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Creating and living authentic lives : finding ourselves in the midst of everydayness

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CREATING AND LIVING AUTHENTIC LIVES:
FINDING OURSELVES IN THE MIDST OF EVERYDAYNESS

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the School of Education,
Organization and Leadership Department

In partial fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctorate of Education

BY
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SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

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This dissertation, written under the direction of the candidate's

Dissertation committee and approved by the members of the committee,

Has been presented to and accepted by the faculty of the School of

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In this work represent the work of the candidate alone.

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Dedication

To my Father and Mother in their blessing and love.
To my wife, Grace, for her unconditional support.
To my dearest daughter, Kate.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

<u>Introduction</u>

What makes for a well-lived life? How does one go about making choices that

enable one to lead such a life? Having thought about and struggled with these questions

myself, I am delighted to add my voice to the ongoing discussion on how to live an

authentic life and find oneself in the midst of everydayness. The purpose of this study is

to develop informed curriculum and leadership agendas to promote the creating and

living of authentic lives by organization and community members. More specifically,

this research pertains to the private and public spaces that culture provides those who

are interested in the moral domain. Three categories direct this inquiry: authenticity,

narrative identity, and imagination. These categories are derived from the work of

Martin Heidegger (1962), Paul Ricoeur (1984; 1988; 1992), and Richard Kearney

(1995; 1988; 2002). One major implication of the research could reside in the

development of curriculum to help organization and community members reflect on the

moral domain of their lives. In the introduction to their book, *Questioning Ethics*,

Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley (1999: 2) bring authors together from many

disciplines and cultures to delve into the nature of social life and argue that "no amount

of neo-Nietzchean aestheticizing can dispense with the need for moral…vigilance."

Statement of Research Topic

As adults, we often become part of the social mass, the anonymous "they." The

complex processes of everyday life so completely absorb our attention that we can lose

contact with our deepest inner selves. We live basically scattered and fragmented lives,

pushed and pulled this way and that by the changing tides of fad and fashion. Our hectic

and "involved" way of life effectively shields us from the disclosure of our underlying

existential anxiety, guilt, and fear of death. Our post-modern culture provides ready-

made ways of interpreting everything.

By keeping ourselves preoccupied with small talk, chatter, and "everydayness,"

we lose the uncanniness of existence in a tranquil and familiar world. We are thrown

into the middle of a fully-formed human culture. We often develop a social personality

by slightly modifying the "they-self." We seldom make real choices of our own; rather,

we are carried along by the expectations of our culture. We can grow into

fundamentally irresolute people, lost in what "they" say. To be sure, we may be deeply

involved and busily engaged, but whose life-purposes are we pursuing? Many of us

become responsible adults but inauthentic people. In order to notice the lostness,

fragmentation, and conformity, something must reach us where we are submerged in

inauthenticity. We too often become interchangeable parts of the huge social

mechanism; if we become unavailable for our roles, then someone else can easily step

into our places, perhaps playing "our" parts even better than we did.

<u>Background of Research Topic</u>

C. Wright Mills (1959) described the post-modern period as one in which the

economy would shift employment from heavy industry to non-unionized clerical,

service, and new industrial sectors. He foresaw the rise of multinational corporations,

trouble in the social welfare system, and a decline in human freedom and choice.

In his *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1984; 1987), Habermas presents a

general framework that attempts to explain how capitalist modernization produces

social pathologies. He argues that social well-being depends on a critical balance

between social processes—which reproduce cultural traditions, social integration, and

personal identities—and activities related to the economic and productive operations

necessary for physical survival. In his view, capitalist modernization upsets the balance

between the first realm—a background context, which he calls the "lifeworld," in which

we construct, maintain and refresh meanings—and the second, which he calls "system."

In modernity, directives from the system begin to outweigh those deriving from the

lifeworld. Concerns such as profitability, productivity, efficiency, practicality, success,

and economic growth—the various essences of capitalism and industrialization—

gradually displace other interests related to the integrity of the lifeworld—such as play,

morals, self-expression, and social norms.

In the post-modern world, our imagination is controlled by the media of money

and power. Our public spaces are subjected to bureaucratic social administration (as in

policing, propaganda, social work, and mass education) and social manipulation by the

marketplace (as in advertising and commercial mass media). Simultaneously, we

struggle with depression, boredom, and substance abuse in our private spaces.

Increasing numbers of people in our society have trouble maintaining a sense of

meaningfulness in what they do and how they live.

Significance of Study

It is expected that this dissertation will indicate how people can become more

authentic when everything in post-modern culture pulls in the opposite direction,

keeping people un-centered but functional for the social processes. It is believed that

this dissertation will help leaders and directors in various settings—schools, corporations, and non-profit organizations—to aid others, to question their own work and lives, to develop an interconnected sense of being, and to share with others their spirit, i.e. the essence of themselves. The development of leadership and ethics curriculum in higher education may be the most significant value of this work, because we are now seeing more and more questions of authenticity and a need for moral vigilance.

<u>Summary</u>

People in contemporary society want to make good judgments about how they should live, and they want to learn how to lead lives that really matter. More of us want to incorporate a deeper meaning into our lives—something that makes a difference in this world and satisfies our souls, not just pads our bank accounts or fulfills others' expectations of us—than ever before. This research hopes to help people understand the way they think about how to live. The following sections of this dissertation provide a context for this study with a review of the literature in Chapter Two and a description of the research process, including the theoretical background that will undergird data analysis, in Chapter Three. The data will be presented and analyzed in Chapter Four.

Findings and implications will follow in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER TWO

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

This review of the literature examines research on the topic of leading and identifying authentic lives. The main purpose of this is to provide a context for the relationship between hermeneutic theory and the living of an authentic life. The concept of authenticity has deep roots in existential philosophy and psychology. Five thinkers will be presented here, each with a slightly different approach to the quest for meaning.

Paul Ricoeur

Time and imagination together with narratives provide Ricoeur with a strategy for describing the possible. That human possibilities are displayed in stories and histories means that Ricoeur's narrative theory stands at the crossroads of philosophical anthropology and his textual hermeneutics. Ricoeur is a philosopher of human possibility and his literature holds pride of place in this philosophical project, for it is by reading stories and histories that we learn what is humanly possible.

Ricoeur's (1984: 54) formula is that the understanding of narrative follows "the destiny of a prefigured time that becomes a refigured time through the mediation of a

configured time." To unpack this dense formula, Ricoeur is stating that prefigured time

is the time of our prior understanding—our understanding prior to engaging with the

narrative. Refigured time is the new understanding of the real world we have as a result

of having read the narrative and understood it. The configured time is the emplotment,

the time of the narrative that orders its events and incidents into a plot. Plot is what

enables us to understand narrative as narrative, and as mimetic of the real world; it

enables us to see the actions depicted in a narrative as human actions.

   According to Ricoeur (1984), narrative time has the same threefold composition

as time experienced by humans, phenomenological time, but that it uses its mirror

image. In narrative, prefiguring is configured into refiguring, while, in real life, the

present is an anticipation of the future mediated by the memory of the past. It is because

narrative time and real time mirror one another that the "healthy circle" between

narrative and real life exists: we can understand narrative because we understand life,

and our understanding of life is bettered by our understanding of narrative. Ricoeur's

further turn of the circle—also known as the hermeneutic circle, or circle of

understanding—is constituted by the explanation of time within life and within

mimesis; thus explaining why it is that mimesis + time = narrative, and why it is that

narrative is important to human life and the understanding thereof.

For Ricoeur, narrative is mimetic of human action. There is a healthy

hermeneutic circle between narrative and life—narrative imitates life and we can learn

about life from narrative—and the turning of this circle continuously elevates the

understanding of life. Narratives are exemplary of a model of time, but this is human, or

phenomenological, time, and not time conceived as a series of points. Just as human

time is experienced as an anticipation of the future through the memory of the past, so

narrative consists of a three-stage mimesis, no one stage of which makes sense without

the operation of the other two. Mimesis$_1$ is prefiguration; the pre-understanding we have

of what narratives consist of that we bring to a text when reading it. Mimesis$_2$ is

configuration or emplotment; the ordering of events and the establishing of causal and

other relations between them. Mimesis$_3$ is refiguration, the act of reading whereby our

understanding of the world is increased by the new slant on it that the narrative has

provided. Narratives require readers to complete them; the reader provides Mimesis$_3$,

without which Mimesis$_1$ and Mimesis$_2$ would be without purpose.

