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Heeding the Call to Action: Public Policy Engagement for Children

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Heeding the Call to Action: Public Policy Engagement for Children

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By

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

What do individual motives and organizational factors have to do with individuals from public charities joining and participating in child-focused advocacy coalitions? A mail survey of members of child-focused advocacy coalitions in California was conducted in order to investigate the correlation between incentives for joining advocacy coalitions and level of advocacy activity. The study also examined the relationships among incentives and level of advocacy activity and other factors, including role in the coalition, job function, official duty, and organizational size. Four hundred surveys were mailed, yielding a final valid response rate of 36.8%.

The study found that strategic incentives, such as bringing about social change to benefit others and expressing important personal values, were the most influential incentives behind members' decisions to join advocacy coalitions, particularly for core members, whereas resource development incentives, such as protesting cuts or generating revenue, were the weakest influences on decisions to join. The results showed that strategic incentives had the highest positive correlation with action, followed by fellowship incentives, such as networking with colleagues, and then resource development incentives. The study also found strong positive correlations among incentives to join and incentives to remain, along with a significant increase over time in resource development incentives. Finally, coalition members without advocacy in their job description were significantly more motivated to remain with advocacy coalitions by fellowship incentives than subjects with advocacy in their job description. It is recommended that coalition leaders direct their attention towards assessing and nurturing strategic and fellowship incentives within the coalitions.

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LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF APPENDICES

INTRODUCTION

> *Children need a voice in our political system. We, adults, parents, caregivers, healthcare providers, teachers, who care about them have to ensure there are programs and services to take care of them and that the government continues/begins to consider their best interests in planning and spending.*
> (Subject 304)

As of 2002, approximately 72.8 million children under age 18 were living in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003). Considering the great number of children in America, we need to muster significant resources to ensure that they remain safe and healthy, succeed in school, and contribute to the development and vitality of their communities. Because children are undoubtedly underrepresented in the democratic process, advocacy on behalf of children is urgently needed to meet the critical needs of one of our nation's most dependent and vulnerable populations. Among the important resources available to conduct advocacy on behalf of children are the service providers that children encounter every day in public charities. All across America, health, education, housing, family, and employment professionals, among others, dedicate countless hours of service to children.

But many professionals from across the spectrum of service provision create an even larger role for themselves. In addition to their responsibilities at their respective public charities, they also engage in advocacy. As the National Association of Social Workers' Code of Ethics, Section 6.04(a), states, "social workers should be aware of the impact of the political arena on practice and should advocate for changes in policy and legislation in order to meet basic human needs and promote social justice" (quoted in Schneider and Lester, 2001, p. 74). Service providers from the nonprofit sector have a long history of embracing the dual roles of charity and advocacy (Schneider and Lester,

2001). For example, in the late nineteenth century, Hull House Settlement workers led by Jane Addams (1938) successfully lobbied the Illinois legislature to enact protections for child workers. Today's charity workers continue this rich tradition of advocacy. On behalf of children, they strive to influence public policies through a variety of advocacy activities such as lobbying, media outreach, and constituent mobilization. Their deep understanding of children's issues adds valuable knowledge to advocacy efforts. As Berry (2001, p. 5) noted, "for congressional staffers and agency policymakers, expertise is the coin of the realm, and those who want to lobby them need to use the same currency." Moreover, Roberts-DeGennaro (1986a, p. 308) reported that "studies have suggested that the most important variable in the legislative and budgetary priorities given to social welfare programs is the presence of a community organization that can lobby successfully for these programs." Fortunately, these important advocates do not stand alone in their efforts; they unite through coalitions.

Coalitions are groups of individuals and organizations working together on issues of common interest (McKay, 2001). Coalitions are not ends in themselves; they are "strategic devices to enhance the leverage of various organizations" (Roberts-DeGennaro, 1986a, p. 309). Coalitions serve as a driving force to help communicate common goals and promote collective action. In fact, studies have shown that coalitions are a necessary and effective vehicle for advocacy on behalf of children (Kinley, 1986; Surgalla, 1984). In response to social conditions, such as the concentration of poverty in inner-city areas, "a wide-array of local partnerships that aim to mobilize significant action on behalf of young people converge on certain core values, assumptions, and operating principles ... to change an array of existing beliefs, work habits, resource priorities, and

institutionalized relationships" (Briggs, 2001, p. 6). For example, in California, the Kern County Network for Children brings together service agencies, residents, and local businesses to identify children's needs, find resources, and engage policymakers (Action Alliance for Children, 2002). Kern County Network for Children's efforts have improved children's lives: both infant death rates and high school drop-out rates have declined, while other indicators, such as immunization rates and school attendance, have improved.

America is a nation of joiners, individuals "who for whatever reason choose to 'combine in order to act'" (Schlesinger, 1949, p. 25). But *why* do individuals choose to join child-focused advocacy coalitions? Some join to express important personal values. Others join to provide altruistic service or social change for the benefit of others. Still others might join to associate with like-minded individuals or to network with colleagues. Finally, some join to foster or maintain the financial health of their organizations, such as by protesting cuts or generating revenue. Overall, there is a great deal of variability in motives that drive people and groups. Equally importantly, variability in motives is related to differences in behavior; some reasons for joining advocacy coalitions are stronger motivators than others. Yet the success of advocacy coalitions is fundamentally dependent upon the behavior of their members. Coalition members must heed the call to action, that is, must act upon messages that urge advocacy, such as writing Congress in support of a piece of legislation. Without action, coalitions like the Kern County Network for Children could not engage policymakers on behalf of children. But if different motives are tied to different behaviors, how does this impact heeding the call to action? Are some incentives — for instance, financial rewards — more powerful motivators to advocacy than others, such as personal values? While a number of factors likely impact

coalition members' willingness and ability to heed the call to action, this study examined a key factor in all behavior: the motives behind it. Why do individuals from public charities join child-focused advocacy coalitions? Is there an association between particular reasons for joining advocacy coalitions and responsiveness to calls to action? How do organizational factors, such as staff size, budget size, job function, and official duties impact heeding the call?

This study was important for several reasons. First of all, nonprofit organizations have historically performed a central role in America's civic engagement and democracy (O'Neill, 2002; Reid, 2000). The First Amendment established the foundations of advocacy: the freedom of speech and the rights to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. In nineteenth-century America, factors such as ethnic and religious diversity, urbanization, humanitarian motivations, and economic and political changes, converged creating a deluge of new voluntary associations (O'Neill, 2002). More than a century later, in the 1970s, nonprofit organizations had become even more pervasive in America, and the prominent Filer Commission conducted a thorough examination of the scope and roles of the nonprofit sector (Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, 1975). The commission affirmed the role of nonprofit organizations in shaping and advancing public policy. Equally importantly, the commission concluded that "the monitoring and influencing of government may be emerging as one of the single most important and effective functions of the private nonprofit sector" (p. 45). Certainly such broad validation warranted investigation into the current nature of nonprofit child-focused advocacy coalitions.

Next, troubling information on the health and well-being of children supported the need for this research as well. Childhood poverty remains a critical problem. Poverty has long-lasting negative effects on the safety, health, and education of children. Figures on child poverty should raise alarms. In 2000, 16.1% of children under age 18 lived below the poverty threshold (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001a). In California that year, the rate was 19.2% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001b). Data on education add to the concerns; results from California's STAR standardized testing fueled worries about the prospects for many children. A troubling 39% of all 11th grade students rated below basic, or worse, on English/Language arts, while students receiving special education services attained a dismal 3% proficiency score (California Department of Education, 2002). Even the environment itself endangers children. Nationally, 18.5% of children in 2001 lived in areas that did not meet one or more of the Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics, 2003, Table POP9.A, p. 86). Yet large numbers of children did not have health insurance. In California in 2001, about 1.3 million children under age 18 lacked health insurance or experienced gaps in coverage (Children Now, 2003). Taken together, this information suggests that the status of children is linked to their underrepresentation in the democratic process. Children do not vote; their voices are easily ignored, if heard at all. Service providers acting through advocacy coalitions speak for children, guard their interests, and promote their health and well-being. There was a vital need to support these efforts through research.

This study was also needed because there is a dearth of information about advocacy by nonprofit organizations (Krehely, 2001; McCarthy and Castelli, 2001; Reid,

2000; Schneider and Lester, 2001). De Vita, Mosher-Williams, and Stengel (2001) reported that "very little information is available on the number, types, geographic distribution, or financial resources of nonprofit groups that direct their attention to children and child advocacy issues" (p. 4). This was particularly true for public interest coalitions (Hula, 1999). Additionally, while advocacy included a wide range of ideas and activities, few people agreed on what it actually meant (Ezell, 1994; McCarthy and Castelli, 2001; Reid, 2000; Schneider and Lester, 2001). Persistent definitional problems and a general dearth of information sounded a call for more research.

Finally, strengthening the capacity of child-focused advocacy coalitions is key to building a stronger voice for children; this served as the ultimate rationale for the study. Too many calls to action are left unheeded, weakening the collective force of child-focused advocacy coalitions. In order to get the most action from available resources, it is critical that nonprofit leaders understand the motivations of the human resources at their disposal. But sound human resource management cannot take place without relevant information on the current and potential human resources (Pynes, 1997). This study aimed to support leaders at advocacy coalitions by providing current information on the motivations and advocacy activities of their members. Managers, advocates, funders, and policymakers can all use these findings to support child advocacy. With such knowledge at hand, the ability of leaders to improve the rates of response by coalition members to calls to action would be enhanced, furthering public policy engagement and fostering safer, healthier, more successful lives for children.

CHAPTER ONE: REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND DELINIATION OF PROBLEM

This chapter summarizes the principal theoretical and research literature relevant to the topic. Specifically, it covers key definitions, related literature, delineation of hypotheses and exploratory research questions, and the study's anticipated contributions to the field.

Key Definitions

Public Charities. For the purposes of this study, public charities were defined as nonprofit organizations organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Public charities include human and social service groups, hospitals and healthcare organizations, religious groups, arts organizations, educational institutions, advocacy groups, and others.

Advocacy. Advocacy is not synonymous with lobbying. Advocacy encompasses a wide range of concepts and activities commonly linked to influencing the policymaking processes of government (Reid, 2000; Schneider and Lester, 2001), while lobbying typically refers to a narrower set of activities directed at legislators. In fact, with regards to public charities, the IRS limits its classification of advocacy to grassroots lobbying, meaning attempts to influence legislation by affecting public opinion, or direct lobbying, meaning attempts to influence legislation through communication with legislators or government officials participating in the formulation of legislation (Adler, 1999). Schneider and Lester (2001) described a number of key dimensions of advocacy, including speaking on behalf of another, taking action, promoting change, and securing social justice. Reid (2000) suggested yet another important dimension of advocacy: the notion of collective action. Groups of people unite and act around common causes.

Where action is concerned, a range of activities fall under the heading of advocacy, including public education, research, constituent mobilization, policy design, and lobbying, along with litigation, public demonstrations, and coalition building, among still others (McCarthy and Castelli, 2001; Reid, 2000). To all intents and purposes, no one really agrees on what advocacy actually means (Ezell, 1994; McCarthy and Castelli, 2001; Reid, 2000; Schneider and Lester, 2001). To take only two examples, Jenkins (1987, p. 297) broadly defined advocacy "as any attempt to influence the decisions of any institutional elite on behalf of a collective interest," while Polier (1977, p. 497) characterized child advocacy in particular "as an effort to challenge and change systems that are injurious to children, that are inadequate to prevent harm, or that provide inappropriate help to children" (p. 497).

For the purposes of this study, advocacy was defined as an action that attempts to influence the proposed or actual policies of local, state, or federal government entities. There were a few key elements to this definition. Action meant actually doing something, moving beyond interest and intentions to effort. Furthermore, these actions were an attempt to exert influence, whether or not successful in outcome. Finally, the influence was aimed at the proposed or actual policies of government, which covered deliberations and decisions on, and implementation or practice of, these policies.

Action Alert. Communication is the foundation of action. Through communications commonly known as action alerts, advocacy organizations call their members to action. Action alerts urge group members to conduct advocacy, typically around a particular issue. For example, the National Youth Advocacy Coalition (NYAC) has sent action alerts by email to its members that, on more than one occasion,

"contributed to the ability of youth and their advocates to have their voices heard" (Carey, 1996, p. 9). NYAC action alerts have encouraged "youth, teachers, parents, and service providers to send in written testimony" to Congress about antigay Congressional activities (p. 9).

For the purposes of this study, an action alert was defined as a message urging group members to conduct advocacy. There were a few key elements to this definition. First, it did not restrict action alerts to any particular mode of delivery. Email, faxes, postal mailings, phone calls, and face-to-face communications all fell within its parameters. Additionally, action alerts urged advocacy action on a particular issue; they went beyond general encouragement to participate in the group's activities. Furthermore, action alerts did not necessarily specify a particular advocacy tactic. It was assumed, however, that most of the time they did suggest a particular form of action, as the NYAC example demonstrates.

Advocacy Coalition. Coalitions are generally thought of as structured groups of individuals or organizations that come together to work on issues of common interest (McKay, 2001). "Coalitions provide a mechanism through which very separate and diverse organizations can cooperate and work together around a common goal" (Roberts-DeGennnaro, 1986b, p. 248). Coalitions exist for a variety of reasons, including providing services, sharing information, conducting research and analysis, enhancing fundraising, or undertaking advocacy. Berry (1977) suggested that coalitions were structured along two dimensions: permanence and participation. Some coalitions are temporary alliances that meet only occasionally, with participation and resources possibly dependent on only one member. Other coalitions are more enduring and participatory, but

they "do not lend themselves to institutionalized or permanent arrangements" (Berry, 1977, p. 258). However, still other coalitions, which Berry (1977) characterized as "independent coalitions," may last for years and have staff, offices, and a distinct identity separate from its members.

