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Competition and Cooperation in Polygynous & Monogamous Households: Experimental Evidence from Sierra Leone

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Abstract : Competition and cooperation in polygynous households have both been widely documented across various disciplines. There is contradictory evidence as to whether these interpersonal dynamics produce better or worse outcomes for the household. This study uses a competitiveness game and a series of dictator games to measure competition and cooperation within households and between marriage types. Results show that there are key differences between monogamy and polygyny. Monogamous women compete less with their husbands than stranger and less in comparison to polygynous women. Monogamous spouses are more likely to forgo economic opportunities than polygynous spouses and have a greater preference for egalitarian resource allocations. Poly spouses maximize resources more often, even if it leads to disadvantageous intra-household inequality. Co-wife rivalry is rife: Junior wives compete more with senior wives than any other opponent, and both show high levels of spite and selfishness with respect to their co-wife. Education and wealth related variables mitigate the variation in behavior between the marriage types and sexes, suggesting that larger socioeconomic factors are just as important in outcomes for households.

1. Introduction

Polygyny is the practice of one man marrying multiple wives. It is a widespread and common practice throughout the "polygyny belt", an area that spans across the width of the African continent. Today, between 20-55% of women in this part of the world are in polygynous marriages and it is now estimated that 1 in every 4 women in the African continent are in polygynous marriages (Dalton & Leung, 2011; Arthi & Fenske, 2018). Most practitioners of polygyny are Muslim, as it is permitted under certain circumstances by Islam, but some across the region identify as Christian or practice a blend of spiritual traditions. In Sierra Leone, the country of interest in this study, polygyny is most frequently associated with Islam. On average, 37% of women are in polygynous marriages in Sierra Leone, with greater concentration in the northern province and rural areas. 20% of Sierra Leonean men between the ages 15-59 have two or more wives (DHS, 2013).

The slave trade and colonialism greatly impacted the population composition and the evolution of many cultural practices across the African continent. Although the exact origins of polygyny are unknown beyond general tribal culture, perhaps related to agricultural practices, research shows that the trans-Atlantic slave trade caused a broad expansion of the practice (Boserup, 1970). A larger proportion of men were victims of the slavery which lead to extremely skewed sex ratios (Leung & Dalton, 2011). The practice of polygyny grew as a result. Studies show that ethnic groups that were subjected to the slave trade are more likely to be polygynous, which explains why polygyny is more common in West Africa than all other regions (Fenske, 2015; Leung & Dalton 2011).

Existing research shows a strong link between a number of negative development outcomes and polygyny. Polygyny in Sierra Leone correlates with low levels of education and lower wealth quintiles (DHS, 2013). Most consequential are vulnerability to sexually transmitted infections, increased fertility, food insecurity, poor child health, early marriage of girls, reduced investment in female human capital, and more domestic violence (Heath et al, 2018; Rossi, 2018; Bove and Valeggia 2009; Edlund and Lagerlöf, 2006; Tertilt, 2003). There are also costs specific to men: in many parts of the world where polygyny prevails, the distended bride-price leads to marriage market obstruction for large numbers of men, often younger and poorer, who turn to crime, violence and political agitation in the absence of marriage prospects (Hudson and Matfess, 2017). Men also face a trade-off between investing in physical assets or investing in marriage which leads to the crowding out of investment that may have otherwise provided personal income

growth and greater economic security. Each of these factors alone can result in worse development outcomes or lead to greater suffering. Combined they help explain why the polygynous practicing societies in Africa experience higher rates of poverty (Tertilt, 2005).

Not only do polygynous households generally fare worse on economic, female welfare, and child health indicators, but competition appears to exacerbate the problem (Bove and Valeggia 2009; Omariba and Boyle, 2007; Tertilt, 2005; Strassman, 1997). It has been observed that men rarely treat wives equally, often pitting wives against each other for the purposes of ego inflation and to thwart conspiracy (Madhavan, 2002). Co-wife conflict is believed to be one of the prominent mechanisms that corrodes welfare outcomes for women and their children in polygyny. Senior wives strive to maintain their status within the household as new wives enter while junior wives have to carve out their place. Where resources are more scarce or where women are more dependent on resources from their spouses, poly women will have to vie for their household status, duties, and resource allocation. Less social power in society and within the household leads to grave resource dilution for poly women and their children (Kazianga and Klonner, 2006).

Among so many reports of conflict in polygynous households, this study seeks to determine the extent to which members in polygynous nodes compete with each other to maximize personal gains, and extent to which they cooperate with one another to maximize gains for the household. The existing literature on polygyny lacks concrete, empirical measures of competition and cooperation within households. This study produces empirical measures to quantify these behaviors between spouses and cowives in polygynous and monogamous households. We use two behavioral experiments and a survey conducted in the field in Sierra Leone. Data is collected for polygynous and monogamous households. Games are conducted with respect to a subject's spouse (first and second wife for polygynous men), co-wife (for polygynous women), and a stranger. Two counterfactuals are present in this research: the actions of monogamous households and actions towards a stranger. Monogamous household data will expose differences in the marriage types, and actions towards a stranger will provide a baseline for measurement for each marriage type. Linking game outcomes with household data reveals the predictive power of competitive and cooperative dynamics for the well-being of adults, their children, and the household unit.

Our analysis shows that polygynous spouses (husbands and wives) choose the resource maximizing option more frequently than monogamous subjects, refuting the oft-touted narrative

that monogamous households are more efficient. In stark contrast to the efficiency achieved between polygynous spouses, we find that polygynous women deliberately impair their co-wives, often to the point of self-sabotage. Mono subjects have a higher preference for equal allocations, but such inclinations result in fewer total resources for the household. While mono men, poly men, and poly women each compete equally with their spouse and a stranger, mono women compete significantly less with their spouse. Mono women are also more likely to select the less advantageous monetary allocations than other groups. Poly men display no favoritism towards their first or second wives. In general, male subjects exhibit more similar behavior than female subjects. Our estimates show that there is no singular and consistent *polygyny* effect throughout the games, and that behavior is determined by marriage type and gender interacted with other socio-economic conditions.

2. Literature Review

This review explores the connections between competitive and cooperative behavior and gender and marriage structure. Although many disciplines have investigated behavior within the marriage types, this review primarily highlights the influential theories within the economics discipline. The review starts with a discussion of gender and competitiveness, then details the unique form of competition in the polygynous context. It gives a brief summary of evolutionary theories of polygyny and then finishes by relating interpersonal dynamics to theories of efficiency within economic household models.

2.1 Female Competition

Competition in the polygynous context almost exclusively refers to competition between co-wives. Female strategies and motivations for competition and cooperation are at play in a household where two or more women are sharing limited resources. For this reason, it is useful to understand female modes of competition. Previous studies in economics have found a significant gender gap in willingness to compete between men and women, suggesting that women are less competitive or that they lack competitive traits that might secure more power, prestige, and resources (Buser et al., 2014).

Experiments that clarify the differences in competition along gender lines show that women are indeed competitive beings, but their true competitive nature only surfaces for the benefit of their offspring. Cassar et al. (2016) tested female competitiveness using an experiment adapted from Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) which offers subjects the opportunity to compete for cash and another opportunity to compete for a prize, of equal cash value, that strictly benefits

children. The results from the cash scheme verified the established literature on female competitiveness, but the children's prize scheme induced competition among women that equated levels of male competition. Within a polygynous context, such findings would suggest that co-wives would engage in competitive behavior if resources are generally limited, particularly if there are stakes involving offspring.

2.2 Competition in Polygynous Households

Several models of competition have been observed in polygynous household. Bove and Valeggia (2009) characterize polygyny as an example of "cooperative conflict" among co-wives, where cooperation is necessary for childrearing, domestic production, or farm work. Rivalry emerges over splitting the time, resources, attention and affection of the shared husband. This dynamic gives rise to differential reproductive and resource outcomes. Rossi (2018) argues that fertility strategies are expressions of these competitive interactions in polygynous households. Rossi first identifies the impact of polygamy on fertility by measuring the birth spacing before and after the arrival of the second wife. A second model is used to estimate birth intervals with a baseline hazard specific to each woman by comparing the birth rates of the same woman in the monogamous stage and in the polygamous stage. Together, these models accurately predict that children are strategic compliments; polygynous women raise their fertility in response to an increase by their co-wife because children can secure access to resources controlled by the husband.

It is common for a co-wife's rank within the household to be established in part by her childbearing capacity. Her rank then determines her resource allocation (Desai, 1992; Bove and Valeggia, 2009; Madhavan, 2002; Rossi, 2018). Co-wife competition is heightened whenever women and their children are more dependent on their husband for resources or attention. In particular, competition in certain households is most intense when wives vie for a husband's investment in their children's health and education, especially for sons with special status in the family hierarchy (Bledsoe, 1993; Rossi, 2018). In countries that restrict spousal benefits such as identity documents or health benefits to only one wife, competition may also be fierce in an effort to secure their reproductive value and household rank (Bove and Valeggia, 2009).

2.3 Theories of Polygyny

The predominant theoretical model of polygyny, known as the Polygyny Threshold Model, connects the practice of polygyny in the animal kingdom to evolutionary processes (Verner & Willson, 1966). The theory posits that when female species select mates according to

their biological fitness, they opt to mate with males who possess superior fitness characteristics, such as genes, food supply, and environment, in order to ensure the survival and success of offspring. These characteristics are held by relatively few males within the group, not by all, who become the preferred mating partner for the majority of females (Orians, 1969).

Empirical extensions of the Polygyny Threshold Model to humans link the prevalence of polygyny to societies in which men control resources and where there is greater wealth inequality, thereby influencing female reproductive choice towards more resourced male partners. Investigations into Kenyan polygyny, for example, demonstrate a positive correlation between amount of land ownership with number of wives (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1987). Data from the Kipsigis people of Kenya, show that women first select male partners who offer the best reproductive opportunities in terms of material wealth. Once land ownership is controlled for, Kipsigis women prefer bachelors over monogamists and polygynists as a way of minimizing the personal costs of reproduction (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1990).

Human applications of the Polygyny Threshold Model suggest that polygyny should become more prevalent as human societies shifted away from sustenance farming, a system which maintained a relatively flat society, to larger-scale agricultural systems, a system which engenders social and economic stratification. In fact, polygyny has become less practiced as societies have become more unequal. This is known as "Polygyny Paradox." Later works solve the Polygyny Paradox by expanding the Polygyny Threshold Model to account for two-sided mating choices (i.e. female and male choice), where male choice is based on the number of wives which maximize his own fitness. They identify the conditions that produced parallel transitions away from polygyny and towards agriculture and thus explain the "Polygyny Paradox":

"(i) in these highly stratified economies, the fraction of men with sufficient wealth to make polygynous marriage an attractive option for them and their potential partners is low relative to other subsistence systems, and (ii) decreasing marginal fitness returns to increasing number of wives above and beyond the fitness costs of sharing a husband's wealth sharply limit the number of wives acquired by exceptionally wealthy individuals." (Ross et al., 2018)

2.4 Household Efficiency

The focus of empirical work on the topic of polygyny in economics has centered around the concept of household efficiency in an attempt to affirm, reject or reformulate theory of the household. Much of this work tests the theoretical construct of the collective household model (a model that allows for differing preferences within a single household) and its ability to achieve efficiency (married partners take advantage of opportunities that make the household better off).

The folk theorem approach to cooperative game theory, where repeated interactions can lead to enforcement mechanisms that secure the cooperative outcome, predicts a Pareto superior outcome for spouses (Chiappori and Mazzucco, 2017). Yet it is widely documented that households often fail to achieve efficiency (Duflo and Udry, 2004). Some studies show that this is acutely true for polygynous households with regard to production, consumption, and distribution (Akresh, 2011; Rossi, 2018; Kazianga and Klonner, 2006). Others contend that the practice has been sustained precisely due to efficiency gains (Lawson et al., 2015; Munro et al., 2010; Boserup, 1970).

The first challenge to the household efficiency assumption came from Udry (1996) who used data from farm yields in Burkina Faso from plots cultivated by different members of the household. Yields were substantially lower on plots controlled by women, which meant that women received smaller plots to cultivate although, on average women achieve higher values of output per hectare on smaller plots than men. This study demonstrates that resource allocation is determined by gender and such divisions fail to maximize household efficiency (Udry, 1996). Kazianga and Klonner (2006) test the intrahousehold efficiency assumption in a polygynous context by examining the co-movement of child survival odds and child investment. Their estimations fail to reject the hypothesis of efficient child investment in monogamous households, implying that all children, regardless of birth order or sex, have equal chances of surviving. In contrast, the researchers reject the efficient resource allocation hypotheses for children of junior wives but not senior wives. These results confirm the narrative evidence of polygynous unions, which consistently brings to light the diminished bargaining power and disadvantaged economic position of junior wives.

Another approach to examining efficiency can be taken from the perspective of maximizing the common pot. In this sense, distribution is a secondary concern if dynamics within the household are reducing total income. An examination of this perspective comes from Barr et al. (2018) who conducted a field experiment involving a public goods game in Nigeria with polygynous and monogamous spouses. The experiment is played between spouses and co-wives. Each individual was given a sum of money and the choice to either keep any amount for one's self or contribute whatever fraction to a shared fund that would be multiplied by 1.5 and divided between the two players. Higher contributions indicate greater cooperation and hence, greater household efficiency, as each player was given the choice to maximize real earnings for the household or keep an undivided lesser amount for one's self. The researchers found that,

controlling for baseline levels of cooperation for the individual, contributions towards the shared fund are significantly lower within polygynous compared to monogamous couples, both between co-wives and between polygynous men towards their wives.

An earlier study, also from Nigeria, finds the opposite effect (Munro et al., 2010). This study also employs a public goods game to evaluate household efficiency in polygynous households, using monogamous households as a counterfactual. It finds that, while all subjects retain at least half of their game endowments for personal gain, polygynous subjects are not less efficient than monogamous subjects. In fact, polygynous men receive higher payoffs from their wives than do monogamous men. Additionally, senior wives receive more from their husbands than junior wives.

2.5 Cooperation and Efficiency

Lawson et al. (2015) argue that polygyny has been practiced in more than 80% of pre-industrial societies, which implies that there must be some perceived benefit to those who participate. The "polygyny-threshold model" tested by Lewis et al. (2015) posits that women chose polygyny when the associated costs are offset by greater resource access than monogamy marriage can offer. In particular, the costs of sharing a husband are offset by the land and livestock that women gain by joining polygynous union. This study found no difference between the monogamous and polygynous households of Tanzania on food security and child health after differences in environmental vulnerability and socioeconomic marginalization are accounted for. Households in this study are able to achieve a critical level of efficiency thereby sustaining the practice of polygyny in the region.

Akresh et al. (2016) was able to demonstrate efficiency in production between co-wives through agricultural production in Burkina Faso. Using data on monogamous and polygynous agricultural households, Akresh et al. observe greater cooperation among co-wives than among monogamous or polygynous spouses. Co-wives share fewer resources with one another and were thus able to achieve higher levels of cooperation than spouses. Fewer resources in common creates an emotional distance that enables cooperation. The theory that emerges from these results is that less altruism can actually increase the incentive to cooperate by lowering the utility one expects to receive in a non-cooperative equilibrium. The reward for cooperation will be larger for individuals without altruistic ties who might not otherwise engage in any mutually beneficial behavior.

The most recent advancement on this topic also affirms the ability of polygynous households to attain economic efficiency (Hidrobo et al., 2019). Another public goods game, this time in Senegal among semi-nomadic pastoralist households, shows no differences in contribution rates or reciprocity between sexes and marriage types. For farming and pastoralist households, coordination in production is essential to their survival. Such a lifestyle appears to foster greater cooperation in polygynous households. This could even be the reason polygyny has persisted into the present.

The existing body of economics literature offers contradictory evidence of the conditions related to polygyny. On the one hand, the marriage structure proves as efficient as the alternative. On the other hand, it is crippled by conflict between co-wives. In light of this mixed evidence, more research is needed to enhance our understanding of the costs and benefits of the marriage structure. Cooperation and competition are the root behaviors that affect vital life outcomes for household members. This research attempts to quantify these interpersonal dynamics and provide an empirical measure that can provide the link between marriage type and various life outcomes. In doing so, we can further our knowledge of this long-standing practice and provide solutions to development challenges that are unique to the practice of polygyny.

3. Experimental Design

This study includes two experiments we will refer to as "Competition" and "Cooperation". To capture variation across monogamous and polygynous households, as well as within polygynous households (between co-wives and their husbands), we use within-subject design experiments as the empirical method of this study. In doing so, we create realistic scenarios through the use of salient payoffs that will induce the behaviors of interest. This method observes the subjects' behavior directly through their choices in games that mimic real-life events such as situations involving resource acquisition and allocation. As such, the identification strategy for this study is based on variation across subjects within the two experiments.

3.1 Experimental Data

The sample consists of 593 individuals from the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sierra Leone (Appendix A). 254 are monogamous men and women, 338 are polygynous. Of the polygynous, 110 are men and 228 are women. The married sample includes both husband and wife from the same household and the entire polygynous node. Households with three wives are

dropped in some estimations to maintain consistency in our sample. This brings the poly sample size to 314 for estimations involving spouse opponents or co-wife opponents.

Two of the four provinces in Sierra Leone were randomly selected for sampling. Fourteen villages were randomly selected within the eastern and north-western provinces. Within each village, every third house in randomly selected neighborhoods were invited to participate. Only households for which all adult members were able and willing to participate were included.

All subjects participated in two experiments and completed a survey. Each subject was paid for participating in the survey and for one of the experiments randomly chosen by a die toss. The subjects understood that their total payment would be conditional on their performance and choices in the experiments.

Each session was conducted in private and are confidential so as to elicit authentic responses and eliminate the potential for retaliatory or reciprocal behavior. Activities were conducted in random order and included the competition game, the cooperation game, two short games that serve as controls for the competition game, and a survey. The games consisted of multiple rounds which were also randomized using a die.

3.2 The Competition Experiment

The competition experiment utilizes standard experimental protocol of eliciting competitive preferences first developed by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). Our study builds on the experiment to measure individuals' baseline desire to compete against their desire to compete against specific opponents. Subjects perform multiple one-minute rounds of mental summation: 1+8=9, 9+3=12, 12+2=14, etc. Mental summation is a quotidian function in Sierra Leone. Even those with little education and low literacy perform it for most transactions. The summation always begins with the correct answer to the previous problem, as demonstrated above, so that those who are mathematically challenged can easily count up to the correct answer. Only numbers 1 through 10 are added to the summation so to maintain simplicity.

In the beginning of each round, each subject is told who their opponent is and then asked whether they would like to compete with the opponent in a "tournament" or simply play by themselves for "piece rate". In the piece-rate scheme, they are paid 1000 leones[1] (le) for each correct answer. In a tournament, they are paid le 2000 for each correct answer if their score is higher than their opponent's. Otherwise, they receive nothing.

[1] About $0.12 at the time of the study.

Unlike previous versions of this experiment, the opponent changes in each round. In first round, subjects play against only themselves for piece-rate so that we can measure their baseline performance. The second round is a compulsory tournament against an anonymous person from the same village whose score has been obtained in advance. This measures baseline competitive behavior. The third round gives the subject the choice between piece-rate or tournament against an anonymous person in the same village. This round indicates the subject's preference for competition. All subjects play the first three rounds. In the fourth round, the opponent is the subject's spouse. Poly men have separate rounds with respect to each of his wives. Poly women have an additional round with the option to play against their co-wife.

In light of the literature that suggests that women are not as competitive as men, even with cash incentives, we can interpret the desire to compete as being driven by the particular opponent. We rely on the third round to establish the subject's baseline competitiveness, coupled with controls for risk tolerance and confidence, to isolate behavior in relation to the variation in opponents. The results for the monogamous subjects serve as counterfactual for choices of polygynous subjects.

Table 1

Round	Opponent	Who plays
1	Self *Piece-Rate*	Everyone
2	Anonymous person in the same village *Mandatory Tournament*	Everyone
3	Anonymous person in the same village *Choice Piece-Rate or Tournament*	Everyone
4	Spouse *Choice Piece-Rate or Tournament*	Mono men & women, poly women
5	First wife/senior co-wife *Choice Piece-Rate or Tournament*	Poly men, 2nd wives
6	Second wife/junior co-wife *Choice Piece-Rate or Tournament*	Poly men, 1st wives

3.3 The Cooperation Experiment

This experiment was developed by Fehr, Bernhard and Rockenbach (2008) to understand other- regarding social preferences of children using a series of abridged dictator games. Bauer, Cassar, Chytilová, and Henrich (2014) use an expanded version of the Fehr et al. protocol to elicit

social preferences for children and adults who have experienced inter-group conflict. The Ferh et al. experiment entails three treatments, the prosocial, sharing, and envy games, while the Bauer et al. experiment adds a fourth treatment called the costless envy game. Our experiment consists of the four treatments from Bauer et al. and adapts the experiment for adults in order to reveal social preferences for strangers, spouses and co-wives.

