli land is that to the west of the 1949 armistice line (Green Line), and



the Palestinian territories consist of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In 1967, Israel and its neighbors went to war again (the Six Day War/Arab-Israeli War), and Israel gained military control over the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and the West Bank. Israel annexed East Jerusalem and the Golan, eventually

returned Sinai to Egypt, and has occupied Gaza and the West Bank ever since. Settlement expansion in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) began in 1967 following the Arab-Israeli War, despite the fact that the occupation and transfer of Israeli population into the Palestinian Territories is illegal and often criticized under international law.

Construction of the “security barrier” in the West Bank was approved in 2000 and in April 2002 the Israeli government announced that it would begin construction of the barrier, the stated purpose of which was to provide security to Israeli citizens from suicide bombers who infiltrated Israel from the West Bank (United Nations 2009; Cook & Hanieh 2006; Parry 2011; Gelvin 2005, 2007). The International Court of Justice “affirmed that the settlement of Israeli citizens in the oPt is illegal, and found that ‘the wall’s sinuous route has been traced in such a way as to include within that area the great majority of the Israeli settlements in the oPt,’” a fact that has been largely ignored as construction of the wall continues unabated (United Nations 2009, 6). Israelis call the structure a “security fence,” Palestinians call it a “separation wall,” but either way it follows a highly controversial route:

Instead of adhering to the 1949 armistice lines that had served as Israel’s unofficial border for over half a century, the barrier – which will eventually consist of a 450-mile stretch of concrete walls, electronic fences, barbed-wire fences, and trenches – sometimes cuts deeply into the occupied areas and incorporates the largest of the West Bank settlement blocs as well as Jerusalem (Gelvin 2005, 2007, 247).

According to a UN report, once completed approximately 85% of the route of the barrier will run inside the West Bank and East Jerusalem rather than along the Green Line (United Nations 2009, 4). In fact, the barrier runs deep inside the West Bank in order to surround “80 Israeli settlements, which will be located between the Barrier and the Green Line” (United Nations 2009, 12). The Israeli government states that “the protection of Israeli settlers and settlements against Palestinian violence is an additional objective of

the Barrier,” which is why it encircles the settlements (United Nations 2009, 12). This, in itself, is highly controversial, since construction of the settlements in the West Bank violates international law, just as the path of the barrier has been deemed to do. In addition to encircling the settlements, the wall also “loops far inward from the boundary between the West Bank and Israel, cutting Palestinians off from water sources, land and communities” – controlling vital land and water resources for the use of Israelis and to the detriment of Palestinians (Erickson 2008, 22).

As stated above, the barrier follows a highly contested route: “Palestinians, human rights groups, and most of the international community have condemned the construction of the barrier for a number of reasons,” including the fact that the barrier

creates a revised starting point for any future negotiations of the conflict, the fact that it requires the uprooting of Palestinians whose land is then confiscated, the fact that it cuts off some Palestinian villages from the rest of the West Bank, and the fact that it separates towns from the land they farm (Gelvin 2005,



Image 2: The barrier in East Jerusalem (From personal collection).

2007, 247-8; Erickson 2008, 22). In fact, some critics go so far as to suggest that the barrier represents “the first step of a kinder, gentler form of ethnic cleansing” (Gelvin 2005, 2007, 248).

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has declared that “Israel’s construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, [is] contrary to international law and should cease forthwith” (Sands 2006, 18). The UN report mentioned earlier quotes the ICJ’s advisory opinion at length:

Whilst the Court notes the assurance given by Israel that the construction of the wall does not amount to annexation and that the wall is of a temporary nature, it nevertheless cannot remain indifferent to certain fears expressed to it that the route of the wall will prejudice the future frontier between Israel and Palestine, and the fear that Israel may integrate the settlements and their means of access. The Court considers that the construction of the wall and its associated regime create a ‘fait accompli’ on the ground that could become permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto annexation (ICJ, Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, para. 121, quoted in United Nations 2009, 40).

The ICJ recognizes that, though Israel insists that the wall is temporary,⁶ it actually represents de facto annexation of Palestinian land and a revised starting point for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Based on this assessment, the ICJ has declared the wall to be in violation of international law. William Parry describes the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the barrier, saying that it “unequivocally stated that the route of the Wall in the occupied Palestinian territory is illegal under international law” and “[w]as overwhelmingly backed by a UN General Assembly Resolution” (Parry 2011, 12; Hammami & Tamari 2006, 271). A representative of Kadima youth said this of the advisory opinion: “The 2004 ICJ advisory opinion was rather problematic and beyond the mandate of the ICJ. I believe most Israelis won’t accept it” (From personal notes: youth

⁶ A Kadima youth representative in Israel once said to me: “Eventually the wall can be moved... the wall is nice [laughing], the wall can come down. It is just a wall. It was never meant to be the future border.” (From personal notes: Tel Aviv University, Israel, July 21, 2011). Later a Palestinian man in Bethlehem asked me if I thought the wall would ever come down, and I told him I hoped so. He said he was sure the wall will come down – “the wall will come down when Israel annexes all of Palestine and there is no need for a wall anymore,” he said. (From personal notes: Bethlehem, Palestine). Obviously the ICJ does not believe the wall will be moved, despite Israel’s assurances to the contrary, and I do not believe (as the man in Bethlehem asserted) that Israel wants to annex all of Palestine – just as much of the land as possible while excluding the people.

representative, Kadima party, Tel Aviv University, Israel, July 21, 2011). Whether Israelis accept it or not, most of the international community is in agreement about the illegality of the construction and path of the barrier.

Voicing his frustration over the inaction of the international community during the continued construction of the illegal barrier, Parry points out that after six years of underwhelming inaction by the international community, Israel “rubbished the ICJ’s ruling and continues to build the Wall with impunity; our governments, which the ICJ said are obliged to help enforce its decision, remain complicit through their silence and inaction” (Parry 2011, 12). International law apparently doesn’t apply to Israel, and despite overwhelming support for the ICJ’s advisory opinion, there are no teeth to enforce it.

Security (or not)

Construction of the “separation wall” in the West Bank began in 2002, and despite Israeli assertions that the wall is being constructed for security reasons, I believe, as many scholars do, that “security is being invoked simply as a disguise for territorial ambitions” (Chomsky 2003, 26). In other words, its construction is aimed at an expansion of power in the name of security. From the literature review it is clear that territoriality aims at controlling people and phenomena by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area, which seems to be the real motive behind the path of the barrier. Even the International Court of Justice stated that “the infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military exigencies or by the requirements of security or public

order,” they can, however, be explained as an attempt to exercise authority and annex large sections of the West Bank (United Nations 2009, 6).