For the purposes of this study, advocacy coalition was defined as a collection of organizational representatives working together through a unifying agency to influence the proposed or actual policies of local, state, or federal government entities. There were some key elements to this definition. Coalitions in the study that met this definition had separate staff, offices, and function from any of their members and operated with separate public and legal identities. Additionally, the primary purpose of the coalition was advocacy. Some scholars would label this type of coalition an interest group. As Berry (2003, p. 27) noted, "the general rule of thumb among scholars is that if it lobbies, it's an interest group." Examples include Children Now in Oakland, California or the Children's Initiative in San Diego.

Member. For the purposes of this study, member was defined as an individual carried on an advocacy coalition's contact list for action alerts. It was assumed that the members were individuals primarily representing their employer, with the sanction of their employer for participation, as opposed to autonomous individuals or organizations as members. It was also assumed that the members' incentives reflected a mixture of individual and organizational motives.

Children. For the purposes of this study, children were defined as people aged zero through eighteen. This definition encompasses a range of populations commonly known as infants, children, and youth.

Review of Literature

A discussion of forces that impact participation in advocacy begins with an examination of the role of organizational capacity. As Berry (2003, p. 124) stated, "the beginning point in understanding an organization's political ability is to ask simply, if a bit crudely, 'How much do they have?'" A number of studies have investigated this question. First, Krehely (2001) evaluated financial reports from agencies from across the spectrum of charities. He found that, comparatively speaking, larger organizations more typically reported lobbying expenses (Krehely, 2001). Similarly, De Vita et al. (2001) conducted an examination of child-focused nonprofits. Like Krehely, they also found that larger organizations were more likely to report lobbying expenditures than smaller agencies (De Vita et al., 2001). Findings from the Strengthening Nonprofit Advocacy Project (2002), a national research project by OMB Watch, Tufts University, and Charity Lobbying in the Public Interest, supported these conclusions as well. This project found that both budget size and staff size were significant predictors of public policy participation (Strengthening Nonprofit Advocacy Project, 2002). Agencies with annual expenses of $1 million or more were significantly more likely to participate in public policy activities than agencies with less than $1 million in expenses, and as the number of staff increased, organizations participated more in public policy as well (Strengthening Nonprofit Advocacy Project, 2002). Lobbying requires a substantial commitment of human and financial resources, which inhibits smaller organizations from participating in the legislative process (De Vita et al., 2001). In general, more resources lead to more advocacy.

Two other organizational factors have been shown to be related to participation in advocacy: job function and official duty. Ezell (1991) found that administrators and supervisors were more likely than direct-service staff members to set aside time for advocacy. This is consistent with the nature of advocacy as an external function. As part of their job function, administrators and supervisors are more responsible for activities external to the organization. Similarly, Ezell (1994) discovered that official duties had significant implications for the amount of advocacy conducted by social workers, with those officially assigned to conduct advocacy performing more advocacy than those not officially assigned to so. He found that more than 50% of social workers who reported that advocacy was part of their official duties engaged in five or more hours of advocacy per week, while only 2% of those who said that advocacy was not part of their official duties performed that much advocacy. From Ezell's two studies it appeared that both job function and official duties impacted participation in advocacy. However, these organizational factors do not alone account for differences in participation in advocacy: Underlying motivations play an important role too.

Motivation is a hypothetical construct used to explain variations in behavior. Why do some individuals work harder than others? Motivation relates to voluntary behavior, not instinctive behavior nor involuntary action (Beck, 1983). Motivation cannot be seen, but it is assumed to exist. Researchers rely on theories to guide them towards its measurable manifestations (Pinder, 1984). As Herzberg (1990) asserted, "the psychology of motivation is tremendously complex, and what has been unraveled with any degree of assurance is small indeed" (p. 49). It is beyond the scope of this investigation to present an exhaustive discussion on motivation. Rather, this section will first briefly summarize

the basic philosophies on motivation in the workplace, then highlight the findings of some influential authors on motivation, and finally review the role that incentives play in advocacy coalitions.

Beck (1983) suggested that there were four basic philosophies on motivation in the workplace. These viewpoints had influenced how managers thought and how they dealt with their workers.

- "Rational-economic": the assumption that only economic forces motivated individuals, and that workers made rational decisions based on financial considerations.
- "Social": that workers were primarily motivated by social needs.
- "Self-actualizing": that individuals were intrinsically motivated; that feelings of pride, satisfaction, and the work itself drove behavior.
- "Complex": that there was "a great variability in motives, emotions, experiences, and abilities of different people and that these *change*[d] *over time*" (Beck, 1983, p. 378; italics in original).

Maslow's (1970) "need hierarchy" theory certainly influenced many discussions on motivation. Maslow argued that psychological and physiological needs underpinned motivation and behavior. He structured needs in a hierarchy, starting at the lowest level with the physiological needs, such as food, then moving up through needs for safety, love and belonging, esteem, and finally to the need for self-actualization, that is, self-fulfillment in finding one's calling. Lower-level needs would drive behavior until they were satisfied. Once satisfied, though, they would no longer drive behavior and the individual would become motivated to satisfy higher-level needs. However, theories on

motivation and behavior must account for levels and force; most behavior results from a combination of needs from varying levels and with differing degrees of intensity (Maslow, 1970).

Pinder (1984) argued that there were two human factors related to productivity in the workplace: employee ability and employee motivation. He defined work motivation as "a set of energetic forces that originate both within as well as beyond an individual's being to initiate work related behaviors, and to determine its form, direction, intensity, and duration" (p. 8). These forces consisted of a mixture of needs, desires, and external factors. Vroom (1995) described several forces likely to impact motivation. First, people worked to gain wages. "Although economic factors undoubtedly play an important role in the decision to work, it is highly improbable that they are the only inducements" (p. 37). Additionally people wanted to expend mental or physical energy. Conditions did exist where action was preferred to idleness. People worked to contribute to the production of goods and services, to fulfill moral purposes, and to experience social interactions and fellowship. Finally, social status influenced motivation in the workplace, because "a person's occupation greatly influences the way in which other people respond to him outside the work situation" (p. 48). Vroom asserted that motivation in the workplace was a confluence of these forces and the choices individuals made were based on the probability that particular efforts would lead to particular, valuable outcomes. As the expectation of valuable outcomes increased, so effort would increase.

Barnard (1938) asserted that organizations brought about the actions of individuals through the range of incentives they provided. Material incentives, such as money or other physical things, were provided as inducements for service or reward for

contributions. However, he believed, personal, non-material incentives, for example, opportunities for prestige or distinction, played a more important role than material incentives. Desirable physical conditions at work, associational attractiveness, and the opportunity for participation in important events also served as inducements. But one of the most powerful incentives was ideal benefaction: the "capacity of organizations to satisfy personal ideals usually relating to non-material, future, or altruistic relations" (p. 146). Examples included loyalty, patriotism, pride of workmanship, and altruistic service for family or others. Political organizations could not survive without the capacity to satisfy these personal, altruistic ideals. Finally, the condition of communion, which Barnard described as the "opportunity for comradeship, for mutual support in personal attitudes" (p. 148), completed his inventory of incentives. He pointed out that personal motives were neither a universal attribute nor a steady-state function. "Different men are moved by different incentives or combinations of incentives and by different incentives or combinations at different times" (p. 148).

Yet even given the great variability and dynamic nature of incentives, Clark and Wilson (1961) claimed that the "incentive system may be regarded as the principal variable affecting organizational behavior" (p. 130). They categorized incentives as well, emphasizing that particular incentives impacted people differently and that changes in the economy, distribution of resources, morals, expectations, and attitudes transformed personal motives over time. Material incentives were "rewards that have a monetary value or can be easily translated into ones that have" (p. 134). Solidary incentives originated from "socializing, congeniality, [and] the sense of group membership and identification" (p. 134). Solidary incentives tended to exist independently of the goals of

the organization. On the other hand, purposive incentives were primarily derived from the goals of the organization. Organizational members were motivated by efforts to alter the status quo on behalf of nonmembers, for example "the demand for the enactment of certain laws or the adoption of certain practices (which do *not* benefit the members in any direct tangible way)" (p. 135; italics in original). The value of the goals themselves motivated effort. Nevertheless, Clark and Wilson believed that for purposive organizations, such as advocacy groups, "fewer people are willing to accept organizational purposes as a primary incentive than are willing to accept material or solidary inducements" (p. 151).

Herzberg (1990), however, argued, "It is only when one has a generator of one's own that we can talk about motivation. One then needs no outside stimulation. One *wants* to do it" (p. 52; italics in original). Intrinsic motivators, such as the work itself, responsibility, and growth led to job satisfaction and increased motivation. On the other hand, separate and distinct extrinsic factors, such as company policies, interpersonal relationships, working conditions, and salary, were the primary sources of job dissatisfaction and could reduce motivation. Herzberg proposed that job enrichment, through increases in responsibility, opportunities for personal achievement, recognition, and growth, led to job satisfaction and motivation. While the aforementioned authors provided valuable insight on motivation that can be applied to an examination of participation in advocacy coalitions, other authors addressed this topic more directly.

In his exchange theory of interest groups Salisbury (1969, p. 2) postulated that the "origins, growth, death, and associated lobby activity" of interest groups could be explained by an exchange relationship between interest group entrepreneurs and

prospective members. Interest group entrepreneurs, the organizers, leaders, and initiators of the group, offered a mixture of incentives to potential members at a set price: membership, which might range in practice from a supportive signature to heavy dues. Salisbury conceptualized both material and solidary incentives as described by Clark and Wilson. But rather than purposive benefits, which were derived primarily from organizational goals, he preferred the notion of expressive benefits. These benefits provided mechanisms for the public expression of values, and people were willing to join groups primarily to express their values.

Essentially, the exchange theory asserted that in order for interest groups to remain viable, there must be a mutually satisfactory exchange between the potential member and the entrepreneur (Salisbury, 1969). For the potential member, if the incentives warranted the price of membership, then they joined the interest group, satisfied, while at the same time, the entrepreneurs' incentives must maintain the necessary flow of benefits to their group. If the incentives failed to attract sufficient membership at the set price, or the price failed to keep the group solvent, then the interest group collapsed. Basically, the success of the organization depended on the quality of the entrepreneurship. Group leaders must find the appropriate balance between incentives and price. Salisbury's exchange theory held that group members were willing to give in exchange for an incentive. However, Salisbury's members were generally limited to donors and dues payers. While these types of member were certainly important to interest groups, Hula (1999) applied the exchange theory to members' actions beyond the exchange point of joining a group.

Hula (1999) argued that the incentives motivating a group to join a coalition strongly influenced the role the group played within the coalition once they joined. More specifically, he contended that differences in coalition members' work levels were closely correlated with the reasons why the members had joined the coalition. Hula divided coalition members into the three groups: core members, specialists (or players), and peripheral (or tag-along) members. Core members were coalition founders and other resource-rich groups that typically brokered the initial emergence of the coalition or joined a coalition to achieve strategic policy goals. Motivated to bring about strategic victory, core groups carried out a high level of coalition work towards the overall goal. They were "generally willing to commit time and effort to carrying the coalition's platform into battle" (p. 50). Specialists also joined coalitions to achieve policy goals, but their reasons for joining were tactical: rather than pursuing broad strategic goals, specialist groups sought to include their particular goals in the coalition's platform and insert specific provisions within the legislation at hand. Their work level and "lobbying efforts in the legislative arena ... tend to be focused on their specific piece of the issue or legislation rather than the package as a whole" (p. 44). Lastly, peripheral groups joined coalitions for non-policy incentives, such as information or benefits related to symbolic participation in the coalition. While generally supportive of the coalition's goals, peripheral groups lacked a "willingness to expend significant resources to achieve the eventual policy goal that serves as the focus of the coalition" (p. 46). These groups typically maintained a low work level for coalition activities. As Hula summed it up, not all of the coalition members in his study were interested in getting a bill passed: "the core

members wanted the bill [passed]; the players wanted a paragraph; and the peripheral groups wanted a picture for their newsletter" (p. 135).

Hula (1999) also recognized the dynamic characteristics of motives, noting that a group's position within a coalition and their corresponding level of work might change over time. For instance, as the particular goals of a coalition shifted, groups may move back and forth from the positions of specialist and peripheral as the relevance of the issues to their organizations and constituents waxed and waned. Furthermore, core members were not limited to founders and other resource rich groups. "Other groups may become core members if they have strong commitment to the overall coalition goal and are willing to devote time, energy, and other resources to coalition work" (p. 43).

Notwithstanding the general dearth of studies of the role that incentives play in participation in advocacy coalitions, some studies touched upon this topic. First, Berry's (1977) study found that membership services and publications were not important incentives and that the role of solidary incentives varied greatly even within single organizations. Berry (1977) also concluded that "purposive incentives are the most important type of incentives for public interest groups" (p. 42). These incentives "make it possible for most public interest groups to operate" (p. 43). Next, Weisner's (1983) analysis of the coalition building process for human service agencies in the San Francisco Bay area revealed that ideological, friendship, and altruistic reasons, along with increased publicity, all played a role in the decision-making process to join advocacy coalitions. Weisner (1983) also found a strong relationship between membership in coalitions and perceived threats to an organization's funding. By and large, groups joined advocacy coalitions to protest cuts in programs and to generate new revenue streams, with

advancement of their own programs and constituencies a primary concern. The most frequently cited benefit of joining a coalition, however, was the "enhanced ability to gather and exchange information in an increasingly volatile and complex human services field" (Weisner, 1983, p. 304).

Similarly, Cruz (2001) found that human service agencies in New York joined interest groups, such as the New York State Association of Community and Residential Agencies, to analyze and exchange information on public policies and government budgets. In general, agencies joined to advance their political and fiscal prospects. Agency leaders saw membership in associations as a tool to promote their cause through a unifying structure that also provided additional resources such as staff lobbyists. However, the most important benefit for joining was fiscal. As one executive director in the study stated, "without anybody there to look at the state budget, I think it's fairly obvious we would be in a disastrous position" (quoted at p. 82). Finally, Walker's (1991) study of interest groups operating in Washington, D.C. reported that, from the perspective of interest group leaders, purposive benefits consistently received high rankings on the relative importance of benefits in attracting members, with most group leaders reporting that solidary benefits were not nearly as important an incentive. "These group leaders clearly believe that the maintenance of their organizations depends on their success as representatives for their members or as advocates for a cause" (p. 92).