The Sharing game presents the subject with the choice between an allocation of 1,1 (1 unit for self, the "sender", and 1 unit for the "receiver"), and allocation of 2,0 (2 units for self and 0 for the receiver). Our experiment departs from the previous experiments in that the payoffs are in cash, so that 1 unit is equivalent to le 5000 (about USD$0.60) and 2 units represent le 10,000. The sender decides between le 5000 for one's self and le 5000 for the receiver, or le 10,000 for one's self and nothing for the receiver. This treatment distinguishes between preference for equal allocation versus self-maximizing allocation. Implicit in the 1,1 option is a strong expression of the subject's aversion to inequality because it is ultimately costly. The 2,0 option could be an expression of ill will or simply the desire to maximize personal gains. Whatever the motivating behavior may be (combining games and our survey data shed light on those questions), we can conclude that the behavior has an unambiguous economic impact on the receiver.

Fehr et al.'s "prosocial" treatment is known as the Costless Sharing game in this experiment and is a choice between the same 1,1 allocation described above and a 1,0 allocation (le 5000 for self, nothing for the receiver). This game reveals preferences for either equality if 1,1 is selected or advantageous inequality towards the receiver if 1,0 is selected. By equating the payoff for the sender in both choices, we can eliminate economic self-interest as a motive. Thus, a 1,1 choice will indicate a preference for equality while a 1,0 choice will indicate a preference for advantageous inequality with respect to the receiver.

The next treatment, the Costless Envy game, offers a choice of 1,1 and 1,2, (le 5000, le 5000 or le 5000 for self, le 10,000 for the receiver). Consistent with the previous game, the sender can award the receiver without detracting from his own gains, but choosing the unequal allocation subjects the sender to disadvantageous inequality. How the sender feels about disadvantageous inequality versus equality is conveyed in the outcome of this game.

The Envy game comes from Bauer et al. (2014) and poses the question 1,1 versus 2,3. In this experiment, the unequal allocation is exaggerated: 2,6 (le 5000, le 5000 or le 10,000 for self, le 30,000 for the receiver). The 2,6 choice subjects the sender, once again, to disadvantageous inequality but at a higher price than in the costless envy game. This game is used to illuminate

other-regarding preferences that actually reduce individual gains. How strongly a subject feels about equality and/or disadvantageous inequality is brought to light by this game. However, the egalitarian option could be revealing a preference for equality rather than an aversion to disadvantageous inequality. We will discuss in another section how we can use the outcomes of these games to explicate the drivers of behavior.

This study is interested in individual behavior towards people with specific relationships to the sender; the monogamous spouse, the polygynous wives, and co-wives in particular. To understand how the behavior in these games may differ depending on the relationship of the receiver to the sender, we change the receiver in each round. The subject, known in this experiment as the sender, is asked a series of binary choice questions in the form of dictator games. There are six rounds, each consisting of the aforementioned four games, but not all subjects complete all six rounds. In the first round, the receiver is an anonymous person in the same village. In the second round, the receiver is an anonymous person in a distant village. The results of the first two rounds indicate baseline pro-sociality of the subject. In the third round, the receiver is the subject's spouse. Polygynous men do not participate in this round. The fourth round involves the first wife as the receiver. If the subject herself is the first wife, she will not complete this round, as in the Competition game. Second wives are the receivers in the fifth round. Monogamous subjects do not participate in rounds 4 & 5. Poly men "send" to their first and second wives in these rounds. Poly women send to their co-wives.

Cash payoffs are used with the understanding that the subject will get paid for the experiment according to their choices in the games so that we can ascertain the potential economic impact of their social preferences. Thus, a choice allocation of 1,1 with respect to a spouse as opposed to a cash-maximizing allocation of 2,6 or 1,2 would suggest that social preferences impact household finances and the ability for households to achieve maximum financial gain. The anonymous receivers serve as a counterfactual, so that we can differentiate between a subject's minimum level of pro-sociality with their social preferences towards receiver known to them.

Table 2

Games	Receiver	Who plays (Senders)
1	Anonymous person in the same village	Everyone
2	Anonymous person in a distant village	Everyone
3	Spouse	Mono men & women, poly women

4	First wife	Poly men, 2nd wives
5	Second wife	Poly men, 1st wives

Table 3

Games	Senders are asked:
Sharing	le 5000 for self and le 5000 for receiver or le 10,000 self and le 0 for receiver.
Costless Sharing	le 5000 for self and le 5000 for receiver or le 5000 self and le 0 for receiver.
Costless Envy	le 5000 for self and le 5000 for receiver or le 5000 self and le 10,000 for receiver.
Envy	le 5000 for self and le 5000 for receiver or le 10,000 self and le 30,000 for receiver.

3.4 Behavior Types

Combining the cooperation game choices, subject behavior can be grouped into five types: Selfish, Generous, Spiteful, Egalitarian and Resource Maximizer. The selfish type maximizes his/her payoffs in the sharing game (choosing 2,0) and envy game (choosing 2,6), resulting in maximum payoff for one's self. Generous types maximize payoffs for the receiver in all four games by choosing 1,1 for sharing; 1,1 for costless sharing; 1,2 for costless envy; and 2,6 for envy. Spiteful types minimize the total payoffs for the other person and deny themselves resources in the process. They forgo the higher allocations for themselves in order to disadvantage the other person. They choose 2,0 in sharing, 1,0 in costless sharing, and 1,1 in costless envy and 1,1 in envy. The egalitarian type will select 1,1 for all four games. Our analysis adds a 5th type, the Resource Maximizer, who selects the allocation that maximizes resources for first themselves and then the receiver. When the subject is resource maximizing with their spouse, for example, they select either allocation in sharing; 1,1 in costless sharing; 1,2 in costless envy; and 2,6 in envy. These choices differ slightly for a stranger. When resource maximizing with a stranger, the subject would select 2,0 in sharing; 1,1 in costless sharing; 1,2 in costless envy; and 2,6 in envy. Subjects who do not conform to these four categories will have a 0 value for these variables.

Table 4

	Selfish	Spiteful	Generous	Egalitarian	Resource Maximizer
Sharing	5000/5000 **10000/0**	5000/5000 **10000/0**	**5000/5000** 10000/0	**5000/5000** 10000/0	5000/5000 10000/0
Costless Sharing	5000/5000 5000/0	5000/5000 **5000/0**	**5000/5000** 5000/0	**5000/5000** 5000/0	**5000/5000** 5000/0
Costless Envy	5000/5000 5000/10000	**5000/5000** 5000/10000	5000/5000 **5000/10000**	**5000/5000** 5000/10000	5000/5000 **5000/10000**
Envy	5000/5000 **10000/30000**	**5000/5000** 10000/30000	5000/5000 **10000/30000**	**5000/5000** 10000/30000	5000/5000 **10000/30000**

4. Estimation

4.1 Hypotheses

This study is interested in cooperation and competition across monogamous and polygynous households. The two experiments described above tests the following hypotheses between monogamous and polygynous households:

(1) Competition Experiment: There is a difference greater than zero between monogamous and polygynous subjects when competing against their spouse.
(2) Cooperation Experiment: There is a difference greater than zero between monogamous and polygynous subjects when allocation resources to their spouse.

4.2 Competition Specification

A logit model and a random effects model are used to estimate competition in the household for monogamous couples and polygynous nodes. The dependent variable is a dummy denoting the subject's choice to compete against spouse (*Competition*_Spouse). A 1 value represents the choice tournament and 0 represents the choice piece-rate. A logit model estimates competition as a function of marital structure and personal characteristics, all conditional on various controls, and then interpreted using coefficients from a linear probability model. In this regression series, we obtain the discrete effects of sex (male/female) and marriage structure (mono/poly). The same estimation is repeated with choice to compete against stranger as the dependent variable (*Competition*_Spouse).

(1) $Competition\_Spouse_i = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Female_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 Poly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 FemalePoly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_4 ProbWin_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_5 RiskTolerance_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_6 Confidence_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

(2) $Competition\_Stranger_i = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Female_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 Poly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 FemalePoly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_4 ProbWin_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_5 RiskTolerance_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_6 Confidence_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

Female and *Poly* are dummy variables, *FemalePoly* is an interaction to ascertain the effect of being a polygynous woman, θ is a vector of personal characteristic controls (a wealth index variable, region, education, children, tribe, age) and ε is an error-term. *ProbWin* is determined by the number of correct answers in round 2, thereby controlling for the subject's baseline competitive performance. The *RiskTolerance* control comes from the risk experiment (Appendix B), wherein subjects choose one of six lotteries to bet on, each with a different allocation of money. The less risky lottery is worth le 12,000 if successful and le 12,000 on

failure. The riskiest lottery is worth le 40,000 if successful and le 0 on failure. After the subject chooses their lottery a coin toss determines the success. This control establishes the baseline risk tolerance of the subject. *Confidence* is the different between the subject's score for the round and what the subject believes is their opponent's scores. Lower values for the *confidence* variable represent less confidence. Competition equals 1 if the tournament payment scheme was chosen in round 3, when spouse is the opponent. For poly men, this value is the mean of game choices for first and second wives. The variable can take the value of .5 if he selected to compete with one wife and not the other.

The second model for estimating competition uses random effects regression. This model allows us to compare behavior towards a spouse to that of a stranger in order to account for the subject's baseline competitiveness. We transform our dataset into a panel with multiple observations per subject: choice to compete against the score of an anonymous person in the same village (stranger) and choice to compete against spouse (averaged choice for poly men). The dependent variable is equal to 0 if piece-rate is chosen or 1 if tournament is chosen. The *treatment* dummy is equal to 0 for choice against stranger and 1 for choice against spouse. The result is interpreted as the difference between the aggregate effect of the spouse treatment and the aggregate effect of the stranger treatment. Statistically insignificant values and values near 0 represent no difference in behavior toward stranger and spouse. Statistically significant positive or negative values represent departures from behavior towards stranger.

$$(3) \quad Competition_{ij} = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Treatment_j + \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 Poly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 FemalePoly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_4 ProbWin_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_5 RiskTolerance_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_6 Confidence_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$$

The next set of regressions take the form of model (2) but are separately restricted by subpopulation (poly women, mono women, poly men, mono men). The panel now has two or three observations per subject, dependent on subject type. For mono subjects, *competition* includes stranger and spouse as in model (2). For poly women, the panel contains includes for stranger (omitted), co-wife and husband. Likewise, for poly men the panel includes choice for stranger, first wife, and second wife.

$$(4) \quad Competition_{ij} = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Treatment_j + \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 ProbWin_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 RiskTolerance_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_4 Confidence_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$$

4.3 Cooperation Specification

The framework for analyzing the cooperation game and the behavior types comes from Bauer et al. (2014) and is adapted to capture variation between subjects and their spouses. Consistent with the competition methodology, we estimate the following models separately with regard to spouse and stranger.

(5) $Sharing_i = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Female_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 Poly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 FemalePoly_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

(6) $Costless\ Sharing_i = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Female_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 Poly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 FemalePoly_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

(7) $Envy_i = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Female_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 Poly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 FemalePoly_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

(8) $Costless\ Envy_i = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Female_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 Poly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 FemalePoly_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

Where the dependent variable is 1 or 0, indicating allocation choice when the receiver is the spouse (round 3), except in the case of poly men whose choices have been averaged across wives (rounds 4 and 5). The 1 value always represents the equal allocation (le 5000 for self, le 5000 for the other person), and the 0 value represents the unequal allocation (refer to Table 3). First, as per the competition specifications, a logit model is used to compare the cooperation choices across gender and marriage type (5-8). A linear probability estimation is used to interpret results. Second, we use a panel in conjunction with random effects regression to distinguish between behavior towards a stranger and the spouse (9). The second process is repeated separately for the four subject categories[2] to isolate the effect for each subpopulation (10). All four games (sharing, costless sharing, envy, costless envy) take the same form:

(9) $Game_{ij} = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Treatment_j + \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 Female_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 Poly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_4 FemalePoly_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

(10) $Game_{ij} = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Treatment_j + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

4.4 Behavior Type Specification

The behavior type analysis is adopted from Fehr et al. (2008) and adapted to characterize subject behavior towards a stranger, spouse or co-wife. We do not estimate spiteful behavior because so few subjects qualify. The spiteful category is added back during the co-wife analysis.

(11) $Selfish_i = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Female_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 Poly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 FemalePoly_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

(12) $Generous_i = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Female_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 Poly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 FemalePoly_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

[2] The four subject types are poly women, mono women, poly men, and mono men. The poly men model includes variables for choice stranger, first wife, and second wife. Poly women model includes variables for choice stranger, co-wife, and husband.

(13) $Egalitarian_i = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Female_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 Poly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 FemalePoly_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

(14) $Resource\ Maximizer_i = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Female_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 Poly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 FemalePoly_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

Co-wife Analysis only:

(15) $Spiteful_i = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 FirstWife_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

The dependent variables are dummies, with 1 denoting that the subject carries that label according to the description in section 3.4. The *firstwife* variable used in the co-wife analysis is a dummy equal to 1 if the subject is first wife. As with competition and cooperation estimations, we estimate behavior types using a panel with random effects on the full sample (16) followed by the same estimations restricted to the subpopulations (17).

(16) $BehaviorType_{ij} = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Treatment_j + \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 Female_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_3 Poly_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_4 FemalePoly_i + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

(17) $BehaviorType_{ij} = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 Treatment_j + \theta_i + \varepsilon_i$

4.5 Control Variables

Wealth is constructed as an average of an index of six components (home ownership, electricity in the home, land ownership, television ownership, hunger frequency, income). *Makeni* is a regional dummy that assigns 1 to subjects from the Makeni region and 0 to subjects from the Kenema region. *Education* is an ordinal variable with 5 bins that represent different levels of education. 0 equals less than primary school education, 1 equals primary school completion, 2 equals secondary school education, 3 equals college or post-secondary education, and 4 equals graduate education. *Children* is a continuous variable corresponding to the subject's number of biological children. There are two dummy variables representing the largest tribes in the sample, *Mende* and *Temne*. Each tribe separately constitutes over 40% of the subject pool. The *age* variable is a continuous variable and missing for subjects who do not know their age or birth year.

5. Results

The results are presented in a series of regressions starting with the most naïve form and progressively adding more independent variables of interest, followed by covariates specific to the experiment, and then demographic controls. The *age* variable is added separately, as it substantially decreases the observations[3].

[3] Many subjects in our sample do not know their own age or birth year.

5.1 Competition Logit & Linear Probability Estimations

In Table 5, the predicted disparity in female competition is easily observed; women are 15% less likely to compete against their spouse than men, significant at the 1% level[4]. This effect drops to 12% once the demographic controls are added, significant at only the 10% level. The education variable absorbs almost all variation in a predictable way. Increased education leads to 0.7 percentage point (pp) change choosing tournament against spouse, significant at the 1% level. Once the game specific controls are added (risk tolerance, likelihood of winning, and confidence), those correlated with education absorb all of the subject variation in game choice against spouse, leaving no difference in choice between male and female subjects. This pattern of results is common for many of the subsequent estimations.

The logit and linear probability models detect no statistically significant effect of being polygynous. In the naïve estimation restricted to mono subjects only, mono women are 0.17 pp less likely to choose tournament against their spouse than mono men, significant at the 1% level. The effect drops off after controls are progressively added. Restricting the estimation to poly subjects only unveils a similar pattern of results between the sexes; there is an initial effect of poly women choosing to compete with -0.15 likelihood as compared to poly men, but only in the naïve regression. These results suggest that female choice to compete against spouse in mono and poly households is highly correlated with education, risk tolerance, and confidence.

Restricting the estimation to male subjects only, we see no difference between poly and mono. Female subject estimations reveal the opposite result: poly women show a slight uptick in choice to compete against spouse compared to mono women, a 0.09 greater likelihood, significant with 90% confidence. In this regression, the children variable is statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels, with a 0.3 pp higher propensity to compete with spouse associated with an extra child. Though this result is not wholly conclusive, poly women appear more competitive with their spouses than mono women, both according to the model and mean choice.

[4] All statistically significant results reported in this paper reflect a 95% or 99% confidence level unless otherwise stated.

Figure 1



We estimate the outcome variable, choice to compete against stranger, in the same way (Table 7). Mean choice to compete for poly and mono men is 0.63 and 0.67 respectively, while women compete about 10% less. Men compete with a stranger at approximately the same rate as they compete with their spouse. Women compete about 10% less with their spouse than a stranger. This effect is confirmed in the naïve regressions of female on choice to compete against stranger but disappears once the demographic controls are introduced to the estimation. The effect of being female electing to compete against a stranger is associated with almost 20% less wealth and 10% more education. The magnitude of these effects diminishes once we introduce the game controls. Competing against a stranger is associated with about higher confidence and likelihood of winning.

The *polygyny* and *female x polygyny* coefficients are not statistically significant. Restricting by subpopulation shows no differences in choice to compete against a stranger. All of the differences in subject type emerge when competing against a spouse. While men compete at roughly the same rate with spouse and stranger, women compete less in general, and even less with spouse than with stranger. This is particularly true for mono women. A simple mean comparison displayed by Figure 1 illustrates these results.

Wealth is a highly significant control variable the competition estimations. Less wealth predicts more competition against spouse, especially for women. A one-unit decline in a woman's wealth produces a 25% increase in probability that she competes against her spouse. When this relationship is explored further in the random effects estimations restricted to poly women, the wealth effect disappears and is absorbed by children and education related variables. Choice to

compete against a stranger also sees a strong wealth effect. This suggests that subjects may be choosing to compete for the possibility of doubling their prize money.

5.2 Competition Random Effects Estimations

To further compare these differences in subpopulations, we turn the panel estimations. For the full sample panel estimations, model (3), see Table 9. This analysis will focus on model (4) for the sake of simplicity since earlier results reveal key differences between the subpopulations. In the panel estimation results, reported in Table 10, mono women emerge as the anomaly. Mono women compete with their spouses 0.12 pp less than a stranger at a 99% confidence level. Only age and likelihood of winning are significant controls. Mono women compete with a stranger at a rate of 58% and a husband at a rate of 46%. By contrast, poly women show no statistically significant difference in behavior stranger, spouse or co-wife. *Education*, *children*, *likelihood of winning*, and *confidence* are all significant at the 1% level with a positive relationship with choice competition. On average, poly women compete with husband at 53%, co-wife at 55% and stranger at 55% (Figure 2). Likewise, for men, random effects estimates show no difference between behavior towards stranger and behavior towards wife/wives. For poly men, mean choice to compete is 0.64 against a stranger, 0.68 against first wife, and 0.67 against second wife (Figure 3). *Likelihood of winning* and *confidence* are significant and positive controls. For mono men, mean choice to compete against wife is 0.63 and 0.67 against stranger.

Figure 2



Figure 3



5.3 Cooperation Logit & Linear Probability Estimations

65% of all subjects share with their spouse on average (selecting the equal allocation). Tables 11 & 12 shows no significant difference in sharing between mono and poly subjects, nor between male and female subjects. Wealth is a highly significant control across all subject groups.

In the costless sharing game (Tables 13 & 14) all subject groups increase their sharing to an average rate of 0.82. Again, there is no significant difference between mono, poly, male, or female. In this game, one unit less wealth is associated with a 0.22 pp increase in choosing to share for mono subjects and 0.18 pp for poly subjects. These games highlight the importance of material wealth in subject's allocation decisions. While less wealth tends to predict more sharing in both games, this relationship is amplified for poly subjects.

The Costless Envy game (Table 15) produces a broad shift in preference away from the equal allocation across all subjects. 34% of poly men and 36% of poly women select the equal allocation, while 43% of poly men and 48% of mono women select the equal allocation. In the simple regression, poly subjects are 0.11 pp more likely to prefer the unequal allocation (5000/10,000), but this difference is absorbed by the wealth and children variables once controls are added. However in the restricted models, poly women are 0.14 pp less likely to act with costless envy towards spouse than mono women. An increase in wealth of 1 unit generates 0.31 pp greater likelihood of selecting the equal allocation. In the restricted regressions, this effect is even greater and statistically significant for mono subjects but insignificant for poly subjects. Having fewer children is also linked to selecting the 5000/5000 split.