According to Ricoeur (1984), there are two types of narrative: history and

fiction. Despite their differences, they have key elements in common: they each show a

human truth rather than a referential truth, and they both require the same 'narrative competence' to be understood. Peoples and nations in the writings of history behave as if they were characters in a fiction, just as characters in fiction behave as if they were real people, and the past in fiction is depicted as if it were the real past depicted by history. Ricoeur seeks to demonstrate, however, that history and fiction not only have things in common, but are interwoven in the narrative experience of life. We understand history as events that are tragic and historical characters as heroic, for example, and it is in this way that history repays our debt to the dead. Conversely, it is because fictional accounts are related as if they were historical that we can learn moral lessons from them.

The analysis of the mimetic structures of narrative, of time in narrative, and of the relationship between fiction and history is of value in and of itself, and each structure casts a new light on the discipline of which the analysis forms a part—literary criticism, historiography, etc. But the real purpose of these analyses is to demonstrate the narrative dimension of human life itself, which qualifies hermeneutics not only as a process of reading texts, but also of reading lives. If hermeneutics is the route to understanding narrative, then reading oneself is the key to self-understanding. If literary

judgments can be of the ethics within the narrative, then the same may be said of the judgments made of a life recounted.

Objections to this line of thinking are overcome by understanding 'narrative' not in a naive way, but in the way analyzed earlier by Ricoeur: in the terms of Mimesis$_1$, Mimesis$_2$ and Mimesis$_3$. Just as literary narratives require the work of readers (Mimesis$_3$) to complete them, so the understanding of real lives requires others to interpret them. It is the interpretations of others, and not death, that brings closure to the narrative of life. Moreover, our life is entangled with others' lives. Each of these individual lives can be seen as narrative threads within the great plot of our life: sometimes the threads are knotted together, sometimes they merely cross.

<u>Martin Heidegger</u>

Martin Heidegger is the German existential philosopher who gives the most systematic account of our existential predicament. He focuses especially on existential anxiety, guilt, and being-towards-death. He also has the most to say about how we can become more authentic. We are born into the "they," into a fully-scripted, well-organized, on-going social structure. And we will remain absorbed in the "they" for our whole lives unless we discover how to become more authentic.

Heidegger (1962) claims that tradition has misrepresented and misinterpreted the reality of human beings. As a first step in his project, he attempted to work out a fresh analysis of what it is to be human. The results are important for anyone that wants to understand what sort of being he or she is.

Our being already situated in a shared-life world makes up what Heidegger calls our "facticity." As tactical beings who are thrown into a world, we are not just active decision makers. We are also finite beings whose existence is embedded in a world that makes binding demands on us in making us the people we are. We are active beings. We find ourselves thrown into a world we neither create nor control, but it is up to each of us to take up the task of self-understanding presented us in that world, and shape those situations into lives that are our own.

In Heidegger's account, authenticity has nothing to do with getting in touch with an inner self or with rising above the social world. On the contrary, his version of authenticity throws us into the familiar practical world in a more intense and involved way.

According to Heidegger (1962), authentic clear-sightedness brings with it a lucid awareness of our inextricable embeddedness in and belongingness to the wider context

of a historical community. To be authentic is to realize that our own life stories make sense only against the wider stories of our community. When the notion of authentic historicity is fully fleshed out, it becomes clear that our lives are indebted to a cultural heritage that gives us our 'basic possibilities' of self-understanding and self-assessment.

When we recognize our embeddedness in the wider context of history, we will also see that our own futures are implicated in the project or in realizing the common goods definitive of what Heidegger calls a people's 'destiny.' To be authentic is to be lucidly aware that "our fates have already been guided in advance, in our being-with-one-another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities."

He characterizes authentic existence as virtues or enduring dispositions such as commitment, integrity, courage, steadiness, and clearsightedness about what it is to be a human. In our actions in the course of our lives, we are bringing to realization certain roles and self-interpretations we have taken over as definitive of our identities.

In Heidegger's account, human existence involves living between the tensions of thrownness and projection. Because there is no substantive human nature that determines how we can or ought to live, our essence lies in our existence. We just are what we do in bringing our lives to their realization as a whole.

Jean-Paul Sartre

French philosopher and playwright Jean-Paul Sartre (1946) describes our

existential predicament as meaninglessness. As people of the world, we are busy doing

things, but we do not usually realize the ultimate futility of our efforts. When we are

bitten by the meaninglessness bug, however, this can stimulate us to get our lives in

gear in the creating of our own meanings in a world initially devoid of meaning. We

create meaning by moving away from "bad faith" and creating our own comprehensive

projects. Then our everyday activities can be organized toward the fulfillment of

whatever we choose as our ultimate purposes in life.

Sartre writes: (1956: 291–300) "Man is nothing else but that which he makes of

himself…he is the sum of his actions." If existence really precedes essence, man is

responsible for what he is. Sartre is concerned with letting the full responsibility of

man's existence rest upon himself. Because our decisions involve all humanity, we are

responsible for both ourselves and everyone else. In choosing and creating myself, I am

creating and choosing mankind. A man who realizes this cannot escape "the feeling of

his total and complete responsibility" or "anguish"—like an officer whose decisions

involve the lives of other men. Sartre saw very clearly that the possibility of finding

values in a heaven of ideas disappears with the introduction of the nonexistence of God.

Since existence precedes essence, there is no *a priori* determinism. Man is free and

freedom. He is on his own and has no excuses. Sartre states (1948: 27): "Man is

condemned to be free, condemned because he did not create himself"; But "once thrown

into the world, he is responsible for everything he does."

At every moment, mankind is condemned to invent itself. We choose our way of

being. Being does not precede choice or action. Nor can we say that the choice of our

being is the outcome of deliberation. Having rejected the world of ideas or essences,

Sartre draws the logical conclusion from his position. The choice of our ends is also

absolutely free. Everyone freely chooses the norms of truth, beauty, and goodness.

Ordinarily we think of people as being responsible to something—to God, to society, to

the bar of history, or to an ideal or law. But in Sartre's view, people are responsible only

to themselves for what they make of themselves.

Nevertheless Sartre does not believe that his atheistic existentialism is

pessimistic. People can be courageous and confident because their destiny is defined by

themselves. Furthermore, Sartre is not afraid of the charge of subjectivity. He (1948:

44) revels in it; "There can be no other truth to take off from than this: I think, therefore,

I exist.... Outside the Cartesian cogito, all views are probable." Sartre sees the nothingness as the potential of mankind to realize its being. He also recognizes that the nothingness is simultaneously mankind's greatest enemy.

Soren Kierkegaard

Soren Kierkegaard is often called the father of existentialism. Before anyone else, he exposed the routine ways of life that possessed his contemporaries and which still shape the lives of most people. Instead of remaining well-adjusted conformists, we can purify our hearts by intentionally willing one thing to happen.

Kierkegaard (1956) describes in great detail the process of living more authentically. He asserts that, though we may never achieve our goals, we are responsible for making sure that we live each day clearly focused around our singular goal, the good we must try to do.

According to Kierkegaard, there are two ways in which the good can be practiced. He declares (1993: 78): "If a person is to will the good in truth, he must will to do everything for the good or will to suffer everything for the good." Of course, the one who acts also runs the risk of suffering, but he is still essentially acting. On the other hand, the one who learns to will to suffer everything for the good is one "who

suffers essentially" (1993: 100); that is, one so stricken by misfortune that his whole life

is bound to an unavoidable suffering.