In summary, the literature provided a number of useful insights that guided this study. First, while it appeared certain that an organization's ability to participate in advocacy depended on its resources, the investigation on the role of organizational capacity was not yet complete. How did organizational capacity influence an individual's

ability to participate in advocacy? Next, Ezell's (1991, 1994) investigations on the impact of official duty and job function on participation in advocacy revealed the importance of these factors. However, Ezell's studies did not specifically address advocacy through coalitions. Finally, the literature on motivation and interest groups provided a great deal of direction for this study. There is an immense amount of complexity and variability in the motives that drive people and groups. Clearly, the behavior of individuals and organizations derives from a wide range of motives generated from both internal and external forces, such as needs for safety, material gains, moral fulfillment, interpersonal relations, and altruistic drives, to name a few. Additionally, motives are not universal, nor are they steady state. Equally importantly, different motives appear to impact behavior differently: some incentives are stronger motivators than others. Yet the literature is inconclusive and contradictory at times. Are intrinsic motives, such as responsibility, really more powerful than extrinsic incentives, such as financial gains? Furthermore, motives are not an all-or-nothing element to behavior. More than one motive, and with varying degrees of intensity, could be powering actions. In fact, people's behavior could be driven by a combination of their personal desires and their organizations' needs. Additionally, members join advocacy coalitions for a wide range of reasons, and different motives are tied to different roles and work levels. However, once again, the literature seems inconclusive. Are material rewards or altruistic ideals more central to participation in interest groups? Finally, while a wide range of incentives motivates action, it is possible to develop groups of similar incentives in order to facilitate the empirical specification and measurement of motivation. Without such specifications, the features of this hypothetical, but important, construct would remain unknown. To that end, this study

tested a series of hypotheses and explored a number of questions in order to enhance the understanding of motivation and its role in advocacy coalitions.

Delineation of Research Questions

Hypothesis 1

The number of action alerts that coalition members respond to correlates with the incentives that motivated them to join the coalition.

This investigation tested the relationship between the number of action alerts members of child-focused advocacy coalitions responded to and incentives. For the purposes of this study, incentives were categorized as strategic, resource development, and fellowship. This hypothesis predicted that there would be significant differences in the number of action alerts that coalition members responded to based upon whether the members had been primarily motivated by strategic, resource development, or fellowship incentives to join the coalition. The project also explored how incentives shifted over time. Turning to action alerts, the study explored the frequency of action alerts received by coalition members and examined the similarities and differences between the advocacy tactics requested in action alerts and the advocacy tactics conducted by coalition members.

Hypothesis 2

The number of action alerts that coalition members respond to correlates with their role in the coalition.

This investigation tested the relationship between the number of the action alerts members of child-focused advocacy coalitions responded to and their role in the coalition. For the purposes of this study, roles were categorized as core, partner, and

peripheral. The hypothesis predicted that there would be significant differences in the number of action alerts coalition members responded to depending on whether their role in the coalition was core, partner, or peripheral. This investigation also explored the relationships between role and incentives.

Hypothesis 3

Coalition members who have advocacy as part of their official duties will respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than members who do not have advocacy as part of their official duties.

This examination tested the relationship between the number of action alerts members of child-focused advocacy coalitions responded to and the presence or absence of advocacy specified among their official duties. This hypothesis predicted that coalition members that participated in advocacy activities as part of their official duties would respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than coalition members that did not have advocacy as part of their official duties. This study also explored the association between official duties and incentives.

Hypothesis 4

Managers will respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than direct-service providers.

This examination tested the relationship between the number of action alerts members of child-focused advocacy coalitions responded to and their job function. This hypothesis predicted that coalition members whose primary job function was management would respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than

members whose primary job function was to provide services directly to clients. This study also explored the relationship between job function and incentives.

Hypothesis 5

Coalition members from larger organizations will respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than members from smaller organizations.

This hypothesis built on the evidence at hand: larger organizations tended to participate more in public policy. Would such predictors of public policy participation hold true at the level of the individual participant? It was predicted that coalition members from larger organizations would respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than members from smaller organizations. This study also explored the relationship between organizational size and incentives.

So far, these hypotheses and exploratory research questions tended to seek motivations separately. But in reality these factors probably did not operate in isolation; they likely operated simultaneously. In order to gain a yet clearer picture of the relationships among these factors, this study explored how incentives, role, official duty, job function, and organizational capacity in conjunction impact the number of action alerts to which coalition members responded.

Contributions to the Field

The aim was to add to the current body of knowledge in a number of important ways. First of all, given the complexity of the concept of motivation, questions certainly remained about the relationships between incentives and action. The study could add more empirical evidence to this multifaceted construct. Next, the vast majority of the literature on advocacy virtually ignored human service groups, whereas this study might

bring much-needed attention to child-focused advocacy groups. In fact, as McCarthy and Castelli (2001) strongly emphasized, the study of advocacy needed expansion in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of advocacy within the nonprofit sector. Moreover, while recognizing that some researchers had examined the interest group phenomenon in the nonprofit sector (Berry, 1977; Hula, 1999; Walker, 1991), these researchers had focused predominately on national organizations based in Washington, D.C. In contrast, this study focused on local and statewide groups in California. This was an important distinction because state and local groups had different practices as compared to their national counterparts (Reid, 2000). Additionally, although the investigation was partly modeled on Hula's (1999) argument that the incentives motivating a potential group member's decision to join a coalition were tied to the member's work level for the coalition, Hula's conceptualization of work level included a wide range of activities, even internal meetings, whereas this study narrowed the focus to the question of response to action alerts. This tighter focus provided clarity to arguably the most important activity for members of advocacy coalitions: heeding the call to action. Furthermore, Hula had studied interest groups in general as members of advocacy coalitions, whereas this study examined service providers in particular. This is an important distinction because Hula's groups had primarily been policy actors joining together in coalitions, whereas this study examined actors moving from a role primarily in service provision to an expanded role in policy.

Furthermore, considering that the literature was nearly devoid of studies on advocacy as dependent on official duty or job function, this examination added empirical evidence to these important, yet considerably under-researched, factors. Many of the

studies that had tested the relationship between organizational size and advocacy had drawn on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sources, yet De Vita et al. (2001) and Krehely (2001) had acknowledged this as a key weakness in their studies. "IRS reporting requirements do not capture many advocacy activities" (De Vita et al., 2001, p. 32). Instead of relying on financial data to determine levels of advocacy activity, this study aimed to enrich the picture by utilizing additional measures of advocacy activity. Lastly, current knowledge was also enhanced by investigating advocacy activities specifically associated with advocacy coalitions. Previous studies, particularly those based on IRS documents, had failed to differentiate between advocacy activities conducted independently of advocacy coalitions and advocacy activities conducted with advocacy coalitions. In summary, this study added to the current body of knowledge by examining a unique combination of factors and their relationships to heeding the call to action. This added important new insights to the understanding of child-focused advocacy coalitions and, hopefully, would help these groups build a stronger voice for children.

CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the methodology that was used to investigate the hypotheses and exploratory research questions presented in Chapter 1, specifically the topics of research design, description of subjects, operational definitions, procedures, treatment of data, limitations, and ethical considerations.

Research Design

For this empirical study, a nomothetic approach was utilized as the broad methodological framework. As such, the research sought to identify factors that were generally associated with the number of calls to action members of child-focused advocacy coalitions responded to. More specifically, it was a cross-sectional, quantitative, mail survey that contained both explanatory and exploratory elements.

Explanatory Elements

- Hypothesis 1: The number of action alerts that coalition members respond to correlates with the incentives that motivated them to join the coalition.
- Hypothesis 2: The number of action alerts that coalition members respond to correlates with their role in the coalition.
- Hypothesis 3: Coalition members who have advocacy as part of their official duties will respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than members who do not have advocacy as part of their official duties.
- Hypothesis 4: Managers will respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than direct-service providers.

- Hypothesis 5: Coalition members from larger organizations will respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than members from smaller organizations.

Exploratory Elements

- Exploratory Question 1: How do incentives shift over time, if at all?
- Exploratory Question 2: What is the frequency of action alerts received by coalition members?
- Exploratory Question 3: What are the similarities and differences between the advocacy tactics requested in action alerts and the advocacy tactics conducted by coalition members?
- Exploratory Question 4: What is the association between role and incentives?
- Exploratory Question 5: What is the association between official duties and incentives?
- Exploratory Question 6: What is the association between job function and incentives?
- Exploratory Question 7: What is the association between the organizational size and incentives?
- Exploratory Question 8: How do incentives, role, official duty, job function, and organizational capacity in conjunction impact the number of action alerts to which coalition members respond?

Subjects

The subjects of this study were individuals that met two primary criteria: they worked at California nonprofit organizations organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the

Internal Revenue Code; 2) they were also named on action alert contact lists of child-focused advocacy coalitions in California. This was the appropriate population and unit of analysis for the research questions, because for the coalitions included in this study, the relevant individuals were those who had joined by adding their names to an action alert list, who had received action alerts urging advocacy, and who had heeded the call to action on behalf of children. Nonetheless, these individuals were primarily representing their employer in the coalitions' activities. For the subjects of this study, their employers were nonprofit organizations organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. It was assumed that the subjects' employers were service-based public charities. It was also assumed that the subjects were adults, ages 18 or older, with a mix of male and female subjects.

Operational Definitions of Concepts and Variables

The questionnaire titled "Survey of California Nonprofit Organizations" (see Appendix A) served as the instrument for operationally defining the concepts and variables in this study. Part I asked subjects about their membership in groups; such groups were the child-focused advocacy coalitions preselected to participate in this study. Question 1 sought to confirm that the subjects met subject criterion number 2 as described previously. This study's definition of "member" was included in the instructions for Question 1, which operationally defined the term and verified that the subjects were indeed members of the child-focused advocacy coalitions participating in this study; to eliminate responses from other organizations, respondents who indicated "none of the above" were instructed to return the questionnaire. If any individual subject was a member of more than one of the groups listed, then Question 1a asked the subject

to select the group with which they considered themselves most active during the previous twelve months. This provided consistency in the responses for subjects in more than one group. Question 2 asked subjects to report their length of group membership. This question was linked to the exploratory question 1.

Question 3 asked subjects to characterize their role in the group. This question operationally defined role in hypothesis 2 and was linked to exploratory questions 4 and 8. Questions 4 through 7 collected information on incentives. For this section, questions about reasons, were, in fact, asking about incentives. Question 4 inquired about the incentives that had motivated subjects to join child-focused advocacy coalitions. For this study, incentives were categorized as strategic, resource development, or fellowship. These incentives were the independent variables for hypothesis 1 and also linked to exploratory questions 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Question 4 utilized a composite measure to operationally define each of these incentives. Strategic incentives were operationally defined by combining level-of-influence scores from the following items: bringing about social change to benefit others, expressing important personal values, achieving broad goals, and providing altruistic service for others. Resource development incentives were operationally defined by combining scores from these items: advancing one's organization, protesting cuts in its funding, generating revenue for it, and maximizing flow of money to it. Fellowship incentives were operationally defined by combining scores from these items: associating with like-minded individuals, networking with colleagues, obtaining mutual support in personal attitudes, and developing new friendships. Question 6 relied on the same composite measure typology as Question 4 to operationally define the incentives. This question was linked to exploratory question 1.

Recognizing that questions 4 and 6 probably did not cover the full range of possible reasons why the subjects had joined child-focused advocacy coalitions, Questions 5 and 7 allowed for some open-ended input. Answers to these questions enhanced the exploratory dimension of this study.

Part II of the survey was about action alerts. This study's definition of action alert was included in the instructions for this section. Question 8 asked about the frequency of action alerts that subjects had received, and was linked to exploratory question 2. Question 9 asked the subjects to make a best guess at the percentage of the total action alerts they had acted on during the previous twelve months. This question operationally defined the dependent variable included in hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4, along with exploratory question 8. Question 10 asked subjects to indicate what advocacy activities they had been urged to perform in the action alerts they had received, and also asked them to indicate whether they had performed the requested activity at least once. This question operationally defined advocacy by listing 21 activities that could influence the proposed or actual policies of local, state, or federal government entities on behalf of children. Recognizing that this question did not cover all possible advocacy tactics, the question also provided a mechanism for subjects to include additional advocacy activities in their response. Like question 8, this question was linked to the study's exploration on action alerts. In this case, though, Question 10 was tied to exploratory question 3. Part III of the survey was about the subjects' employers. Question 11 operationally defined public charity and sought to confirm that the subjects met subject criterion number 1. Since only organizations organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code qualified for the tax-deductible benefit, asking whether contributions to their organization

were tax-deductible verified that that criterion was met. If contributions were not tax-deductible for a respondent's organization, Question 11a collected information on what type of organization best described their organization.

The next section of this chapter details procedures that were used to minimize unqualified potential subjects from receiving the survey. Question 12 asked subjects to indicate their primary job function as one of the following: provider of services to clients, management, or other. This question operationally defined the independent variables for hypothesis 4 and also provided input for exploratory questions 6 and 8. Question 13 asked subjects if advocacy was part of their job description. Tied to hypothesis 3, this question operationally defined the independent variable official duty as having advocacy as part of the subject's job description. This question also provided input for exploratory questions 5 and 8. Questions 14 and 15 were linked to hypothesis 5 and exploratory questions 7 and 8. Question 14 operationally defined the independent variable organizational size as number of paid staff members, while question 15 operationally defined organizational size as budget size in dollars.