Don’t misunderstand; security is a legitimate concern for any community. According to Vern Neufeld Redekop in his book about human identity needs, “[t]he degree of security one needs is a result of fear, which is itself a function of past experiences” (Redekop 2002, 40). An Israeli student I met at Hebrew University retold her experiences with terror bombings and fear, saying that “it is embedded in Israeli minds – everyone you meet knows someone who died” (From personal notes: Bikhhal, Hebrew University student, Hebrew University, Israel, June 29, 2011). She also spoke out openly against the occupation and construction of the barrier, tempering her statement by saying that every Palestinian has a story like that, too. Another Israeli I met, a settler from Gush Etzion, expressed a similar feeling of fear (though he disregarded the possibility that Palestinians might also be suffering) saying: “We see terror all around us” (From personal notes: settler, Gush Etzion, Israel, June 27, 2011).

While I do not deny that Israel’s experience with suicide bombings increases public fear, and therefore the need for a feeling of security, I do think that the wall plays on Israeli fears without providing real protection. Catherine Cook and Adam Hanieh support this assessment, stating that construction of the barrier “[capitalizes] on the Israeli public’s fear of Palestinian suicide bombings and other attacks on Israeli civilians,” allowing Israel to unilaterally expand its borders uninhibited (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 347). “Security” is being invoked to justify expansionist goals.

Additionally, though terrorism is a legitimate concern, the possibility that terrorism is “merely a symptom” of Israeli colonialism would suggest that the wall

actually endangers Israelis by creating desperate conditions that lead some people to commit desperate acts (Reuveny 2003, 370). At the Dheish Refugee Camp in West Bank, Palestine, I met a girl who said that for every action there is a reaction – the pressure on Palestinians living under the occupation builds. Referring to violent resistance strategies she said, “there is a root cause for everything... I’m not justifying it” (From personal notes: Ibdac Cultural Center, Dheish Refugee Camp, June 28, 2011). For Palestinians, “the settlements symbolize the Israeli occupation and fuel Palestinian nationalism and hostility toward Israel” – they see their land being annexed while they are forced into isolated enclaves and they have limited options for recourse (Reuveny 2003, 366). As Noam Chomsky explains, terror is “a weapon of the weak and the desperate which may continue to plague Israeli life” as long as the occupation and Israeli expansion persists (Chomsky 2003, 99). A group of Israeli youths who signed a letter to Ariel Sharon explaining why they refuse to join the IDF feel that “the occupation is not only immoral; but it also damages the security of Israel’s citizens and residents [due to terrorist attacks that are a result of Palestinian desperation]. Such security will be achieved only through a just peace between Israelis and Palestinians” that negates the need for desperate action (Beinin & Stein 2006, 184). Chomsky reinforces this sentiment, stating: “In the long run, Israel’s security rests on relations with its neighbors,” and the expansion policy that increases long-term and short-term threats by poisoning these relations only further endangers Israeli citizens (Chomsky 2003, 26).

In addition to creating a desperate situation that becomes a breeding ground for terrorism, the wall hinders security tactically as well. Some retired Israeli generals have expressed that “[t]he present path of the fence... was a trap for [Israeli] soldiers” (Trottier

2007, 111). According to these generals, if the purpose of the wall were truly to provide physical/military security it would follow a path “as close as possible to the Green Line, and one that follows the shortest route” (Trottier 2007, 111). This is not the case, as the Green Line is only 315 km long while the wall will be 709 km long once completed – not nearly running along the armistice line (Parry 2011, 11). In fact,

[a]s it has emerged, with a serpentine shape dictated by political compromises between various Israeli actors, the separation fence *does not serve a military logic*. It often runs deep in valleys, instead of on the highest points. It weaves intricately in the landscape, creating real traps for soldiers. It includes fences where passage may be reduced, but still persists. Pipes run under it, thereby allowing for it eventually to be blown up. It constitutes a general’s nightmare, as several generals have argued in Israeli courts. It certainly does not prevent rocket attacks (Trottier 2007, 126, *emphasis added*).

Tactically speaking, the wall is clearly not a model of military efficiency and safety, and one would think that when it comes to national security Israel might put more stock in the recommendations of its own experienced generals. Reserve General Mattityahu Peled, one of the most outspoken critics of the annexation policy (of which the wall is a major part), “has explained over and over again that the new 1967 boundaries did not increase the security of Israel.... Those who make a fetish of security, he argues, have been concerned ‘not with Israel’s security but with her territorial dimensions’” (Chomsky 2003, 24). General Peled sees clearly that the Israeli expansion policy exercises territoriality in order to annex and assert sovereignty over the West Bank.

Professor John Dugard, former UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, asserts that “[t]he 75 km Wall being built in East Jerusalem is an instrument of social engineering designed to achieve the Judaization of Jerusalem by reducing the number of Palestinians in the city. The Wall is being built through Palestinian neighborhoods, separating Palestinians from Palestinians, in a manner that cannot conceivably be justified on security grounds” (quoted in Parry 2011,

139). Jeff Halper, whom I met in Israel, claims that “the separation barrier takes on the coloring of a political border rather than a defense mechanism. That is the only way to explain its tortuous route deep into Palestinian areas rather than along the 1967 line” (Halper 2006, 70). This political barrier is aimed at the territorial maximization of the State of Israel at the expense of the native Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank. Many Palestinians, such as Abu Omar, a Palestinian farmer from Jayyous, agree with this assessment; Abu Omar believes that “[t]his Wall has nothing to do with security... Israel simply wants our land without us” (Abu Omar quoted in Parry 2011, 99). The goal of annexing the land while avoiding annexing the Palestinian population will be discussed further below.

Overall, it would appear that while Israel claims that expansion and construction of the barrier can be explained and justified on security grounds, “a review of the facts suggests that the annexation policy is to be explained on other grounds” (Chomsky 2003, 22-23; Parry 2011, 12). Expansion is more concerned with territorial aspirations, demographic fears and Palestinian “statehood.”