Kierkegaard exhibits an understanding of and a great deal of sympathy for

people so unfortunate. Just as freedom's resolution helps the one who acts to stick to the

decision for the good, however, so it helps the person who suffers in the hard task of

freely resolving to accept his severe suffering. Of the person who freely chooses to

endure his suffering in the right way, Kierkegaard writes:

> Unquestionably he is making a virtue of necessity; that is the secret, that is the
> most descriptive expression for what he is doing—he is making a virtue of
> necessity, he is deriving a category of freedom (virtue) from what is defined as
> necessity. Precisely in this lies the healing through the decision of the eternal,
> that the sufferer freely takes upon himself the enforced suffering. Just as it is a
> relief for the sufferer to open himself in confidence to a friend, so also it is his
> salvation through the decision of the eternal that he opens himself to the eternal
> while the constraint of necessity compresses his heart, so to speak, and he
> complies eternally by willing to suffer everything (Kierkegaard 1993: 119–20).

Kierkegaard was the first to see the unique character and peculiar significance of

the strange emotion of dread, which he singled out for special attention. This dread is

not the same as fear (Kierkegaard 1968: 38). When we are afraid, we can identify the

object of which we are afraid—be it unemployment, sickness, loss of money, war, etc.

But this peculiar feeling latent in all men is very different; it has no determinate object.

No definite danger threatens, yet it comes from all sides. There is no defense. We cannot hide from it. The warmth and friendliness of an environment disappears and a strange curtain falls between the self and the world. The color of life grows pale and there is nothing to cling to. We find ourselves alone, surrounded by alien things. He found this emotion very significant.

Kierkegaard suggests (1968: 38–39) that this emotion represents being brought face to face with "nothing." As we say when the experience seems to pass, "it was nothing." This is no doubt true. But when we think of it, this nothing is not soothing. It is precisely the object of dread. If, as we are inclined to believe, our normal everyday existence in the world is healthy and good, then dread is a morbid phenomenon, an unfortunate disturbance. But if, as the existentialist sees it, our normal existence is not authentic, then is only natural. It is really a fallenness, which we conceal from ourselves with soothing anodynes.

Dread is, therefore, an incipient experience of arousing and awakening. For a moment, the veils are torn from our eyes, and we see ourselves as we really are—in a drab and ordinary state, not doing what we might be, only half alive and half awake.

This experience of dread shocks us out of all our normal habits and relations. It

awakens us from our thoughtlessness, and arouses us to what we might be. Kierkegaard says (1968: 55): "Dread is the possibility of freedom." He holds that this is the gateway to authentic choice and human existence.

Abraham Maslow

Abraham Maslow (1971) is an American psychologist best known for introducing the concept of "self-actualization." He suggests that, instead of spending our lives trying to satisfy our deficiencies, we can become more self-actualizing by creating and pursuing meaningful life-purposes. We are self-actualizing if we pursue meanings and values beyond ourselves and our families. We transcend our concerns for what other people think and focus instead on being the people we choose to be.

For the most part, Maslow shares Rogers's optimistic view of human nature. Our innate tendencies are predominantly healthy, and they include the capacity for constructive growth, kindness, generosity, and love. Yet Maslow also agrees with Erikson that these "instinct–remnants" are very weak, and are easily overwhelmed by the far more powerful forces of learning and culture. "The human needs … are weak and feeble rather than unequivocal and unmistakable; they whisper rather than shout. And the whisper is easily drowned out" (Maslow 1970: 276).

Maslow (1968: 29–31) espouses a dualistic theory of motivation. Some of our "instinctoid" impulses aim toward the attending to such drives as hunger, thirst, safety, and obtaining love and esteem from others. These deficiency motives are possessed by everyone, and involve important lacks within us that must be satisfied by the appropriate objects or people. In contrast to the deficiency motives, growth motives are relatively independent of the environment and are unique to the individual. These needs include attention to pleasurable drives, the unselfish and non-possessive giving of love to others, and the development of one's healthy potential. Growth is, in itself, a rewarding and exciting process. Examples include the fulfilling of yearnings and ambitions, like that of becoming a good doctor; the acquisition of admired skills, like playing the violin or doing carpentry; the steady increase of understanding about people, the universe, or oneself; the development of creativity in whatever field; or, most importantly, simply the ambition to be a good human being.

Although deficiency motives serve such necessary goals as self-preservation, growth motives represent a more pleasurable, higher, and healthier level of functioning. Maslow states (1968: 32) "satisfying deficiencies avoids illness; growth satisfactions produce positive health… [like the] difference between fending off threat or attack, and

positive triumph and achievement."

Maslow prefers not to list specific human needs. He writes (1970: 22–26): "our motives are so complicated and interrelated, and our behavior is so overdetermined, that it is usually impossible to explain personality in terms of separate and distinct drives. For example, making love may be due to needs for sex, power, and to reaffirm one's masculinity or femininity. A hysterically paralyzed arm may fulfill simultaneous wishes for revenge, pity, and attention. Or eating may satisfy the hunger need and offer solace for an unrequited love." Maslow also argues that the various human needs differ considerably in their level of importance, with some remaining virtually unnoticed until others have, at least to some extent, been satisfied. He therefore favors a general, hierarchical model of human motivation. The lowest level of the hierarchy involves physiological needs, including hunger, thirst, sex, oxygen, sleep, and elimination. A starving person cares very little about writing majestic poetry, buying an impressive-looking car, finding a sweetheart, or avoiding injury; most anything but the overriding goal of obtaining food is going to be ignored. Many physiological needs are deficiencies, but not all; among the exceptions are sexual arousal, elimination, and sleep (Maslow 1970: 35–38).

As the physiological needs are satisfied, the next level in the hierarchy gradually emerges as a motivator. These safety needs include an environment that is stable, predictable, and free from anxiety and chaos.

For example, a young child may seek reassurance and protection after being frightened by a sudden loud noise or injury; an adult in the grip of safety needs may pursue a tenured professorship, amass a substantial savings account, or constantly prefer the familiar and routine to the unknown. Although the safety needs help us to avoid severe pain and injury, they can become so powerful as to interfere with personality development—as when people willingly yield some of their rights during periods of rampant crime or war in order to gain a measure of security. "In the choice between giving up safety and giving up growth, safety will ordinarily win out" (Maslow 1970: 39–43).

Once the physiological and safety needs have been more or less satisfied, the belongingness and love needs come to the forefront as motivators. The individual then hungers for affectionate relationships with friends, a sweetheart or spouse, and/or offspring.

To Maslow, love consists of feelings of affection and elation, yearnings for the

loved one, and often intense sexual arousal. Our hunger to receive such love from others is a relatively selfish deficiency need, one that often involves anxious and manipulative efforts to win the loved one's affection. Yet this need must be satisfied in order for us to develop growth-oriented or "being" love, which is non-possessive, unselfish, and more enjoyable than a selfish deficiency need (1970: 43–45).

Maslow confers considerable importance upon our need for superiority and respect. We strive to achieve self-confidence and mastery of the environment, and to obtain recognition and appreciation from others. These esteem needs usually act as motivators only if the three lower types have been satisfied to some degree. Maslow cautions that true self-esteem is based on real competence and significant achievement, rather than external fame and unwarranted adulation.

The highest form of need is self-actualization, which is fulfilled by discovering and fulfilling one's own innate potentials. Maslow writes (1970: 46) "self-actualization is idiosyncratic, since every person is different. … The individual [must do] what he, individually, is fitted for. A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write, if he is to be ultimately at peace with himself. What a man can be, he must be."

The hierarchy of needs is presumed to apply to most people, though the specific

form of satisfaction often varies in different cultures. Members of a primitive tribe may

gain esteem by becoming great hunters, whereas people in a technological society are

more likely to gratify such needs by advancing to an executive position. Maslow also

allows for various exceptions. Some people regard esteem as more important than love,

whereas others accord the highest status to creativity. The higher needs may alternately

emerge after the lower ones have been severely frustrated, as with the displacement of

unsatisfied sexual needs onto artistic endeavors. Nevertheless, the easiest way to release

us from the dominance of our lower and more selfish needs and to promote healthy

psychological development is by satisfying them (1970: 51–53).

Summary

We create our authenticity; it is not delivered to us by higher authorities. As

human beings, however, we often morally compromise ourselves by escaping our

responsibility to ourselves. To block off certain avenues of escape and bring about

fundamental changes in our lives, the philosophers of authenticity use fictional portraits

and dramatic descriptions of extreme situations that make us realize how, even in

everyday situations, it is up to us to create our own selves.