Procedures

Selection of Subjects

Selection of subjects began with the development of a list of child-focused advocacy coalitions in California. This list was initially developed using the publicly available Internet search engine located at http://www.google.com. Key word searches using the words advocacy, coalition, child, children, youth, and California, among others, were conducted in order to develop a list of organizations that merited further review. Next, the Internet homepages of the organizations on this initial list were reviewed to

determine whether the organizations fell within this study's definition and description of child-focused advocacy coalition. Each of the organizations that appeared to meet the definition was contacted by phone or email to confirm that it did, in fact, qualify for the study. Specifically, was the organization serving as a unifying agency through which organizational representatives were working collectively to influence the proposed or actual policies of local, state, or federal government entities on behalf of children? Did the organization's members include representatives from public charities? Did the organization maintain an action alert contact list? If the organization did qualify, then a request was made to provide the researcher with its action alert contact list. Recognizing that the privacy of contact information on action alert lists might be an important factor in an organization's decision to share their list, in order to facilitate participation in the study, the researcher supplied organizations with information on the study, answered questions, and provided assurances that the contact lists would be used only for this study and that only the researcher would have access to the lists. A snowballing technique was used to develop further the number of child-focused advocacy coalitions participating in the study. All organizations that were contacted were asked for leads to other potentially appropriate organizations.

In the end, advocacy alert contact lists from four child-focused advocacy coalitions were selected for inclusion in this study. Coalition A was a statewide coalition of approximately 500 members that focused on critically important issues, like teen pregnancy and violence. Coalition A had six staff and an annual budget of about $500,000. Coalition B was a statewide coalition of 83 members that focused on maternal and child health, public health, and nutrition. Coalition B had 4 staff and an annual

budget of about $1.5 million. Coalition C was a statewide coalition of about 175 members that represented over twenty child-related issues. Coalition C was part of the school of law of a private university in California. Eight staff worked in the university's center that provided leadership for Coalition C. Coalition D was a local coalition of about 1400 members that covered essentially all of the issues that faced children in a single metropolitan area. Coalition D had six staff and an annual budget of approximately $700,000. Selection of these coalitions was based, in part, on the availability and willingness of child-focused advocacy coalitions to participate. Selection was also based purposively, using the study's definition and description of child-focused advocacy coalition as a guide to develop a pool of advocacy coalitions that most precisely met the merits of the definition and the focus of this study.

Selection of subjects continued after the child-focused advocacy coalitions provided the researcher with their action alert contact lists. The contact lists were reviewed and edited to promote accurate subject selection with regards to the public charity criteria. Individuals without an organizational affiliation, individuals with a governmental affiliation, and employees of the unifying agency (i.e., the organization that provided the list) were deleted from the contact lists. Next, the lists were combined and sorted to search for individuals that belonged to more than one advocacy coalition. Duplicate names were eliminated from all but one contact list in order to give all potential subjects an equal chance of being selected and to prevent over-sampling of more active individuals. The contact lists were then sorted back to group individuals by their original contact list. In order to ensure that individuals from each advocacy coalition were sufficiently included in the sample a probability proportionate to size (PPS)

sampling procedure was utilized. More specifically, the total number of potential subjects was calculated by adding up the number of individuals from each contact list. This number was divided by 400 in order to calculate a number (X) to use for systematic random sampling. A random starting point was determined and then every Xth individual from each contact list was selected on a rotating basis until 400 potential subjects were selected.

Gathering and Storing of Information

Information was gathered through a postal mail survey. Four hundred potential subjects received a maximum of three contacts by postal mail. An initial introductory and consent cover letter (see Appendix B), a survey and a pre-addressed, pre-stamped envelope were sent to all 400 potential subjects on March 15, 2004. Potential subjects that did not respond by March 24, 2004 were sent a reminder post card (see Appendix C). Potential subjects that did not respond by April 9, 2004 were sent one final introductory and consent cover letter (see Appendix D), a survey and a pre-addressed, pre-stamped envelope. No experimental manipulations or interventions were conducted. Information was recorded and stored in locked filing cabinets and password-protected Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, and SPSS computer files; only the researcher had access to the locked and password-protected files.

Treatment of Data

Several statistical analyses were used to treat the data. Broadly speaking, the selection of statistical technique was based on the number of variables under examination, on the level of measurement of those variables — for instance, nominal, ordinal, or interval — and on whether the researcher sought a descriptive or inferential

finding. Additionally, the level of significance was set at .05 for all statistical tests. To start, each of the variables in the hypotheses and exploratory research questions was examined using mode, mean, median, and frequency/percent distributions, where appropriate. This series of analyses provided an initial body of findings before the variables were plugged into the hypotheses and exploratory questions for testing.

First, for hypothesis 1, the treatment of data began with Crombach's index of internal consistency on the items comprising each of the composite measures of incentives. This hypothesis was tested using Pearson's product-moment correlation and a stepwise regression analysis. Next, hypothesis 2 was tested using a one-way ANOVA analyses. Hypothesis 2 was also examined using crosstabulations and chi-square by recoding action from an interval variable to an ordinal variable. Since both hypotheses 3 and 4 consisted of dichotomous independent variables and an interval dependent variable, two-sample *t*-tests for independent samples were used. Finally, data for hypothesis 5 were tested in two ways. First, the relationship between the interval independent variable number of paid staff members was tested against the interval dependent variable using Pearson's product-moment correlation. Secondly, the ordinal variable budget size was tested against the recoded action variable using crosstabulations and chi-square.

The exploratory questions were examined using a variety of techniques to uncover important facets of the data. Frequency/percent distributions provided much of the data treatment of exploratory questions 2 and 3. Exploratory questions 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 were examined using Pearson's product-moment correlation, two-sample *t*-tests, crosstabulations, chi-square, and ANOVA, where appropriate.

Limitations

This study had several limitations. First, it was limited by its design. While nomothetic, quantitative research provides a mechanism to identify causal factors that generally impact a class of conditions, it is potentially limited in its richness of examination. This design forwent a deep, qualitative investigation of incentives, advocacy, and child-focused advocacy coalitions in favor of testing a limited number of hypotheses in order to detect patterns. Additionally, it was limited to the definitions prescribed for the concepts and variables under investigation. In order to promote mutual understanding among interested parties and to facilitate quality research, each of the definitions intentionally limited the examination. For instance, the definition of "member" assumed that coalition members had the sanction of their organizations for participation in the coalitions' activities. However, in actuality, this might not have been the case. Furthermore, while this study attempted to explain variability in the number of action alerts responded to by applying a template of incentive theories, perhaps other theories, based on different assumptions, might have afforded clarity and answers obscured by the limited view incentive theory provided. Next, the nature of incentives presented limits. Incentives are a dynamic attribute, and they could have changed prior to, during, or even after the research took place. Moreover, this study did not attempt to isolate personal motives from organizational incentives. Rather, it assumed action was driven by a combination of these forces. Nor did it address some potentially critical factors. For example, the processes involved in weighing the study's limited number of positive incentives against any number of unknown negative incentives or barriers remained hidden.

The study's procedures potentially limited the investigation as well. The coalitions that participated in this study were a more formalized subset of the larger group of child-focused advocacy coalitions. Less formalized coalitions – for instance coalitions without separate staff, offices, or legal identities from their members and coalitions formed under temporary or ad hoc arrangements – were excluded from this study. Additionally, by using the Internet and snowball techniques to develop a group of child-focused advocacy coalitions to participate in the study, other relevant advocacy coalitions, not detected by these methods, were excluded from the study. In fact, the study was limited to the advocacy coalitions and their members that participated in the study, and the findings should not be generalized beyond them. Also, purposive selection of advocacy coalitions and editing of advocacy alert contact lists lends itself to inherent conscious and unconscious bias. Additionally, relying on subjects' memory may have led to inaccurate data collection. Subjects may have over-emphasized some incentives as reasons for joining advocacy coalitions and over-reported the numbers of action alerts responded to in a self-congratulatory way. Other methods of data collection on advocacy, such as referring to evidence in primary sources like letters written or records of testimony, might have supplied more accurate information.

Ethical Considerations

This study's investigation considered the rights of its subjects. To begin with, participation in the research was voluntary and occurred only after a disclosure of the possible risks. The introductory consent and cover letter (Appendix B) detailed both the voluntary nature and possible risks of this project and provided a reasonable level of informed consent to potential subjects. While the study did not afford the protection of

anonymity to its subjects, several measures were taken to ensure that the subjects' identities would in fact remain confidential. Surveys were numerically coded and return envelopes were separated from completed surveys in order to protect the subjects' identities. All records remained, and will remain, permanently confidential, only the researcher having access to the coded and locked files; identities will not be revealed in any reports, publications, or conversations resulting from the study.

CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS

This chapter presents the results of the research. The level of significance was set at .05 for all statistical tests. The data supported hypothesis 1 but failed to support hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5.

Overview of Responses

Response Rate

A total of 194 responses to the survey were received. However, some were excluded from the study. Twenty-nine were excluded because they were returned indicating that the potential subjects were no longer employed at that address, while an additional 12 were returned as undeliverable as addressed. Additionally, using survey Question 11 as a guide, 10 responses were excluded because the respondents did not meet subject criterion 1; that is, they did not work at California nonprofit organizations organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Two responses were from nonprofit organizations not organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 5 from local, state, or federal government agencies, 1 from a for-profit organization, and 2 were indeterminable. Finally, 23 responses were excluded because the respondents did not meet subject criterion 2: they did not appear on the action alert contact lists of the child-focused advocacy coalitions participating in this study. In sum, 120 responses were used for the study, for a final valid response rate of 36.8%. These responses constituted the subjects of the study ($N = 120$). The subjects were affiliated with child, youth, or family-related organizations located throughout California in both rural and urban settings. Nearly all of the subjects' organizations were social service, educational, recreational, or healthcare agencies. It should be noted that not every subject

completed the survey in its entirety; actual sample sizes (n) for particular tests and per-cell calculations are presented throughout this chapter.

Advocacy Coalition Membership

Table 1 shows the results of coalition membership as the subjects indicated in question 1 of the survey. This table shows that the largest portion of subjects were members of Coalition D ($n = 50$).

Table 1

Summary of Coalition Membership

Coalitions	%	n
Coalition A	31.7	38
Coalition B	13.3	16
Coalition C	25.8	31
Coalition D	41.7	50
		$N = 120$

Note. Total percentage is greater than 100% because 15 subjects were members of more than one advocacy coalition.

Results of Explanatory Elements

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 brought together the central elements of this study: incentives and action. The number of action alerts that coalition members responded to correlates with the incentives that motivated them to join the coalition. Starting with an examination of

incentives, Table 2 highlights key results from Question 4 of the survey, which asked the subjects to report what reasons initially motivated them to join the advocacy coalition they selected in Question 1. This table shows that more than 50% of the subjects ($n = 65$) indicated that bringing about social change to benefit others had a significant influence on their decision to join the advocacy coalition, whereas more than 40% of the subjects ($n = 47$) reported that generating revenue for their organization had no influence on their decision.

Table 2

Most and Least Influential Reasons to Join Coalitions

Reasons	%	*n*
Most Frequent Significant Influence[a]		
Bring about social change to benefit others	55.6	65
Network with colleagues	35.6	42
Achieve broad goals	32.2	37
Most Frequent No Influence[b]		
Generate revenue for your organization	41.6	47
Maximize flow of money to your organization	39.6	44
Develop new friendships	27.9	31

[a]Significant influence equals score of 4 on survey; [b]no influence equals score of 0.

However, as described in Chapter 3, this study used composite measures of the items in Question 4 of the survey to test this hypothesis. Specifically, strategic incentives

were calculated by combining scores from the items "bring about social change to benefit others," "express important personal values," "achieve broad goals," and "provide altruistic service for others"; resource development incentives were calculated by combining scores from the items "advance your organization," "protest cuts in funding to your organization," "generate revenue for your organization," and "maximize flow of money to your organization"; and fellowship incentives were calculated by combining scores from the items "associate with like-minded individuals," "network with colleagues," "obtain mutual support in personal attitudes," and "develop new friendships." Referring again to Table 2, it is noteworthy that two of the items that formed strategic incentives were among the three most frequent "significant influence" items, whereas, in contrast, two of the items that formed resource development incentives made up two of the top three most frequent "no influence" items.

Next, examinations using Crombach's index of internal consistency were performed on each of the composite incentives. Resource development incentives had the highest alpha at .7789, followed by fellowship incentives with an alpha of .6938, and strategic incentives with an alpha of .5618. A review of these findings merited keeping the composite incentives as originally formulated. The means for each of the composite incentives were calculated as well. As shown in Table 3, strategic incentives had the highest mean score at $M = 10.47$ ($SD = 2.978$), whereas resource development incentives had the lowest mean at $M = 6.96$ ($SD = 4.264$).

Additionally, Question 5 of the survey provided an opportunity for subjects to report other reasons that motivated them to join the advocacy coalition. By far the most frequently stated other reason, with 22 subjects so reporting, was to acquire information.

For example, Subject 254 stated that he or she joined "to receive updated current information on a regular basis regarding children's issues." The next most frequently cited reason for joining was the quality of the advocacy coalition or its staff (n = 10). As Subject 368 stated, "[Coalition D] is a visionary, action oriented, big hearted organization committed to making a huge difference for children, youth and families." Or, as Subject 167 reported, "support due to excellent Executive Director [and] staff." Interestingly, only one subject reported that he or she "was asked to join" was the primary reason (Subject 277). Finally, Subject 366 asserted, "I don't do it for the money, I do it for the justice."