What the Barrier Does Accomplish

Catherine Cook and Adam Hanieh suggest that despite the official explanation that the barrier is a “security” measure “the structure’s meandering path betrays underlying territorial objectives” (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 338). Chomsky reiterates that settlement and expansion are not driven by security needs, and suggests that the annexation policy must be explained on other grounds (Chomsky 2003, 10). I agree, and think that the barrier ultimately accomplishes three goals: (1) encompassing the

settlements to ensure the territorial contiguity of the State of Israel; (2) annexing the maximum amount of Palestinian territory (without annexing the Palestinian people); and (3) creating a Palestinian Bantustan “state” that will allow Israel to maintain sovereignty in all of historic Palestine.

As noted in a report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the occupied Palestinian territory: “The protection of Israeli settlements, including areas planned for their future expansion, constituted the major factor for the deviation of the Barrier’s route from the Green Line” (United Nations 2010, 2). This is ironic because the meandering path of the barrier that deviates from the Green Line violates international law (according to the ICJ) and the settlements that its serpentine path encompasses also violate international law (Parry 2011; Sands 2006; United Nations 2009). Parry highlights this farce when he explains that the reason for the circuitous route of the barrier is to ensure that 80 of the more sizeable and significant colonies (housing 385,000 settlers and all of which were established *illegally* on Palestinian land that Israel has *illegally* occupied for over 40 years) will be on the west side of the wall (Parry 2011, 11).

It is essential to Israeli expansion that the settlements are protected because in a competition between Jews and Arabs for control of the land “[e]stablishing settlements [provides] a way of defending territorial claims” (Evans 2006, 579). The idea is to plant enough Israelis in the West Bank so that the land would be unofficially annexed to Israel – the wall being the next step in this process of *de facto* annexation by encompassing the settlements. According to Matt Evans, “Israel’s population dispersal policy is one of the longest ongoing attempts to defend territorial sovereignty by directing population

settlement to areas of strategic national importance” (Evans 2006, 578). As explained in the literature review, territory is the common denominator in definitions of sovereignty. Sovereignty means absolute authority within a territorial space, and population dispersal is one way of controlling territory through *de facto* annexation.

Not only will the wall’s path ensure that the settlements and the land they are built on is annexed to Israel, but “[t]he path of the wall incorporates the planned expansion areas of various settlements – rather than built-up areas alone – with the effect of capturing land for future settlement growth” (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 344). Therefore, the path of the wall doesn’t stop once security for the settlers is achieved, but again clearly embodies a land grab aimed at the maximization of Israeli sovereign territory. Commenting on the absurdity of building an illegal wall around illegal settlements in order to protect them, Yiftachel states that “more Palestinian land is now illegally seized, to protect settlements, which illegally seized Palestinian land in the first place!” (Yiftachel 2004, 608). The security barrier is another step towards annexation.

Building on the encompassment of the settlements, the barrier’s circuitous route is motivated by the *de facto* annexation to Israel of large sections of Palestinian land in the West Bank. Recognizing this process, Cook and Hanieh refer to the barrier as “a unilateral political boundary demarcating territories slated for annexation to Israel” (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 345). Territorial control allows Israeli to exercise effective sovereignty in the oPt – control that is achieved, in part, through annexation. As William Parry states in his book *Against the Wall: The Art of Resistance in Palestine*, “West Bank Palestinians have been losing land and rights illegally to Israel’s colonies for over four decades, and are now losing more land via the Wall – another Israeli project deemed illegal under

international law – so that Israel can annex this colonized territory and unilaterally impose a new, larger border” (Parry 2011, 11). The goal is to annex as much of the land as possible *without* absorbing the Palestinian people into the Jewish State.⁷ Once completed, about 85 percent of the wall will be built on West Bank land, and its route will annex 10 percent of the West Bank to Israel; according to Palestinians, this “insidious path... is a *de facto* land grab by Israel” (Parry 2011, 11).

Richard Falk explains that rather than serving a military function Israeli settlements and the security barrier “represent an undisguised plan to shift resources and effective sovereignty from the inhabitants to the settlers” – a major goal of settler colonialism (Falk 2003, 126). Since shifting sovereignty is the goal of Israeli colonialism and sovereignty is exercised within a specific territory, annexation is a logical means to this end. As stated by Patrick Wolfe, “[t]erritoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element” (Wolfe 2006, 388). In this dynamic, settler colonialism in Israel-Palestine is insatiable: it always needs more land (Wolfe 2006, 395). Joel Beinin believes that the barrier’s trajectory “could ultimately annex as much as half of the West Bank,” and, combined with continuing land confiscations and the construction of bypass roads, draws the boundaries “for potential Palestinian ‘Bantustans’” (Beinin 2006, 35). This brings us to the final purpose of the wall: the creation of a Palestinian Bantustan “state”.

The culminating task accomplished by encircling the settlements and annexing large segments of West Bank land is the creation of fragmented and isolated Palestinian Bantustans. The goal of the wall, ultimately, is the destruction of the territorial contiguity of Palestine while maintaining the territorial contiguity of lands occupied by Israel since 1967 (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 345). Jeff Halper notes that, through called a “security

⁷ More about annexation and Israeli demographic fears below.

barrier,” the wall actually separates Palestinians from Palestinians, preventing them from forming a unified political entity (From personal notes: Jeff Halper, ICAHD, East

Jerusalem, Israel, June 24,

2011). A Gush Etzion settler

who gave an informal lecture

while I was in Israel opened his

talk by telling us about a

Japanese game in which the

players use black and white

counters in order to surround

their opponent and win the

game (From personal notes:

settler, Gush Etzion, Israel, June

27, 2011). He compared this to

what is happening between Jews

and Arabs in the area

surrounding the settlement in

the West Bank where he lives. I

suppose he was trying to explain

the Israeli strategy of

cantonization by which Israel

encircles each Palestinian

pocket with Israeli settlements




Figure 3: An image of the emerging Palestinian Bantustans in the West Bank (Civic Coalition 2011).

and/or with the barrier in order to “win” the territorial game. This encirclement of Palestinian pockets is exactly what is occurring in the West Bank.

A report by the UN states that the barrier is “one of the key components in the continuing fragmentation of West Bank territory” (United Nations 2009, 12). The path of the barrier is no accident; rather, the wall “cements a topography of geographically disconnected Palestinian population centers, cut off from one another and from their sources of livelihood” – a collection of isolated Bantustans (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 340). The modern conception of a world made up of clearly bounded territorial nation-states aids Israel in this task. If the map is composed of flat, neat surfaces that are clearly separated from each other the blurred line of the border between Israel and the Palestinian territories does not fit this model (Malkki 1992, 26). Israel created the blurred line through continuous territorial expansion beyond the Green Line, and now it will define it – created a clearly delineated (if non-sovereign) Palestinian “state” in the form of a collection of isolated (but neatly bounded) cantons.