Chapter Three discusses the research process followed in this work. The pilot

study is reviewed as both a learning experience and a compass guiding the researcher.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH PROTOCOL

<u>Introduction</u>

The research process is carried out within the context of a participatory research paradigm based upon critical hermeneutic theory. This research process is drawn from Herda (1999). The first section of this chapter presents the conceptual framework for the data analysis. Second, the research process is discussed including a description of the research site, entrée to the site, participants, and processes of data collection. Next the results of the data analysis, specifically the analysis of the texts created from the recorded conversations and the researcher's personal journal, are described. A summary of the pilot study is presented, language and translation are discussed, a timeline for research is provided and the background of the researcher is described.

<u>Conceptual Framework</u>

The conceptual framework used in this study is drawn from critical hermeneutic theory. The most significant authors are Martin Heidegger (1962), Paul Ricoeur (1984; 1988; 1992), and Richard Kearney (1995; 1988; 2002) and Gadamer (1991). Each of these will provide a window through which we can look upon the data to gain

understanding and will, in turn, be used as the conceptual framework for the data

analysis.

Paul Ricoeur

According to Ricoeur (1984; 1988), the narrative is the basic figuration process

that produces the human experience of one's own life and actions and the lives and

actions of others. Through the action of emplotment, the narrative form constitutes

human reality into a whole, manifests human values, and bestows meaning on life.

Emplotment constructs meaning from events by a process similar to the process that

grammar employs to create concepts from collections of words. To ask of a narrative

"What really happened?" is to assume that plots are simply representations of

extralinguistic realities and that they can be investigated empirically by recapturing

those extralinguistic realities.

When organizing real past events into meaningful stories, narrative

configuration is more than a simple personal projection. When the acknowledged task

of a narrative is to organize and make actual past events meaningful, it is required to

attend to the accepted reality of those events; nevertheless, narrative meaning derives

from more than the events alone. It consists also of the significance that these events

have for the narrator in relation to a particular theme. Plots are expressions of meaning, and the appropriate question to ask of them is what the events have meant to someone. Because plot is the logic or syntax of narrative discourse, it is a linguistic expression that produces meaning through temporal sequence and progression. Narrative discourse is one of the large categories or systems of understanding that we use in our negotiations with reality, most particularly in our negotiation with time. Narrative constructs meaning out of our time-boundedness and our awareness that human existence occurs within the limits of mortality. The emplotment of events into narrative form is so much a part of our ordinary experience that we are usually not aware of its operation, only of the experience of reality that it produces. We inherently accept that certain truths and kinds of knowledge can be understood only sequentially, as in the unfolding of a narrative.

Plotting is an activity in which temporal events are shaped into meaningful units. It manifests itself not only in the construction of experience, but also in conversations between people and the literary creations that rely on experience, such as myths, fairy tales, stories, novels, and histories. As spectators to the recounts of narrative experiences—the narrative creations—of others, we understand the stories through the

linguistic processes we use in constructing our own narratives. We call this kind of understanding—of hearing and understanding the meaning of a story—hermeneutic understanding.

Our lives are ceaselessly intertwined with narrative: the stories that we tell and hear told, the stories that we dream or imagine, and the stories we would like to tell. All these stories are reworked in the story of our own lives, which we narrate to ourselves in an episodic, sometimes semiconscious, virtually uninterrupted monologue. We live immersed in narrative, recounting and reassessing the meanings of our past actions, anticipating the outcomes of our future projects, and situating ourselves at the intersection of several stories not yet completed. We explain our actions in terms of plots, and often no other form of explanation can produce sensible statements. We can translate and recognize the same plot as it appears in various media. Narrative appears to be a subset of the general language code that we use to summarize and retransmit stories into other words and other languages.

From the beginning, Ricoeur (1984; 1988) has been fascinated by the power of words and symbols and by the creative capacity of human beings to make sense of their world. He affirms this response in the face of those forces that inhibit inventive

variation. Rather than defer to a reproductive imagination, which simply replicates experience, Ricoeur has sought to express the dynamics of a productive imagination in a poietic mode of depiction. Such an appeal to literary forms of expression permits him to avoid the impasses that occur when strictly rational or logical procedures cannot do the human predicament justice.

In his work on both metaphor and narrative, Ricoeur seeks a poetic/poietic understanding that does not operate solely on the level of ideas, for it is intimately related to 'praxis'. He borrows the term from Aristotle; it implies that poetic delineations of narrative are self-referential, but have definite practical implications. Whatever new appreciations occur from our interaction with literary figures and forms can be the basis for changes in our world views and our actions.

A central aspect of all Ricoeur's work has been his focus on hermeneutics or interpretation theory. Ricoeur's approach is hermeneutical in that it accepts that we are constantly part of a process of interpretation and reinterpretation. We are involved in a constant evolution, whereby the past is being integrated into the present, and the present is refining its perception of the past and of its own definitions. This hermeneutic perspective implies that there is no personal a-historical, objective identity to be

constituted, any more than there is a supreme plot to be deciphered. Ricoeur sets out a

hermeneutical circle that holds that we are influenced by the reading of narratives as

much as we influence their subsequent readings. "At the very heart of what we call

experience, [there is a tension] between the efficacity of the past we undergo and the

reception of the past that we bring about" (Ricoeur 1988: 220). Ricoeur proposes that

our identity is basically a composite of all the narratives to which we have been

exposed.

At the core of hermeneutics, then, is an awareness that any interpretation takes

place in a context where one must be open-minded and prepared to revise both self-

understandings and one's sense of responsibility to the world. It is the task of

hermeneutics, in turn, to reconstruct the set of operations by which a work lifts itself

above the opaque depths of living, acting, and suffering, to be given by an author to

readers who receive it and thereby change their actions and world views (Ricoeur 1984:

53).

At the same time, we cannot evade our responsibility to the past. As a result, one

of the most poignant pleas in the whole of *Time and Narrative* occurs in Vol. I, where

Ricoeur relates the need for narrative as a mode of self-understanding to a specific debt

to the past. This issues from a growing awareness that constructing our present identity

can involve reclaiming lost heritages, whether personal or collective, that have not been

allowed their impact on the stage of history. For Ricoeur, the narrative of identity that

can be construed from this evidence is not just an interesting hobby or a peripheral

pursuit. It illuminates, within the categories of space and time, records whose

rehabilitation adds to a more equitable heritage of knowledge.

Narrative identity, in this reading, is not just a psychological construct, but a

composite of detailed memories and present re-evaluation. Narrative is both a testament

to the diversity of human accomplishment and the possible basis for further self-

determination. Narratives of whatever nature furnish the building blocks by which we

construct a sense of identity. Ricoeur states that the debt is not just to the past, but to

ourselves; "We tell stories because, in the last analysis, human lives need and merit

being narrated. This remark takes on its full force when we refer to the necessity to save

the history of the defeated and the lost. The whole history of suffering cries out for

vengeance and calls for narrative" (1984: 75).

The resultant 'redescription of reality' was refined by Ricoeur in his three

volumes on *Time and Narrative*, where Ricoeur developed the position that the

muthos/plot plays the same role in narrative that metaphor does in a semantic frame of reference. Metaphor, for Ricoeur, is not simply an instance of semiotic substitution, but a vibrant wordplay that encourages new insights into the way the world is perceived and recorded. Muthos, as plot, functions in a similar fashion in narrative to the way metaphor does with words, to portray the world in novel ways. The narrative redescription of activity by 'emplotment' is a poietic act of configuration.

The phrase 'redescription of reality', first used describing the effects of metaphor, was even more finely articulated in *Time and Narrative* in the introduction of the term 'mimesis.' In the past, this term has often been employed to refer to reproduction as simply duplication, but Ricoeur introduces the more complex tripartite model of $mimesis_1$, $mimesis_2$ and $mimesis_3$.

'$Mimesis_1$' refers to the way in which human action occurs in an unthematized or unreflective manner (prefiguration); '$mimesis_2$' refers to the organization of these activities in a comprehensible form by means of muthos/plot (configuration); '$mimesis_3$' refers to the effects of reading or reception, by which a person can change his or her ideas and behavior as a result of discovering new dimensions of life (refiguration).