Table 3

Means of Incentives to Join Coalitions

Composite Measures	*M*	*SD*	*n*
Strategic Incentives	10.47	2.978	111
Resource Development Incentives	6.96	4.264	108
Fellowship Incentives	8.98	3.229	109

Next, descriptive statistics were performed on Question 9 of the survey in order to examine some of the dimensions of the variable action. The mean for percentage of action alerts acted upon during the previous twelve months was M = 31.61 (SD = 27.530) with the median level of action at 20.0. A frequency analysis also revealed that the range varied from 0% to 100% and that the majority of subjects (50.9%, n = 54) acted upon 20% or fewer of the action alerts they had received during the previous twelve months. In

fact, nearly 20% of the subjects (19.8%, $n = 21$) acted upon 10% or fewer of the action alerts they had received. Very few subjects reported additional tactics. One noteworthy one was "help with candidate forum" (Subject 372).

Hypothesis 1 was initially tested using Pearson's product-moment correlation (two-tailed). As Table 4 illustrates, each of the composite measures of incentives was correlated with action at a significant level, with the strongest correlation between strategic incentives and action ($r = .356, p < .01$), followed by fellowship and action ($r = .305, p < .01$) and resource development and action ($r = .248, p < .05$).

Table 4

Correlations Between Incentives to Join Coalitions and Action

Variables	1	2	3	4
1. Action	-	.356**	.248*	.305**
2. Strategic Incentives	.356**	-	.293**	.457**
3. Resource Development Incentives	.248*	.293**	-	.483**
4. Fellowship Incentives	.305**	.457**	.483**	-

Note. Data examined using Pearson's product-moment correlation (two-tailed).

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

Additionally, each of the incentives was significantly correlated with each of the others. In particular, fellowship incentives were strongly correlated with both strategic incentives ($r = .457, p < .01$) and resource development incentives ($r = .483, p < .01$). Hypothesis 1

was also examined using a stepwise regression analysis. As shown in Table 5, this method revealed that the best equation for prediction of variance in action would include strategic incentives and fellowship incentives, while excluding resource development incentives (r^2 = .173). The findings from the regression analysis made clear that the incentives were separate dimensions statistically even though the incentives were highly correlated with each other. Taken together with the Pearson's analysis of the relationship between incentives and action, the evidence supported hypothesis 1: The number of action alerts that coalition members responded to correlated with the incentives that motivated them to join the coalition.

Table 5

Stepwise Regression Analysis of Incentives to Join Coalitions

Independent Variables	*B*	*SE B*	β
Step 1[a]			
Strategic Incentives	3.371	.889	.364**
Step 2[b]			
Strategic Incentives	2.398	.984	.259*
Fellowship Incentives	1.859	.870	.227*

Note. Dependent variable is action.

[a]R^2 for step 1 = .133; [b]r^2 for step 2 = .173.

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the number of action alerts that coalition members respond to correlates with their role in the coalition. Results from Question 3 of the survey revealed that the vast majority of subjects characterized their role as peripheral (75%, $n = 63$), whereas core members constituted 16% of the subjects ($n = 19$) and 21% of the subjects reported their role as partner ($n = 25$). Table 6 begins the examination of the relationship between role and action by showing that core members had the highest mean of action ($M = 37.50$, $SD = 28.460$) and peripheral members had the lowest ($M = 28.37$, $SD = 27.573$). Interestingly, though, core members and partners had nearly the same means for action. However, a one-way ANOVA analysis found no statistical difference in action between core, partner, and peripheral groups, $df = 2$, $F = 1.327$, $p = .270$.

Table 6

Summary of Coalition Roles and Mean Scores for Action

Role	*M*	*SD*	*n*
Core	37.50	28.460	16
Partner	37.36	26.269	22
Peripheral	28.37	27.573	68

Next, action was recoded from an interval variable to an ordinal variable in order to test hypothesis 2 using crosstabulations and chi-square. Table 7 shows that the majority of subjects reported less than 50% action regardless of role. Moreover, the chi-

square tests were not significant, $X^2(2, n = 106)$, $p = .536$. Taken together with the ANOVA analysis, the data did not support hypothesis 2: the number of action alerts that coalition members responded to was not correlated with role in the coalition.

Table 7

Crosstabulation of Coalition Roles and Action

	Core (%)	Partner (%)	Peripheral (%)
Action < 50%	9 (56.3)	12 (54.5)	45 (66.2)
Action >= 50%	7 (43.8)	10 (45.5)	23 (33.8)
Total	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 stated that coalition members who have advocacy as part of their official duties will respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than members who do not have advocacy as part of their official duties. Responses to Question 13 of the survey revealed that more than two thirds of the subjects (69.8%, $n = 81$) reported that advocacy was part of their job description, whereas about one third of the subjects (30.2%, $n = 35$) indicated that advocacy was not part of their job description. As predicted, subjects with advocacy included as part of their official duties had a greater mean for action ($M = 34.53$, $SD = 26.650$) than subjects who did not have advocacy included among their official duties ($M = 24.06$, $SD = 26.480$). However, a two-sample *t*-test for independent samples failed to confirm a significant difference in action between

these two groups, t (103) = 1.790, p = .076, n = 105 (two-tailed). Given this evidence, the data supported hypothesis 3 as a description of the sample, but not inferentially for the underlying population: advocacy as an official duty was not related to the number of action alerts coalition members responded to.

Hypothesis 4

According to hypothesis 4, managers will respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than direct-service providers. Results from Question 12 of the survey showed that the great majority of subjects indicated their primary job function as management 71.3% (n = 82), whereas 17.4% (n = 20) indicated their job function as service providers and 11.3% (n = 13) reported other. It should be noted that three responses in the category other were recoded into service provider because of the nature of the description provided by the subject (e.g., "teacher"). Contrary to the prediction, service providers had a higher mean for action (M = 37.21, SD = 31.699) than managers (M = 32.82, SD = 27.177). However, a two-sample t-test for independent samples failed to confirm a significant difference between these two groups, t (88) = .542, p = .589, n = 90 (two-tailed). Overall, the data did not support hypothesis 4: job function was not related to the number of action alerts coalition members responded to.

Hypothesis 5

Hypothesis 5 predicted that coalition members from larger organizations would respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than members from smaller organizations. Results from Question 14 of the survey revealed the mean and median for the number of paid staff (M = 69.75, SD = 150.138, MDN = 25.00). It should be noted that a small number of organizations had a much larger paid staff than the more typical

organization in the study. In fact, while 95% of the subjects' organizations (n = 113) had staff sizes of fewer than 300 employees, one organization was reported to have 1400 employees. Additionally, Table 8 illustrates that the majority of subjects (56.8%, n = 67) reported in response to Question 15 of the survey that their organization's budget size was more than $1 million. An examination using Pearson's product-moment correlation found no significant correlation between staff size and action, r = .159, p = .103, n = 106 (two-tailed).

Next, a crosstabulation of budget size and action was performed. For this test, budget size was recoded into either less than, or equal to, or greater than $1 million. Table 9 shows that the majority of subjects reported that they responded to 50% or fewer action alerts regardless of their organization's budget size. In fact, a chi-square analysis did not find a significant difference between these groups, $X^2(1, n = 105) = 3.278$, p = .070. Overall, the evidence did not support hypothesis 5.

Table 8

Summary of Reported Budget Sizes

Budget Size	%	n
Less than $100,000	2.5	3
$101,000 to $500,000	22.9	27
$500,000 to $1 million	17.8	21
More than $1 million	56.8	67

Table 9

Crosstabulation of Budget Size and Action

	<=$1 million (%) Budget	>$1 million (%)
Action < 50%	34 (72.3)	32 (55.2)
Action >= 50%	13 (27.7)	26 (44.8)
Total	(100%)	(100%)

Results of Exploratory Elements

Exploratory Question 1

Exploratory question 1 investigated how, if at all, incentives shifted over time. Table 10 highlighted key data from Question 6 of the survey, which asked the subjects to report what reasons motivated them to remain members of the advocacy coalition they selected in Question 1. This table shows that more than 50% of subjects (52.6%, $n = 60$) indicated that bringing about social change to benefit others had a significant influence on their decision to remain a member, whereas nearly one third of subjects (32.1%, $n = 35$) reported that the aim of generating revenue for their organization had no influence on their decision to remain. When compared to the reasons to join advocacy coalitions set out in Table 2, it appears that the reasons to join were quite similar to the reasons to remain; all six of the reasons listed in each table are the same, appearing in nearly identical order with, for the most part, only modest changes in percentages.

Table 10

Most and Least Influential Reasons to Remain in Coalitions

Reasons	%	*n*
	Most Frequent Significant Influence[a]	
Bring about social change to benefit others	52.6	60
Achieve broad goals	33.3	38
Network with colleagues	34.8	39
	Most Frequent No Influence[b]	
Generate revenue for your organization	32.1	35
Maximize flow of money to your organization	28.7	31
Develop new friendships	23.6	26

[a]Significant influence equals score of 4 on survey; [b]no influence equals score of 0.

Next, Question 7 of the survey provided subjects with an opportunity to describe other reasons that motivated them to remain members of the advocacy coalition. The comments on this question paralleled the responses to Question 5. Information was by far the most frequently cited reason ($n = 15$) followed by the quality of the advocacy coalition or its staff ($n = 4$). Additional comments included "loyalty to the organization" (Subject 59) and "assigned by my agency" (Subject 140). Finally, Subject 341 wrote, "As an early childhood education provider it is a part of my professionalism to be an advocate for families and their children so I have to remain in the organization so as not to go against one of the norms of my profession."

Next, means for the composite measures of incentives to remain were calculated. As Table 11 illustrates, strategic incentives had the highest mean at $M = 10.60$ ($SD = 3.282$), while resource development incentives had the lowest mean at $M = 7.58$ ($SD = 3.749$). These results were strikingly similar to the results for incentives to join in Table 3; each of the incentives held to the same position relative to other incentives.

Table 11

Means of Incentives to Remain in Coalitions

Composite Measures	*M*	*SD*	*n*
Strategic Incentives	10.60	3.282	107
Resource Development Incentives	7.58	4.318	106
Fellowship Incentives	8.96	3.749	106

To peer further into exploratory question 1, a Pearson's product-moment correlation amongst the incentives was conducted (two-tailed). The results illustrated in Table 12 indicate that the incentives reported for joining advocacy coalitions were significantly correlated ($p < .01$) with their corresponding incentives for remaining. In fact, the correlation for resource development had a very strong correlation ($r = .903$), followed by fellowship incentives ($r = .787$) and strategic incentives ($r = .728$). Further, with the exception of the correlation between strategic incentives to join with resource development incentives to remain, all of the inter-correlations among the various pairs of incentives were highly significant.

Table 12

Correlations Between Incentives to Join and Incentives to Remain in Coalitions

Variables	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
Incentives to Join						
1. Strategic	-	.293**	.457**	.728**	.144	.461**
2. Resource Develop.	.293**	-	.483**	.379**	.903**	.434**
3. Fellowship	.457**	.483**	-	.463**	.396**	.787**
Incentives to Remain						
4. Strategic	.728**	.379**	.463**	-	.392**	.666**
5. Resource Develop.	.144	.903**	.396**	.392**	-	.448**
6. Fellowship	.461**	.434**	.787**	.666**	.448**	-

Note. Data examined using Pearson's product-moment correlation (two-tailed).

**$p < .01$.

These findings demonstrated that strong predictions could be made from joining to remaining and among the numerous pairs of incentives. However, an examination of the extent of the shift from joining to remaining was still needed to explore this question fully. A paired sample *t*-test (two-tailed) accomplished this task. As Table 13 shows, only resource development incentives significantly changed. In fact, resource development incentives increased from a mean of 7.10 ($SD = 4.225$) as an incentive to join advocacy coalitions to a mean of 7.63 as an incentive to remain ($SD = 4.379$). Recognizing that length of time as a member might impact the shift in incentives, an additional paired

sample *t*-test (two-tailed) was conducted on only those subjects who reported in Question 2 of the survey that their length of membership in the advocacy coalition was about one to three years or more than three years. These results were nearly identical to the results of the first paired sample *t*-test. For instance, material incentives significantly increased as a motivation to join advocacy coalitions ($M = 7.24$, $SD = 4.364$) when compared with their strength as an incentive to remain ($M = 7.79$, $SD = 4.462$).

Table 13

Paired Sample T-tests of Incentives to Join Coalitions to Incentives to Remain in Coalitions

Incentives	*M*	*SD*	*df*	*t*	*n*
Pair 1					
Strategic Join	10.61	2.847	105	.084	106
Strategic Remain	10.59	3.297			
Pair 2					
Resource Join	7.10	4.225	100	-2.827**	101
Resource Remain	7.63	4.379			
Pair 3					
Fellowship Join	9.00	3.289	104	.293	104
Fellowship Remain	8.93	3.766			

**$p < .01$.

Exploratory Question 2

Exploratory question 2 asked, what is the frequency of action alerts received by coalition members? Table 14 shows that the portion of subjects (37.9%, $n = 44$) received action alerts once per month or less as indicated in Question 8 of the survey. Additionally, crosstabulations revealed that the majority of subjects (62.9%, $n = 73$) acted upon 33% or fewer of the action alerts regardless of the frequency of receiving them.

Table 14

Summary of Frequency of Receiving Action Alerts

Group	%	*n*
Once per month or less	37.9	44
Two times per month	25.0	29
Three times per month	12.1	14
Four or more times per month	21.6	25

Exploratory Question 3

Table 15 reveals some of the key similarities and differences between the advocacy tactics requested in action alerts and the advocacy tactics conducted by coalition members during the twelve months prior to the study. For example, endorsing circular letters or petitions had the highest frequency for a tactic requested and conducted at least once during the previous twelve months, while faxing elected officials had the highest frequency for a tactic that was requested but was not conducted at least once;

filing suit or engaging in other legal action had the highest frequency for a tactic that was never requested.