I disagree with authors who assert that the wall has “destroyed the prospect of a two-state solution to the conflict” (Parry 2011, 12). Rather, the wall is another step toward a two-state solution which will result in Israel possessing the majority of the Palestinian territories and surrounding a series of Palestinian Bantustans which comprise “independent statehood” in “territorial fictions” (Tilley 2011). A two-state solution would, in fact, move forward despite the fact that the settlements and the barrier combine to make “a politically and economically viable Palestinian state impossible” by cutting up the oPt into “physically isolated cantons” (Parry 2011, 12). This “state,” as envisioned by Israel, will consist of a collection of Bantustans reminiscent of apartheid South Africa



Image 3: Graffiti on the separation barrier in East Jerusalem stating “Welcome to Apartheid” and “Israel Apartheid State” (From personal collection).

(Sussman 2006; Bein 2006; Halper 2006). And far from being shy about Israel’s intentions, “Bantustans” is exactly the term used by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to describe the future for

Palestine (Parry 2011, 11).

Redolent of the Japanese game described by the Gush Etzion settler, Dr. Iyad Barghouti, General Director of the Ramallah Center of Human Rights Studies,⁸ describes the oPt as a chessboard:

The geography of Palestinian land has changed. One can hardly find a Palestinian village or city not surrounded by one or more settlements. The landscape has become similar to a chessboard and the creation of an *independent and real* Palestinian state has become impossible (Barghouti 2011, 19, *emphasis added*).

The outcome, instead, will be a non-sovereign fiction termed a “state,” and since states are conceptually sovereign and responsible for the well-being of their own citizens Israeli will no longer be held responsible for the rights of the Palestinian people (not that Israel ever accepted its responsibilities as occupier). Cook and Hanieh project that the wall will “confine the majority of the Palestinian population of the West Bank into three large

⁸ I interned at the Ramallah Center for Human Rights Studies (RCHRS) with Dr. Iyad for one month in the summer of 2011 while living in Ramallah.

cantons comprising some 50 percent of the West Bank's territory" (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 339). The rest of the land will be permanently annexed to the State of Israel, which will surround and effectively control these cantons.

Israel's end game is to create enough facts on the ground that Palestinians will be "compelled to accept a 'state' made up of a series of Bantustans" (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 346). The most urgent mission of apartheid South Africa was the same, "getting the indigenous people to declare statehood in non-sovereign enclaves" (Tilley 2011). Though in apartheid South Africa this mission "finally collapsed with mass black revolt and took apartheid down with it," the supreme irony for Palestinians today is that "the Palestinian leadership now is not only walking right into the same trap but actually making a claim on it" by going to the UN to unilaterally declare statehood (Tilley 2011). Rather than being compelled to accept a "state" made up of isolated Bantustans, by declaring independent statehood Palestinians are backing themselves into a place where Israel can say "as you are, you are now a state" (Tilley 2011). This perfectly serves Israel's goal to create a territorially discontinuous Palestinian Bantustan state in the West Bank on whatever resource-scarce land Israel does not claim when annexing the majority of the West Bank territory.

The path of the barrier points to how "Israeli territorial control divides, splits, and fragments the West Bank into separate Palestinian-controlled blocks that lack any territorial continuity," and the emerging Palestinian state will be modeling accordingly (Leuenberger & Schnell 2010, 829). Iyad Barghouti expresses the Palestinian national cause as putting an end to the occupation (Barghouti 2011, 21). Yet under the present circumstances (given the facts on the ground), a declaration of Palestinian statehood

“raises the clearest danger to the Palestinian national movement in its entire history” (Tilley 2011). The cantonization achieved by the barrier and settlements aims for the creation of “nominal ‘states’ without genuine sovereignty,” and the worst thing Palestinians can do is declare independent statehood under this framework (Tilley 2011). It is clear, as a representative of Civic Coalition⁹ claims, that the wall and the settlements are part of an elaborate system aimed at carving the West Bank into three main ghettos (From personal notes: Jamal, Civic Coalition, June 25, 2011).

Noam Chomsky says that any vision of a future Palestinian state is “approaching the level of South Africa forty years ago.... and the ‘homelands’ (Bantustans) they established” (Chomsky 2003, xi). He explains that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the currently occupied areas would be under permanent military protection (i.e., occupation) and “would be little other than a kind of Bantustan” (Chomsky 2003, 80). Commonly described within Israeli circles as the “Bantustan solution,” Chomsky states that “the goal of the Oslo negotiations is to establish a situation of ‘permanent neocolonial dependency’ for the occupied territories” – colonization that would not end with the formation of a Palestinian “state” (Chomsky 2003, 215). Rather, this would create the conditions necessary for the Palestinian Bantustans to become “impoverished labor cesspools” without the essential resources for actual independence (Tilley 2011).

A declaration of Palestinian statehood in the current framework will accomplish little for the Palestinian people in terms of protecting their rights, but a Palestinian Bantustan “state” ensures a positive outcome for Israel in terms of achieving its goals.

⁹ The Civic Coalition for Defending the Palestinians’ Rights in Jerusalem (CCDPRJ) is a nongovernmental nonprofit coalition of institutions, societies, associations and individuals with experience and mandate of working in the different fields of human rights. Website: <http://www.civiccoalition-jerusalem.org/ccdprj.ps/new2/index.php>.

Benefits of a Palestinian “state” for Israel

In the past I would have agreed that Israel would never allow the creation of a Palestinian state because when I said state I was referring to an entity with the requirements of Westphalian sovereignty: “territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures” (Krasner 1999, 20). The creation of a Palestinian Bantustan “state” that merely possesses recognition (international legal sovereignty) serves many interests for Israel as it will essentially be a non-sovereign nominal entity termed a “state” in order to free Israel from any obligations towards the Palestinian people and to avoid absorbing the Arab population. In fact, “getting the Palestinians to declare statehood themselves allows Israel precisely the outcome that eluded the apartheid South African regime: voluntary native acceptance of ‘independence’ in a non-sovereign territory with no political capacity to alter its territorial boundaries or other essential terms of existence” (Tilley 2011). The Bantustans essentially maintain Israeli sovereignty over the whole of the West Bank while addressing Israeli demographic fears.