The same pattern is repeated in the Envy game (Tables 17 & 18), with all groups selecting away from the equal allocation. Poly subjects select the equal option less often then mono (0.26 on average for poly subjects and 0.33 for mono subjects). However, there is no statistically significant difference between the groups after the naïve model and all controls are added. The controls associated with more envy (selecting the equal amount) are having fewer children for all subjects, more wealth for mono subjects, and being from the Kenema region for men.

Tables 27-30 display results for the cooperative games when the stranger is the receiver. There is no significant difference between the marriage types or sexes for all four games. Therefore, all differences in allocation preferences between the subject groups happen when the spouse is the receiver. Wealth continuous to be an important control in the stranger estimations, with less wealth associated with more sharing and costless sharing with stranger. Being from the Kenema region, and more years of education, are associated with envy and costless envy with respect to a stranger.

Figures 4-7



5.4 Cooperation Random Effects Estimations

All results are interpreted with respect to a stranger, which serves as a baseline for measuring the difference in behaviors between the subject groups and within the household. Tables 19-22 show that all of the following results are statistically significant at either the 5% or 1% level, with the exception of mono men.

Mono women distinguish themselves from the other groups again in this game. They are nearly twice as likely compared to the other groups to share with spouse versus stranger. Random effects estimates show that the probability of poly women share is greater 0.09 more with spouse than stranger, whereas mono women are more likely to share at 0.18 more with spouse than stranger. The probability that poly men share with their wives is 0.1 more than stranger. Mono male probability to share with wife is 0.09 more than with stranger, but this is only significant at the 10% level. For all subjects except mono women, less wealth is linked to more sharing.

Figure 8



Figure 9



In the costless sharing game, all subjects increase the probability of sharing with spouse at nearly equal rates as compared to a stranger. Poly women probability to costless share is 0.09 more with husband than with stranger, and mono women's probability is 0.1 more. Poly male probability to costless share with both wives is 0.1 greater than with stranger and mono male probability is 0.09 more with spouse.

Figure 10



Figure 11



All subject types make statistically different choices between stranger and spouse in the costless envy game. The probability that poly women exhibit costless envy towards spouse is 0.36 less than stranger. For mono women, it is 0.18 less. Poly men are 0.32 less likely to exhibit costless envy with both wives than strangers and mono men are 0.29 less likely. Higher wealth is correlated with more costless envy for mono men only.

Figure 12



Figure 13



In the Envy game, all women are 0.24 less likely to exhibit envy with husband than stranger. Tribe and region are correlated with the outcome. Poly men are 0.28 less likely to act with envy towards either wife as compared to stranger, and mono men are 0.26 less

Figure 14



Figure 15



Poly female behavior towards co-wife is markedly different than that of behavior towards husband in some of the cooperation games. In the sharing game, poly women share at similar rates with co-wife and husband: they are 0.08 more likely to share with co-wife than stranger and 0.09 more likely to share with husband than stranger. There is no statistical difference between Costless Sharing with co-wife and stranger, whereas poly women are 0.09 more likely to costless share with husbands than either co-wife or stranger. Poly women are 0.14 less likely to show costless envy towards co-wife than stranger, but 0.36 less with husbands. The envy game shows no statistical difference between stranger and co-wife, but husbands are 0.24 less likely to receive envy.

The patterns that emerge in these games show a strong preference for husband over co-wife when selecting allocations. Co-wives are consistently shown the same or similar treatment as a stranger. Poly men treat both wives approximately equally in all cooperative games. Poly subjects overwhelmingly select the resource maximizing option for the household, maximizing both for themselves and the other, but less so for co-wife than husband. Mono subjects also prefer the larger allocations on average, but tend towards the egalitarian option more often than poly subjects. Wealth is a significant factor in selecting the equal option in sharing for poly subjects, but not in the other games. For mono women, wealth is not significant in any of the games while it is significant for mono men in all games but envy.

5.5 Behavior Types Logit & Linear Probability Estimations

The next series of estimates describe the relationship between marriage type and behavior type (Tables 31-34). The behavior types are all in relation to the spouse as described in section *3.4*. There is no singular poly effect in the Selfish category. Male poly subjects are 0.14 pp less likely to be selfish while the *poly x female* interaction shows that poly women are 0.16 more likely. More wealth is highly correlated with being selfish. In the generous category, there is no statistically significant result on our variables of interest, although the initial regression shows a strong positive effect before controls are added. Restricted to the female subjects, poly women appear weakly more generous than mono women, at a 0.09 increase in probability significant at the 10% level. The generous type is related to possessing less wealth. The egalitarian type is equal across all subgroups in the full regressions, but the *polygyny* coefficient starts significant and negative initially. Poly women, and poly men to a lesser extent, stand out as resource maximizers. Poly women are 0.14 pp more likely than mono women to be maximizers with spouse in the restricted regression. The *polygyny* coefficient in the pooled regression begins positive and significant, but the effect evaporates once the demographic controls are added. Less wealth in particular is highly correlated with resource maximizing for poly subjects.

5.5 Behavior Types Random Effects Estimations

Tables 35-38 display the panel estimations for all subject types. Poly women are 0.13 less likely to be selfish with co-wife than stranger and equally likely to be selfish with husband and stranger. Mono women are also equally likely to be selfish with stranger and husband. Poly men are 0.19 less likely to be selfish with both wives. Mono men are as selfish with spouse as with stranger. The proportion of selfish types with respect to spouse are higher for poly subjects but note that the selfish type overlaps substantially with the resource maximizer type.

In the generous category, less wealth is correlated with more generosity towards spouse for all subjects. Poly women are 0.1 more likely to be generous with co-wife than stranger and 0.26 more with husband than stranger. Mono women are 0.2 more likely to be generous with husband than stranger. Poly men are 0.25 more likely to be generous with both wives than stranger and mono men are 0.22 more likely.

The egalitarian type is correlated with more wealth in general, with mono women as the exception. Poly women are equally egalitarian with husband and stranger, but 0.13 less likely to be egalitarian with co-wife. Mono women and men are as egalitarian with stranger as with spouse. Poly men are 0.18 less likely to be egalitarian with wives than with stranger. Note that egalitarianism is in opposition with the generous and resource maximizing types. The proportion of poly who are egalitarian with spouse is 0.15 and 0.24 for stranger. Mono have a higher proportion of egalitarians towards both: 0.30 for stranger and 0.36 for spouse.

The resource maximizer type with respect to spouse is dominated by poly subjects. Interestingly, the means are identical for men and women. 53% of poly subjects maximize with spouse as compared to 39% of mono subjects (Figure 16). 64.26% of spouse maximizers are poly: 45% of which are poly women and 19% are poly men. When it comes to maximizing with a stranger, only about 16% of subjects do so on average. Compared to a stranger, poly women are more likely to maximize with co-wife by 0.09 and 0.35 with husband. The likelihood of mono women maximizing with spouse is 0.23 more than with a stranger. Poly men are likely to maximize with both wives on average by 0.36 more than with a stranger. Mono men are more likely to maximize by 0.26 more with wife. Less wealth in these estimations leads to more resource maximizing.

Figures 16-19









5.6 Co-Wife Analysis

Competition

Just over half of all poly women choose to compete with stranger, husband, and co-wife (Figure 20). They compete with each opponent at approximately the same rate. The only exception is choice to compete against co-wife for junior wives. Nearly 60% of second wives opt to compete with first wives.

In the logit and linear probability regressions, the subjects are limited to poly women only. We regress a dummy variable for first wife onto a dummy for choice to compete against co-wife. The results in Tables 39 & 40 show that effect of being the first wife on choice to compete with co-wife is -0.13, significant with 95% confidence. Wealth is not a significant control variable but children are: adding another child produces 8% greater likelihood of competing with co-wife. Confidence, education, and likelihood of winning are all positive and significant.

Next we run two random effects regressions. In the first, husband is the omitted category with the regressions run for first wives and second wives separately. Table 41 shows that first wives compete with co-wife at an equal rate as husband. Second wives compete with co-wives 8% more than husbands, significant at the 5% level. The same process is repeated with stranger as the omitted category (Table 42). Both first wives and second wives compete with co-wife at an equal rate as stranger. Children and the education related controls are significant and positive.

Behavior Types

Figures 21-25 show the percentage of poly women in each behavior type, displayed by wife rank. Approximately 20% of poly women exhibit spiteful behavior towards co-wife in the cooperation games. That is nearly a 100% increase from spitefulness towards husband. 26.5% exhibit selfish behavior towards co-wife, similar to selfishness towards husband. Maximizing behavior dramatically retreats to just around 10% from over 50% when maximizing with

husband. Similarly, generous behavior drops from 36% with husband to about 10% with co-wife. Interestingly, junior and senior wives match in each other in representation of the different behavior types.

Tables 43 & 44 reports results for the logit and linear probability estimations for behavior types. In these estimations, the behavior is always with respect to the co-wife. We see no difference between first and second wives for all behavior types.

The panel estimations, which compare co-wife and husband to stranger, are displayed in Table 45. These estimations were also executed separately for first and second wives. In the selfish category, there is no difference in results for first wives or second wives. They are equally selfish towards stranger, co-wife and husband.

First wives and second wives are equally generous with stranger as with co-wife. They are about 27% more generous with husband. Less wealth is correlated with being generous. They are both 23% less egalitarian with co-wife than stranger, but only about 14% less with husband than stranger. This means they are disadvantaging co-wife, and themselves in the process, more often than with husband. First wives and second wives are equal maximizers with cowife and stranger, but they are maximizing much more with husband. About 39% more, regardless of wealth. They are also 16% more spiteful with co-wife than stranger or husband. For junior wives, less wealth means more spite towards co-wife.

Figures 20-25







6. Discussion

In this section we explore the connections between gender, marriage structure, control variables, and game outcomes. There are patterns in female behavior that differ from male behavior, as well as poly behavior that differs from mono behavior. Recognizing the inherent differences in the subpopulations (mono men, mono women, poly men, poly women) related to gender, marriage structure, level of personal agency, belief system, place in society, and every combination therein; this analysis examines each group separately as they each possess a different set of constraints and motivations.

This analysis focuses on the ways in which choice and behavior of the subpopulations are the same and different. This analysis data cannot disentangle completely the motivations of each subject group, but by combining the dependent variable results with patterns in control variables and survey data, we gain insights into the motivations behind the game outcomes.

6.1 Competition

Female competitiveness in the competition game cannot be explained by biological factors because the disparity between male and female choice to compete is eliminated after controlling for education-related variables. This result suggests that desire to compete in this game is dependent on educational opportunities afforded to women and the confidence they feel as a consequence of those opportunities, rather than a biological disinclination. Mean education for men is 1.187 (bins ranging from 0-4) and 0.586 for women[5]. The results show that this disparity in education manifests as lower competitiveness in female subjects.

Poly men compete more on average than mono men (67% versus 63%). Although the average education for mono men is 1.41 and only 0.935 for poly men[6] this difference does not affect their desire to compete with spouse or stranger. The mental summation task was designed to be simple enough for any subject regardless of formal education, as mental summation is a function in everyday life in Sierra Leone. The average score is consistently lower for poly men but there is no statistically significant difference in scores between poly and mono men for any of the competition game rounds. This allows us to conclude that the education differential does not meaningfully affect scores nor does it deter poly men from competing at a higher rate than mono men.

Mono and poly women exhibit stark differences in this game: while poly women compete more in general and at the same rate against all opponents, mono women compete 0.12 percentage points less with spouse than a stranger. There are no statistically significant differences between mono and poly women in terms of wealth or education, although mean education for poly women is 0.53 compared to 0.69 for mono women. What motivates this difference in behavior? The preference for piece-rate when competing against spouse could be due to the larger education differential between mono husbands and wives compared to poly. Mono women perform worse in all rounds of the competition game compared to mono men, but the same is true for poly women compared to poly men[7]. Either mono women uniquely assume they will lose and consequently choose not to compete or there is an internal dynamic within households that influence female choice in opposite directions.

[5] The t-test comparing male and female education is significant at the 1% level.
[6] Difference in means is statistically different than 0 at the 1% level.
[7] T-tests confirm a statistically significant difference between scores for mono men and women and between scores for poly men and women.

Although average choice to compete is greater for poly subjects, the logit, linear probability, and random effects models show that there is no effect of being polygynous on choice to compete. As such, we can conclude that polygynous subjects are not *more* competitive than monogamous subjects as a result of their marriage structure, but that mono women are *less* competitive as a result of their marriage structure. We can rule out education and wealth as intermediaries because education differential does not affect poly choice to compete. Moreover, our subpopulation estimations show that less wealth for both mono subjects and women lead to greater competition, not lesser.

6.2 Cooperation

6.2.a Stranger versus Spouse

In the cooperation games we observe markedly different behavior between subjects and their spouses as compared to behavior regarding a stranger. All subject groups give preferential treatment to spouse on average. There is no difference between any of the subject groups in their choices regarding stranger for all four games. At a 99% confidence level, there is a 0.11 percentage point increase in sharing with spouse over stranger for all subjects; 0.09 pp increase in costless sharing with spouse; a 0.30 pp decrease in costless envy with spouse; and a 0.29 pp decrease in envy with spouse.

6.2.b Mono versus Poly

We cannot conclude that mono households share more than poly households. Poly and mono subjects differ in terms of mean sharing with spouse, but the difference is not significant. Hence, our results show that mono and poly households share with spouse at statistically equal rates. This challenges recent experimental results from Nigeria that employs a public goods game to examine household efficiency. Poly subjects selected to keep more endowment for themselves as compared to mono subjects, thereby contributing less to the household pot and forgoing the opportunity to double the common pot reward (Barr et al., 2018). This experiment made the case internal dynamics within poly households in Western Nigeria sacrifice overall efficiency for personal gain, which could be a contributing factor in diminished outcomes for household members. In our experiment, by contrast, poly choice to share equates mono choice, which implicitly demonstrates poly subjects' endorsement the resource allocation arrangement of the husband-wife arrangement.

This conclusion is further evinced by the results of the costless envy. Poly subjects accept inequality for the opportunity to bring resources into the household. This cannot be said for

mono households. While mono and poly men are statistically equal in their costless envy, mono women are .14 pp more (costless) envious than poly women. In this way, mono women are sabotaging the household's ability to achieve efficiency, which is a completely novel result given the available literature comparing mono and poly subjects.

Further testimony of monogamous inefficiency is found in the results of the behavior analysis. With lower commitment to maximizing and higher allegiance to egalitarianism, mono households are sacrificing resources available to the household. Mono men in particular lead in egalitarianism, meaning they too are sabotaging household efficiency more so than their poly counterparts.

6.3.c Conditional Cooperation

There are some interesting patterns in the relationship between wealth and cooperative game choices with respect to spouse. Less wealth is linked to more sharing when the total sum of money is the same for either choice (as in the sharing game). When the total sum is less for one of the choices (the unequal allocation for costless sharing), subjects prefer the choice with the larger total sum (i.e. the equal allocation in costless sharing). Less wealth is linked to more costless sharing for mono men only. Mono women are costless sharing at about 80% anyway, regardless of wealth.

In the costless envy game, more wealth is associated with more envy for poly and mono men, but not women. In envy, the wealth variable is insignificant for all groups. This is could be because the total potential earnings are so much more for both individuals that all subjects are disinclined to forego the added money. This leads us to believe that male subjects are conditionally cooperative: as long as the payoffs are high enough (as in the envy game), they will optimize for the spouse. Below a certain threshold, they prefer the equal allocation.

Mono women also exhibit conditional cooperation. The combined game results, in conjunction with covariates, indicate that mono women take steps to avoid resource accumulation below a certain threshold of payment. After a high enough reward is offered, they opt for the highest payoff. This may explain why certain outcomes depend on wealth status (costless envy) and others do not (envy). In particular, less wealthy mono women tend towards the generous behavior type, perhaps because poorer subjects will more frequently maximize whereas wealthier subjects will only maximize above a certain threshold. Recall that mono women compete less, independent of their wealth status. This could be because the earnings in that experiment were below the threshold, in which case, they prefer to minimize. But a one unit increase in wealth for

mono women generates a 0.11 pp increase in the probability of being egalitarian, a resource burner.

6.3 Male Choice and Behavior towards Spouse

Male choice in games (competition, sharing, costless sharing, envy) and in behavior (generous, selfish) are statistically indistinguishable. Despite the differences in marriage structure, resources, education, and culture, mono and poly men do not diverge much in terms of game choice and behavior type. Poly men are less selfish towards their wives, they are less egalitarian, and more resource maximizing. All of these choices are highly correlated with possessing less wealth. As previously discussed, poly households have the same amount of wealth as mono households but resources are divided between more people. We can assume there is more financial strain and stress related to resources in the poly household. If mono and poly men otherwise behave similarly except with respect to decisions dictated by resource acquisition, then their divergence can be explained by a disparity in wealth.

6.4 Female Choice and Behavior towards Spouse

In contrast to men, mono and poly women are more dissimilar. Poly women compete more with spouse than mono women but they are also more generous and maximize resources much more frequently. Mono women, on the other hand, burn more resources for the household by competing less, cooperating conditionally, and favoring egalitarian allocation with spouse. The following section examines these differences and posits explanations for such behavior based on the cultural and economic context.

6.4.a Monogamous Women

In this analyses, monogamous women emerge as a special subpopulation. Their choices, behavior, and extent to which control variables influence their decisions are noticeably different across the various games. Mono women systematically choose the resource burning options more often than their poly counterparts in the cooperation games and they compete less than poly women against spouse, but in competition against a stranger, they compete as much as poly women. Poorer mono women tend towards the resource maximizing options while wealthier women only do so once the payoff exceeds a certain threshold. As such, they conditionally cooperate by maximizing resources with spouse when the payoff is high enough, and forgo resources otherwise. Evinced by these strategic differences in behavior, we can say with certainty that monogamous women are tactical in their choices and weigh the costs and benefits to wealth to wealth accumulation and inequality.

Are monogamous women competing less or polygynous women competing more? It could be that polygyny *makes* a woman more competitive, or monogamy *makes* a woman less competitive. We assume that polygyny is only self-selecting less than 50% of the time because approximately half of all poly women are monogamous when they chose to marry. That is to say, some unknown proportion of the monogamous population will become poly in the future, so presumably there is nothing different about the women married to Muslim men *before* polygyny[8]. Our data cannot uncover the true motivation, but we can conclude that there is something about the marriage structure which motivates mono and poly women in opposite directions in competition towards spouse.

Taken in aggregate, mono women burn the most resources and compete less against spouse, thereby eliminating the possibility of doubling their earnings. These behaviors lend support to the theory that mono women are in a unique position as compared to the other subpopulations. Mono women are the only subjects whose future household is both uncertain and out of their control. Some unknown portion of mono couples will become polygynous. This choice is dependent on a man's preference for polygyny and the accumulation of greater household wealth. There is some evidence from our survey data that this is an aspiration for some mono men and would not be preferred by 97% of our mono women subjects (Table 46). Due to their unique position and their known anxiety about a polygynous future, women may be trying to limit the resources coming into the mono household or maintain a steady level of bargaining power in order to stave off a polygynous future. This is not a conclusive interpretation of the data but a theory based on experimental results and combined with the cultural context that requires further investigation.

6.4.b Polygynous Women

Does polygyny foster competition in women? As previously discussed, the propensity to compete could be related to wealth for poly women. On average they have more children and total household resources are divided between more people in the poly household. Poly women could be attracted to the opportunity to double the prize. Their level of competitiveness combined with their other resource maximizing efforts across the games corroborate the theory that conditions related to polygyny foster competition in women. Consistent with the literature and evinced by the significant coefficient on the children variable in the panel estimation, those

[8] In Sierra Leone, most polygynous men are Muslim.

conditions are directly linked to total resources (material and emotional) available to the poly woman and their children.

Recent research into west African polygyny links the financial strain experienced by polygynous households to male behavior and demonstrates improved conditions for poly women as a result of greater household income (Heath et al., 2018). If similar circumstances exist for our sample of poly women, we would expect them to maximize for themselves and husband. This is exactly what we see: preferential treatment for themselves and their husbands as compared to a stranger. The Heath et al. study saw no treatment effect for mono households, which could help to explain why our monogamous sample was less concerned with resource maximization.