Table 15

Advocacy Tactics Most Frequently Requested and Conducted, Most Frequently Requested and Not Conducted, and Most Frequently Not Requested

Advocacy Tactics	%	*n*
Most Frequently Requested and Conducted		
Endorse circular letters or petitions	64.1	66
Participate in rallies or demonstrations	62.9	66
Email elected officials	61.9	65
Distribute literature about public policy issues	60.8	62
Most Frequently Requested and Not Conducted		
Fax elected officials	38.6	39
Phone elected officials	37.3	38
Submit letters to the editor or op-ed pieces	33.3	33
Mail government agency directors	32.7	32
Most Frequently Not Requested		
File suit or engage in other legal action	87.3	89
Conduct voter registration drive	74.5	76
Conduct research or data collection	64.7	66
Submit letters to the editor or op-ed pieces	55.6	55

The data also showed that email was the most frequently conducted tactical means of contacting elected officials or government agency directors. However, elected officials were contacted by email at twice the rate applying to agency directors (61.9%, $n = 65$; 27.9%, $n = 29$, respectively). This distinction between elected officials and agency directors was repeated for mail, fax, and phone contact. Further, while more than one third of the subjects (39.6%, $n = 40$) reported having testified at a public hearing at least once during the previous twelve months, about the same number of subjects ($n = 41$) had never been asked to testify. Finally, the results showed that more than 50% (58.7%, $n = 61$) of subjects had mobilized their clients for advocacy at least once during the previous twelve months.

Exploratory Question 4

Exploratory question 4 sought to uncover the relationships among core, partner, and peripheral roles in advocacy coalitions and each of the strategic, resource development, and fellowship incentives for joining and remaining. To examine these relationships, incentives were recoded from an interval variable to an ordinal variable and then crosstabulations and chi-square analyses were performed. The only significant findings were discovered in the relationships between role and strategic incentives for joining advocacy coalitions. As Table 16 shows, strategic incentives had at least a minor influence on all of the subjects' decisions to join advocacy coalitions, regardless of role. However, strategic incentives had a strong influence on all of the core members ($n = 18$) and nearly all of the partner members ($n = 20$), whereas, in contrast, one third of the peripheral members reported that strategic incentives were only a minor or moderate

influence on their decision. As mentioned, the chi-square test was significant, $X^2(2, n = 110) = 10.596, p = .005$.

Table 16

Crosstabulation of Role and Strategic Incentives to Join Coalitions

	Influence of Strategic Incentives		
Role	No[a](%)	Minor/Moderate[b](%)	Strong/Significant[c] (%)
Core	0 (0)	0 (0)	18 (21.4)
Partner	0 (0)	3 (11.5)	20 (23.8)
Peripheral	0 (0)	23 (88.5)	46 (54.8)
Total	(0%)	(100%)	(100%)

[a]No score equals 0; [b]minor/moderate score equals 1 through 8; [c]strong/significant score equals 9 through 16.

Exploratory Question 5

This question sought to uncover the relationship between advocacy as an official duty and incentives. Using a series of two-sample *t*-tests for independent samples (two-tailed), Table 17 shows that significant differences were found only in fellowship incentives to remain members of advocacy coalitions where the mean for those subjects who reported that advocacy was not part of their job description was higher ($M = 10.34$, $SD = 3.062$) than those subjects who reported advocacy was part of their job description ($M = 8.36$, $SD = 3.843$).

Table 17

Independent Samples T-tests of Advocacy as an Official Duty to Incentives

Incentives	Advocacy in job description?	*M (n)*	*SD*	*df*	*t*
Incentives to Join					
Strategic	Yes	10.53 (78)	2.691	106	.732
	No	10.00 (30)	3.562		
Resource	Yes	6.93 (75)	4.260	103	-.361
	No	7.27 (30)			
Fellowship	Yes	8.78 (76)	3.393	104	-.980
	No	9.47 (30)	2.921		
Incentives to Remain					
Strategic	Yes	10.33 (76)	3.296	102	-.831
	No	10.93 (28)	3.173		
Resource	Yes	7.25 (75)	4.439	102	-1.223
	No	8.41 (29)	4.067		
Fellowship	Yes	8.36 (76)	3.843	103	-2.499*
	No	10.34 (26)	3.062		

*$p < .05$.

Exploratory Question 6

This exploratory question examined the association between primary job function and incentives, once again using a series of two-sample *t*-tests for independent samples

(two-tailed). As Table 18 illustrates, no significant differences were found between service providers and managers in their incentives to join advocacy coalitions or their incentives to remain.

Table 18

Independent Samples T-tests of Primary Job Function to Incentives

Incentives	Job Function	*M (n)*	*SD*	*df*	*t*
Incentives to Join					
Strategic	Management	11.21 (19)	2.992	95	1.170
	Service	10.33 (78)	2.917		
Resource	Management	6.00 (18)	3.199	91	-1.702
	Service	7.55 (75)	4.391		
Fellowship	Management	9.35 (17)	2.621	92	.575
	Service	8.84 (77)	3.426		
Incentives to Remain					
Strategic	Management	10.88 (17)	3.740	92	.353
	Service	10.58 (77)	3.015		
Resource	Management	6.38 (16)	3.998	91	-1.344
	Service	7.96 (77)	4.351		
Fellowship	Management	9.47 (17)	3.502	92	.708
	Service	8.75 (77)	3.839		

Exploratory Question 7

Exploratory question 7 investigated the relationship between organizational size and incentives. This was first accomplished through a series of Pearson's product-moment correlations. As Table 19 shows, no significant correlations were found between staff size and either incentives to join advocacy coalitions or incentives to remain (two-tailed).

Table 19

Correlations Between Staff Size and Incentives

Variables	Number of Paid Staff (*n*)
Incentives to Join	
Strategic	-.093 (110)
Resource Development	-.107 (108)
Fellowship	-.058 (109)
Incentives to Remain	
Strategic	-.034 (106)
Resource Development	-.087 (106)
Fellowship	-.002 (107)

Note. Data examined using Pearson's product-moment correlation (two-tailed); n = per-cell sample size.

Additionally, in order to conduct a second set of Pearson's correlation coefficients, budget size was recoded from an ordinal variable to interval variable using the midpoints of the ordinal scale. As shown in Table 20, like staff size, no significant findings were found in the correlations between budget size and incentives (two-tailed).

Table 20

Correlations Between Budget Size and Incentives

Variables	Budget Size Interval (*n*)
Incentives to Join	
Strategic	.022 (110)
Resource Development	.043 (106)
Fellowship	.013 (107)
Incentives to Remain	
Strategic	.130 (106)
Resource Development	.084 (106)
Fellowship	.051 (106)

Note. Budget size recoded from an ordinal variable to an interval variable using the midpoints of the ordinal scale; data examined using Pearson's product-moment correlation (two-tailed); n = per-cell sample size.

Exploratory Question 8

This exploratory question was formulated on the prediction that the factors of incentives, job function, official duty, and organizational size would each have a significant relationship to action. However, since only incentives were found to have a significant relationship with action, the path analysis model was not conducted as planned. Rather, it will be the charge of future research to include multiple factors in an examination of their relationship to action.

CHAPTER FOUR: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter reviews the problem, summarizes the findings, discusses the important results, offers implications for the existing literature and organizational practices, recommends improvements to this study, and suggests avenues for further research.

Review of the Problem

America needs to muster significant resources to ensure that children remain safe, live healthy lives, and succeed in school. America's children are undoubtedly underrepresented in the democratic process, and public policy advocacy on their behalf is urgently needed to meet the needs of one of our nation's most dependent and vulnerable populations. Among the important resources available to conduct advocacy on behalf of children are the service providers that children encounter in public charities such as human and social service agencies, hospitals, and educational organizations. Some of these service providers are already engaged in advocacy through a network of advocacy coalitions. These individuals have combined in order to collectively influence public policy. Yet the success of advocacy coalitions is fundamentally dependent on their members heeding the call to action, that is to say, acting upon alert messages that urge advocacy. Without action, advocacy coalitions cannot effect changes in public policy. While a number of factors likely influence the responsiveness of coalition members to calls to action, this project examined a central factor in all behavior: the motives behind it.

There is an immense amount of complexity and variability in the motives that drive people and groups. Behavior is derived from a wide range of motives generated

from both personal and organizational forces, such as needs for moral fulfillment, altruistic drives, interpersonal relations, and material gains, to name a few. Additionally, not all motives are universal and, equally importantly, different motives appear to impact behavior differently. But what do individual motives and organizational factors have to do with individuals from public charities joining and participating in child-focused advocacy coalitions? To add to the understanding of this important subject, this study tested five hypotheses and explored seven additional questions in order to enhance the understanding of motivation and its role in advocacy coalitions. Why do individuals from public charities join child-focused advocacy coalitions? Is there an association between reasons for joining advocacy coalitions and the frequency of heeding the calls to action? How do other factors, such as role in the coalition, job function, advocacy as an official duty, and organizational size, impact coalition members heeding the call to action?

Summary of Results

Surveys were mailed to 400 members of child-focused advocacy coalitions in California. Responses were received from 120 subjects, yielding a final valid response rate of 36.8%, with the largest portion of subjects having been members of Coalition D.

Explanatory Elements

Several significant results were revealed with regards to hypothesis 1. First, the hypothesis was supported: the number of action alerts that coalition members responded to was correlated with the incentives that motivated them to join the coalition. Strategic incentives had the strongest positive correlation, followed by fellowship incentives and resource development incentives. A combination of strategic and fellowship incentives served as a significant predictor of up to 17.3% of the variance in action. An examination

of the results showed that two of the top three "most significantly influencing" reasons to join advocacy coalitions were tied to strategic incentives, whereas two of the top three "non-influential items" were tied to resource development incentives. Overall, a picture emerged showing that strategic incentives were the most influential incentives to join advocacy coalitions, with the largest positive correlation with action. By contrast, resource development incentives were the least influential incentives to join advocacy coalitions, with the smallest positive correlation with action. Fellowship incentives fell in between strategic and resource development incentives for both influence to join and correlation with action.

Still other significant findings emerged from the testing of hypothesis 1. For instance, there were significant positive correlations among the various pairs of incentives. The results revealed that strategic, fellowship, and resource development incentives were all significantly and positively correlated with each other. Finally, the data showed that the mean level of action was about 33%, with the majority of subjects having acted upon one fifth or fewer of the action alerts they had received during the previous twelve months. The results, however, were not statistically significant for the remaining hypotheses.

Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5 were not supported by the data. For hypothesis 2, core and partner members had higher means for action in the sample than peripheral members, but no statistically significant difference was detected. Since three fourths of the subjects were peripheral members, the small sample size of the core and partner members may have inhibited detection of a statistical difference in action between the groups. It should also be noted that since a large portion of the subjects identified themselves as peripheral

members, this might have skewed the findings throughout the study towards these self-identified outermost participants of the advocacy coalitions. Next, for hypothesis 3, no significant difference in action was detected between those subjects reporting that advocacy was part of their job description compared to those subjects reporting that advocacy was not part of their job description. Since more than two thirds of the subjects reported that advocacy was part of their job description, the small sample size for comparison may have inhibited detection of a significant difference.

Interestingly, for hypothesis 4, the results ran contrary to the prediction: subjects who reported their job function as service to clients had a higher, not lower, mean for action than managers. However, further statistical analysis failed to reveal a significant difference. Because more than four times as many subjects were managers as compared to service staff, the small sample size for service staff may have precluded detection of a significant difference in action. Finally, the examination of hypothesis 5 found no relationship between organizational size and action. No correlation was found between staff size and action, nor were differences in action revealed between the various budget sizes. With regards to budget size, because the majority of subjects reported their organization's budget as more than $1 million, actual differences could have been obscured by the imprecise nature of the top-heavy data in ordinal scale for budget.

It should be underscored that since the results supported hypothesis 1, there is probably a relationship between incentives and action in the population under examination. However, the fact the results failed to support hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5 does not mean that no differences exist in action with regards to role, official duty, job function, or organizational size. While individuals within each of these groups may have

heeded similar percentages of calls to action during the previous twelve months, differences may appear on other dimensions of action such as types of advocacy activity undertaken. Additional research is warranted to confirm the null hypothesis of the unsubstantiated predictions.

Exploratory Elements

The data revealed a number of significant findings during the examination of exploratory question 1. First, the results showed that the relative influence of strategic, fellowship, and resource development incentives on subjects' decisions to remain members of advocacy coalitions was the same as on their decision to join: strategic incentives were most influential, followed by fellowship and then resource development incentives. Additionally, the incentives to remain members were strongly correlated with the incentives to join; as incentives to join increased, there tended to be a corresponding increase in incentives to remain. However, a significant shift from joining to remaining appeared only in resource development incentives. The mean for resource development incentives to remain was significantly higher than the mean for resource development incentives to join. In fact, with regards to strategic and fellowship incentives, there was essentially no meaningful shift at all.

Next, exploratory questions 2 and 3 inquired into action alerts. The data revealed that most subjects received action alerts once per month or less. The results also showed that most subjects acted upon 33% or fewer of the action alerts, regardless of the frequency of receiving them. Endorsing letters or circular petitions and participating in rallies were the two most frequently requested and conducted advocacy tactics. Email was the most frequently conducted means of contacting elected officials and government

agency directors. Elected officials were contacted at twice the rate of agency directors. Finally, while the data revealed that the majority of subjects had mobilized their clients for advocacy at least once during the previous twelve months and that more than one third of the subjects reported having testified at a public hearing, various other advocacy tactics — for example, legal action, voter registration, and undertaking research — had yet to be requested by advocacy coalitions to any meaningful degree.

The investigation of exploratory question 4 showed that strategic incentives played a part in all of the subjects' decisions to join advocacy coalitions, regardless of their role. Moreover, all of the core members reported that strategic incentives played a strong influence on their decision to join. Next, regarding exploratory question 5, the results demonstrated that fellowship incentives played a significantly greater part in the decision to remain members of advocacy coalitions for those subjects who did not have advocacy in their job description than it did for those subjects who did have advocacy in their job description.

Finally, no significant findings were discovered with regards to exploratory question 6 or exploratory question 7. The data did not reveal any relationship between incentives and job function, nor did the results show any relationship between organizational size and incentives.