The construct of narrative identity is another dimension of Ricoeur's more recent work on narrative that has proven particularly insightful. Ricoeur believes a narrative form of identity can rescue us from our contemporary dilemmas as defined by the postmodern impasse between repetition and indeterminacy. Speaking with specific reference to the problem of self and identity, Ricoeur says (1988: 246): "without the recourse to narration, the problem of personal identity would in fact be condemned to an antimony with no solution. Either we must posit a subject identical with itself through the diversity of its different states, or, following Hume and Nietzsche, we must hold that this identical subject is nothing more than a substantialist illusion whose elimination merely brings to light a pure manifold of cognitions, emotions and volitions."

Ricoeur comments that "the most important trait of a project is undoubtedly its reference to the future" (1966: 48). The project is a practical determination of a future state of affairs which depends on the self. Ricoeur writes: "this 'possible' designates the capacity for the realization of the project inasmuch as it is within my power; it is the correlate of my power over things themselves… It is by virtue of an unjustifiable reduction that we decide to equate 'world' with the whole of observable facts; I inhabit a world in which there is something 'to be done by me'; the 'to be done by me' belongs

to the structure which is the 'world'" (1978: 68).

For Ricoeur, that humans intend to do certain projects means that the possible precedes the actual: "a part of the actual is a voluntary realization of possibilities anticipated by a project" (1966: 54). Ricoeur is thus able to refine his understanding of ethics: "I will call ethics therefore this movement [parcours] of actualization, this odyssey of freedom across the world of works, this proof-texting of the being-able-to-do-something [pouvoir-faire] in effective actions which bear witness to it. Ethics is this movement between naked and blind belief in a primordial 'I can', and the real history where I attest to this 'I can'" (1978: 177).

Existence must be mediated by semantics. It is Ricoeur's thesis that we only come to understand human existence and human possibilities through an analysis of symbols and texts which attest to that existence. What aspect of human existence is mediated by narratives in particular? Ricoeur believes that narratives are unique in their display of existential possibilities, possibilities for human action, and ways of being in or orienting oneself to time. Ricoeur sides with Heidegger in the assigning of priority to the possible. But contrary to Heidegger, Ricoeur claims that these possibilities are projected only by narratives. Only through stories and histories do we gain a catalogue

of the humanly possible. The human condition, determined by and preoccupied with time, is made more intelligible by narrative. What is time? What is human time? Narrative offers a 'poetic' solution: intelligibility. Narrative theory thus stands at the crossroads of philosophical anthropology, which deals with the meaning of human existence, and hermeneutics, which deals with the meaning of texts.

Instead of viewing imaginative literature as a product of mere fancy, Ricoeur insists that fiction not only refers to reality, but actually 'remake' it. Ricoeur (1983) argues that works of fiction are not less real but more real than the things they represent, for works of fiction display a whole world, 'condensing' reality and gathering its essential traits into a concentrated structure. Fiction can 'remake' human reality by projecting a possible world which can intersect and transform the world of the reader. Ricoeur writes (1983: 185): "Fiction has the power to 'remake' reality and, within the framework of narrative fiction in particular, to remake real praxis to the extent that the text intentionally aims at a horizon of new reality which we may call a world. It is this world of the text which intervenes in the world of action in order to give it a new configuration or, as we might say, in order to transfigure it."

Ricoeur (1981) claims that the task of hermeneutics is to explicate the 'world' in

front of the text. The world of the text is the reference of fiction, and corresponds to the imagination being not a norm-governed tool of productivity, but as a power for redescription. The world of the text is the keystone which supports Ricoeur's 'hermeneutical arch', and it is in the notion of the world of the text that Ricoeur's hermeneutics and philosophical anthropology intersect.

Hermeneutics can be defined no longer as an inquiry into the psychological intentions which are hidden beneath the text, but rather as the explication of the being-in-the-world displayed by the text. Ricoeur states (1981: 112): "what is to be interpreted in the text is a proposed world which I could inhabit and in which I could project my own most possibilities."

The world projected by the work allows one to explore the possibilities of action and so have 'fictive experiences.' By 'fictive experience', Ricoeur understands a virtual manner of inhabiting the proposed world. According to Ricoeur, the distinctive intentionality of fictional narrative is this offering of a new world, a new way of perceiving things or possibilities.

Whereas the intentionality of history is its inquiry into the real as actual, the intentionality of fictional literature is its redescription of the real as possible. Because

the world of the text proposes new possibilities for being-in-the-world, it is implicated

in Ricoeur's philosophical anthropology.

Humans use the socially-given linguistic domain to understand themselves,

others, and the world as meaningful. The linguistic domain and the human order of

meaning are organized according to a hermeneutic rationality and aligned on various

interactive levels. On this basis, humans make decisions about what they want and what

they need to do to satisfy these wants. We retrieve stories about our own and the

community's pasts, and these provide models of how actions and consequences are

linked. Using these retrieved models, we plan our strategies and actions and interpret

the intentions of other actors. Narrative is the discourse structure in which human action

receives its form and through which it is meaningful.

Ricoeur (1984) believes that humans possess a competence or pre-understanding

of the world of action that is similar to their competence to recognize which groups of

words can produce meaningful sentences. With sentences, this competence draws on a

recognition of what kind of organization produces an acceptable sentence, what words

can be linked together in a meaningful manner, and how order affects understanding.

The recognition and composition of meaningful plots require a corresponding

understanding of the kinds of activity that compose human action, the kinds of events

that can be gathered together into a plot, and the importance of temporal order in

configuring events into a plot.

This means that the composition of plots draws on the human competence to

distinguish the domain of action from the domain of physical movement. The

competence to know which bodily movements are human actions is called practical

understanding, and provides the basic unit for composing and understanding narration.

Narrative assumes practical understanding on the part of both the narrator and

the listeners, as well as the competence to understand and use such concepts as "agent,"

"goal," "means," "success," "failure," and so on. Narrative adds the structure of a plot

to simple action statements. The rules for narrative composition determine how to order

action sentences into the total action sequence of a story. Because of the sequential

linking of sentences into a plot, the agents, their deeds, and their sufferings receive a

deepened meaning.

For Ricoeur (1984), human action occurs within cultural settings that maintain

symbolic narrative forms for use in the articulation of action. These symbolic forms

have a public character and are not the private understandings of a particular actor.

Thus, an act is undertaken with the knowledge of what it will mean to the community in which it takes place. The actor in a particular culture realizes that the act of bowing before another is a means of expressing contrition within the community and will be understood by others in it as such an expression. The communal significance of actions confers an initial "readability" on them. The manners, customs, and other social agreements also supply an evaluation of actions in terms of their conformity to moral norms, and they define which actions are good or bad, better or worse. The tellers of tales assume that their audiences understand the appropriate evaluation of the actions in a story. According to Ricoeur (1984: 59): "There is no action [in the narrative] which does not give rise to approbation or reprobation, to however small a degree, as a function of a hierarchy of values for which goodness and wickedness are the poles."

Narrative is the form of hermeneutic expression in which human action is understood and made meaningful. Action itself is the living narrative expression of a personal and social life. The competence to understand a series of episodes as part of our story informs our own decisions to engage in actions that move us toward a desired ending. The length of storied actions can range from a short adventure to the time between our own birth and death, or even to the length of all the generations of

humankind. To define a narrative as a linked series of episodes contributing to a single adventure with a beginning, a middle, and an end—or as the presentation of a problem that is followed by actions that result in a resolution—is to describe in simple terms what is already included in our ordinary understanding of action.

As in his analysis of metaphor, Ricoeur (1984) adopts Aristotle's definition of mimesis: it is not an imitation of nature, but an imitation of an action. This is why mimesis is intimately connected with muthos (emplotment), since emplotment orders not events, but actions, and conversely characters within narratives would have no motive to act were it not for the causal connections that emplotment provides.

Understanding human action through understanding the intention of action is the aim of Ricoeur's work on narrative. The ultimate goal is to discover the kinds of human truth that scientific propositions cannot accommodate. This is a question of how we organize our own lives. The point of Ricoeur's analyses is to demonstrate that "time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative" (Ricoeur 1984: 3). We understand our own lives, our own selves and our own places in the world by interpreting our lives as if they were narratives. Through the work of interpreting our lives, we turn them into narratives, and life understood as narrative

constitutes self-understanding.