6.5 Co-wife Competition

Choice to compete in the game is an expression of actual competitiveness within the household, rather than simply a monetary calculation based on personal wealth. Recall that polygynous women in aggregate compete equally with stranger, co-wife, and spouse. But when the sample is divided by wife rank, we observe heightened competition from junior wives towards senior wives. Choice to compete with stranger and spouse are equal between junior and senior wives, but the game against co-wife unviels the bifurcation in wife rank. If poly women were more competitive simply as a result of their resource status, or as a result of their younger average age, then we would expect to see equal rates of competition with all opponents. Instead we see more competition from junior wives towards senior wives and no one else, which lends support to the experiment as a predictor of competitive household dynamics as widely documented throughout the literature.

Junior wives compete more with senior wives as a result of their status within the house. T-tests show that mean education, confidence, and likelihood of winning are all equal between first and second wives, and although there is an age differential, first and second wives show equal competitiveness towards other opponents. A t-test of number of children show that second wives have fewer children than first wives (2.46 compared to 3.55). Fewer children but higher competitiveness among junior wives therefore identifies wife rank as determinant of competition. This result is consistent with the Kazianga & Klonner (2006) study that empirically exposed the disadvantages faced by junior wives and their children.

6.6 Co-wife Cooperation

The results give an unambiguous affirmation of co-wife conflict. Aside from the competition game results, the behavior analysis reveals sharp divisions in willingness to

cooperate with spouse versus co-wife. There are stark declines in resource maximizing and generosity, both of which are associated with disadvantageous inequality but greater total resources for the household. We even see a resurrection of the spiteful behavior type, which is used almost exclusively among and for co-wives. Spite entails selecting the lower amount of money for the receiver, even at the peril of the sender. Over 20% of poly women acted with spite in the cooperation games, which is 15% over spite towards stranger according to the panel estimation. Survey data confirms that tension that exists between cowives (Figure 46 in the Appendix). On a 1-5 scale, with 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest, 50% of co-wives report friendship and sisterhood at 1, "rarely". The other 50% report a 2, "sometimes." These selections were evenly split between first and second wives. Options 3-5 did not receive a single selection over our entire poly female sample.

7. Conclusion

The logit and linear probability estimates do not support the notion that the condition of polygyny is highly influential in these games. Although we see an initial effect in many of games and behavior types, controls routinely absorb much of the variation across marriage types. There are some notable exceptions. Poly subjects are both more (men) and less (women) selfish than mono subjects. Poly women are more resource maximizing and more generous than mono women in these estimates and act with less costless envy towards spouse compared to mono women. Poly women are more competitive with spouse than are mono women.

On average, all subjects demonstrate an allegiance to their spouse as compared to stranger. Male behavior is similar across the marriage types. Divergence between mono and poly men revolve around wealth. Poly men maximize resources, and mono men lead in egalitarianism. In contrast to many of the existing accounts of polygyny, poly men give exactly equal treatment to first and second wife.

Are monogamous women competing less or polygynous women competing more? The propensity to compete could be a matter of wealth for poly women, as previously discussed, since the competition experiment offered the chance to double the prize. At the same time, we assume that polygyny is only self-selecting less than 50% of the time because approximately half of all poly women are monogamous when they chose to marry. Some unknown proportion of the monogamous population will become poly in the future. The unique position of these currently mono women may be reflected in their competition-avoidant, wealth-reducing behavior. They

waste resources in order to achieve egalitarianism with husband. Their monetary choices reflect conditional cooperation as they are willing to forgo small amounts cash but take the large amounts.

The myth of the efficient monogamous household has been dispelled. The results did not convey a story of greater household efficiency among mono subjects. In comparison to poly spouses, mono subjects in our sample more frequently selected the less monetarily advantageous options and missed opportunities to maximize for the household. In fact, 70% of mono subjects are not maximizers compared to less than 50% of poly subjects. In contrast to the vast literature that portrays poly people as serially selfish, this research finds that they act with the decisive desire to acquire. Monogamous households are the perpetrators of inefficiency. Nonetheless, their preference for the equal allocation is also loudly expressed. We are unable to discern whether this preference is rooted in the values of egalitarianism or in an aversion to disadvantageous inequality.

Poly women, on the other hand, are first driven by resource maximization and then generosity when it comes to cooperating with spouse, but not with co-wife. They trade resource maximizing and generosity for spite and selfishness. Co-wives burn resources in order to burn each other. Less wealth is associated with more generosity toward spouse, but it is associated with more spitefulness toward co-wife. If poly women are willing to forgo, and even hurt themselves, in order to disadvantage their co-wife, then their willingness to maximize with spouse must be rooted in the spirit of cooperation. Junior wives, being perhaps the most disadvantaged in the poly household, intensify their competitiveness with co-wife alone. We believe this reflects actual competitive dynamics because a purely monetary motivation should produce more competition with stranger and spouse.

The results of this study can help to inform effective programming that targets the poor in different marriage contexts. This study gives context related to the distribution of benefits, such as cash transfers or entitlements. If benefits are distributed to the legal spouse alone, our results predict that junior wives and their children will be disadvantaged, as sharing is not likely to occur at least 20% of the time between poly women. Furthermore, mono women may not see cash transfers or benefits at all if it results in disadvantageous inequality for their husbands. Therefore, in order to ensure the most efficient distribution of benefits, they should be administered to women directly or through channels that give everyone equal opportunity to benefit.

Recognizing that polygyny is now a deeply rooted cultural tradition as well as an adaptive response to challenging economic conditions, the focus of policy should not be suppressing the practice. Increasing economic opportunities for society as a whole would address many of the underlying problems in any marriage structure. Focusing efforts on empowering women by providing education, jobs, child assistance, and capital would raise the prospects for women and their children so that they may have more choices outside of a marriage arrangement to gain agency over their own lives.

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8. Appendix

Appendix A



(DHS, 2013)

This study takes place in the two shaded regions.

Appendix B

RISK ACTIVITY **Select One Lottery**	
Lottery 1	**Lottery 4**
Successful 12,000 Leones Failed 12,000 Leones	Successful 20,000 Leones Failed 5000 Leones

Lottery 2	**Lottery 5**
Successful 15,000 Leones Failed 10,000 Leones	Successful 22,000 Leones Failed 2000 Leones
Lottery 3	**Lottery 6**
Successful 17,000 Leones Failed 7000 Leones	Successful 25,000 Leones Failed 0 Leones

Appendix C

Enumerator Work Sheet for Each Subject

1. Date					4. Spouse ID		
2. Subject ID 3. If poly female, # _____ of _____ wives.	___ ___	___ ___	___ ___ ___	___ ___	5. Household ID	___ ___ Enum #	___ ___ 20-59 Mak 70-99 Ken	___ ___ ___ 1000-2999 Mono 4000-5999 Poly 7000-9999 Single
	Enum # Ex: 10	20-59 Mak 70-99 Ken	1000-2999 Mono 4000-5999 Poly 7000-9999 Single	33 Female 88 Male				

Randomize the tasks:
1 = Survey 3 = Risk 5=Preference
2 = Competition 4 = WTP

1st task		3rd task		5th task	
2nd task		4th task			

Competition Activity Score Card 60 seconds per round for all rounds 1-9.

PR= Piece rate MT= Mandatory Tournament

Round	Circle correct answers. X out the problems that the subject was not able to complete.	Score	Guess
1 PR	3+5=8 8+4=12 12+5=17 17+9=26 26+8=34 34+11=45 45+4=49 49+10=59 59+7=66		X
2 MT	4+8=12 12+4=16 16+10=26 26+9=35 35+3=38 38+11=49 49+4=53 53+13=66 66+2=68		

CTC=Choice Tournament Cash CTG=Choice Tournament Gender Prize CTK=Choice Tournament Children Prize

Randomize the next 3 rounds. Circle one: PR = chose piece-rate payment, MT= chose tournament payment		Score	Choice	Guess
3 CTC	13+5=18 18+4=22 22+5=27 27+9=36 36+2=38 38+4=42 42+6=48 48+3=51 51+7=58		PR MT	
4 CTG	3+3=6 6+5=11 11+1=12 12+6=18 18+12=30 30+7=37 37+5=42 42+4=46 46+8=54		PR MT	
5 CTK	6+2=8 8+11=19 19+5=24 24+7=31 31+6=37 37+8=45 45+4=49 49+3=52 52+1=53		PR MT	

CTCS=Choice Tournament Cash Spouse

Randomize rounds 6-9. If married, round 6 is spouse. For poly men, skip round 6 and complete rounds 7+.		Score	Choice	Guess
6 CTCS	5+3=7 7+4=11 11+5=16 16+9=25 25+8=33 33+10=43 43+4=47 47+2=49 49+3=52		PR MT	

CTC1=Choice Tournament Cash 1st Wife CTC2=Choice Tournament Cash 2nd Wife CTC3=Choice Tournament Cash 3rd Wife

Poly ONLY. Numbers correspond to wife order (example: first wife=CTC1)		Score	Choice	Guess
7 CTC1	1+3=4 4+5=9 9+1=10 10+6=16 16+5=21 21+7=28 28+5=33 33+4=47 47+8=55		PR MT	
8 CTC2	2+5=7 7+7=14 14+5=19 19+2=21 21+6=27 27+5=32 32+4=36 36+3=39 39+4=43		PR MT	
9 CTC3	5+7=12 12+4=16 16+2=18 18+4=22 22+5=27 27+10=37 37+6=43 43+3=46 46+1=47		PR MT	

Round selected for payment: _____ Opponent's score for that round: _____

Risk/Willingness to Pay Activity Score Card

Risk	**Willingness to Pay**	
Lottery number selected _____	Switch from prize to cash:	1. Gender prize: _____ 2. Kids prize:
Success or Failure ? (Circle one)	Round 1 or 2 chosen ? (Circle one)	Choice # selected for payment: _____

Preferences Activity Score Card

Randomize the order of the rounds. Write down the order they were conducted in the ____ **space.** Subject chooses either (a) ***or*** (b). The first amount is for self ("**S**") and second amount is for the other person ("**OP**"). Circle (a) or (b) for 1 to 4 for all rounds.

Round 1 ____	**Anonymous person in the same village** 1. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 10000 **S** & 0 **OP** 2. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 5000 **S** & 0 **OP** 3. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 5000 **S** & 10000 **OP** 4. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 10000 **S** & 30000 **OP**	**Round 2** ____	**Anonymous person in a distant village (specify village)** 1. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 10000 **S** & 0 **OP** 2. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 5000 **S** & 0 **OP** 3. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 5000 **S** & 10000 **OP** 4. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 10000 **S** & 30000 **OP**
Round 3 ____	**Spouse** 1. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 10000 **S** & 0 **OP** 2. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 5000 **S** & 0 **OP** 3. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 5000 **S** & 10000 **OP** 4. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 10000 **S** & 30000 **OP**	**Round 4** ____	**If poly, first wife** 1. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 10000 **S** & 0 **OP** 2. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 5000 **S** & 0 **OP** 3. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 5000 **S** & 10000 **OP** 4. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 10000 **S** & 30000 **OP**
Round 5 ____	**If poly, second wife** 1. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 10000 **S** & 0 **OP** 2. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 5000 **S** & 0 **OP** 3. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 5000 **S** & 10000 **OP** 4. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 10000 **S** & 30000 **OP**	**Round 6** ____	**If poly, third wife** 1. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 10000 **S** & 0 **OP** 2. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 5000 **S** & 0 **OP** 3. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 5000 **S** & 10000 **OP** 4. (a) 5000 **S** & 5000 **OP** *or* (b) 10000 **S** & 30000 **OP**

Round selected for payment: _____ Select choice 1, 2, 3, or 4 from selected round ____ Did the 2nd roll land on 12? Y or N

FINAL PAYMENT

Activity selected : _____	**Round number selected:** ____	**Total cash payout:** _____le	**Did they get a prize?** **Y or N**

Appendix D

Supplemental Materials

Experimental Instructions (https://tinyurl.com/y3fmp8wx)
Enumerator Script (https://tinyurl.com/yxfsnn2e)
Survey (https://tinyurl.com/y32fcqwf)
Dataset (https://tinyurl.com/y3he6r9t)

Table 5: Logit Estimates of the Competition Game

Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) All	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Mono	(9) Mono	(10) Poly	(11) Poly	(12) Poly	(15) Poly	(16) Poly	(17) Men	(18) Men	(19) Men	(20) Men	(21) Women	(22) Women	(25) Women	(26) Women
Female	-0.66***	-0.70***	-0.47*	-0.33	-0.22	-0.68***	-0.58**	-0.52*	-0.30	-0.72***	-0.37	-0.08	-0.07	-0.07								
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.38)								
Polygyny		0.27	0.28	0.45	0.55										0.29	0.47	0.62*	0.69*	0.25	0.28	0.47*	0.47
		(0.18)	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.35)										(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.29)
Female x Polygyny			-0.02	0.00	-0.11																	
			(0.39)	(0.42)	(0.44)																	
Wealth			-0.62	-0.63	-0.88*		-0.47	-0.65	-1.00		-0.69	-0.20	-0.36	-0.36		-0.22	-0.19	-0.32		-1.00*	-1.02	-1.37**
			(0.42)	(0.47)	(0.49)		(0.63)	(0.67)	(0.69)		(0.57)	(0.70)	(0.72)	(0.72)		(0.69)	(0.74)	(0.76)		(0.54)	(0.63)	(0.65)
Makeni			0.44	0.17	0.50		0.94	0.95	1.32*		0.32	-0.44	-0.25	-0.25		0.28	0.25	0.30		0.46	0.02	0.49
			(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.44)		(0.68)	(0.72)	(0.76)		(0.47)	(0.55)	(0.62)	(0.62)		(0.59)	(0.62)	(0.66)		(0.48)	(0.54)	(0.61)
Education			0.33***	0.04	0.04		0.22*	-0.10	-0.12		0.44***	0.26*	0.25	0.25		0.16	-0.07	-0.08		0.58***	0.26	0.29*
			(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.16)		(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)		(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Children			0.05	0.06	0.02		-0.03	-0.03	-0.13		0.09*	0.11*	0.08	0.08		-0.02	-0.02	-0.03		0.18**	0.20**	0.15*
			(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)		(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Temne			-0.31	-0.29	-0.29		0.15	0.30	0.23		-0.57	-0.57	-0.58	-0.58		-0.36	-0.18	-0.22		-0.22	-0.31	-0.28
			(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.33)		(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.50)		(0.40)	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.46)		(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.50)		(0.39)	(0.43)	(0.44)
Mende			-0.26	-0.05	0.15		0.78	1.22*	1.32*		-0.72*	-0.70	-0.58	-0.58		0.05	0.37	0.34		-0.52	-0.42	-0.12
			(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.42)		(0.68)	(0.72)	(0.74)		(0.41)	(0.49)	(0.57)	(0.57)		(0.55)	(0.59)	(0.63)		(0.43)	(0.49)	(0.57)
Risk				0.11**	0.10*			0.13*	0.12			0.16**	0.14*	0.14*			0.12	0.11			0.10	0.08
				(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.08)	(0.08)			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)			(0.08)	(0.08)			(0.07)	(0.07)
Likelihood of Winning				0.23***	0.23***			0.21**	0.21**			0.26***	0.26***	0.26***			0.20**	0.19**			0.25***	0.26***
				(0.06)	(0.06)			(0.08)	(0.08)			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)			(0.09)	(0.09)			(0.07)	(0.08)
Confidence				0.20***	0.22***			0.11	0.12			0.33***	0.37***	0.37***			0.17*	0.19**			0.22**	0.22**
				(0.06)	(0.06)			(0.09)	(0.09)			(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)			(0.09)	(0.09)			(0.09)	(0.09)
Age					0.01				0.03*				0.01	0.01				0.00				0.02
					(0.01)				(0.02)				(0.02)	(0.02)				(0.02)				(0.02)
Constant	0.67***	0.54***	0.21	-1.75***	-2.39***	0.53***	-0.35	-2.13**	-3.08***	0.82***	0.57	-1.84**	-2.32**	-2.32**	0.53***	0.41	-1.56**	-1.61	-0.15	-0.57	-2.34***	-3.25***
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.44)	(0.54)	(0.74)	(0.19)	(0.82)	(0.96)	(1.17)	(0.21)	(0.54)	(0.72)	(1.05)	(1.05)	(0.19)	(0.63)	(0.80)	(1.05)	(0.18)	(0.52)	(0.66)	(0.90)
Observations	567	567	567	567	539	238	238	238	231	329	329	329	308	308	227	227	227	221	340	340	340	318

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: Linear Probability Estimates of the Competition Game

Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) All	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Mono	(9) Mono	(10) Poly	(11) Poly	(12) Poly	(15) Poly	(16) Men	(17) Men	(18) Men	(19) Men	(20) Women	(21) Women	(22) Women	(25) Women
Female	-0.15***	-0.16***	-0.12*	-0.06	-0.04	-0.17***	-0.14**	-0.11*	-0.07	-0.15**	-0.06	-0.01	-0.00								
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)								
Polygyny		0.05	0.03	0.07	0.09									0.04	0.08	0.10	0.12	0.06	0.06	0.09*	0.09*
		(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)									(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Female x Polygyny			0.03	0.01	-0.01																
			(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)																
Wealth			-0.14	-0.11	-0.16*		-0.11	-0.14	-0.21		-0.16	-0.01	-0.04		-0.05	-0.02	-0.04		-0.23*	-0.20*	-0.26**
			(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)		(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Makeni			0.12	0.04	0.11		0.22	0.21	0.27*		0.09	-0.05	-0.02		0.10	0.08	0.08		0.10	0.00	0.09
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Education			0.07***	0.01	0.01		0.05	-0.02	-0.03		0.09***	0.04	0.04		0.03	-0.02	-0.02		0.13***	0.06*	0.06*
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Children			0.01	0.01	0.00		-0.01	-0.01	-0.02		0.02*	0.02*	0.01		-0.00	-0.00	-0.01		0.04**	0.04**	0.03*
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Temne			-0.07	-0.05	-0.06		0.03	0.07	0.06		-0.12	-0.10	-0.10		-0.07	-0.03	-0.04		-0.05	-0.06	-0.05
			(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Mende			-0.05	0.01	0.04		0.18	0.27*	0.28*		-0.14	-0.10	-0.08		0.05	0.11	0.08		-0.12	-0.08	-0.02
			(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Risk				0.02*	0.02			0.03*	0.03			0.02*	0.02			0.02	0.02			0.02	0.01
				(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Likelihood of Winning				0.05***	0.05***			0.05***	0.05**			0.05***	0.05***			0.04**	0.04**			0.05***	0.05***
				(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Confidence				0.04***	0.04***			0.02	0.02			0.06***	0.06***			0.04**	0.04**			0.04**	0.04**
				(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Age					0.00				0.01				0.00				0.00				0.00
					(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)
Constant	0.65***	0.62***	0.54***	0.14	0.01	0.63***	0.42**	0.03	-0.14	0.67***	0.60***	0.16	0.08	0.63***	0.57***	0.15	0.14	0.46***	0.37***	0.05	-0.11
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.16)
Observations	567	567	567	567	539	238	238	238	231	329	329	329	308	227	227	227	221	340	340	340	318
R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.20	0.21	0.03	0.05	0.15	0.16	0.02	0.08	0.28	0.29	0.00	0.01	0.13	0.13	0.00	0.09	0.25	0.26

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: Logit Estimates of the Competition Game

Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against Stranger

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) All	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Mono	(9) Mono	(10) Poly	(11) Poly	(12) Poly	(15) Poly	(16) Poly	(17) Men	(18) Men	(19) Men	(20) Men	(21) Women	(22) Women	(25) Women
Female	-0.40**	-0.38**	-0.12	0.14	0.16	-0.41	-0.21	-0.12	0.13	-0.36	0.12	0.55	0.41								
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.35)	(0.39)								
Polygyny		-0.09	-0.19	-0.05	-0.01									-0.12	-0.10	0.04	0.06	-0.07	-0.08	0.04	-0.02
		(0.18)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.36)									(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Female x Polygyny			0.12	0.10	0.01																
			(0.40)	(0.44)	(0.45)																
Wealth			-0.86**	-0.82	-1.07**		-0.53	-0.74	-1.16		-1.09*	-0.64	-0.82		-1.13	-1.13	-1.14		-0.83	-0.68	-1.11
			(0.44)	(0.50)	(0.51)		(0.66)	(0.71)	(0.74)		(0.59)	(0.73)	(0.75)		(0.72)	(0.76)	(0.78)		(0.56)	(0.68)	(0.71)
Makeni			0.91**	0.79*	1.12**		0.83	0.99	1.35*		1.15**	0.67	0.92		1.17**	1.30**	1.10*		0.68	0.31	0.99
			(0.37)	(0.41)	(0.46)		(0.67)	(0.73)	(0.78)		(0.47)	(0.54)	(0.61)		(0.59)	(0.62)	(0.65)		(0.48)	(0.56)	(0.65)
Education			0.50***	0.22*	0.24**		0.44***	0.12	0.11		0.53***	0.37**	0.38**		0.34***	0.15	0.15		0.73***	0.37**	0.44**
			(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.17)		(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.17)		(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Children			0.08*	0.09*	0.08		-0.03	-0.04	-0.16		0.13**	0.16**	0.17**		0.06	0.06	0.08		0.12*	0.14*	0.10
			(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.11)		(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Temne			0.05	0.15	0.18		0.62	0.78	0.71		-0.35	-0.25	-0.24		-0.13	0.08	0.01		0.23	0.26	0.37
			(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.34)		(0.47)	(0.51)	(0.51)		(0.41)	(0.46)	(0.48)		(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.50)		(0.40)	(0.45)	(0.47)
Mende			0.03	0.33	0.53		0.74	1.18	1.32*		-0.33	-0.17	-0.02		0.54	0.90	0.71		-0.32	-0.14	0.32
			(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.43)		(0.67)	(0.72)	(0.76)		(0.40)	(0.47)	(0.55)		(0.53)	(0.57)	(0.60)		(0.44)	(0.51)	(0.61)
Risk				0.03	0.02			0.07	0.05			0.05	0.05			0.02	-0.00			0.03	0.04
				(0.05)	(0.06)			(0.08)	(0.08)			(0.08)	(0.08)			(0.08)	(0.09)			(0.07)	(0.08)
Likelihood of V				0.21***	0.19***			0.12	0.12			0.28***	0.25***			0.13	0.11			0.25***	0.24***
				(0.06)	(0.06)			(0.08)	(0.09)			(0.08)	(0.08)			(0.09)	(0.09)			(0.08)	(0.08)
Confidence				0.29***	0.31***			0.25**	0.26***			0.38***	0.42***			0.26***	0.28***			0.33***	0.34***
				(0.07)	(0.07)			(0.10)	(0.10)			(0.10)	(0.11)			(0.09)	(0.10)			(0.10)	(0.10)
Age					0.01				0.03*				-0.00				-0.01				0.03
					(0.01)				(0.02)				(0.02)				(0.02)				(0.02)
Constant	0.63***	0.68***	-0.25	-2.21***	-2.64***	0.69***	-0.47	-1.93**	-2.91**	0.57***	-0.45	-3.05***	-3.06***	0.69***	-0.23	-1.83**	-1.24	0.28	-0.43	-2.22***	-3.48***
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.45)	(0.56)	(0.77)	(0.19)	(0.82)	(0.98)	(1.21)	(0.20)	(0.53)	(0.75)	(1.09)	(0.19)	(0.63)	(0.79)	(1.05)	(0.18)	(0.53)	(0.70)	(0.98)
Observations	573	573	573	573	545	241	241	241	234	332	332	332	311	228	228	228	222	345	345	345	323

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8: Linear Probability Estimates of the Competition Game

Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against Stranger

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) All	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Mono	(9) Mono	(10) Poly	(11) Poly	(12) Poly	(15) Poly	(16) Poly	(17) Men	(18) Men	(19) Men	(20) Men	(21) Women	(22) Women	(25) Women
Female	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.03	0.03	0.04	-0.10	-0.05	-0.02	0.02	-0.09	0.03	0.08	0.06								
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)								
Polygyny		-0.02	-0.04	0.00	0.01									-0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.01
		(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)									(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Female x Polygyny			0.03	0.00	-0.01																
			(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)																
Wealth			-0.19**	-0.14	-0.18**		-0.11	-0.14	-0.21		-0.23*	-0.09	-0.12		-0.24	-0.19	-0.20		-0.18	-0.12	-0.18
			(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Makeni			0.21**	0.14*	0.20**		0.19	0.20	0.26*		0.25**	0.11	0.16		0.26**	0.25**	0.21		0.15	0.05	0.16
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Education			0.10***	0.04**	0.04**		0.09***	0.02	0.02		0.10***	0.06**	0.06**		0.07***	0.03	0.03		0.15***	0.07**	0.08***
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Children			0.02*	0.01	0.01		-0.01	-0.01	-0.03		0.03**	0.02**	0.02**		0.01	0.01	0.01		0.03*	0.02*	0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Temne			0.01	0.03	0.03		0.13	0.16	0.15		-0.07	-0.05	-0.05		-0.03	0.02	0.00		0.05	0.04	0.06
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Mende			0.01	0.06	0.10		0.16	0.24*	0.26*		-0.07	-0.02	0.00		0.12	0.18	0.14		-0.07	-0.02	0.05
			(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Risk				0.01	0.00			0.01	0.01			0.01	0.00			0.00	-0.00			0.01	0.00
				(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Likelihood of Winnng				0.04***	0.04***			0.03*	0.03*			0.05***	0.05***			0.03*	0.03			0.05***	0.05***
				(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Confidence				0.05***	0.05***			0.05**	0.05***			0.05***	0.06***			0.05***	0.05***			0.05***	0.05***
				(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.02)
Age					0.00				0.01*				0.00				-0.00				0.00
					(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)
Constant	0.65***	0.66***	0.45***	0.08	-0.00	0.67***	0.40**	0.09	-0.08	0.64***	0.41***	0.01	-0.00	0.67***	0.46***	0.13	0.25	0.57***	0.41***	0.10	-0.09
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.15)
Observations	573	573	573	573	545	241	241	241	234	332	332	332	311	228	228	228	222	345	345	345	323
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.09	0.25	0.26	0.01	0.08	0.19	0.20	0.01	0.12	0.33	0.34	0.00	0.06	0.15	0.15	0.00	0.13	0.32	0.34

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9: Random Effects Estimates of the Competition Game

Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against Stranger/Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) All	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Mono	(9) Mono	(10) Poly	(15) Poly	(16) Poly	(17) Poly	(18) Men	(19) Men	(20) Men	(21) Men	(22) Women	(23) Women	(24) Women	(25) Women
Spouse	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.08***	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.05	0.01	0.02	-0.13**	-0.06	-0.03	0.01	-0.12**	0.01	0.07	0.06								
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)								
Polygyny		0.02	-0.00	0.04	0.05								0.02	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.04
		(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)								(0.15)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female x Polygyny			0.03	0.01	-0.01																
			(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)																
Wealth			-0.17*	-0.13	-0.17**		-0.12	-0.15	-0.21*		-0.19*	-0.05	-0.08		-0.15	-0.11	-0.12		-0.21*	-0.16	-0.22**
			(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Makeni			0.16**	0.09	0.15**		0.20	0.20	0.26**		0.17*	0.03	0.07		0.18	0.17	0.14		0.13	0.02	0.13
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Education			0.09***	0.02	0.02		0.07***	-0.00	-0.00		0.10***	0.05**	0.05**		0.05**	0.00	0.00		0.14***	0.06**	0.07***
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Children			0.01*	0.01	0.01		-0.01	-0.01	-0.03		0.02**	0.02**	0.02*		0.01	0.00	0.00		0.03**	0.03**	0.02*
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Temne			-0.03	-0.01	-0.01		0.08	0.12	0.11		-0.10	-0.07	-0.08		-0.05	-0.01	-0.02		0.01	-0.00	0.01
			(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Mende			-0.02	0.04	0.07		0.17	0.25**	0.27**		-0.11	-0.06	-0.04		0.09	0.15	0.11		-0.10	-0.05	0.02
			(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Risk				0.01	0.01			0.02	0.02			0.01	0.01			0.01	0.01			0.01	0.01
				(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Likelihood of Winnng				0.05***	0.04***			0.04**	0.04**			0.05***	0.05***			0.04**	0.03**			0.05***	0.05***
				(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Confidence				0.04***	0.05***			0.03**	0.04**			0.05***	0.06***			0.04***	0.04***			0.05***	0.05***
				(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Age					0.00				0.01**				0.00				0.00				0.00*
					(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)
Constant	0.67***	0.66***	0.50***	0.11	0.01	0.69***	0.43**	0.08	-0.10	0.66***	0.49***	0.07		0.65***	0.51***	0.14	0.20	0.54***	0.41***	0.10	-0.07
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.10)		(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Observations	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,084	479	479	479	465	661	661	661	619	455	455	455	443	685	685	685	641
N	573	573	573	573	545	241	241	241	234	332	332	332	311	228	228	228	222	345	345	345	323

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 10: Random Effects Estimates of the Competition Game for Subpopulations

Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against Stranger/Spouse/Co-Wife

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		Poly Women					Mono Women					Poly Men					Mono Men		
Treatment1	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00						**Treatment1**	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04					
(Co-Wife)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)						(1st Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)					
Treatment2	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	**Treatment1**	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.12***	**Treatment2**	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	**Treatment1**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05
(Husband)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(Husband)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(2nd Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wealth		-0.23*	-0.09	-0.13	Wealth		-0.12	-0.16	-0.25	Wealth		-0.13	0.05	0.04	Wealth		-0.11	-0.11	-0.14
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)			(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)			(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)			(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Makeni		0.11	-0.05	0.04	Makeni		0.21	0.18	0.27	Makeni		0.20	0.10	0.07	Makeni		0.17	0.20	0.23
		(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)			(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)			(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)			(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Education		0.14***	0.08**	0.08***	Education		0.14***	0.05	0.06	Education		0.06	0.03	0.03	Education		0.04	-0.02	-0.03
		(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Children		0.05***	0.04***	0.04***	Children		-0.01	0.00	-0.02	Children		0.01	0.01	0.01	Children		0.00	-0.01	-0.02
		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Mende		-0.18*	-0.13	-0.05	Mende		0.19	0.23	0.23	Mende		-0.03	-0.01	-0.07	Mende		0.17	0.28	0.30
		(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)			(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.18)			(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)			(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Temne		-0.07	-0.05	-0.04	Temne		0.15	0.12	0.11	Temne		-0.21	-0.20	-0.22*	Temne		0.04	0.13	0.13
		(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)			(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)			(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)			(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Risk			0.02	0.02	Risk			0.01	0.00	Risk			0.00	0.00	Risk			0.03*	0.03
			(0.01)	(0.01)				(0.02)	(0.02)				(0.02)	(0.02)				(0.02)	(0.02)
Likelihood of Winning			0.05***	0.05***	Likelihood of Winning			0.05**	0.04*	Likelihood of Winning			0.05**	0.05**	Likelihood of Winning			0.03	0.03
			(0.01)	(0.01)				(0.02)	(0.02)				(0.02)	(0.02)				(0.02)	(0.02)
Confidence			0.06***	0.06***	Confidence			0.03	0.04	Confidence			0.05**	0.05**	Confidence			0.04*	0.04*
			(0.02)	(0.02)				(0.02)	(0.02)				(0.02)	(0.02)				(0.02)	(0.02)
Age				0.00	Age				0.01**	Age				0.00	Age				0.00
				(0.00)					(0.00)					(0.00)					(0.00)
Constant	0.55***	0.45***	0.13	0.04	Constant	0.68***	0.42*	0.14	-0.08	Constant	0.64***	0.61***	0.18	0.28	Constant	0.67***	0.47**	0.11	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)		(0.07)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.26)		(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.26)		(0.04)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.30)
Observations	659	659	659	611	Observations	240	240	240	228	Observations	324	324	324	309	Observations	239	239	239	237
N	224	224	224	208	N	121	121	121	115	N	108	108	108	103	N	120	120	120	119
Standard errors in parentheses					Standard errors in parentheses					Standard errors in parentheses					Standard errors in parentheses				
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1					*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1					*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1					*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Table 11: Logit Estimates of the Sharing Game

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Sharing Game with Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	-0.32*	-0.30	-0.13	0.18	-0.10	-0.08	0.13	-0.47*	-0.60*	-0.42						
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.35)						
Polygyny		-0.08	0.21	0.30							0.14	0.15	0.19	-0.23	-0.21	-0.33
		(0.18)	(0.32)	(0.33)							(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Female x Polygyny			-0.41	-0.60												
			(0.40)	(0.42)												
Wealth			-1.88***	-2.00***		-1.49**	-1.54**		-2.13***	-2.29***		-1.62**	-1.89**		-2.05***	-2.04***
			(0.44)	(0.45)		(0.67)	(0.69)		(0.60)	(0.61)		(0.73)	(0.75)		(0.56)	(0.58)
Makeni			-0.33	0.23		-0.09	0.11		-0.37	0.30		0.15	0.54		-0.66	-0.00
			(0.41)	(0.43)		(0.70)	(0.72)		(0.52)	(0.56)		(0.62)	(0.65)		(0.56)	(0.59)
Education			0.06	0.09		0.11	0.09		0.04	0.09		0.11	0.12		-0.01	0.03
			(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.14)	(0.15)
Children			-0.01	-0.09*		0.03	-0.07		-0.02	-0.09		0.02	-0.05		-0.05	-0.16*
			(0.04)	(0.05)		(0.08)	(0.10)		(0.05)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)
Mende			-0.57	-0.25		-0.43	-0.37		-0.48	-0.09		-0.21	-0.02		-0.84	-0.42
			(0.38)	(0.41)		(0.70)	(0.71)		(0.47)	(0.50)		(0.58)	(0.60)		(0.52)	(0.56)
Temne			-0.38	-0.37		-0.13	-0.16		-0.47	-0.47		-0.29	-0.26		-0.42	-0.43
			(0.30)	(0.31)		(0.48)	(0.48)		(0.40)	(0.41)		(0.48)	(0.49)		(0.40)	(0.41)
Age				0.03***			0.03*			0.04**			0.03*			0.04***
				(0.01)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)
Constant	0.83***	0.87***	2.09***	0.49	0.77***	1.44*	0.52	0.91***	2.54***	0.82	0.77***	1.38**	0.27	0.67***	2.51***	0.86
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.48)	(0.66)	(0.20)	(0.87)	(1.03)	(0.21)	(0.60)	(0.87)	(0.20)	(0.67)	(0.92)	(0.19)	(0.61)	(0.78)
Observations	571	571	571	543	241	241	234	330	330	309	228	228	222	343	343	321

Table 12: Linear Probability Estimates of the Sharing Game

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Sharing Game with Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.04	0.00						
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)						
Polygyny		-0.05	-0.04	-0.03							-0.05	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	0.02	0.02
		(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)							(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Female x Polygyny			-0.00	-0.04												
			(0.08)	(0.09)												
Wealth			-0.42***	-0.45***		-0.32**	-0.33**		-0.49***	-0.52***		-0.36**	-0.41***		-0.18*	-0.19*
			(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.14)	(0.15)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Makeni			-0.09	0.02		-0.02	0.02		-0.12	0.01		-0.04	0.04		-0.07	-0.04
			(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.09)	(0.10)
Education			0.01	0.02		0.02	0.02		0.01	0.02		0.02	0.02		0.02	0.03
			(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Children			-0.00	-0.02*		0.01	-0.01		-0.00	-0.02		0.00	-0.01		0.01	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Mende			-0.12*	-0.06		-0.09	-0.08		-0.10	-0.03		-0.07	-0.03		-0.12	-0.10
			(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.08)	(0.09)
Temne			-0.06	-0.06		-0.03	-0.03		-0.06	-0.05		-0.01	0.00		0.04	0.04
			(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Age				0.01***			0.01			0.01**			0.01*			0.00
				(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
Constant	0.66***	0.68***	0.97***	0.64***	0.68***	0.83***	0.63***	0.63***	0.98***	0.62***	0.68***	0.85***	0.61***	0.66***	0.91***	0.86***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Observations	571	571	571	543	241	241	234	330	330	309	228	228	222	343	343	321
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.07	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.09	0.10	0.00	0.04	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.02

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 13: Logit Estimates of the Costless Sharing Game

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Costless Sharing Game with Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	-0.16	-0.21	-0.05	-0.01	-0.04	-0.16	0.15	-0.38	0.05	0.02						
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.35)	(0.40)	(0.43)						
Polygyny		0.29	0.22	0.17							0.50	0.18	0.13	0.16	0.11	0.13
		(0.23)	(0.41)	(0.41)							(0.38)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Female x Poly			-0.12	-0.07												
			(0.51)	(0.51)												
Wealth			-1.63***	-1.73***		-1.50*	-1.85**		-1.74**	-1.78**		-2.36**	-2.55**		-1.29*	-1.37*
			(0.57)	(0.58)		(0.81)	(0.85)		(0.81)	(0.82)		(1.00)	(1.03)		(0.70)	(0.71)
Makeni			0.09	0.41		0.24	0.62		-0.04	0.24		1.09	1.38*		-0.67	-0.32
			(0.53)	(0.55)		(0.83)	(0.87)		(0.73)	(0.76)		(0.80)	(0.84)		(0.75)	(0.77)
Education			0.11	0.14		0.01	-0.01		0.19	0.21		0.08	0.09		0.16	0.21
			(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.16)	(0.17)		(0.18)	(0.19)		(0.16)	(0.16)		(0.18)	(0.18)
Children			0.07	0.05		-0.07	-0.20*		0.15*	0.17*		0.09	0.03		0.06	0.07
			(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.09)	(0.12)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.10)
Mende			-0.61	-0.43		-0.23	-0.13		-0.85	-0.60		-0.16	-0.09		-1.00	-0.76
			(0.48)	(0.49)		(0.81)	(0.84)		(0.61)	(0.63)		(0.70)	(0.72)		(0.70)	(0.72)
Temne			0.11	0.13		0.27	0.21		0.03	0.05		-0.05	-0.03		0.29	0.32
			(0.40)	(0.40)		(0.59)	(0.60)		(0.55)	(0.56)		(0.67)	(0.68)		(0.51)	(0.51)
Age				0.01			0.04**			-0.01			0.02			0.00
				(0.01)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)
Constant	1.71***	1.58***	2.11***	1.48*	1.49***	2.32**	0.97	1.99***	2.10***	1.95*	1.49***	1.81**	0.90	1.45***	2.38***	1.89**
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.62)	(0.79)	(0.24)	(1.02)	(1.24)	(0.30)	(0.79)	(1.06)	(0.24)	(0.87)	(1.13)	(0.23)	(0.80)	(0.95)
Observations	571	571	571	543	241	241	234	330	330	309	228	228	222	343	343	321

Table 14: Linear Probability Estimates of the Costless Sharing Game

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Costless Sharing Game with Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.05						
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)						
Polygyny		0.02	-0.02	-0.02							0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
		(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)							(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Female x Poly			0.03	0.04												
			(0.07)	(0.07)												
Wealth			-0.20***	-0.21***		-0.22*	-0.25**		-0.18*	-0.18*		-0.23*	-0.25**		-0.18*	-0.19*
			(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Makeni			-0.01	0.03		0.03	0.09		-0.04	-0.01		0.07	0.11		-0.07	-0.04
			(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.09)	(0.10)
Education			0.02	0.02		0.00	-0.00		0.03	0.04		0.02	0.02		0.02	0.03
			(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Children			0.01	0.01		-0.01	-0.03		0.01*	0.02*		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Mende			-0.09	-0.07		-0.04	-0.02		-0.11	-0.09		-0.05	-0.03		-0.12	-0.10
			(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.09)
Temne			0.01	0.02		0.03	0.03		0.01	0.01		-0.01	-0.00		0.04	0.04
			(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Age				0.00			0.01**			-0.00			0.00			0.00
				(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
Constant	0.82***	0.81***	0.89***	0.81***	0.82***	0.93***	0.73***	0.83***	0.84***	0.84***	0.82***	0.86***	0.75***	0.81***	0.91***	0.86***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Observations	571	571	571	543	241	241	234	330	330	309	228	228	222	343	343	321
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.00	0.02	0.02

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 15: Logit Estimates of the Costless Envy Game