Ever since the creation of the state in 1948 Israel has faced a demographic problem caused “by the existence of Arabs in a Jewish state” (Chomsky 2003, 19). Though Israel would of course prefer to annex the whole of “Greater Israel,”¹⁰ a solution had to be reached that solved the demographic problem – a problem which would be exacerbated by the inclusion of West Bank Palestinians into the State of Israel (Palestinians who, despite Israel’s best efforts, refused to leave their homes and, say, go

¹⁰ “Greater Israel” has several meanings of slight variation: the land stretching from the Jordan River to the sea; the whole of British mandatory Palestine; or (the most common definition today) the combined territory of the State of Israel and the Palestinian territories.

to Jordan).¹¹ It was understood among Israeli officials that a substantial Arab population would likely “destroy the foundations of our state” (Chomsky 2003, 105). Israel has long recognized “the need to ‘separate and disengage’ from the Palestinians in order to preserve Israel as a Jewish and democratic state” (Leuenberger & Schnell 2010, 818).

An article in Ha’aretz¹² from September 4, 1973 stated that “it will be possible to take over the territories without annexing them and without granting their inhabitants, the Arabs, the rights of citizens in Israel” (Chomsky 2003, 16). It is possible through the creation of a non-sovereign Palestinian Bantustan “state” which would allow maximum Israeli annexation of the territories without absorbing the Palestinian people. Without exacerbating the demographic problem, a “‘Bantustan’ model would maximize Israeli control of territory” through annexation and effective sovereignty over the Palestinian enclaves (Sussman 2006, 304). When I asked an Israeli student at Tel Aviv University how important it is that Israel be a Jewish state, she replied: “It is *essential*” (From personal notes: Tel Aviv University, Israel, July 21, 2011).¹³ She went on to say that a one-state solution would not work, suggesting we “need to get back to reality” – in reality, a Palestinian Bantustan state much better serves Israel’s interests.

Despite a significant amount of literature that suggests that a Palestinian state will never exist (Parry 2011),¹⁴ “Israel wants and needs a Palestinian state so that it will not have to grant citizenship to three and a half million Palestinians” (Halper 2006, 70). Not disrupting the demographic balance of the Jewish State is the primary reason for

¹¹ As one Israeli university student told me, “if they [the Palestinians] could go to Jordan I would support it but this is impossible” (From personal notes: Tel Aviv University, Israel, July 21, 2011).

¹² Ha-aretz is Israel’s oldest daily newspaper. Website: <http://www.haaretz.com/>.

¹³ This was the same girl who said she would prefer it if Palestinians would “go to Jordan.”

¹⁴ Possibly when this assertion is made it is because one does not conceive of a “state” as a collection of non-sovereign isolated cantons.

abandoning the *complete* annexation of the West Bank in favor of the creation of Bantustans. Leuenberger and Schnell note that while Israel's goal has always involved a vision of Greater Israel, "demographic concerns increasingly led to the recognition that some territorial compromises were in Israel's interest" (Leuenberger & Schnell 2010, 825). These compromises are not in the favor of the Palestinian population. Chomsky predicts that "[t]he Palestinian state is likely to be a kind of Bantustan, a reservoir of cheap labor, thus overcoming the fears of Israeli liberals that annexation would erode the Jewish character of the state, while perpetuating the conditions of economic dependence" (Chomsky 2003, 30). Cantonization will mean occupation under another name.

While resolving Israel's demographic fears, cantonization means the creation of a nominal Palestinian 'state' while maintaining Israeli sovereignty over the whole of the West Bank. Chomsky postulates: "Perhaps Israel will succeed – as it would of course prefer – to institute a liberal occupation policy and create tolerable material conditions for its Arab population.... with the establishment of a Palestinian state of some sort" (Chomsky 2003, 94). This possibility suggests several pending realities for Palestinians. First, though Israel will create a Palestinian state rather than absorb the Palestinian population into Israel, it will be a state "of some sort" – in other words, it will not be viable or have Westphalian sovereignty but it will be officially recognized as a state anyway (the requirement of international legal sovereignty). Second, though a "state" will be established, the occupation will continue – simply in another form and by another name. The goal of settlement expansion and construction of the security barrier is to "force [Palestinian] concession to a moribund entity termed a state," thus arguing that

Israel “has ended the occupation, but in a manner that will undeniably maintain it” (Roy 2006, 287). Palestinian statehood is yet another tool of Israeli dominance.

Though this Palestinian entity would not possess Westphalian sovereignty, “[i]t would make sense for [Israel] to use the term ‘state’ to refer to whatever scattered cantons they decide to leave to local Palestinian administration” (Chomsky 2003, 190). This is because, in the nation-state system, a Palestinian state would be responsible for the welfare of its own citizens, technically letting Israel off the hook for the desperate conditions created by the occupation. Ironically, a Palestinian Bantustan “state” would fit accepted models of statehood by the mere fact that its boundaries would finally be cemented. However, according to Yiftachel what we are witnessing in the creation of the Palestinian Bantustan state is “the making of political space marked by ‘neither two states, nor one’, as Palestinians are left in the twilight zone between occupation and ghettoized self-rule” (Yiftachel 2004, 611). Palestinian cantons would not comprise a state in terms of Westphalian sovereignty, but would be termed as such anyway – it would instead be a Palestinian non-state. The occupation would continue, just under another name and with increased impunity for the state of Israel. Beinun and Stein claim that “this so-called ‘state’” would be “little more than a handful of cantons, surrounded by Israel and enjoying only limited sovereignty” (Beinin & Stein 2006, 15).

It is obvious, from the Israel standpoint, that the façade of the Palestinian “state” should receive only “the outward semblance of sovereignty” (Chomsky 2003, 169). In 2003 Chomsky predicted that should there emerge a Palestinian state from the system of Israeli expansion, “there is every likelihood that it will be under the domination of Israel,” and this is the model that seems to be emerging (Chomsky 2003, 29). Israeli

officials have never intended to give up control of the oPt, and Defense Minister Dayan asserted that “Israel should regard itself as the ‘permanent government’ (*memshelet keva*) in the occupied territories” – Palestinian state or no (Chomsky 2003, 97). Similarly, in 1977 Likud “asserted that in Greater Israel (all of Palestine) there could only be Israeli sovereignty” (Reuveny 2003, 354).

It is clear that though the creation of a Palestinian Bantustan “state” serves Israeli interests, it will never result in self-determination for the Palestinian people. Therefore, resistance must take a path other than the declaration of Palestinian statehood.