Ricoeur (1988: 246) writes, "to answer the question "Who?" is to tell story of a life. The story told tells about the action of the "who." And the identity of this 'who' therefore itself must be narrative identity." The refiguration of time and the introduction of emplotment offer the promise of a narrative identity. Ricoeur (1988: 246) describes narrative identity as "the fragile offshoot issuing from the union of history and fiction." A narrative identity allows the incorporation of disparate events or ideas into a meaningful plan. Ricoeur (1992: 140) writes that "the interconnection of events constituted by emplotment allows us to integrate with permanence in time what seems to be its contrary in the domain of sameness-identity, namely diversity, variability, discontinuity, and instability."

For Ricoeur, hermeneutics is not only a process of reading texts, but of living lives. If hermeneutics is the route to understanding texts, then "reading" oneself is the key to understanding oneself.

Martin Heidegger

Heidegger's work is briefly presented in the previous chapter. This is a further discussion of his work relevant to this research. Heidegger's most basic claim is that, as

agents, our existence is "being-in-the-world." This means, first, that we are always

caught up in familiar contexts of significance in such a way that there is no way to draw

a sharp distinction between self and non-self. In our lives, we are largely absorbed in

contexts of equipment that serve as the "dwelling" of our agency. Second, it means that,

as social beings, we have become acculturated to the shared forms of our culture, with

the result that we have all come to act, respond, and experience things in very similar

ways.

In Heidegger's terminology, humans are beings who "care" about their lives—

we care about what we are becoming and what we will be. And because we care, we are

always taking some concrete stand on the possibilities we find in our cultural context.

Heidegger gives us a picture of human beings as always moving in two different

directions. On the one hand, we are usually "falling" into everyday, worldly affairs,

doing what we are meant to do according to the norms and conventions of the social

world; a way of being that he terms the "They" or "Anyone." On the other hand, we are

constantly composing our own autobiographies on what we do and the temporal life-

happenings around us. As self-defining beings, we are always already "ahead of

ourselves" and "ex-static" in the sense that we are already projecting forward, into the

future.

The authentic life is characterized by resoluteness. Heidegger (1962: 384) states that resoluteness pulls us back from "the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one" and enables us to be clear-sighted about what is demanded by the current situation in which we find ourselves. It therefore calls for simplifying our lives so that we can identify what the "basic possibilities" are for us, specifically the possibilities genuinely worth pursuing. Having identified those possibilities, we then make them the focus of our existence. Where the inauthentic life is disjointed, dispersed and directionless, an authentic life is focused, coherent, and totally engaged.

The basic concept behind "Dasein" is being-in-the-world. But being-in-the-world is, for Heidegger, not merely a matter of being spatially in the world. It is being in a situation in which Dasein has the possibility of non-being. Non-being is of the essence of Dasein. In death, people see the possibility of not being. However, death is not simply the end of life. That would be an unauthentic view of death. An authentic attitude toward death recognizes that death qualifies the entirety of human existence. Moreover, Heidegger is not primarily concerned with showing the finitude of human existence, but that death, as integral to Dasein, constitutes its possibility; for if Dasein is

to become something, it must originally not be. Nonbeing, therefore, guarantees the freedom of Dasein to determine and to choose itself as possibility, and thus to realize its being. Whereas in Kierkegaard it was the presence of pure being or eternity (God) in human existence that provided the tension and the possibility of choice and despair, in Heidegger this is replaced by death. And death is of the essence of Dasein.

Dasein has its Being to be, and so in its way of Being, in its concrete forms of acting in and relating to its world, it has some understanding of its Being. Such understanding of its potentiality to be, of the potentialities of its general form of existing, is the primary sense of understanding, since it is involved in anything Dasein may do or be. Having such an understanding, it "knows" what it is capable of and what its potentiality for Being is. Within our immediate absorption in the world, in everydayness, this understanding of one's potentiality for Being does not derive from Dasein itself, from the Being of a being which exists as having a relation to its Being.

In its immediate form of existing, Dasein is simply absorbed in its world, understanding its Being unreflectively in terms of what it can do there. It understands itself, that is, in terms of its success and failure in living within the purposive relations of its world.

This unauthentic self-understanding, not drawn from the Being of Dasein itself, has an essential temporal structure: Dasein awaits the revelation of itself in what the future may bring in terms of success or failure, lives a present absorbed in its world, and has behind it a past which, however much it may be a matter of satisfaction, regret or indifference, is something finished and determinate.

Such authentic existing, resoluteness, is the pre-eminent form of human temporality. Dasein does not await itself in what the future may bring in the world, but always comes towards itself; that is, it takes over what it has been as what must always be taken over, so that the future is open, the past a source of possibility and the present that within which a new revelation of a possibility of its past can occur. Dasein takes over what it has been, its world, so that it exists in relation to the world in a new way, in terms of its own potentiality. It takes over the concrete possibilities provided by its world, but as possibilities and not as finished modes of being into which Dasein must fit. It appropriates its past not as something finished, but as possibility; and this it can only do by relating to the past as open and by maintaining it as possibility. The very search for authenticity "constitutes its meaning" (1962: 59) and discloses the seeker's authenticity.

To be authentic Dasein, therefore, is to grasp that one cannot become authentic as an ontic entity among entities or as a static being, but only as the asking and searching Becoming; that is, as a transcendent consciousness whose projected intentionalities become authentic "only by anticipation" (1962: 310).

Since its world is a common one, such engagement with the world constitutes the renewal of a common heritage or a tradition. A human being is a kind of being which, unlike other beings, has a relation to its own Being: it can only relate itself to other beings in whatever way it does through having some understanding of itself. Since it must always comport itself in this self-referential way, its Being can be nothing, which Dasein could be as complete. We can only conceive such a self-referential notion of Being, which the being concerned always has to be, as temporality: as a way in which what one has been is to be taken over. Inauthentic temporality takes over what one has been as simply the past and completed, which shows itself in what one has accomplished or failed to do, whilst looking towards one's future as something determinate which will be settled in time by what happens.

But to understand oneself in this way is not to understand oneself as temporality, but as a being within the world like any other. It is the incompatibility between such an

understanding of one's Being and the way that Being must always be projected in one's

dealings with beings in the world which compels a recognition of one's Being as

temporality. To understand one's Being as temporality is radically to distinguish it from

the being of intra-worldly beings. It is to realize that one can only be that Being as one's

Being in the appropriation of the past without issue. And that can only take place if the

past is regarded as itself without issue: not as finished and determinate, but as constant

possibility of being taken over.

To understand oneself in this way is to engage in one's past as an ever

renewable source of possibility, to engage in the constant renewal of one's heritage. It is

in this that genuinely new creation lies and which enables man to have a history

(Heidegger 1985: 279). Man has a history because he is historical: that is, exists as a

being which must constantly take over its past as possibility. For the most part a human

being must exist inauthentically, simply living at home in the familiar world. But he

lives in accordance with his Being, lives it as his Being, in creation, in the bringing forth

of what is new out of the possibilities made available by his past.

Human Dasein is different from all other modes of being in that it is constantly

concerned about its being and its possibilities. So an ontological characteristic of Dasein

is care (Sorge). Care defines Dasein as a kind of being which is concerned for its own being. The concept of dread in Sören Kierkegaard's book of the same name laid the way for the analysis of care by Heidegger. Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger distinguish "dread" (Angst) from "fear" (Furcht). Kierkegaard said, "fear is always fear of something definite" (Kierkegaard 1968: 88). Dread, as Kierkegaard explained, is the reality of freedom as a potentiality, before this potentiality has materialized, and its object is the something which is nothing (1968: 39). What threatens, Heidegger states, is to be found nowhere in particular, yet is everywhere. What 'dread' dreads is the 'being-in-the-world.' This dread of being-in-the-world arises from the necessity of fending for oneself in the world and from the fact that Dasein is a 'being-toward-death.' Death is part of the being of Dasein. As soon as Dasein comes into being, it is 'thrown' into this possibility, and this 'thrownness' reveals itself in 'dread.' Hence man 'cares' or is concerned for his being.