Discussion of Important Results

Incentives and Action

This research sought to understand why individuals from public charities joined child-focused advocacy coalitions and to identify factors that influenced responses to the call to action. Motivations were revealed and important factors were identified. This

study discovered that the incentives to join advocacy coalitions were positively correlated with the number of calls to action that members of advocacy coalitions responded to. As the influence of the incentives to join increased, there tended to be corresponding increases in action. This evidence validates motivation theory: variations in behavior can be explained, at least in part, by motivation. In this study, subjects tended to work harder — that is, respond to more action alerts — as their incentives to join advocacy coalitions increased. This is an important finding. But as the results of this study revealed, not all incentives were equally influential.

This study discovered that strategic incentives were the most influential incentives. By and large, coalition members joined advocacy coalitions to bring about social change to benefit others, to express important personal values, to achieve broad goals, and to provide altruistic service for others. In fact, the evidence showed that core members of the coalitions were motivated especially by strategic incentives. Resource development incentives were the least influential incentives. Opportunities to advance their organization, to protest cuts in funding to their organization, to generate revenue for their organization, or to maximize the flow of money to their organization played a small role, at best, in decisions to join advocacy coalitions. Moreover, not only did strategic incentives play the most significant role in decisions to join advocacy coalitions, but these incentives also correlated most closely with levels of response to action alerts. As the influence of strategic incentives grew, there tended to be larger corresponding increases in action as compared to equivalent increases in the influence of resource development incentives. The contrast is readily apparent. Coalition members primarily joined to serve, benefit, and achieve broad goals for others; they were not motivated by

material gains for their organizations. In effect, it appears that strategic incentives served as the core influence on coalition members. Equally importantly, the motivation to serve and benefit others was associated comparatively strongly with action. These too are important discoveries.

However, the study also revealed that incentives to join advocacy coalitions do not operate in isolation from one another. For instance, while strategic incentives were the most influential incentives, they did not serve, when taken in isolation, as the firmest basis for prediction. Rather, the largest amount of variance in action could be accounted for by simultaneously observing the level of influence of both strategic and fellowship incentives. Furthermore, the results showed that as the influence of one set of incentives grew, there tended to be corresponding increases in the other incentives as well. This was particularly true in the case of fellowship incentives. As the influence of either strategic or resource development incentives grew, there tended to be a relatively large corresponding increase in fellowship incentives. It appears that as the influence of motivations to serve and benefit others or to enhance material gains grows, so does the need to do so among like-minded individuals. Overall, the evidence showed significant relationships amongst the incentives to join advocacy coalitions. But such interrelationships were not limited to incentives to join.

The results revealed that the incentives to join advocacy coalitions were significantly correlated with the incentives to remain. As the influence of incentives to join grew, there tended to be corresponding increases in the incentives to remain. This was the case for each of the pairs of incentives: strategic incentives to join correlated strongly with strategic incentives to remain, and so forth. In fact, the correlation between

resource development incentives to join and to remain was exceptionally strong. While these findings showed that the motivation level for joining advocacy coalitions was significantly related to the motivation level to remain, other, related evidence revealed the extent to which incentives shifted from joining to remaining. The study found that there were no significant changes from joining to remaining for either strategic or fellowship incentives. It was as if the level of influence of these incentives at joining continued to be the ongoing level of influence. In contrast, however, the results showed a significant shift in resource development incentives. The level of influence of resource development incentives was significantly stronger for remaining with advocacy coalitions than for joining them. It appears that something special was happening to bring about an increase over time in the strength of resource development incentives. Perhaps coalition members saw that material rewards were to be gained from their participation in coalition activities and they increasingly staked a claim on financially beneficial outcomes of action. However, even the increased influence of resource development incentives still did not meet the strength of fellowship or strategic incentives. They grew, but they did not surpass the influence of the other incentives.

The study found a significant relationship between incentives and official duty. Fellowship incentives to remain members of advocacy coalitions were more influential among those members who did not have advocacy in their job description as compared to those members who did. It was as if those members without advocacy in their job description had a found a community of like-minded individuals with whom to network and associate. The evidence showed that these members were willing to expand their

official role beyond service provision, and in doing so the sense of fellowship strongly influenced their decision to remain with the coalition.

Advocacy Tactics and Action

One exploratory question of this study was to assess the similarities and differences between advocacy tactics requested in action alerts and the advocacy tactics conducted by coalition members. The study revealed several important results in this line of inquiry. First, the evidence implied there were "tried and true" tactics in place in advocacy coalitions. Tactics such as endorsing circular letters, participating in rallies, and emailing elected officials stood out as frequently requested and frequently conducted tactics. However, while some tactics were requested and conducted far less frequently, the results showed that, broadly speaking, specific tactics were requested, but not conducted, about one third of the time. No single tactic stood as the one tactic few members conducted. Conversely, several tactics stood out as very infrequently requested, including legal action, voter registration, and research. The evidence showed that coalition members were much more engaged with elected officials than with government agency directors. This may suggest that advocacy coalitions form to engage elected officials on behalf of children. In fact, the focus on elected officials matches well with the strong influence of strategic incentives. Coalition members joined to achieve broad goals and, as such, directed their attention towards these crafters of broad policy goals. By contrast, the findings suggested that engagement with government agency directors was being handled elsewhere, perhaps at the group level with individual public charities rather than at the coalition level. Additionally, while this study's charity workers heeded the call to action on behalf of others, it was encouraging to discover that a majority of the

coalition members had mobilized clients to conduct advocacy on their own behalf. Finally, the results showed that coalition members responded to about one in three calls to action, with a majority of members responding to about one in five calls.

In summary, this study found that public charity workers joined child-focused advocacy coalitions in order to speak and act on behalf of others towards the achievement of broad goals. These incentives promoted action more than did opportunities for fellowship or for material rewards. Additionally, the study revealed important differences in advocacy tactics requested and conducted, most notably that coalition members were much more engaged with elected officials than with government agency directors. Coalition leaders should use these findings to enhance their ability to attract and retain hard-working members. Specific implications of these findings for organizational practices will be addressed later in this chapter.

Implications for Existing Literature

The results of this study inform the existing literature in a number of valuable ways. First of all, it drew attention to under-researched segments of society, in particular, child-focused advocacy coalitions. It responded to the call by De Vita et al. (2001) for more research on organizations that directed their attention towards children and it added to the growing body of knowledge on these important advocates for children.

The study also added more empirical evidence to the understanding of motivation in the context of child-focused advocacy coalitions. For instance, referring to Beck's (1983) summary of the four basic philosophies of motivation in the workplace, the rational/economic viewpoint was not supported by the evidence. Rather, the results indicated that motivation is a complex construct with great variability. The findings

support Barnard's (1938) argument that non-material incentives are more important than material rewards. It appears, as Barnard asserted, that political organizations would not be able to survive without the ability to satisfy personal, altruistic ideals, a position similarly argued by Berry (1977). In contrast, the study provided evidence counter to Clark and Wilson's (1961) claims that for purposive organizations, such as advocacy groups, "fewer people are willing to accept organizational purposes than are willing to accept material or solidary inducement" (p. 151). The results revealed that purposive incentives, such as bringing about social change to benefit others and achieving broad goals, were far more accepted and influential than material incentives like generating revenue or maximizing the flow of money.

Next, the results furthered Hula's (1999) argument that coalition members' work-levels are closely correlated with the reasons why the members joined the coalition. Indeed, the evidence showed that strategic, fellowship, and material incentives were closely correlated with work-level. Additionally, the results supported Hula's assertion that the incentives that motivated a group to join a coalition influenced the role the group played in the coalition: for example, core members were significantly motivated by strategic incentives. Essentially, the findings successfully extended Hula's work in a couple of meaningful directions. It appears that Hula's (1999) arguments applied to a narrower range of behavior, specifically acting upon action alerts, and his model applied to individuals whose primary role lay outside public policy engagement. Lastly, the findings enrich the existing literature on advocacy. Previous studies, particularly those based on IRS documents, failed to capture many advocacy activities. In contrast, this study revealed a number of important facets of such activities. For example, some

advocacy activities, such as supporting rallies and endorsing petitions, were far more frequently undertaken than activities involving legal action or voter registration.

Implications for Organizational Practices

So far, this study has provided evidence for two of the main purposes of research: explanation and prediction. The results have explained the significance of incentives and their relationship to action. For example, it has been shown that strategic incentives were the primary incentive to join advocacy coalitions and had the largest positive correlation with action. The results also lend themselves to prediction. For example, it has been shown that observing the level of influence of both strategic and fellowship incentives served as the best predictor of action. However, leaders of advocacy coalitions should also use these findings for another main purpose of research: the application of knowledge. It was an important goal of this research to support leaders of child-focused advocacy coalitions in their efforts to increase organizational capacity and build a stronger voice for children. With that goal in mind, certain implications for organizational practices at advocacy coalitions follow.

Because coalition members join for a variety of reasons, leaders of child-focused advocacy coalitions ought to pay attention to the motivation of their members when they join. In fact, coalition leaders would do well to pay careful attention to the motivations of their members, because not all incentives exert equal influence on action. Implementing systems to record and assess the incentives that motivated new members to join would aid in the endeavor to predict and control the capacity of advocacy coalitions to engage policymakers on behalf of children. Assessments of incentives to join could be used to ensure strong matches between particular coalition members and particular coalition

activities, thus strengthening organizational capacity. For example, if a coalition member was strongly motivated by fellowship incentives, perhaps he or she could work on fostering networks within the coalition. By managing the fulfillment of coalition members' motivations for joining, coalition leaders might build on the incentives most likely to fuel action. Furthermore, since the evidence showed that strategic incentives served as coalition members' core incentives for action, leaders of advocacy coalitions ought to turn their attention towards nurturing these incentives. Implementing systems to promote each of the coalitions' activities as efforts tied to the achievement of broad goals for the benefit of others would cultivate these essential motivators for core strength and action. In fact, since the evidence showed that members primarily joined the coalition for strategic incentives, marketing the coalition as a tool for social change to potential members could well facilitate recruitment of similarly motivated members.

Additionally, leaders of advocacy coalitions would do well to seek out those members who are acting outside of their official duties and to provide validation for their participation, to introduce them to the social networks and norms, and to aid in the fulfillment of their needs for fellowship. Otherwise, these members may retreat from public policy engagement. In fact, the nurturing of fellowship incentives, particularly for peripheral members, could be used as a tool to build solidarity among coalition members with disparate motivations and interests. As suggested, leaders of advocacy coalitions should refine their observations and nurture incentives in their attempts to strengthen the core and increase action, but they must also recognize the potential limits of members to heed the call. As Subject 239 indicated,

> My org[anization] focuses on health issues. Thus, I can't/won't respond to alerts about issues on other topics. Not because we don't care, but to preserve our focus and be disciplined with our limited resources.

Further research is certainly warranted to understand the barriers to action public charities face, even with the best of intentions to heed the call.

The results also suggest that coalition leaders should continue to request that members endorse letters and participate in rallies; members tended to perform these activities readily when asked. Coalition leaders should also continue to direct advocacy activities towards elected officials; members also tended to perform these functions when asked. Perhaps practices within coalitions could be developed that build on the strong match between strategic incentives for joining and advocacy directed at elected officials with the goal of fostering organizational capacity. Coalition leaders might also consider directing more advocacy activities towards government agency directors that implement public policy. Encouraging more action on this point in the public policy process might facilitate an increase in coalition capacity through those members with close working relationships with agency directors. Coalition leaders should consider ways to leverage such relationships to strengthen the voices of children. Finally, perhaps there is opportunity for increased capacity in the less frequently requested tactics like voter registration. Experimenting with less frequently requested tactics might uncover untapped resources and opportunities for public policy engagement.

In conclusion, public charity workers are indeed heeding the call to action on behalf of children. They are members of advocacy coalitions and they are actively engaged in public policy from a broad, altruistic standpoint where personal values and

service for others outweigh material rewards. As Subject 304 concluded on the survey, "children do not have a voice in our political system and the only way to give [them] voice is to join with others who care about them." Hopefully, the results of this study will aid in this important endeavor. However, any changes in organizational practices certainly warrant consideration of the limited resources at hand and the innumerable factors not addressed by this study. With sound planning and thoughtful use of this study's findings, the capacity of child-focused advocacy coalitions could be enhanced, improving the frequency at which coalition members heed the calls to action, furthering public policy engagement, and fostering safe, healthy, successful lives for children.

Recommendations

Improvements to this Study

If this research were to be conducted in the future, several recommendations may be set forth:

1. Since subjects were selected from only four advocacy coalitions, the pool of potential subjects was somewhat limited for the random selection process. About 20% of the randomly selected potential subjects in this study worked in the same public charity as other subjects. Involving a larger number of advocacy coalitions or selecting only one subject per public charity might enhance the diversity of the results.
2. A larger sample size might improve the ability to detect significant findings, particularly with regards to the investigations of role, job function, and official duty.

3. Survey Questions 4 and 6 could be changed in key ways. First, given that nearly 20% of the subjects wrote in Question 5 that the desire for information was one of their other reasons for joining the advocacy coalition, adding "information" as an item on these questions would improve the ability to measure the relative strength of that oft-cited motivation. Similarly, it might be useful to amend these questions so that subjects could indicate the relative strength of any of the other reasons they choose to add.
4. Survey Question 9 could be clarified to indicate its meaning more precisely. To some subjects "acted on" might have included behaviors other than advocacy activities. Alternatively, this question could be revised from "acted on" to "responded to" to create more alignment between the hypotheses and the operationalization of the variable action.
5. Since many nonprofits workers are volunteers, Question 14 of the survey could be changed to include volunteers.
6. Since most of the subjects indicated that their organizations' budget size was more than $1 million, changing Question 15 of the survey to allow for more precise responses might more accurately capture the data on budget size.