Resistance: Shifting Tactics

Repeatedly while I was in Israel and the West Bank I was told that Palestinians have three options for responding to the occupation. A Palestinian woman from Tent of Nations in Bethlehem first laid them out for me: the first option is immigration – she said that people who leave do so in order to live as human beings and to not always want for things; the second option is to become resigned – people who choose this option remain in Israel-Palestine but live each day submissive to their life under occupation; and the final option is to react, either violently or nonviolently (From personal notes: Tent of Nations, Bethlehem, Palestine June 27, 2011). Similarly, a representative from TIPH (Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron)¹⁵ laid out the same three options: fight, flee, or live as alien residents (From personal Notes: TIPH representative, TIPH headquarters, Hebron, Palestine, June 28, 2011). Palestinians have repeatedly chosen the option of fighting this anti-colonial struggle.

¹⁵ Website: <http://www.tiph.org/>.

Some resistance tactics employed by Palestinians follow the historical trend in anti-colonial struggle: the colonized pushing back against the colonizer to create an independent space for self-determination. For example, Palestinians have frequently employed economic boycotts of Israeli goods in an attempt to force the colonizer to relent and cease expansion (these methods were employed during both Intifadas) (Gelvin 2005, 2007). While boycotts and sanctions from within Palestine have become less effective as Israel has reduced its dependence on trade with Palestinians, these approaches have not been completely laid to rest as resistance tactics; these means are still employed through the campaign for boycotts, divestment and sanctions (BDS Movement)¹⁶ where they have shifted so that international players are doing the boycotting. This movement seems to be having relatively little success, however, since Israeli expansion has not stopped; in part this is due to economically powerful Israeli backers, such as the United States.

Palestinians have also resisted Israeli expansion by being *physically present* on the land, fighting back using the same tactics as the colonizer: the use of territoriality as a strategy for exercising sovereignty. Palestinians in Budrus (and in other villages) used this strategy when they *physically got in the way* of the construction of the “security barrier,” resulting in its path being diverted around the town:

Several Palestinian villages – Ni’lin, Bi’lin, Jayyous and others – are at the forefront of this popular struggle to oppose the continued construction of the Wall on their land. Non-violent anti-wall demonstrations are organized by local committees, often by village youth. In Ni’lin, these demonstrators consist mainly of local men and boys, international activists and some left-wing and anti-Zionist Israelis. Demonstrations vary in size from a few dozen to a few hundred people, depending on the significance of the occasion and the level of emotion. Flags, banners, t-shirts expressing solidarity, chants, loudspeakers, video cameras and the spirit of defiance and resistance – these are what they bring to the frontline (Parry 2011, 188).

¹⁶ For more about the BDS movement and how you can become involved, see: <http://www.bdsmovement.net/>.

While I was in the West Bank I visited a place called the Tent of Nations where the land owners use similar tactics; though Israeli settlers from a settlement nearby frequently come and uproot hundreds of olive trees from the property, the owners respond by replanting (with interest). The idea is that as long as they plant Israel can't claim that the land is unused and fallow, in which case it would be declared state land and designated for use by the nearby settlement. Though the Palestinians at Tent of Nations are incredibly resilient and the villagers in Budrus were successful in impacting the path of the fence by standing in front of the bulldozers day after day and refusing to move from the land, these victories, while impressive, are limited. The barrier still carves deep into the West Bank in many locations and settlement expansion is ongoing.

Palestinians also use tactics that draw attention to the injustice of the occupation in the hopes that international pressure will force Israel to withdraw. Frequently Palestinians throughout the oPt and within the borders of Israel hold rallies and protests which attract both Israeli and international support. Art on the separation wall is another means of drawing attention to its path and injustice. In reading William Parry's book about art on the wall, one of the images/slogans that stuck out to me again and again said: "To exist is to resist," a message I often saw spray-painted on the barrier while I was in Israel-Palestine. The aim of art on the wall and the use of powerful slogans is to draw attention to the illegal path of the "security" barrier; according to Parry, "[t]he spray can hasn't forced Israel to stop building its highly controversial Wall, but in the skilled hands of a guerrilla street artist like Banksy, it's a formidable weapon in the struggle for hearts, minds and justice" as it has gained the attention of a Western audience and "contributed to an awareness about the reality on the ground and the asymmetrical power struggle

between Palestinians and Israelis” (Parry 2011, 9). Again, though, the occupation continues.

Not insignificantly, Palestinians have also resisted the occupation and Israeli expansionism by approaching the United Nations. The impetus behind the unilateral declaration of statehood by Palestine in the UN is the belief that statehood entails certain benefits:

Maybe it could help the ‘peace talks’ if they are redefined as negotiations between two states instead of preconditions for a state. Declaring statehood could redefine Israel’s occupation as invasion and legitimize resistance as well as trigger different and more effective United Nations intervention. Maybe it will give Palestinians greater political leverage on the world stage... (Tilley 2011).

Joseph Massad says that the perceived primary benefit of recognition as a state (international legal sovereignty) is the ability to use legal instruments only available to UN member states to force Israel to grant Palestinian independence (Massad 2011).

According to Massad this is false logic since historically there has never been a lack of legal instruments to challenge Israel; Israel and the United States simply disregard these instruments repeatedly, an occurrence that will not change with recognition (Massad 2011). Massad goes on to say, as I have been saying, that recognition as a state will never mean sovereignty for Palestinians because even if Palestinians achieve recognition Israel will simply say, ‘Okay, but that small fraction of discontinuous West Bank territory is your territory,’ and Palestinians will remain “colonized, discriminated against, oppressed, and exiled” (Massad 2011). An Israeli student at Tel Aviv University said: “I think every human deserves the right to be a citizen, with a flag and anthem and a community...”

(From personal notes: Tel Aviv University, Israel, July 21, 2011). The student from Hebrew University who told me about Israeli fears concerning terrorism said, similarly, that she personally believes that Palestinians should have their own country because it

gives you a sense of self to have your own flag, your own anthem (From personal notes: Bikhhal, Hebrew University, Israel, June 29, 2011). But what are these things – flags and anthems – if you don't have self-determination, if your "state" is not sovereign, if you cannot defend your rights?