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Costless Envy Game with Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	-0.04	0.03	0.21	0.40	0.19	0.34	0.43	-0.10	-0.32	-0.20						
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.33)						
Polygyny		-0.39**	-0.02	0.07							-0.22	0.02	0.07	-0.51**	-0.56**	-0.61**
		(0.18)	(0.30)	(0.31)							(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Female x Polygyny			-0.49	-0.66*												
			(0.38)	(0.39)												
Wealth			1.58***	1.51***		2.21***	2.01***		1.12*	1.12*		2.02***	2.10***		1.36**	1.24**
			(0.44)	(0.45)		(0.67)	(0.67)		(0.59)	(0.61)		(0.75)	(0.77)		(0.55)	(0.56)
Makeni			-0.79**	-0.27		-0.14	-0.01		-0.76	-0.18		-1.54***	-1.29**		-0.24	0.58
			(0.37)	(0.41)		(0.68)	(0.69)		(0.47)	(0.53)		(0.59)	(0.62)		(0.49)	(0.58)
Education			-0.11	-0.10		0.03	0.01		-0.24*	-0.20		-0.12	-0.13		-0.15	-0.13
			(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.14)	(0.15)
Children			-0.05	-0.10**		-0.05	-0.10		-0.04	-0.09		-0.06	-0.12*		-0.05	-0.09
			(0.04)	(0.05)		(0.08)	(0.10)		(0.05)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)
Mende			-0.10	0.36		1.10	1.09		-0.50	-0.01		0.24	0.38		-0.33	0.47
			(0.33)	(0.37)		(0.68)	(0.68)		(0.39)	(0.46)		(0.53)	(0.55)		(0.43)	(0.53)
Temne			-0.33	-0.27		0.01	-0.02		-0.52	-0.43		0.20	0.19		-0.75*	-0.67*
			(0.29)	(0.30)		(0.47)	(0.47)		(0.38)	(0.40)		(0.49)	(0.49)		(0.39)	(0.40)
Age				0.02*			0.01			0.03*			0.03*			0.01
				(0.01)			(0.02)			(0.01)			(0.02)			(0.01)
Constant	-0.37***	-0.19	-0.13	-1.31**	-0.27	-1.63*	-1.94**	-0.49**	0.33	-1.15	-0.27	-0.31	-1.52*	-0.08	0.22	-0.78
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.43)	(0.61)	(0.18)	(0.84)	(0.99)	(0.20)	(0.52)	(0.81)	(0.18)	(0.62)	(0.88)	(0.18)	(0.52)	(0.73)
Observations	571	571	571	543	241	241	234	330	330	309	228	228	222	343	343	321

Table 16: Linear Probility Estimates of the Costless Envy Game

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Costless Envy Game with Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.09	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.01	-0.04	-0.02						
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)						
Polygyny		-0.11***	-0.03	-0.02							-0.09	-0.02	-0.01	-0.12**	-0.13**	-0.14**
		(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)							(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Female x Polygyny			-0.08	-0.12												
			(0.09)	(0.09)												
Wealth			0.33***	0.31***		0.50***	0.46***		0.21*	0.20		0.36**	0.37**		0.31**	0.28**
			(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.12)	(0.13)
Makeni			-0.17**	-0.05		-0.03	0.00		-0.17	-0.04		-0.32**	-0.26**		-0.05	0.12
			(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.15)	(0.16)		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.11)	(0.13)
Education			-0.02	-0.02		0.01	0.00		-0.04	-0.04		-0.02	-0.02		-0.03	-0.03
			(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Children			-0.01	-0.02**		-0.01	-0.02		-0.01	-0.02*		-0.02	-0.03*		-0.01	-0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Mende			-0.02	0.09		0.25	0.25		-0.12	0.00		0.06	0.09		-0.08	0.10
			(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.12)
Temne			-0.07	-0.06		0.00	-0.01		-0.11	-0.09		0.04	0.04		-0.17*	-0.15
			(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Age				0.00*			0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00
				(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
Constant	0.39***	0.44***	0.48***	0.23*	0.43***	0.13	0.05	0.34***	0.56***	0.26	0.43***	0.46***	0.24	0.48***	0.55***	0.33**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.16)
Observations	571	571	571	543	241	241	234	330	330	309	228	228	222	343	343	321
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.00	0.08	0.08	0.00	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.11	0.13	0.01	0.05	0.05

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 17: Logit Estimates of the Envy Game

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Envy Game with Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	-0.01	0.03	-0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.04	0.03	0.08	-0.05	0.02						
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.26)	(0.32)	(0.35)						
Polygyny		-0.26	-0.06	0.01							-0.31	0.02	0.03	-0.22	-0.20	-0.20
		(0.19)	(0.32)	(0.33)							(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.27)
Female x Polygyny			-0.13	-0.21												
			(0.41)	(0.42)												
Wealth			0.78*	0.71		1.70**	1.50**		-0.00	-0.01		0.88	1.07		0.69	0.51
			(0.47)	(0.48)		(0.69)	(0.71)		(0.64)	(0.66)		(0.77)	(0.79)		(0.59)	(0.60)
Makeni			-1.04***	-0.55		-0.36	-0.29		-1.19**	-0.65		-1.42**	-1.38**		-0.77	0.14
			(0.38)	(0.43)		(0.71)	(0.72)		(0.49)	(0.55)		(0.61)	(0.64)		(0.51)	(0.62)
Education			-0.06	-0.05		-0.06	-0.07		-0.05	-0.02		-0.06	-0.07		-0.05	-0.02
			(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.15)	(0.15)
Children			-0.07	-0.10*		-0.14	-0.17		-0.04	-0.07		-0.10	-0.10		-0.05	-0.10
			(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.09)	(0.11)		(0.05)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)
Mende			-0.33	0.14		0.60	0.54		-0.62	-0.05		-0.43	-0.39		-0.29	0.63
			(0.34)	(0.38)		(0.70)	(0.70)		(0.40)	(0.47)		(0.54)	(0.57)		(0.44)	(0.57)
Temne			-0.32	-0.23		-0.41	-0.42		-0.17	-0.02		-0.40	-0.40		-0.33	-0.19
			(0.31)	(0.33)		(0.50)	(0.50)		(0.42)	(0.45)		(0.50)	(0.51)		(0.41)	(0.44)
Age				0.01			0.01			0.02			0.00			0.01
				(0.01)			(0.02)			(0.01)			(0.02)			(0.01)
Constant	-0.83***	-0.72***	-0.01	-0.82	-0.69***	-0.96	-0.99	-1.00***	0.17	-1.04	-0.69***	0.24	-0.07	-0.71***	-0.19	-1.37*
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.45)	(0.63)	(0.19)	(0.88)	(1.02)	(0.22)	(0.54)	(0.84)	(0.19)	(0.65)	(0.89)	(0.19)	(0.54)	(0.78)
Observations	571	571	571	543	241	241	234	330	330	309	228	228	222	343	343	321

Table 18: Logit Estimates of the Envy Game

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Envy Game with Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) All	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Mono	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Poly	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Men	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.03						
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)						
Polygyny		-0.07*	-0.04	-0.03							-0.09	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04
		(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)							(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Female x Polygyny			-0.00	-0.01												
			(0.08)	(0.08)												
Wealth			0.14	0.13		0.34**	0.30**		-0.01	-0.01		0.15	0.18		0.13	0.10
			(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.12)	(0.12)
Makeni			-0.21***	-0.10		-0.07	-0.05		-0.24**	-0.11		-0.27**	-0.26**		-0.16	0.03
			(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.11)	(0.12)
Education			-0.01	-0.01		-0.01	-0.01		-0.01	-0.00		-0.01	-0.01		-0.01	-0.00
			(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Children			-0.02*	-0.02**		-0.03*	-0.03		-0.01	-0.02		-0.02*	-0.02		-0.01	-0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)
Mende			-0.07	0.04		0.13	0.12		-0.14*	-0.01		-0.08	-0.07		-0.06	0.13
			(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.11)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.11)
Temne			-0.06	-0.04		-0.07	-0.08		-0.03	-0.00		-0.06	-0.06		-0.06	-0.03
			(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.09)
Age				0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00
				(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
Constant	0.29***	0.32***	0.49***	0.30**	0.33***	0.28	0.27	0.24***	0.51***	0.23	0.33***	0.53***	0.47***	0.33***	0.45***	0.20
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.15)
Observations	571	571	571	543	241	241	234	330	330	309	228	228	222	343	343	321
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.00	0.07	0.06	0.00	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.09	0.08	0.00	0.03	0.03

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 19: Random Effects Estimates of Cooperation Games for Poly Women

Dependent Variable: Choice in Game with Stranger/Spouse/Co-Wife

	(1)	(2) Sharing	(3)		(1)	(2) Costless Sharing	(3)		(1)	(2) Costless Envy	(3)		(1)	(2) Envy	(3)
Treatment1	0.07**	0.07**	0.08**	**Treatment1**	0.01	0.00	-0.00	**Treatment1**	-0.13***	-0.14***	-0.11***	**Treatment1**	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
(Co-Wife)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(Co-Wife)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(Co-Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(Co-Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Treatment2	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	**Treatment2**	0.09***	0.09***	0.09**	**Treatment2**	-0.36***	-0.36***	-0.36***	**Treatment2**	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.24***
(Husband)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(Husband)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(Husband)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(Husband)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wealth		-0.46***	-0.49***	Wealth		-0.12	-0.12	Wealth		0.15	0.14	Wealth		-0.08	-0.08
		(0.12)	(0.13)			(0.10)	(0.10)			(0.11)	(0.12)			(0.12)	(0.12)
Makeni		-0.25**	-0.13	Makeni		-0.19**	-0.18*	Makeni		-0.26***	-0.17	Makeni		-0.29***	-0.17
		(0.11)	(0.12)			(0.08)	(0.10)			(0.09)	(0.11)			(0.10)	(0.11)
Education		0.01	0.01	Education		0.01	0.01	Education		-0.00	0.00	Education		0.03	0.03
		(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)
Children		-0.00	-0.01	Children		0.01	0.02	Children		0.00	0.00	Children		0.00	-0.00
		(0.01)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.02)
Mende		-0.20**	-0.12	Mende		-0.17**	-0.15*	Mende		-0.13	-0.01	Mende		-0.19**	-0.05
		(0.09)	(0.11)			(0.07)	(0.09)			(0.08)	(0.10)			(0.09)	(0.10)
Temne		-0.06	-0.07	Temne		0.03	0.03	Temne		-0.03	-0.01	Temne		-0.03	-0.00
		(0.08)	(0.09)			(0.07)	(0.07)			(0.07)	(0.08)			(0.08)	(0.08)
Age			0.01*	Age			-0.00	Age			-0.00	Age			0.00
			(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)
Constant	0.51***	0.93***	0.67***	Constant	0.75***	0.90***	0.95***	Constant	0.71***	0.85***	0.75***	Constant	0.51***	0.76***	0.57***
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.16)		(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.13)		(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.14)		(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Observations	648	648	601	Observations	647	647	600	Observations	648	648	601	Observations	648	648	601
N	224	224	208	N	224	224	208	N	224	224	208	N	224	224	208

Table 20: Random Effects Estimates of Cooperation Games for Mono Women

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Games with Stranger/Spouse

	(1)	(2) Sharing	(3)	(1)	(2) Costless Sharing	(3)		(1)	(2) Costless Envy	(3)		(1)	(2) Envy	(3)
Treatment2	0.17***	0.17***	0.18***	**Treatment2**	0.09**	0.09**	0.10**	**Treatment2**	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.18***	**Treatment2**	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.24***
(Husband)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(Husband)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(Husband)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(Husband)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wealth		-0.15	-0.14	Wealth		-0.22	-0.25	Wealth		0.32**	0.29*	Wealth		0.21	0.16
		(0.18)	(0.18)			(0.15)	(0.16)			(0.16)	(0.17)			(0.16)	(0.17)
Makeni		0.12	0.17	Makeni		0.10	0.13	Makeni		0.05	0.05	Makeni		0.10	0.12
		(0.19)	(0.19)			(0.16)	(0.17)			(0.17)	(0.17)			(0.17)	(0.17)
Education		-0.01	-0.00	Education		0.01	0.02	Education		0.00	0.00	Education		0.01	0.01
		(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.04)	(0.04)
Children		-0.02	-0.04	Children		-0.04*	-0.05*	Children		-0.01	-0.01	Children		-0.02	-0.02
		(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.02)	(0.03)			(0.02)	(0.03)			(0.02)	(0.03)
Mende		0.13	0.14	Mende		0.09	0.09	Mende		0.18	0.16	Mende		0.29*	0.28
		(0.19)	(0.19)			(0.17)	(0.17)			(0.17)	(0.18)			(0.17)	(0.17)
Temne		-0.13	-0.13	Temne		0.01	0.01	Temne		-0.11	-0.11	Temne		-0.14	-0.14
		(0.15)	(0.15)			(0.13)	(0.13)			(0.13)	(0.13)			(0.13)	(0.13)
Age			0.01	Age			0.00	Age			-0.00	Age			0.00
			(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)
Constant	0.33***	0.36	0.12	Constant	0.63***	0.72***	0.58**	Constant	0.86***	0.71***	0.74***	Constant	0.83***	0.64***	0.58**
	(0.08)	(0.23)	(0.27)		(0.07)	(0.20)	(0.24)		(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.25)		(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.25)
Observations	242	242	230	Observations	242	242	230	Observations	242	242	230	Observations	242	242	230
N	121	121	115	N	121	121	115	N	121	121	115	N	121	121	115

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 21: Random Effects Estimates of Cooperation Games for Poly Men

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Games with Stranger/Spouse

	(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)
		Sharing				Costless Sharing				Costless Envy				Envy	
Treatment1	0.10**	0.10**	0.10**	**Treatment1**	0.10**	0.10**	0.10**	**Treatment1**	-0.32***	-0.32***	-0.32***	**Treatment1**	-0.29***	-0.29***	-0.29***
(1st Wife)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(1st Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(1st Wife)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(1st Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Treatment2	0.09**	0.09**	0.09*	**Treatment2**	0.10**	0.10**	0.10**	**Treatment2**	-0.33***	-0.33***	-0.32***	**Treatment2**	-0.24***	-0.24***	-0.25***
(2nd Wife)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2nd Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(2nd Wife)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2nd Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wealth		-0.47**	-0.52***	Wealth		-0.17	-0.17	Wealth		0.05	0.11	Wealth		-0.17	-0.12
		(0.19)	(0.19)			(0.15)	(0.15)			(0.17)	(0.17)			(0.18)	(0.18)
Makeni		-0.01	0.10	Makeni		-0.04	-0.02	Makeni		-0.15	-0.13	Makeni		-0.08	-0.03
		(0.15)	(0.15)			(0.11)	(0.12)			(0.13)	(0.14)			(0.14)	(0.14)
Education		-0.01	0.01	Education		0.01	0.01	Education		-0.02	-0.02	Education		0.01	0.01
		(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)
Children		-0.00	-0.02	Children		0.00	0.01	Children		-0.02	-0.02*	Children		-0.01	-0.02*
		(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Mende		0.02	0.08	Mende		-0.03	-0.01	Mende		0.02	0.04	Mende			0.00
		(0.13)	(0.14)			(0.10)	(0.11)			(0.12)	(0.13)				(0.00)
Temne		0.03	0.07	Temne		0.08	0.09	Temne		-0.11	-0.10	Temne		0.00	0.05
		(0.13)	(0.13)			(0.10)	(0.11)			(0.12)	(0.12)			(0.12)	(0.13)
Age			0.01**	Age			-0.00	Age			0.00	Age		-0.10	-0.07
			(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)			(0.12)	(0.12)
Constant	0.54***	0.73***	0.32	Constant	0.74***	0.77***	0.73***	Constant	0.67***	0.89***	0.71***	Constant	0.51***	0.75***	0.49**
	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.24)		(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.19)		(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.21)		(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.22)
Observations	320	320	305	Observations	319	319	304	Observations	318	318	303	Observations	320	320	305
N	108	108	103	N	108	108	103	N	108	108	103	N	108	108	103

Table 22: Random Effects Estimates of Cooperation Games for Mono Men

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Games with Stranger/Spouse

	(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)
		Sharing				Costless Sharing				Costless Envy				Envy	
Treatment1	0.09*	0.09*	0.09*	**Treatment1**	0.09**	0.09**	0.09**	**Treatment1**	-0.28***	-0.28***	-0.29***	**Treatment1**	-0.26***	-0.26***	-0.26***
(Wife)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(Wife)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(Wife)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wealth		-0.41**	-0.45**	Wealth		-0.31**	-0.35**	Wealth		0.41***	0.39**	Wealth		0.24	0.27
		(0.17)	(0.18)			(0.16)	(0.16)			(0.16)	(0.16)			(0.17)	(0.17)
Makeni		-0.21	-0.16	Makeni		-0.04	0.02	Makeni		-0.29*	-0.26	Makeni		-0.43**	-0.46***
		(0.18)	(0.18)			(0.16)	(0.17)			(0.16)	(0.17)			(0.17)	(0.18)
Education		0.05*	0.05	Education		0.02	0.01	Education		0.05*	0.04	Education		0.04	0.05
		(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)
Children		0.01	-0.00	Children		-0.01	-0.03	Children		-0.00	-0.01	Children		-0.01	0.01
		(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Mende		-0.22	-0.20	Mende		-0.09	-0.06	Mende		0.14	0.15	Mende		-0.11	-0.13
		(0.17)	(0.17)			(0.16)	(0.16)			(0.16)	(0.16)			(0.17)	(0.17)
Temne		-0.04	-0.05	Temne		-0.13	-0.15	Temne		0.05	0.05	Temne		0.05	0.05
		(0.11)	(0.12)			(0.10)	(0.10)			(0.11)	(0.11)			(0.11)	(0.11)
Age			0.00	Age			0.01	Age			0.00	Age			-0.00
			(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)
Constant	0.50***	0.78***	0.63**	Constant	0.63***	0.87***	0.70***	Constant	1.00***	0.80***	0.72***	Constant	0.85***	0.94***	1.04***
	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.25)		(0.07)	(0.20)	(0.23)		(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.24)		(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.25)
Observations	240	240	238	Observations	240	240	238	Observations	240	240	238	Observations	240	240	238
N	120	120	119	N	120	120	119	N	120	120	119	N	120	120	119

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 23: Random Effects Estimates of Sharing Game

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Games with Stranger/Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Mono	(4) Mono	(5) Poly	(6) Poly	(7) Men	(8) Men	(9) Women	(10) Women
Treatment1	0.11***	0.11***	0.13***	0.14***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.12***	0.12***
(Spouse)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.06	-0.02	-0.06	-0.00	-0.03	-0.00				
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)				
Polygyny	-0.05	-0.03					-0.05	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)					(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Female x Polygyny	0.03	0.02								
	(0.07)	(0.08)								
Wealth		-0.37***		-0.31**		-0.41***		-0.46***		-0.30***
		(0.08)		(0.13)		(0.11)		(0.13)		(0.11)
Makeni		-0.05		-0.01		-0.07		-0.02		-0.05
		(0.08)		(0.13)		(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.11)
Education		0.02		0.03		0.00		0.02		0.00
		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)
Children		-0.01		-0.01		-0.01		-0.01		-0.02
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)
Mende		-0.05		-0.04		-0.04		-0.05		-0.03
		(0.07)		(0.13)		(0.09)		(0.11)		(0.10)
Temne		-0.04		-0.07		-0.01		0.01		-0.08
		(0.06)		(0.09)		(0.07)		(0.09)		(0.08)
Age		0.01***		0.01**		0.01**		0.01**		0.01**
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Constant	0.47***	0.44***	0.44***	0.35*	0.44***	0.47***	0.50***	0.44***	0.40***	0.42***
	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.19)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.15)
Observations	1,144	1,088	482	468	662	620	456	444	688	644
N	573	545	241	234	332	311	228	222	345	323

Table 24: Random Effects Estimates of Costless Sharing Game

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Games with Stranger/Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Mono	(4) Mono	(5) Poly	(6) Poly	(7) Men	(8) Men	(9) Women	(10) Women
Treatment1	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***
(Spouse)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.00	0.02				
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)				
Polygyny	0.02	0.00					0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)					(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female x Polygyny	0.01	0.03								
	(0.06)	(0.06)								
Wealth		-0.20***		-0.30***		-0.13		-0.25**		-0.17*
		(0.07)		(0.11)		(0.09)		(0.11)		(0.09)
Makeni		-0.02		0.07		-0.08		-0.02		-0.02
		(0.07)		(0.12)		(0.08)		(0.10)		(0.09)
Education		0.01		0.01		0.00		0.01		0.02
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Children		0.00		-0.04**		0.02*		-0.00		0.01
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Mende		-0.07		0.00		-0.11		-0.04		-0.09
		(0.06)		(0.11)		(0.07)		(0.09)		(0.08)
Temne		-0.02		-0.07		-0.00		-0.02		-0.03
		(0.05)		(0.08)		(0.06)		(0.08)		(0.06)
Age		0.00		0.01*		-0.00		0.00		-0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Constant	0.64***	0.73***	0.63***	0.62***	0.65***	0.79***	0.63***	0.71***	0.63***	0.73***
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.12)
Observations	1,144	1,088	482	468	662	620	456	444	688	644
N	573	545	241	234	332	311	228	222	345	323