In its last condition of being-in-the-world, the being is left falling away from itself, toward the publicness of the impersonal world of everyone. In questioning the unity of this being, we are still interrogating its spread and its being laid open between a past, as always already having been thrown into its condition—that is, its facticity—and

a future which is, as yet, only a possibility defining what it might still become, but toward which it projects itself; that is its existentiality, even in the present moment of its falling. The average condition of a human being as it exists every day is therefore both falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting.

Even as an impersonal subject, which it is not when acting as the self, a human being projects itself upon its own potentiality of being, which remains an issue for its ultimate ontological concern with both self and world. In the world, it always finds itself alongside entities of one sort or another, both with either those of its circumspective concern or of its scientific inspection and with other human beings in a culture shared by all. Such indeed is the picture of our human condition drawn in the preceding sections of the treatise.

Falling into the publicness of the impersonal world is a fleeing or turning away from a truly personal self. How, in such a condition, can a human being come to grips with its own personality? Sometimes, fearfully; as when it shrinks away from those objects of its world or those of the impersonal world that appear threatening to it. In turning away from the threatening object, we find ourselves in a state of fear. But fear is still ontical, and derivative from the more primordial ontological condition we are

seeking to describe.

At the same time, falling into a public world is a flight from oneself as a self-determined entity. What a human being flees from in this falling is its own potential to create its own world and its being-in-the-world as self-determined. Thus, unlike in the case of fear, which involves fleeing from an entity of our world, this fleeing is in anxiety from our own being-in-the-world. Still, its being is disclosed in the feeling itself, and along with that disclosure comes the insignificance of the world; that is, in our anxiety the world appears without its entities and without the structural-relatedness of their significance. It is nothing coming from nowhere within our world that determines our anxious state. What we flee in the face of, in anxiety, is thus the bare world revealed as the condition of our own potentiality for being in it.

That our anxiety is conditioned by a state of our being-in-the-world as thrown, and that the turning away of our falling into the public world is from ourselves, is revealed in the uncanniness of the anxious feeling. Such is the first condition of our anxiety.

The next step parallels the analysis of fear by indicating that about which we are anxious. But again, unlike in the case of fear, we are not anxious about any definite

threat—like, say, the possibility of being hurt by an approaching car. Here again,

nothing definite carries the burden of determining the anxiety, since the objects of one's

world, the total instrumental complex, are without significance: only our possibility of

being in a world and the necessity of making a choice for the kind of world we should

like to call our own can bring us out of the tranquilized temptation offered by the

familiarity of the impersonal world. Such is the second condition of our personal

anxiety.

Falling and anxiety are related as the flight from self reveals what a true self

must be: a possible being that will not be unless one chooses to accept responsibility for

becoming that being. According to Heidegger (1962), human beings are anxious before

their being-in-the-world as thrown and about their being-in-the-world as projected upon

its own potential for being itself. Anxiety individualizes human responsibility, since it

reveals a way of being in the world when the nature of that world is yet to be

determined, and when the ultimate determination of that world must be made by a

personal choice. No other person can make the choice of how to be for me; nor as a

moral subject will that self be determined by the things or processes of the natural

world.

Why, then, are there so few authentic personalities in the world? And why is this 'distinctive determination of human self-disclosedness' so rare a phenomenon? To answer these questions, there's a clue to be found in everyday language—another form of human disclosedness. We feel 'at home' in the familiarity of the public world into which we are falling. Anxiety, which we flee in the forfeiture of our fall, is deeply disturbing.

What, then, is the precise relationship between the falling and the anxiety? The feeling of uncanniness is merely the obverse condition of feeling at home in the tranquilized and familiar world of everyone. Ontologically, Heidegger claims, the not-being-at-home is more basic than the fallen state, because the reverse is true ontically. There seems to be no ontic explanation for the uncanny feeling, and the physiological components of the experience of dread seem to depend upon the feeling of the uncanny placement of the self before a future possibility.

The rarity of true anxiety has two explanations. First, the condition remains hidden in the ordinary state of fallenness; second, its ordinary ontic manifestations—other than the physiological—reveal subtle modifications of the caring structure when it is one's own self, rather than objects, tools, or other selves, that is the object of the care.

Before ourselves and on behalf of ourselves, we can only feel anxiety. Heidegger (1962) reminds us that anxiety and other affective conditions are manners of being in the world; and equiprimordially with this feeling there is an understanding which was previously preontological, but is now ontological: the being of the care structure is now defined as a human being's concern for itself as both thrown-being-in-the-world and existing potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. Prior to ontological reflection, this 'understanding' is the source for our feeling of this anxiety. Upon reflection, it is easy to compare the two conditions of the same self, that of being thrown into one world and that of being projected toward another. The original anxiety thus corresponds to our own sense of being free to determine our own potentiality.

As existing, a human being is ahead of itself; but, as being in a world, it finds itself alongside other entities—tools and mere things—and in solicitude for others, which it does knowingly, since it is always already factually related to some world when the ontological question occurs to it. In sum, then, our being human is a simultaneous three-way stretch: as projected, ahead of itself; as thrown, already in a world; as falling, alongside entities of one sort or another. Since we ordinarily concern ourselves with the entities of our worlds rather than with our own precious selves, the

basic human state of anxiety remains hidden or buried.

As open to its world, and in the clearing of its self-projection, the human being understands itself as projected upon its possibilities of being. And along with this understanding, there is a coterminous affective state that corresponds to a person's finding itself attuned to its world as thrown and itself as abandoned there.

Understanding and feeling ultimately give the person something to say. Discourse is therefore the last of the 'equiprimordial' structures of the human being's disclosedness. The difficulty begins to mount when we recall that the human being exists above all other activities and, as a general rule, in a fallen condition in which its understanding of itself is given through the objects of its concern. That is its world of the everyday.

The human being is brought back to itself, as having been lost in the world of the everyday, but now as having felt the uncanniness of living in such a world, and facing the anxiety of projecting one's way out of it. The mode of relating oneself authentically to the future is anticipation, and the call of conscience relates the self only to the self. But that goes only with the resolute facing up to the anxiety we feel as having to assume full responsibility for what we are. It is always a lived possibility of

the human being, but it is rarely achieved.

A human being is above all irresolute; and when it is, its temporality is temporalized out of an inauthentic future: it merely awaits itself, as if its caring for the world had intercalated a loop between what it was and what it is to become, and it had only to appropriate care for the things of its world in order to be a self. For this reason, ontological understanding interprets the authentic possibility of being responsible for oneself as a condition that is won through a modification of the routinely inauthentic future.

What differentiates the inauthentic from the authentic future, then, is the entity that one holds oneself in readiness for: either one's own most, non-relational, and final possibility or the self that, qua impersonal, is everyone's, that defines itself by the objects that surround it, and that always succeeds in repressing its finitude. For the inauthentic, impersonal self, the world always gets in the way; such a self can only keep awaiting the results of its attending to the objects of its world.

But this holding oneself ready for a future event is eminently modifiable. One way to do this is to expect, to look forward to, but actively, that is, to become attentive to the necessity felt in the uncanniness of the everyday world. This kind of expectation,

Heidegger (1962) tells us, is a mode of projecting a future based on our holding

ourselves open to such a possibility that is temporalized as an anticipation. Our caring

for 'that for the sake of which' we care at all is something that gets indefinitely

postponed, however active we may become in our service to the things or persons

around us.

Once the feeling of uncanniness overtakes the lost self, its anxiety brings it back

to its thrownness. And once the call of conscience relates these two aspects of the

authentic self, the environing world loses its significance; the feeling comes from

nothing other than the self in the world.

The feeling of anxiety brings the self back to its naked uncanny thrownness.

And along with this authentic past, which has been neither forgotten nor merely

remembered, one is presented with a choice that may be repeated; in being called to

assume responsibility for itself, for its own abandonment in the world, its thrownness

becomes a possibility for repetition. In the process, it is revealed an authentic possibility

of being oneself.