Ilan Pappé believes that the two-state solution has long been ill-advised despite having the backing of most of the world because "everybody inside and outside Palestine seems to concede that the occupation will continue and that even in the best of all scenarios [recognition of Palestinian statehood], there will be a greater and racist Israel next to a fragmented and useless bantustan" (Pappé 2011). A non-sovereign state cannot effectively defend its citizens or their rights. In these apartheid-style Bantustans "a fig leaf of autonomy would hide the reality of occupation," which would continue indefinitely (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 342). A Palestinian Bantustan state would really only mean the continuation of the occupation under another name – the continuation of colonization. According to Rafael Reuveny, "[c]olonial conflicts ended only when the colonial rulers gave up the colonies;" therefore, "the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may only end following complete Israeli decolonization and the formation of a Palestinian state in its place" (Reuveny 2003, 347, 349). What is taking place, however, is the formation of a Palestinian "state" without decolonization. Israel has clearly signaled its "intention to hold onto the land forever," so perhaps complete annexation and incorporation of the Palestinian populace into a single state with Israel is the only real solution for ending the conflict (Reuveny 2003, 368). Under this framework, annexation, as opposed to independence, would be the means of decolonization.

Reuveny strongly believes that “if the Palestinian state takes the form of numerous discontinuous enclaves surrounded by Israeli land, the conflict likely will continue” (Reuveny 2003, 347). Just as desperation under occupation has led to violence and terrorism in the past, desperation over the complete lack of self-determination will continue to fuel the hundred year conflict. Virginia Tilley explains that Israel, like the South African apartheid regime, recognizes that Palestinians “would forever resist the permanent denial of equal rights and political voice” that would be necessary to maintain the Jewish State; therefore, a Palestinian declaration of statehood would “permanently absolve” the Israeli government of “any responsibility for [Palestinian] political rights,” (Tilley 2011). Despite the fact that general consensus has held that partition “is the only real solution to the future of that area,” and most “agree on establishing two states in the area of the former British Palestine, a Jewish one and an Arab one,” perhaps these rights could be better fought for as citizens of one Jewish-Palestinian state (Biger 2008, 75, 91).

Noam Chomsky argues that “socialist binationalism offers the best long-range hope for a just peace in the region” (Chomsky 2003, 26). This may be true if a two-state solution includes Palestinian Bantustans. Chomsky suggests a federal state made up of autonomous districts with national autonomy for both peoples instead of a two-state outcome (Chomsky 2003, 33). This solution is not as radical as it might seem; as far back as 1940-1941 Adil Jabr, a member of the Jerusalem Municipal Council, floated the idea for “a binational Palestine based on full equality within a broader federation of autonomous states” (Chomsky 2003, 34). A one-state solution may be the best outcome for both Israelis and Palestinians, who Chomsky asserts are both “following a losing strategy,” – an outcome which is typical of national conflicts that “rarely serve the

interests of those who are slaughtering or threatening one another” (Chomsky 2003, 73). Integration of the oPt into Israel may be “the humane course” for ending the hundred year conflict in Israel-Palestine (Chomsky 2003, 98). Palestinians recognize the “Israeli disposition to insist on an asymmetrical outcome that would not provide the Palestinian people with a viable and independent sovereign state” and they are choosing to fight this anti-colonial struggle in an innovative way (Falk 2003, 99).

The Palestinian *national cause* is to put an end to the occupation and protect the rights of Palestinian refugees, and it appears that the solution to ending the occupation may not be the creation of a Palestinian state made up of a collection of fragmented and isolated Bantustans (Barghouti 2011, 21). Territorial division based on the internationally recognized border (the Green Line) will never happen due to settlement expansion and construction of the barrier; therefore, the solution to ending the occupation may not be national self-determination based on Palestinian statehood. Palestinian society is “fragmented and entrapped within a draconian regime of Bantustanization” and since “[n]o meaningful independence can be accomplished” under this framework, the way *out* of the occupation might be to go *in* (Hammami & Tamari 2006, 263, 271).

Edward Said stressed that the “uniqueness of the Palestinian case” can’t be reduced to anticolonial resistance formulas such as those discussed in my literature review that entail pushing away from the colonizer; hence, a new form of resistance is necessary (Hochberg 2006). Gary Sussman suggests that a one-state solution may be the way to end the occupation, stating that “a struggle against ‘occupation’” is transforming into “a struggle for one man, one vote,” and Said argued for “creating an inclusive

Israeli-Palestinian society” as a way to end the conflict (Sussman 2006, 310; Hochberg 2006, 52).

Recently Palestinians have begun responding to the process of Bantustanization in a way that differs dramatically from other examples of anticolonial resistance. Instead of pushing back against the colonizer and demanding self-determination as a separate and sovereign entity, Palestinians have recognized that any future state based on the current “facts on the ground” would never be viable and sovereign; instead, they have decided to fight for their rights as Israeli citizens – if Israel refuses to withdraw from the oPt, the alternative is one state with one vote for each citizen (From personal notes: informal lecture, al-Quds University, Palestine, June 27, 2011). Palestinians “are seeking any path – even annexation to Israel” in order to end the occupation and promote their rights (Sussman 2006, 313). A group Palestinian young people I met at Dheish Refugee Camp in Palestine said that most people in the camp, including themselves, favor a one-state solution, because they know that realistically there won’t be a two-state solution due to the settlements and the security barrier (From personal notes: Ibdaa Cultural Center, Dheish Refugee Camp, Palestine, June 28, 2011). Annexation, rather than statehood, could be the way to end the occupation that cantonization would prolong (Sussman 2006, 307). Palestinians are beginning to accept that “the territorial basis for establishing a Palestinian state capable of exercising significant sovereign powers may no longer exist” – but they are not abandoning their struggle for self-determination (Beinin 2006, 37).

Chapter 5: Conclusion

While I was in Israel, I was told by a Jewish-Israeli university student that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not a dispute about territory, but a dispute over having a country. I pointed out that if the conflict was about having a country, then it had to be about territory since a country exists *on* territory, to which the speaker replied: “Well yes, a country is not built on air, it is built on land, but the conflict is not about where the line will be drawn” (From personal notes: Kadima Youth representative, Tel Aviv University, Israel, July 21, 2011). I must say that I disagree; I think this is exactly what the conflict is about.

As I have stated throughout, the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is “a contest over land and its control,” taking place within a global framework of a world made up of clearly bounded nation-states (Roy 2006, 282). The premise I began with in the literature review is that, under the seemingly implicit assumption that the globe is divided into mutually exclusive states (a fact which places Palestine’s very existence on uncertain ground), territoriality is a strategy for exercising Westphalian sovereignty. This premise explains the logic behind Israeli expansion and construction of the security barrier in the West Bank, the two main methods of Israeli colonialism. Israel’s understanding is that creating “facts on the ground” (gaining territorial control) equates to sovereignty; therefore, Israeli expansion and construction of the security barrier represent the use of territoriality as a strategy for exercising sovereignty.