Further Research

Certainly the understanding of motivation and behavior in the context of child-focused advocacy coalitions is open to further examination. The following avenues for research are recommended:

1. Further research could continue the examination of incentives and their relationship with levels of response to action alerts. For example, what practices

are coalitions using to strengthen the core and build fellowship? To what extent are particular incentives related to conducting particular advocacy tactics?

2. Further research could examine the relationships between action and role, job function, official duty, and organizational size. Do differences in responsiveness to calls to action appear on dimensions not examined by this study? Are combinations of these factors significantly related to heeding the call to action?
3. Further research could examine the shift in incentives. For example, a longitudinal study might more accurately reveal the influence of incentives over time. What is happening that facilitates a shift in resource development incentives but not in strategic or fellowship incentives?
4. Further research could examine the implications of some of the assumptions made in this study. For example, how, if at all, does organizational sanction for participation in coalitions impact heeding the call to action? What are the similarities and differences between personal incentives and organizational incentives for coalition members?
5. Further research could examine barriers and disincentives to action. For example, what factors inhibit heeding the call to action? What factors reduce motivation to heed the call? How do incentives, barriers, and disincentives play out in the decision-making processes of coalition members?
6. Further research could examine less formalized child-focused advocacy coalitions. Do this study's findings hold true for coalitions without separate staff, offices, or identities from their members or coalitions formed under temporary or ad hoc arrangements?

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Survey of California Nonprofit Organizations

Thank you for completing this brief survey. **Your answers will be kept confidential.**

Part I: This section is about your membership in groups.

1. **Which of the following groups are you a member of?** For purposes of this study, "member" is defined as being on the group's contact list. Check ALL that apply.

   - ☐ [redacted] [Coalition A]
   - ☐ [redacted] [Coalition B]
   - ☐ [redacted] [Coalition C]
   - ☐ [redacted] [Coalition D]

   - ☐ None of the above

   If you selected only one group, skip to question 2, otherwise continue with question 1.a. If you selected none of the above, please return the questionnaire.

   1.a. **If you selected more than one group above**, please answer the remainder of the survey with reference to the **group you consider yourself most active with during the last twelve months**. Please indicate below which one group you've selected to consider when completing the remainder of the survey. Check only ONE.

   - ☐ [redacted] [Coalition A]
   - ☐ [redacted] [Coalition B]
   - ☐ [redacted] [Coalition C]
   - ☐ [redacted] [Coalition D]

PLEASE ANSWER THE REMAINING QUESTIONS WITH REFERENCE TO THE GROUP WITH WHICH YOU ARE MOST ACTIVE.

2. **How long have you been a member of the group** you selected in question 1? Check only ONE.

   - ☐ Less than six months
   - ☐ About six months to one year
   - ☐ About one to three years
   - ☐ More than three years

3. **Which of the following words best characterizes your role in the group** you selected in question 1? Check only ONE.

   - ☐ Core member
   - ☐ Partner
   - ☐ Peripheral

4. In the scale below, indicate **what reasons initially motivated you to JOIN the group** you selected in question 1. In this scale, "0" means not a reason in your decision to become a member; "1" means a minor influence on your decision; and "4" means a significant influence on your decision.

Reasons for JOINING	**Level of Influence** Circle ONE number per reason				
	Not at all	**Minor** ⟶			**Significant**
Bring about social change to benefit others	0	1	2	3	4
Advance your organization	0	1	2	3	4
Associate with like-minded individuals	0	1	2	3	4
Express important personal values	0	1	2	3	4
Protest cuts in funding to your organization	0	1	2	3	4
Network with colleagues	0	1	2	3	4
Achieve broad goals	0	1	2	3	4
Generate revenue for your organization	0	1	2	3	4
Obtain mutual support in personal attitudes	0	1	2	3	4
Provide altruistic service for others	0	1	2	3	4
Maximize flow of money to your organization	0	1	2	3	4
Develop new friendships	0	1	2	3	4

5. In the space below, describe **what other reasons motivated you to JOIN the group** you selected in question 1? If none, write none.

6. In the scale below, indicate **what reasons currently motivate you to REMAIN a member of the group** you selected in question 1. In this scale, "0" means not a reason in your decision to remain a member; "1" means a minor influence on your decision; and "4" means a significant influence on your decision.

Reasons for REMAINING	**Level of Influence** Circle ONE number per reason				
	Not at all	**Minor**			**Significant**
Bring about social change to others	0	1	2	3	4
Advance your organization	0	1	2	3	4
Associate with like-minded individuals	0	1	2	3	4
Express important personal values	0	1	2	3	4
Protest cuts in funding to your organization	0	1	2	3	4
Network with colleagues	0	1	2	3	4
Achieve broad goals	0	1	2	3	4
Generate revenue for your organization	0	1	2	3	4
Obtain mutual support in personal attitudes	0	1	2	3	4
Provide altruistic service for others	0	1	2	3	4
Maximize flow of money to your organization	0	1	2	3	4
Develop new friendships	0	1	2	3	4

7. In the space below, describe what **other reasons currently motivate you to REMAIN a member of the group** you selected in question 1? If none, write none.

Part II: This section is about "Action Alerts." "Action Alerts" are defined as messages from the group that urge you to conduct advocacy around a particular issue. Action Alerts may have been received in any number of ways, including by email, fax, postal mail, phone calls or face-to-face communication.

8. About **how many Action Alerts did you receive each month over the last twelve months** from the group you selected in question 1? Check only ONE.

   - ❑ Once per month or less
   - ❑ Two times per month
   - ❑ Three times per month
   - ❑ Four or more times per month

   - ❑ Never. If never, then skip questions 8 and 9 and proceed to question 10.

9. Using your best guess, **complete the following statement:**

   I've acted on _____ % of the total Action Alerts I received during the last 12 months.

   If zero percent, write 0.

10. In the question below, **indicate by placing an X** if the Action Alerts you received from the group you selected in question 1 **asked you to do the advocacy activity listed anytime during the last twelve months** AND **indicate by placing an X whether or not you did** the requested action. Do not consider advocacy activities you conduct in addition to those requested by the Action Alerts.

Activities (during last 12 months)	**Asked to do Did at least once**	**Asked to do Never did**	**Never asked to do**
Testify at public hearings	___	___	___
Submit written testimony	___	___	___
Mobilize clients to conduct advocacy	___	___	___
Email elected officials	___	___	___
Mail elected officials	___	___	___
Fax elected officials	___	___	___
Phone elected officials	___	___	___
Meet with elected officials or their staff	___	___	___
Email government agency directors	___	___	___
Mail government agency directors	___	___	___
Fax government agency directors	___	___	___
Phone government agency directors	___	___	___
Meet with government agency directors	___	___	___
Participate in rallies or demonstrations	___	___	___
Endorse circulating letters or petitions	___	___	___
Submit letters to the editor or op-ed pieces	___	___	___
Distribute literature about public policy issues	___	___	___
File suit or engage in other legal action	___	___	___
Conduct voter registration drive	___	___	___
Conduct research or data collection	___	___	___
Conduct public education campaign	___	___	___
Other. Specify _____	___	___	
Other. Specify _____	___	___	
Other. Specify _____	___	___	

Part III: This section is about your organization.

11. **Are contributions to your organization tax-deductible?** Check only ONE.

- ❑ Yes
- ❑ No

11.a. Which of the following **best describes your organization**? Check only ONE.

- ❑ Nonprofit for whom contributions are NOT tax-deductible. Describe _____
- ❑ Local, state or federal agency
- ❑ For-profit
- ❑ Other. Describe _____

12. What is **your primary job function**? Check only ONE.

- ❑ Provide services to clients
- ❑ Management
- ❑ Other. Specify _____

13. As you may know, nonprofit organizations are legally permitted to conduct advocacy. **Is advocacy part of your job description**? Check only ONE.

- ❑ Yes
- ❑ No

14. **About how many paid staff** (full-time and part-time) members are employed at your organization?
If none, write 0.

____ Number of paid staff members

15. What is **your organization's budget** for the current year? Check only ONE.

- ❑ Less than $100,000
- ❑ $101,000 to $500,000
- ❑ $501,000 to $1 million
- ❑ More than $1 million

Thank you for your time. **Please mail back the completed survey in the supplied envelope. Or, mail to:**
Kevin Hickey, 1477 Florida Street San Francisco, CA 94110

If you have questions, contact Kevin Hickey at 415-336-7123 or khickey@usfca.edu. If you would like a copy of the results, write your name and address on the back flap of the return envelope, and the results will be sent to you.

I welcome your additional comments. If you have anything else you would like to say, please write your comments on the back of this page.

Appendix B

March 15, 2004
Name of Recipient, Title
Organization
Address
City, State Zip Code

Dear Name of Recipient:

Hello, my name is Kevin Hickey. I'm a graduate student in the College of Professional Studies at the University of San Francisco (USF), and I also work at a nonprofit agency providing employment services to youth with disabilities. For my graduate thesis, I'm conducting a study on public policy participation of staff from nonprofit organizations. I'm researching why people, like yourself, may have become involved with public policy on behalf of children, youth and their families. This study is important because so much of the vital work we do depends on sound public policies. Yet, a great deal of knowledge remains to be learned from the motives and activities of people like you. I'm asking you to participate in this research study because I believe your unique experiences will add valuable insight into the efforts to strengthen the lives of children.

I was given permission to contact you and your contact information by (name of advocacy group), an organization from which you receive information on public policy matters. They have joined me in seeking a deeper understanding of the issues that impact the work we do. If you agree to participate in this study, please complete the enclosed survey and return the survey to me in the provided pre-addressed, pre-stamped envelope. This survey will take about ten minutes to complete. To receive a copy of the results, simply write your name and address on the back flap of the return envelope.

Maintaining your confidentiality is important to me. Although you will not be asked to put your name on the survey, I will know that you were asked to participate in the study. However, participation may mean a loss of confidentiality. In order to safeguard your confidentiality, all records will remain permanently confidential, only I will have access to the coded and locked files. Your identity will not be revealed in any reports, publications or conversations resulting from the study. Also, your individual results will not be revealed to (name of advocacy group), nor will they know precisely who was mailed a survey. While there is no direct benefit to you for participating in the study, the anticipated benefit of the study is to enhance the understanding of the public policy activities by the nonprofit community.

Participation in this research is voluntary. While it is unlikely, it is possible that some of the survey questions may make you feel uncomfortable. You are free to refuse to participate, decline to answer any question or withdraw at any point without penalties or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. While (name of organization) is aware of this study, they do not require you to participate.

There will be no monetary costs to you, nor will you be reimbursed for participating in the study. I ask only for your time and effort. If you have questions, I can be reached at 415-336-7123 or khickey@usfca.edu. You're also welcome to contact the USF Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at 415-422-6091.

Thank you very much for your time and attention. I hope you join me in my attempt to gain a greater understanding of our important work. **Please complete and return the survey today.**

Sincerely,
Kevin Hickey
Graduate Student, Master's of Nonprofit Administration, University of San Francisco

Dear <Name of Recipient>:

I recently mailed you a survey which asks why people, like yourself, may have become involved in public policy on behalf of children.

If you've not already done please complete and return survey today.

Your response will add valuable insight into the efforts to strengthen the lives of children.

This survey is undertaken as a requirement for my Masters in Nonprofit Administration. I appreciate your time and support.

If you cannot find your survey, please contact me at 415-336-7123 or khickey@usfca.edu.

Thanks for your prompt attention.
Sincerely,

Kevin Hickey

PLEASE
PLACE
STAMP

Recipient
Organization
Address
City, State Zip

Reminder

If you've not already done so, please complete your survey today.

Appendix D

REMINDER

Please complete and return the enclosed survey by Friday, April 9, 2004.

April 2, 2004
Name of Recipient, Title
Organization
Address
City, State Zip Code

Dear Name of Recipient:

A few weeks ago you should have received a letter from me, accompanied by a survey. As you may recall, I'm a graduate student at the University of San Francisco (USF). For my thesis, I'm conducting a study on public policy participation of staff from nonprofit organizations. I'm researching why people, like yourself, may have become involved with public policy on behalf of children, youth and their families. This study is important because so much of the vital work we do depends on sound public policies. Yet, a great deal of knowledge remains to be learned from the motives and activities of people like you. I'm asking you to participate in this research study because I believe your unique experiences will add valuable insight into the efforts to strengthen the lives of children.

I was given permission to contact you and your contact information by (name of advocacy group), an organization from which you receive information on public policy matters. They have joined me in seeking a deeper understanding of the issues that impact the work we do. If you agree to participate in this study, please complete the enclosed survey and return the survey to me in the provided pre-addressed, pre-stamped envelope. This survey will take about ten minutes to complete. To receive a copy of the results, simply write your name and address on the back flap of the return envelope.

Maintaining your confidentiality is important to me. Although you will not be asked to put your name on the survey, I will know that you were asked to participate in the study. However, participation may mean a loss of confidentiality. In order to safeguard your confidentiality, all records will remain permanently confidential, only I will have access to the coded and locked files. Your identity will not be revealed in any reports, publications or conversations resulting from the study. Also, your individual results will not be revealed to (name of advocacy group), nor will they know precisely who was mailed a survey. While there is no direct benefit to you for participating in the study, the anticipated benefit of the study is to enhance the understanding of the public policy activities by the nonprofit community.

Participation in this research is voluntary. While it is unlikely, it is possible that some of the survey questions may make you feel uncomfortable. You are free to refuse to participate, decline to answer any question or withdraw at any point without penalties or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. While (name of organization) is aware of this study, they do not require you to participate.

There will be no monetary costs to you, nor will you be reimbursed for participating in the study. I ask only for your time and effort. If you have questions, I can be reached at 415-336-7123 or khickey@usfca.edu. You're also welcome to contact the USF Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at 415-422-6091.

Please complete and return the survey. Your response is important to me and to the field.

Very Much Obliged,
Kevin Hickey
Graduate Student, Master's of Nonprofit Administration, University of San Francisco