Table 25: Random Effects Estimates of Costless Envy Game

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Games with Stranger/Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Mono	(4) Mono	(5) Poly	(6) Poly	(7) Men	(8) Men	(9) Women	(10) Women
Treatment1	-0.30***	-0.30***	-0.24***	-0.24***	-0.35***	-0.35***	-0.30***	-0.30***	-0.30***	-0.30***
(Spouse)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.00	0.04	-0.00	0.05	0.03	-0.01				
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)				
Polygyny	-0.07	0.01					-0.07	0.03	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)					(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female x Polygyny	0.03	-0.03								
	(0.07)	(0.07)								
Wealth		0.22***		0.33***		0.13		0.22*		0.21**
		(0.07)		(0.12)		(0.10)		(0.12)		(0.10)
Makeni		-0.15**		-0.12		-0.13		-0.23**		-0.08
		(0.07)		(0.12)		(0.09)		(0.10)		(0.10)
Education		0.02		0.04		-0.00		0.02		0.00
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)
Children		-0.02*		-0.01		-0.02*		-0.02*		-0.01
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Mende		0.06		0.17		0.01		0.09		0.04
		(0.06)		(0.12)		(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.09)
Temne		-0.05		0.01		-0.08		-0.02		-0.09
		(0.05)		(0.08)		(0.07)		(0.08)		(0.07)
Age		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		-0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Constant	1.03***	0.92***	0.93***	0.65***	1.03***	1.10***	1.03***	0.88***	1.02***	1.01***
	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.06)	(0.13)
Observations	1,144	1,088	482	468	662	620	456	444	688	644
N	573	545	241	234	332	311	228	222	345	323

Table 26: Random Effects Estimates of Envy Game

Dependent Variable: Choice in the Games with Stranger/Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Mono	(4) Mono	(5) Poly	(6) Poly	(7) Men	(8) Men	(9) Women	(10) Women
Treatment1	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.24***	-0.25***	-0.26***	-0.27***	-0.24***	-0.24***
(Spouse)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01				
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)				
Polygyny	-0.09*	-0.01					-0.09*	-0.01	-0.06	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)					(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female x Polygyny	0.03	-0.02								
	(0.07)	(0.07)								
Wealth		0.03		0.19		-0.10		0.06		0.01
		(0.08)		(0.12)		(0.10)		(0.12)		(0.10)
Makeni		-0.14*		-0.17		-0.09		-0.21**		-0.07
		(0.07)		(0.12)		(0.09)		(0.11)		(0.10)
Education		0.03**		0.04*		0.03		0.04*		0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)
Children		-0.01*		-0.01		-0.02*		-0.01		-0.01
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Mende		0.05		0.09		0.03		0.02		0.07
		(0.07)		(0.12)		(0.08)		(0.10)		(0.09)
Temne		-0.04		-0.03		-0.05		-0.00		-0.08
		(0.05)		(0.08)		(0.07)		(0.08)		(0.07)
Age		0.00		-0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Constant	0.83***	0.80***	0.84***	0.76***	0.74***	0.80***	0.86***	0.86***	0.81***	0.79***
	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.13)
Observations	1,144	1,088	482	468	662	620	456	444	688	644
N	573	545	241	234	332	311	228	222	345	323

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 27: Linear Probability Estimates of Sharing Game with Stranger

Dependent Variable: Choice in Sharing Game with Stranger

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	-0.06	-0.06	-0.10	-0.07	-0.10	-0.06	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.00						
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)						
Polygyny		-0.01	-0.05	-0.04							-0.05	-0.07	-0.06	0.02	0.03	0.05
		(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)							(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Female x Polygyny			0.09	0.08												
			(0.09)	(0.09)												
Wealth			-0.27***	-0.30***		-0.25*	-0.30*		-0.28**	-0.31**		-0.48***	-0.51***		-0.12	-0.15
			(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.16)	(0.16)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Makeni			-0.23***	-0.11		-0.10	-0.04		-0.26**	-0.14		-0.19	-0.09		-0.23**	-0.09
			(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.15)	(0.16)		(0.11)	(0.12)		(0.13)	(0.14)		(0.11)	(0.13)
Education			0.01	0.01		0.05	0.05		-0.03	-0.02		0.02	0.02		-0.02	-0.01
			(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Children			0.00	-0.01		0.00	-0.02		0.00	-0.00		0.01	-0.01		-0.00	-0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Mende			-0.11	-0.03		-0.00	0.01		-0.15	-0.05		-0.13	-0.07		-0.09	0.02
			(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.09)	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.10)	(0.12)
Temne			-0.03	-0.03		-0.11	-0.11		0.01	0.02		0.01	0.02		-0.08	-0.08
			(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Age				0.01**			0.01*			0.00			0.01**			0.00
				(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
Constant	0.57***	0.57***	0.85***	0.57***	0.59***	0.69***	0.47**	0.54***	0.84***	0.59***	0.59***	0.89***	0.55***	0.50***	0.73***	0.51***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.17)
Observations	573	573	573	545	241	241	234	332	332	311	228	228	222	345	345	323
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.07	0.01	0.08	0.09	0.00	0.07	0.07	0.00	0.08	0.10	0.00	0.07	0.06

Table 28: Linear Probability Estimates of Costless Sharing Game with Stranger

Dependent Variable: Choice in Costless Sharing Game with Stranger

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.01	-0.01						
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)						
Polygyny		0.02	0.03	0.02							0.02	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.04
		(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)							(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Female x Polygyny			-0.00	0.02												
			(0.08)	(0.08)												
Wealth			-0.19**	-0.18**		-0.32**	-0.35**		-0.10	-0.08		-0.25*	-0.25*		-0.15	-0.15
			(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.13)	(0.14)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.11)	(0.12)
Makeni			-0.10	-0.08		0.02	0.06		-0.15	-0.15		-0.16	-0.16		-0.05	-0.00
			(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.10)	(0.12)
Education			0.00	0.01		0.03	0.03		-0.03	-0.03		0.01	0.01		-0.00	0.00
			(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Children			-0.00	-0.00		-0.03*	-0.04**		0.00	0.01		-0.01	-0.01		-0.00	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)
Mende			-0.09	-0.07		0.02	0.03		-0.15*	-0.13		-0.04	-0.04		-0.13	-0.09
			(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.08)	(0.10)		(0.11)	(0.12)		(0.09)	(0.11)
Temne			-0.06	-0.06		-0.16	-0.16*		-0.01	-0.01		-0.04	-0.03		-0.09	-0.09
			(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Age				-0.00			0.00			-0.00			-0.00			-0.00
				(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
Constant	0.73***	0.72***	0.92***	0.93***	0.72***	0.94***	0.80***	0.74***	0.92***	1.02***	0.72***	0.94***	0.95***	0.72***	0.90***	0.89***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.15)
Observations	573	573	573	545	241	241	234	332	332	311	228	228	222	345	345	323
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.08	0.09	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.07	0.06	0.00	0.02	0.01

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 29: Linear Probability Estimates of Costless Envy Game with Stranger

Dependent Variable: Choice in Costless Envy Game with Stranger

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.05	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.00						
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)						
Polygyny		0.01	0.03	0.04							-0.05	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.07	0.08
		(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)							(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Female x Polygyny			0.05	0.05												
			(0.08)	(0.08)												
Wealth			0.11	0.12		0.21	0.21		0.04	0.06		0.05	0.07		0.14	0.14
			(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.13)	(0.14)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.11)	(0.12)
Makeni			-0.29***	-0.25***		-0.24*	-0.24*		-0.27***	-0.22**		-0.23*	-0.19		-0.31***	-0.28**
			(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.12)
Education			0.05***	0.05***		0.07**	0.07**		0.03	0.03		0.07***	0.07***		0.03	0.03
			(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Children			-0.01	-0.01		0.00	0.01		-0.01	-0.01		-0.01	-0.01		-0.01	-0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)
Mende			-0.01	0.03		0.10	0.09		-0.04	0.01		0.06	0.10		-0.05	-0.03
			(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.08)	(0.10)		(0.11)	(0.12)		(0.09)	(0.11)
Temne			-0.05	-0.04		0.02	0.02		-0.08	-0.08		-0.10	-0.08		-0.03	-0.03
			(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Age				-0.00			0.00			-0.00			0.00			-0.00
				(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
Constant	0.69***	0.69***	0.77***	0.73***	0.72***	0.56***	0.55***	0.67***	0.88***	0.90***	0.72***	0.72***	0.60***	0.67***	0.80***	0.82***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.15)
Observations	573	573	573	545	241	241	234	332	332	311	228	228	222	345	345	323
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.10	0.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	0.11	0.09	0.00	0.16	0.16	0.00	0.09	0.07

Table 30: Linear Probability Estimates of Envy Game with Stranger

Dependent Variable: Choice in Envy Game with Stranger

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	-0.02	-0.00	0.04	0.04	-0.01	0.06	0.04	0.00	-0.02	-0.01						
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)						
Polygyny		-0.07*	0.00	0.01							-0.08	0.00	0.01	-0.07	-0.03	-0.01
		(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)							(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Female x Polygyny			-0.03	-0.02												
			(0.09)	(0.09)												
Wealth			-0.09	-0.08		0.07	0.08		-0.21	-0.19		-0.09	-0.07		-0.08	-0.07
			(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.14)	(0.15)		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.15)	(0.16)		(0.12)	(0.13)
Makeni			-0.24***	-0.17*		-0.27*	-0.28*		-0.16	-0.07		-0.23*	-0.17		-0.22**	-0.15
			(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.11)	(0.12)		(0.13)	(0.14)		(0.11)	(0.13)
Education			0.07***	0.07***		0.09***	0.10***		0.06*	0.06*		0.09***	0.09***		0.04	0.04
			(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Children			-0.01	-0.01		0.02	0.02		-0.01	-0.02		-0.01	-0.01		-0.01	-0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Mende			-0.02	0.06		0.07	0.05		-0.06	0.07		0.05	0.12		-0.07	0.02
			(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.09)	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.10)	(0.12)
Temne			-0.07	-0.05		0.02	0.02		-0.13	-0.10		0.04	0.06		-0.16*	-0.14
			(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Age				0.00			-0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00
				(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
Constant	0.55***	0.59***	0.68***	0.54***	0.59***	0.45**	0.50**	0.51***	0.80***	0.61***	0.59***	0.58***	0.45**	0.58***	0.80***	0.66***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.16)
Observations	573	573	573	545	241	241	234	332	332	311	228	228	222	345	345	323
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.10	0.10	0.00	0.13	0.13	0.00	0.09	0.09	0.01	0.11	0.12	0.00	0.10	0.10

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 31: Linear Probability Estimates of Selfish Type with Spouse

Dependent Variable: Selfish with Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	0.11***	0.12***	0.03	-0.00	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.18***	0.16***	0.13**						
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)						
Polygyny		-0.05	-0.14**	-0.14**							-0.14***	-0.10*	-0.09	0.01	-0.00	0.02
		(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)							(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Female x Polygyny			0.14*	0.16**												
			(0.08)	(0.08)												
Wealth			0.31***	0.34***		0.22	0.26*		0.38***	0.41***		0.21*	0.22*		0.37***	0.40***
			(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.13)	(0.14)		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.11)	(0.12)
Makeni			-0.01	-0.10		0.01	-0.04		-0.02	-0.12		-0.04	-0.05		0.02	-0.11
			(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.10)	(0.12)
Education			-0.01	-0.02		0.01	0.01		-0.02	-0.03		0.00	-0.00		-0.02	-0.03
			(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Children			-0.00	0.01		0.01	0.02		-0.01	-0.00		-0.01	-0.01		0.01	0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)
Mende			0.08	0.04		0.09	0.08		0.07	0.03		0.05	0.05		0.09	0.03
			(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.11)
Temne			0.10*	0.10*		0.08	0.09		0.10	0.10		0.01	0.01		0.14*	0.14*
			(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Age				-0.00**			-0.01			-0.00*			-0.00			-0.01***
				(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
Constant	0.18***	0.21***	0.08	0.30**	0.25***	0.05	0.22	0.11***	-0.04	0.21	0.25***	0.18*	0.21	0.28***	0.04	0.36**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.15)
Observations	574	574	574	546	242	242	235	332	332	311	229	229	223	345	345	323
R-squared	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.07	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.10	0.11	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.08

Table 32: Linear Probability Estimates of Generous Type with Spouse

Dependent Variable: Generous with Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.04						
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)						
Polygyny		0.09**	0.06	0.05							0.09	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.10*	0.09*
		(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)							(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Female x Polygyny			0.03	0.04												
			(0.08)	(0.08)												
Wealth			-0.59***	-0.61***		-0.65***	-0.64***		-0.55***	-0.58***		-0.57***	-0.64***		-0.60***	-0.60***
			(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.13)	(0.14)		(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.14)	(0.15)		(0.12)	(0.12)
Makeni			0.05	0.02		-0.12	-0.09		0.07	0.05		0.11	0.16		-0.01	-0.09
			(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.11)	(0.12)
Education			0.03	0.03*		0.01	0.02		0.04	0.05*		0.01	0.01		0.06*	0.06**
			(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Children			0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00		0.01	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)
Mende			-0.04	-0.11		-0.33**	-0.32**		0.09	0.00		-0.06	-0.06		-0.01	-0.15
			(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.11)
Temne			0.03	0.02		0.01	0.01		0.04	0.02		0.03	0.03		0.06	0.03
			(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Age				0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00
				(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
Constant	0.35***	0.31***	0.47***	0.41***	0.31***	0.75***	0.62***	0.40***	0.44***	0.40**	0.31***	0.47***	0.33*	0.29***	0.43***	0.45***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.15)
Observations	574	574	574	546	242	242	235	332	332	311	229	229	223	345	345	323
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.08	0.09	0.00	0.12	0.12	0.00	0.07	0.08	0.01	0.09	0.10	0.01	0.09	0.10

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 33: Linear Probability Estimates of Egalitarian Type with Spouse

Dependent Variable: Egalitarian with Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.02	-0.03						
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)						
Polygyny		-0.08**	-0.06	-0.03							-0.10*	-0.05	-0.04	-0.07	-0.06	-0.06
		(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)							(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female x Polygyny			0.00	-0.03												
			(0.07)	(0.07)												
Wealth			0.07	0.07		0.25*	0.24*		-0.06	-0.06		0.13	0.15		0.02	0.02
			(0.08)	(0.07)		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Makeni			-0.28***	-0.16**		-0.12	-0.10		-0.31***	-0.17**		-0.25**	-0.22**		-0.30***	-0.12
			(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.09)	(0.10)
Education			-0.00	0.00		0.02	0.02		-0.02	-0.02		0.01	0.01		-0.02	-0.02
			(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.02)
Children			-0.01	-0.02*		-0.01	-0.02		-0.01	-0.01		-0.01	-0.01		-0.01	-0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Mende			-0.11*	0.02		0.15	0.14		-0.19***	-0.03		-0.07	-0.03		-0.14*	0.06
			(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.09)
Temne			-0.02	-0.00		0.02	0.01		-0.03	-0.00		-0.03	-0.02		-0.03	0.00
			(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Age				0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00
				(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
Constant	0.20***	0.24***	0.44***	0.25**	0.25***	0.11	0.07	0.15***	0.49***	0.29**	0.25***	0.35***	0.24	0.23***	0.49***	0.27**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Observations	574	574	574	546	242	242	235	332	332	311	229	229	223	345	345	323
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.08	0.07	0.00	0.07	0.07	0.00	0.11	0.08	0.02	0.08	0.08	0.01	0.08	0.07

Table 34: Linear Probability Estimates of Resource Maximizer Type with Spouse

Dependent Variable: Resource Maximizer with Spouse

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) Mono	(6) Mono	(7) Mono	(8) Poly	(9) Poly	(10) Poly	(11) Men	(12) Men	(13) Men	(14) Women	(15) Women	(16) Women
Female	0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	-0.01	0.10	0.10						
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)						
Polygyny		0.14***	0.06	0.04							0.14**	0.04	0.03	0.14**	0.14**	0.14**
		(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)							(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Female x Poly			0.08	0.10												
			(0.09)	(0.09)												
Wealth			-0.49***	-0.49***		-0.62***	-0.62***		-0.40***	-0.41***		-0.53***	-0.59***		-0.46***	-0.44***
			(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.14)	(0.15)		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.12)	(0.13)
Makeni			0.18**	0.12		0.04	0.08		0.19*	0.10		0.33***	0.36***		0.07	-0.07
			(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.10)	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.11)	(0.13)
Education			0.03	0.03		-0.01	-0.01		0.06**	0.06**		0.02	0.02		0.04	0.04
			(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Children			0.02**	0.02**		0.01	-0.01		0.03**	0.03***		0.03***	0.03*		0.01	0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Mende			0.00	-0.09		-0.24	-0.21		0.08	-0.03		0.01	0.01		-0.00	-0.17
			(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.12)
Temne			0.08	0.06		0.01	0.01		0.11	0.09		0.02	0.02		0.14	0.11
			(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Age				0.00			0.01			-0.00			0.00			-0.00
				(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
Constant	0.46***	0.39***	0.37***	0.44***	0.39***	0.74***	0.55**	0.53***	0.29**	0.47***	0.39***	0.33**	0.27	0.39***	0.40***	0.55***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.16)
Observations	574	574	574	546	242	242	235	332	332	311	229	229	223	345	345	323
R-squared	0.00	0.02	0.09	0.10	0.00	0.11	0.11	0.00	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.15	0.16	0.02	0.07	0.08

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 35: Random Effects Estimates of Behavior Types for Poly Women

Dependent Variable: Behavior with Stranger/Spouse/Co-Wife

	(1)	(2) Selfish	(3)		(1)	(2) Generous	(3)		(1)	(2) Egalitarian	(3)		(1)	(2) Resource Maximizer	(3)
Treatment1	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.13***	**Treatment1**	0.12***	0.11***	0.10***	**Treatment1**	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.13***	**Treatment1**	0.10***	0.10***	0.09**
(Co-Wife)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(Co-Wife)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(Co-Wife)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(Co-Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Treatment2	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	**Treatment2**	0.27***	0.27***	0.26***	**Treatment2**	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	**Treatment2**	0.35***	0.35***	0.35***
(Husband)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(Husband)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(Husband)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(Husband)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wealth		0.38***	0.40***	Wealth		-0.37***	-0.39***	Wealth		0.38***	0.40***	Wealth		-0.25**	-0.25**
		(0.10)	(0.11)			(0.10)	(0.10)			(0.10)	(0.11)			(0.10)	(0.10)
Makeni		0.10	-0.01	Makeni		0.14*	0.12	Makeni		0.10	-0.01	Makeni		0.21**	0.14
		(0.09)	(0.10)			(0.09)	(0.10)			(0.09)	(0.10)			(0.09)	(0.10)
Education		-0.02	-0.03	Education		0.03	0.03	Education		-0.02	-0.03	Education		0.02	0.01
		(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)
Children		-0.01	0.01	Children		0.01	0.01	Children		-0.01	0.01	Children		0.01	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Mende		0.13*	0.08	Mende		0.08	0.01	Mende		0.13*	0.08	Mende		0.05	-0.05
		(0.08)	(0.09)			(0.08)	(0.09)			(0.08)	(0.09)			(0.08)	(0.09)
Temne		0.05	0.06	Temne		-0.02	-0.04	Temne		0.05	0.06	Temne		0.01	-0.01
		(0.07)	(0.07)			(0.07)	(0.07)			(0.07)	(0.07)			(0.07)	(0.07)
Age			-0.01**	Age			0.00	Age			-0.01**	Age			-0.00
			(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)
Constant	0.32***	0.08	0.33**	Constant	0.10***	0.10	0.13	Constant	0.32***	0.08	0.33**	Constant	0.17***	0.10	0.24*
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.13)		(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.13)		(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.13)		(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.13)
Observations	663	663	615	Observations	663	663	615	Observations	663	663	615	Observations	663	663	615
N	224	224	208	N	224	224	208	N	224	224	208	N	224	224	208