Summary of Findings

As explained in the data and discussion of findings chapter, this expansion serves several goals for the State of Israel, primary amongst these being maximum Israeli annexation of the West Bank and containment of the Palestinian people in a series of non-sovereign, isolated Bantustans referred to collectively as a “state.” Further, because states are conceptually sovereign and responsible for the well-being of their own citizens, Israeli will no longer be held responsible for the rights of the Palestinian people.

Palestinians are responding to the cantonization of the West Bank through a resistance strategy that is unusual because the colonized are not fighting to be separate and independent from their oppressors, but are instead pushing for annexation as the best option for achieving Palestinian rights. This tactic is being adopted as an alternative form of achieving self-determination in light of the understanding that a Palestinian “state” in the form of a handful of noncontiguous Bantustans would never be sovereign and would be unable to defend the rights of its citizens.

A Paradox Revealed

In writing a thesis based on the premise that territoriality is a strategy for exercising sovereignty I may have inadvertently encountered a paradox. As described above, Israeli policy has shifted from *complete* annexation of the West Bank to *maximum* annexation and the creation of a Palestinian Bantustan “state.” The difference between the two is that complete annexation means the land from the Jordan River to the sea would be claimed for the State of Israel, and the Palestinian people would have to move elsewhere; maximum annexation, on the other hand, has become the goal because Israel

recognizes that Palestinians aren't leaving their land (yet), and that annexing them would destroy the Jewish nature of the state. Therefore, maximum annexation is aimed at leaving as little land as possible for the Palestinian people to live on so they won't be included in the State of Israel. The resulting Palestinian entity, a Bantustan "state," would have international legal sovereignty but not the more tangible Westphalian sovereignty.

The paradox lies in the fact that under this emerging reality Israel will continue to exercise sovereign power throughout the whole of the West Bank, whether designated as part of the Palestinian "state" or as part of the State of Israel. But if territory is the key to sovereignty – its irreducible element – shouldn't Palestinians be sovereign even in their discontinuous and geographically limited "state"? Why won't the strategy of territoriality work for them as it is being employed by Israel? It seems that Palestinians cannot use territoriality as effectively as Israel can and does (a conclusion that Israeli policy makers seemed to have reached as well, since they don't fear the existence of a Palestinian "state" which they know would not have sovereign power). Territory, clearly, does not equate to sovereignty.

Discovering this paradox may be one of the most important contributions of this study and should be explored in future projects. Possibly the relationship between territory and sovereignty is evolving, or the global system is evolving in such a way that this relationship and the nation-state system no longer make sense. It is also possible that a new form of politics is emerging, where the dichotomy between control and resistance no longer relies on territory.

Perhaps this paradox should have been expected, since Stephen Krasner's primary thesis in *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (1999) is that the rules of sovereignty are

frequently broken – which is the reason behind him terming it “hypocrisy” (Krasner 1999). Certain questions arise in response to this observation: *Who organizes the hypocrisy? Who do the rules work for? And who can suspend normal operations?* Partha Chatterjee, in discussing nationalism, points out that when nationalism does not achieve its ideal (liberty), it is explained away by saying that conditions existed that were “unpropitious to freedom,” and which inhibited nationalism from functioning properly; nationalism is never seen by liberal-rationalists to be theoretically flawed (Chatterjee 1993). Therefore, perhaps the fact that territoriality won’t achieve sovereignty for Palestinians has nothing to do with rules being broken in certain circumstances, but rather has to do with theoretical flaws in the link between territory and sovereignty. Again, this is a question for further research, but it is clear that Israel is effectively detaching sovereignty and territory to its advantage, in line with Foucault and Krasner’s assertions that the “powers that be” can suspend these mechanisms for their benefit. And since new forms of control give rise to new, responsive forms of resistance, counterforce must learn to detach territory and sovereignty as well.

In turning from demands for statehood to a push for annexation, Palestinians are using the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house – they are choosing *not* to seek independence because formal sovereignty (international legal sovereignty) does not always equal actual sovereignty (Westphalian sovereignty). Everything about how sovereignty works is related to others, and Israel, with its superior might and international support, will never allow a Palestinian entity to be truly independent. Anti-colonial resistance is aimed at achieving self-determination (which is more complicated than getting your own territory – or state, or nation) and annexation is an alternative way of

achieving this. Perhaps this tactic is being employed because the formal designation of “statehood” just doesn’t matter anymore. Instead, annexation may prove to be the next step in the decolonization struggle, especially if Palestinians are receiving “statehood” without decolonization – but will they be better off?

What Will the Future Hold?

Whether Israeli citizenship will actually secure Palestinians their rights is a toss-up. The reality on the ground must be compared to rhetoric – citizenship *sounds* good, but Palestinians currently living within the borders of Israel certainly don’t enjoy equal rights as citizens of the Jewish State. As stated previously, Israel recognizes that Palestinians “would forever resist the permanent denial of equal rights and political voice” that would be necessary to maintain the Jewish State, but this doesn’t mean that, if forced to annex the Palestinian population, Israel won’t deny them these rights anyway (Tilley 2011). Therefore, it is possible that even if they successfully achieve annexation, Palestinians will simply remain second-class citizens in the State of Israel for another fifty years or more, until the international community unites to force Israel to provide equal rights and citizenship, like South Africa was eventually forced to end its own apartheid regime. But if bad options are the only ones available to Palestinians, annexation might be the least bad option (especially when compared to cantonization).

It is also possible that the day will come when Israel will no longer get away with its actions and abuses in the West Bank (and the rest of the oPt). Israel can’t function in a vacuum, and though it enjoys a privileged position in the current global system, privileged positions don’t last forever (again, South Africa enjoyed a privileged position

that allowed it to get away with apartheid, but only for a time). Even though Westphalian sovereignty is meant to extend over the globe, it differentiates in the way it operates. Israel is currently “in” with the powers who decide when to suspend the rules, but these might not be the great powers in the future. If history shows anything, it is that power relations and imbalances shift over time. All that is clear is that events, as they are currently emerging, will result in a non-sovereign Palestinian Bantustan “state,” not Palestinian independence.

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