Table 36: Random Effects Estimates of Behavior Types for Mono Women

Dependent Variable: Behavior with Stranger/Spouse

	(1)	(2) Selfish	(3)		(1)	(2) Generous	(3)		(1)	(2) Egalitarian	(3)		(1)	(2) Resource Maximizer	(3)
Treatment1	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	**Treatment1**	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	**Treatment1**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	**Treatment1**	0.23***	0.23***	0.23***
(Husband)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(Husband)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(Husband)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(Husband)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wealth		0.12	0.14	Wealth		-0.40***	-0.39***	Wealth		0.12	0.14	Wealth		-0.51***	-0.49***
		(0.16)	(0.17)			(0.12)	(0.12)			(0.16)	(0.17)			(0.14)	(0.14)
Makeni		-0.13	-0.17	Makeni		-0.08	-0.06	Makeni		-0.13	-0.17	Makeni		0.04	0.06
		(0.17)	(0.17)			(0.12)	(0.13)			(0.17)	(0.17)			(0.15)	(0.15)
Education		-0.00	-0.01	Education		0.03	0.03	Education		-0.00	-0.01	Education		-0.00	-0.00
		(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.04)	(0.04)
Children		0.02	0.03	Children		-0.01	-0.01	Children		0.02	0.03	Children		0.00	-0.00
		(0.02)	(0.03)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.03)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Mende		-0.12	-0.12	Mende		-0.16	-0.15	Mende		-0.12	-0.12	Mende		-0.14	-0.13
		(0.17)	(0.17)			(0.13)	(0.13)			(0.17)	(0.17)			(0.15)	(0.15)
Temne		0.18	0.18	Temne		0.02	0.02	Temne		0.18	0.18	Temne		0.04	0.04
		(0.13)	(0.13)			(0.10)	(0.10)			(0.13)	(0.13)			(0.11)	(0.12)
Age			-0.01	Age			-0.01	Age			-0.01	Age			0.00
			(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)
Constant	0.33***	0.28	0.44*	Constant	-0.14**	0.12	0	Constant	0.33***	0.28	0.44*	Constant	-0.07	0.15	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.25)		(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.19)		(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.25)		(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.22)
Observations	242	242	230	Observations	242	242	230	Observations	242	242	230	Observations	242	242	230
N	121	121	115	N	121	121	115	N	121	121	115	N	121	121	115

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 37: Random Effects Estimates of Behavior Types for Poly Men

Dependent Variable: Behavior with Stranger/Spouse

	(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)
		Selfish				Generous				Egalitarian				Resource Maximizer	
Treatment1	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.18***	**Treatment1**	0.28***	0.28***	0.26***	**Treatment1**	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.18***	**Treatment1**	0.36***	0.36***	0.36***
(1st Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(1st Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(1st Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(1st Wife)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Treatment2	-0.20***	-0.20***	-0.19***	**Treatment2**	0.26***	0.26***	0.24***	**Treatment2**	-0.20***	-0.20***	-0.19***	**Treatment2**	0.35***	0.35***	0.35***
(2nd Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(2nd Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(2nd Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(2nd Wife)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wealth		0.39***	0.40***	Wealth		-0.45***	-0.52***	Wealth		0.39***	0.40***	Wealth		-0.31*	-0.37**
		(0.13)	(0.13)			(0.17)	(0.17)			(0.13)	(0.13)			(0.16)	(0.16)
Makeni		-0.20**	-0.24**	Makeni		0.09	0.13	Makeni		-0.20**	-0.24**	Makeni		0.24*	0.25*
		(0.10)	(0.11)			(0.13)	(0.14)			(0.10)	(0.11)			(0.13)	(0.13)
Education		-0.01	-0.01	Education		0.01	0.02	Education		-0.01	-0.01	Education		0.02	0.02
		(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.03)	(0.03)
Children		-0.01	-0.00	Children		0.01	0.00	Children		-0.01	-0.00	Children		0.02**	0.02*
		(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Mende		-0.02	-0.05	Mende		0.09	0.09	Mende		-0.02	-0.05	Mende		0.08	0.07
		(0.09)	(0.10)			(0.12)	(0.13)			(0.09)	(0.10)			(0.11)	(0.12)
Temne		0.04	0.02	Temne		0.12	0.13	Temne		0.04	0.02	Temne		0.10	0.10
		(0.09)	(0.09)			(0.12)	(0.12)			(0.09)	(0.09)			(0.11)	(0.11)
Age			-0.00	Age			0.00	Age			-0.00	Age			-0.00
			(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)
Constant	0.31***	0.29***	0.45***	Constant	0.13***	0.13	0.06	Constant	0.31***	0.29***	0.45***	Constant	0.18***	-0.05	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.17)		(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.22)		(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.17)		(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.20)
Observations	324	324	309	Observations	324	324	309	Observations	324	324	309	Observations	324	324	309
N	108	108	103	N	108	108	103	N	108	108	103	N	108	108	103

Table 38: Random Effects Estimates of Behavior Types for Mono Men

Dependent Variable: Behavior with Stranger/Spouse

	(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)
		Selfish				Generous				Egalitarian				Resource Maximizer	
Treatment1	0.03	0.03	0.03	**Treatment1**	0.21***	0.21***	0.22***	**Treatment1**	0.03	0.03	0.03	**Treatment1**	0.26***	0.26***	0.26***
(Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wealth		0.27*	0.29*	Wealth		-0.53***	-0.54***	Wealth		0.27*	0.29*	Wealth		-0.55***	-0.58***
		(0.15)	(0.16)			(0.13)	(0.14)			(0.15)	(0.16)			(0.14)	(0.14)
Makeni		0.12	0.10	Makeni		0.09	0.11	Makeni		0.12	0.10	Makeni		0.24	0.28*
		(0.16)	(0.16)			(0.14)	(0.14)			(0.16)	(0.16)			(0.15)	(0.15)
Education		-0.03	-0.02	Education		-0.02	-0.02	Education		-0.03	-0.02	Education		-0.03	-0.03
		(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)
Children		-0.01	0.00	Children		0.01	0.00	Children		-0.01	0.00	Children		0.01	-0.00
		(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Mende		0.12	0.11	Mende		-0.19	-0.18	Mende		0.12	0.11	Mende		-0.14	-0.12
		(0.15)	(0.16)			(0.13)	(0.14)			(0.15)	(0.16)			(0.14)	(0.14)
Temne		0.03	0.03	Temne		-0.06	-0.06	Temne		0.03	0.03	Temne		-0.08	-0.09
		(0.10)	(0.10)			(0.09)	(0.09)			(0.10)	(0.10)			(0.09)	(0.10)
Age			-0.00	Age			0.00	Age			-0.00	Age			0.00
			(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)
Constant	0.18**	0.00	0.08	Constant	-0.12*	0.16	0.10	Constant	0.18**	0.00	0.08	Constant	-0.12*	0.10	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.20)	(0.23)		(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.20)		(0.07)	(0.20)	(0.23)		(0.07)	(0.18)	(0.21)
Observations	242	242	240	Observations	242	242	240	Observations	242	242	240	Observations	242	242	240
N	121	121	120	N	121	121	120	N	121	121	120	N	121	121	120

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 39:
Logit Estimates for Competition Game
by Wife Rank

Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against Co-Wife

	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Poly Women			
First Wife	-0.28	-0.56*	-0.82**	-0.79**
	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.38)
Wealth		-0.99	-0.43	-0.65
		(0.72)	(0.91)	(0.93)
Makeni		0.51	-0.21	0.27
		(0.60)	(0.70)	(0.80)
Education		0.63***	0.34	0.37
		(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Children		0.31***	0.35***	0.35***
		(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Temne		-0.65	-0.74	-0.64
		(0.49)	(0.55)	(0.58)
Mende		-0.88*	-0.98	-0.54
		(0.52)	(0.61)	(0.71)
Risk			0.08	0.06
			(0.10)	(0.10)
Likelihood of			0.23**	0.21**
			(0.10)	(0.10)
Confidence			0.36***	0.38***
			(0.13)	(0.13)
Age				-0.00
				(0.02)
Constant	0.39*	0.02	-1.56**	-1.80
	(0.20)	(0.56)	(0.73)	(1.11)
Observations	214	214	214	198

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 40: Linear Probability Estimates
for Competition Game
by Wife Rank

Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against Co-Wife

	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Poly Women			
First Wife	-0.07	-0.12*	-0.13**	-0.13**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wealth		-0.23	-0.08	-0.13
		(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Makeni		0.11	-0.04	0.06
		(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Education		0.13***	0.07*	0.08**
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Children		0.07***	0.06***	0.06***
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Temne		-0.14	-0.12	-0.11
		(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Mende		-0.20*	-0.15	-0.07
		(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Risk			0.01	0.01
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Likelihood of '			0.05**	0.04**
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Confidence			0.06***	0.06***
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Age				0.00
				(0.00)
Constant	0.60***	0.51***	0.21*	0.13
	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.19)
Observations	214	214	214	198
R-squared	0.00	0.13	0.31	0.32

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Co-Wife Analysis

Table 41: Random Effects Estimates
for Competition Game
by Wife Rank

Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against **Spouse**/Co-Wife

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	1st Wife	1st Wife	1st Wife	1st Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife
Treatment1					0.07**	0.07**	0.08**	0.06**
(1st Wife)					(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Treatment2	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02				
(2nd Wife)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)				
Wealth		-0.20	-0.08	-0.12		-0.20	-0.08	-0.12
		(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)		(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Makeni		0.07	-0.08	0.01		0.08	-0.07	0.01
		(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Education		0.14***	0.08**	0.08**		0.14***	0.08**	0.08**
		(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Children		0.06***	0.05***	0.04**		0.06***	0.05***	0.04**
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Mende		-0.19*	-0.13	-0.06		-0.19*	-0.13	-0.06
		(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Temne		-0.09	-0.07	-0.06		-0.09	-0.08	-0.06
		(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Risk			0.02	0.01			0.02	0.01
			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Likelihood of Winning			0.05***	0.05***			0.05***	0.05***
			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Confidence			0.05***	0.05***			0.05***	0.05***
			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Age				0.00				0.00
				(0.00)				(0.00)
Constant	0.55***	0.45***	0.15	0.04	0.53***	0.42***	0.12	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.17)
Observations	435	435	435	403	435	435	435	403
N	224	224	224	208	224	224	224	208

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 42: Random Effects Estimates
for Competition Game
by Wife Rank

Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against **Stranger**/Co-Wife

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	1st Wife	1st Wife	1st Wife	1st Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife
Treatment1					0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
(1st Wife)					(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Treatment2	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02				
(2nd Wife)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)				
Wealth		-0.25	-0.07	-0.16		-0.23	-0.12	-0.14
		(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)		(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Makeni		0.08	0.01	0.09		0.20	-0.07	0.01
		(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.17)		(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.18)
Education		0.17***	0.10*	0.09*		0.12**	0.07	0.09*
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Children		0.05***	0.04**	0.04**		0.07**	0.07***	0.07**
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Mende		-0.20	-0.10	-0.06		-0.16	-0.21*	-0.13
		(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)		(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.15)
Temne		-0.09	-0.09	-0.11		-0.11	-0.07	-0.04
		(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Risk			0.01	0.00			0.03	0.03
			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Likelihood of Winning			0.04*	0.04			0.06***	0.05**
			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Confidence			0.05*	0.05**			0.08***	0.08***
			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Age				-0.00				0.00
				(0.00)				(0.01)
Constant	0.53***	0.43***	0.12	0.16	0.56***	0.41***	0.06	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.22)
Observations	221	221	221	205	209	209	209	193
N	110	110	110	102	105	105	105	97

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 43: Logit Estimates for Behavior Types for Poly Women

Dependent Variable: Behavior with Co-Wife

	(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)
	Selfish				Generous				Egalitarian				Resource Maximizer				Spiteful		
First Wife	0.14	0.24	0.27	First Wife	0.15	-0.08	0.15	First Wife	-0.82	-0.73	-0.58	First Wife	0.24	0.10	0.14	First Wife	0.04	0.14	0.14
	(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.38)		(0.48)	(0.53)	(0.55)		(0.62)	(0.65)	(0.66)		(0.45)	(0.49)	(0.50)		(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.38)
Wealth		-2.25**	-2.39**	Wealth		-0.07	0.21	Wealth		2.55	2.56	Wealth		-0.71	-0.66	Wealth		-1.81**	-2.02**
		(0.94)	(0.99)			(1.07)	(1.08)			(1.69)	(1.71)			(0.99)	(0.99)			(0.84)	(0.87)
Makeni		-1.51***	-1.33***	Makeni		2.86***	2.11*	Makeni		-1.64*	-1.69*	Makeni		2.43***	2.11**	Makeni		0.08	0.12
		(0.39)	(0.42)			(1.07)	(1.09)			(0.85)	(0.89)			(0.79)	(0.83)			(0.38)	(0.42)
Education		0.10	0.11	Education		0.34	0.24	Education		-0.38	-0.39	Education		0.25	0.22	Education		0.19	0.22
		(0.22)	(0.23)			(0.28)	(0.29)			(0.43)	(0.43)			(0.27)	(0.27)			(0.21)	(0.21)
Children		-0.02	-0.11	Children		0.25*	0.44**	Children		-0.14	-0.20	Children		0.17	0.20	Children		-0.05	-0.00
		(0.10)	(0.11)			(0.15)	(0.18)			(0.18)	(0.20)			(0.14)	(0.15)			(0.10)	(0.12)
Age			0.03	Age			-0.12*	Age			0.01	Age			-0.02	Age			-0.02
			(0.02)				(0.06)				(0.03)				(0.04)				(0.02)
Constant	-1.12***	0.24	-0.50	Constant	-2.46***	-5.58***	-2.01	Constant	-2.46***	-2.27***	-2.28*	Constant	-2.34***	-4.45***	-3.58**	Constant	-1.38***	-0.78*	-0.19
	(0.22)	(0.43)	(0.72)		(0.35)	(1.18)	(1.91)		(0.35)	(0.78)	(1.25)		(0.33)	(0.90)	(1.50)		(0.23)	(0.43)	(0.83)
Observations	224	224	208	Observations	224	224	208	Observations	224	224	208	Observations	224	224	208	Observations	224	224	208

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 44: Linear Probability Estimates for Behavior Types for Poly Women

Dependent Variable: Behavior with Co-Wife

	(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)
	Selfish				Generous				Egalitarian				Resource Maximizer				Spiteful		
First Wife	0.03	0.04	0.04	First Wife	0.01	-0.01	0.01	First Wife	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	First Wife	0.02	0.01	0.01	First Wife	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wealth		-0.28**	-0.28**	Wealth		0.00	0.01	Wealth		0.11	0.11	Wealth		-0.07	-0.07	Wealth		-0.28**	-0.30**
		(0.13)	(0.13)			(0.09)	(0.09)			(0.08)	(0.08)			(0.09)	(0.10)			(0.13)	(0.13)
Makeni		-0.27***	-0.24***	Makeni		0.13***	0.10**	Makeni		-0.07**	-0.08*	Makeni		0.16***	0.14***	Makeni		0.02	0.02
		(0.06)	(0.07)			(0.04)	(0.05)			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.06)	(0.07)
Education		0.01	0.01	Education		0.03	0.02	Education		-0.02	-0.02	Education		0.02	0.02	Education		0.03	0.03
		(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)
Children		-0.00	-0.02	Children		0.02*	0.03**	Children		-0.01	-0.01	Children		0.01	0.02	Children		-0.01	-0.00
		(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Age			0.00	Age			-0.00*	Age			0.00	Age			-0.00	Age			-0.00
			(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)
Constant	0.25***	0.50***	0.37***	Constant	0.08***	-0.05	0.06	Constant	0.08***	0.11**	0.10	Constant	0.09***	-0.02	0.03	Constant	0.20***	0.30***	0.39***
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.13)		(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.09)		(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.07)		(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.10)		(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.13)
Observations	224	224	208	Observations	224	224	208	Observations	224	224	208	Observations	224	224	208	Observations	224	224	208
R-squared	0.00	0.16	0.17	R-squared	0.00	0.08	0.09	R-squared	0.01	0.03	0.04	R-squared	0.00	0.07	0.06	R-squared	0.00	0.03	0.04

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 45: Random Effects Estimates for Behavior Types by Wife Rank

Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against **Stranger**/Spouse/Co-Wife

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Selfish							Generous									Egalitarian			
	1st Wife	1st Wife	1st Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife		1st Wife	1st Wife	1st Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife		1st Wife	1st Wife	1st Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife
Treatment1	-0.04	-0.04	-0.06	-0.07	-0.07	-0.09	**Treatment1**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	**Treatment1**	-0.24***	-0.24***	-0.23***	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.23***
(Co-Wife)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(Co-Wife)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(Co-Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Treatment2	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	-0.07	-0.07	-0.05	**Treatment2**	0.29***	0.29***	0.27***	0.25***	0.25***	0.26***	**Treatment2**	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.15***
(Husband)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(Husband)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(Husband)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Wealth		0.17	0.22*		0.19	0.20*	Wealth		-0.34***	-0.35***		-0.25***	-0.26***	Wealth		0.01	0.03		-0.00	0.00
		(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.12)			(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.09)	(0.10)			(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Makeni		-0.14	-0.21*		-0.16	-0.20	Makeni		0.14*	0.10		0.16**	0.13	Makeni		-0.31***	-0.20**		-0.36***	-0.32***
		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.10)	(0.12)			(0.08)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.10)			(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.10)
Education		0.01	-0.00		-0.02	-0.02	Education		0.03	0.04		0.02	0.02	Education		-0.04	-0.05*		0.01	0.01
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Children		-0.00	0.01		-0.02	-0.03	Children		0.01	0.01		0.02	0.04**	Children		-0.02	-0.02		-0.01	-0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)
Mende		-0.11	-0.10		0.04	0.04	Mende		0.07	0.02		0.01	-0.04	Mende		-0.18**	-0.04		-0.12	-0.04
		(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.11)			(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.07)	(0.09)			(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.09)
Temne		-0.00	-0.01		0.13	0.17*	Temne		0.03	0.04		-0.04	-0.06	Temne		-0.04	-0.05		-0.03	0.03
		(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.09)			(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)			(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Age			-0.01*			0.00	Age			0.00			-0.01	Age			0.00			0.00
			(0.00)			(0.00)				(0.00)			(0.00)				(0.00)			(0.00)
Constant	0.31***	0.36***	0.57***	0.33***	0.33***	0.28*	Constant	0.11***	0.07	0.09	0.08**	0.05	0.22*	Constant	0.27***	0.60***	0.48***	0.34***	0.61***	0.48***
	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.16)		(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.13)		(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.13)
Observations	330	330	306	318	318	294	Observations	330	330	306	318	318	294	Observations	330	330	306	318	318	294
N	110	110	102	106	106	98	N	110	110	102	106	106	98	N	110	110	102	106	106	98

	Resource Maximizer							Spiteful					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	1st Wife	1st Wife	1st Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife		1st Wife	1st Wife	1st Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife	2nd Wife
Treatment1	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	**Treatment1**	0.17***	0.17***	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***	0.15***
(Co-Wife)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(Co-Wife)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Treatment2	0.41***	0.41***	0.40***	0.37***	0.37***	0.38***	**Treatment2**	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
(Husband)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(Husband)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wealth		-0.15	-0.14		-0.04	-0.05	Wealth		-0.06	-0.08		-0.17**	-0.17**
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.10)	(0.11)			(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Makeni		0.16*	0.09		0.08	-0.00	Makeni		0.04	0.03		0.15**	0.18**
		(0.08)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.11)			(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)
Education		0.06**	0.06**		-0.01	-0.02	Education		0.01	0.02		0.00	0.00
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Children		0.01	0.02		-0.00	0.01	Children		-0.01	-0.01		0.01	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Mende		0.06	-0.01		0.01	-0.09	Mende		0.08	0.06		0.02	0.01
		(0.08)	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.10)			(0.05)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.07)
Temne		-0.00	-0.01		0.06	0.04	Temne		0.01	0.02		-0.09	-0.13**
		(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)			(0.04)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Age			-0.00			-0.00	Age			-0.00			-0.00
			(0.00)			(0.00)				(0.00)			(0.00)
Constant	0.12***	-0.01	0.09	0.14***	0.10	0.28**	Constant	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.06**	0.05	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.14)		(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Observations	330	330	306	318	318	294	Observations	330	330	306	318	318	294
N	110	110	102	106	106	98	N	110	110	102	106	106	98

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 46

Under ideal conditions, how many wives would you like your husband to have?

Poly Women			Mono Women	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
1	189	83.38	118	97.52
2	11	4.19	1	0.83
3	2	0.89		
4	2	0.89		
6	16	7.14		
8	4	1.79		
No Response			2	1.65

Under ideal conditions, how many wives would you like to have?

Poly Men			Mono Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
1	6	5.56	105	86.78
2	77	71.3	12	9.92
3	18	16.67	3	2.48
4	1	0.93		
6	4	3.7		
No Re	2	1.85	1	0.83

Figure 46



Figures 47-51










Spiteful Type
Receiver is Spouse
Percent of total type
0
20
40
60
80
100
40.8759
59.1241
Poly Women
Mono Women
Poly Men
Mono Men