The differences between fear and anxiety stem from the differences between

inauthentic and authentic selves. Fear assails us from without; anxiety gnaws at us from

within. Fear is a result of our being irresolute, while anxiety is possible only for the resolute self. Fear overwhelms the self; anxiety liberates it from possibilities that mean nothing. And although both affective states are grounded in our having-been, fear forgets its past and roots us in a lost present, while anxiety calls us out of this being lost among the objects of our worlds by projecting the resolute repetition of our own self-responsibility.

Hans-Georg Gadamer

The concept of the fusion of horizons comes from the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, in *Truth and Method* (1991). The fusion of horizons is Gadamer's idea of understanding. Gadamer describes the horizon as:

> … characterizing the way in which thought is tied to its finite determinacy, and the way one's range of vision is gradually expanded. A person who has no horizon does not see far enough and hence overvalues what is nearest him. On the other hand, 'to have a horizon' means not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it. A person who has a horizon knows the relative significance of everything within this horizon, whether it is near or far, great or small (Gadamer 1991: 302).

> We each have a horizon. When we read, we meet the world of the text and its

horizon, and each of us comes to a new understanding. It is a fusion of what we knew, who we are, and what we are becoming.

Language and symbol for Gadamer are the media of human existence. Language is not a tool we employ after encountering the world or a mirror we hold up to reflect reality. It is not its own sphere of life separated from others, but an integral part of human experience. Gadamer writes (1975: 35) "reality does not happen behind the back of language...reality happens precisely within language." Language communication is the state of our understanding of the world. Gadamer asserts (1975: 31) "being which can be understood is language." Language is a medium of existence that allows for reflection upon itself in which we as creative and interpretive beings are a moment.

Understanding is the way of knowing in the practical interest, and this way of knowing is what comes forward in conversation. Gadamer (1991: 304) writes "the individual is never simply an individual because he is always in understanding with others." Through language, we create our social reality.

Gadamer views understanding as a matter of negotiation between oneself and one's partner in hermeneutical dialogue such that the process of understanding can be seen as coming to an "agreement" about the matters at hand. Coming to such an agreement means establishing a common framework, or 'horizon,' and Gadamer thus takes understanding to be a process of the 'fusion of horizons.' All understanding

involves a process of mediation and dialogue between what is familiar and what is alien,

a process in which neither remains unaffected.

Richard Kearney

Kearney has extended Ricoeur's work on story, narrative, and imagination. He

writes:

> This power of mimetic re-creation sustains a connection between fiction and life
> while also acknowledging their differences. Life can be properly understood
> only by being retold mimetically through stories. But the act of mimesis which
> enables us to pass from life to life-story introduces a "gap" between living and
> recounting. Life is lived, as Ricoeur reminds us, while stories are told (Kearney
> 2002: 132).

> The role of imagination in the creation of new possible worlds we might inhabit

introduces the possibility of a new identity through the narrative thus created. Kearney

explores the role of imagination in the creation of new possible worlds. He writes:

> To account for this phenomenon of ontological novelty Ricoeur's hermeneutics
> of imagination looks beyond the first-order reference of empirical reality—
> which ordinary language discourse normally entails—to a second-order
> reference of possible worlds (Kearney 1998: 149).

> Furthermore, imagination allows for the ethical examination of our past actions

as well as of the future we anticipate. Kearney summarizes this ethical dimension when

he writes:

> The ethical potential of narrative imagination may be summarized under three

main headings: (1) the testimonial capacity to bear witness to a forgotten past; (2) the empathic capacity to identify with those different to us; and (3) the critical-utopian capacity to challenge official stories with unofficial or dissenting ones which open up alternative ways of being (Kearney 1998: 255).

Imagination is the key to the possibility of discovering new meanings of our life with and for others. The power of imagination is in the realizing of the possibility, thereby creating opportunities for action to be taken. The possibility of imagination is made available to us through our inherent capacity as human beings to narrate the events of our lives.

Summary

In this section, the conceptual framework was introduced to provide the basis for the data analysis. A brief overview of the theories of Heidegger, Ricoeur, Kearney and Gadamer were discussed. The theory of these authors provides the basis for the research categories through which data in this study will be analyzed. Next, the research process itself is discussed.

Research Process

Introduction

This section describes the research process for this study. Topics that are discussed include the research site, entrée, participants, data collection, text creation and

data analysis. Each of these topics is presented in accordance with the principles of

conversation- and narrative-based research described in Herda (1999: 85–138).

Research Site

The primary research sites are South Korea and the United States. Participants

were in San Francisco and Seoul. Both formal and informal research participants were a

part of this study. Additional conversation partners are included.

Entrée to Research Participants

I had ten research participants at the research sites. Most of the participants were

known to me personally or introduced to me by other professionals. I engaged in

conversations with five Korean-American participants for the study. They were

naturalized and educated in the United States. One Korean participant was born and

educated in South Korea. All conversations were conducted either in English or Korean.

If a conversation was conducted in Korean, I translated it into English.

Participants

Ten formal participants took part in San Francisco and Seoul. Informal

participants were also a part of this study as they became available. The research

included participants from the following professions: pastor, professor, profit and non-

profit executives. Selection of participants was based on the following research

criterion: they were formally educated, and philosophical. All participants were or had

been in leadership positions in various settings in South Korea and the United States. A

list of the participants can be found in Appendix B. The formal participants were

initially contacted by phone or email. Upon expression of their willingness to

participate, I sent them a formal invitation letter (Appendix A). The Letter of

Participation included research questions to help guide and direct the conversation.

This research abided by the guidelines of the Institutional Review Board for the

Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at the University of San Francisco. My

application was reviewed and approved by the committee.

<div align="center">**Research Categories and Question**</div>

Three categories were identified for the proposed research: authenticity,

narrative identity, and imagination. The purpose of the research categories was to

provide both direction and boundaries for data collection and data analysis.

<u>**Category I: Authenticity**</u>

In his book, *Being and Time* (1962), Heidegger claims that, in decisive moments

of resolution, we can envision ways of integrating our newfound existential knowledge

into the projects which constitute our lives, thereby appropriating 'existence' so as to make it our own. Such 'authenticity' thus characterizes an existence in which an individual's life projects are brought into harmony with the existential structures which condition them, transforming that individual's guilty and anxious repression of his/her essential finitude and groundlessness into a reverence for the possible. It is in such a state that individuals can imagine and carry out different actions in their lives.

Category II: Narrative Identity

For Ricoeur, life is a narrative. In life, we have what Ricoeur calls a 'narrative identity.' Despite our being different, in terms of both physical and moral attributes, at different times in our lives, we are still the same people. We maintain this sameness of personhood by having self-constancy; it is this that constitutes our character. If we prove ourselves reliable, we show ourselves to be people of good character despite the changes that may happen in our lives. Ricoeur writes (1992: 165):

> Self-constancy is for each person that manner of conducting himself or herself so that others can count on that person. Because someone is counting on me, I am accountable for my actions before another. The term 'responsibility' unites both meanings: 'count on' and 'being accountable for'. It unites them, adding to them an idea of a response to the question 'Where are you?' asked by another who needs me. This response is the following: 'Here I am!', a response that is a statement of self-constancy.

Category III: Imagination

Imagination is not an unethical process of subjection and overdetermination, but a process of exploring the multiple dynamics of relation between an 'I' and its world, the opening of time to more possible outcomes, and all that it means for new modes of the self and how to act. Kearney writes (1998: 142) that "imagination can be recognized accordingly as the act of responding to a demand for new meaning, the demand of emerging realities to be by being said in new ways."

The following guide questions provided the framework to initiate the conversations with my participants. Questions could move in and between categories. Other questions were included in conversation.

1. What makes for a well-lived life?

2. What is the story of your life that most dramatically portrays who you are?

3. Who are the most significant people in your life who have given you ideas of what is important for living an authentic life?

4. What is one aspect of your own story that was highly significant in shaping your life today?

5. How will you become different in the future?

6. What do you imagine the future will be for yourself and society?

The boundaries of this research were created by both the people who agreed to participate and the selected categories for data collection and analysis. How the data might be understood and used by the reader depends on the tradition of each reader and what each reader will bring to this text.

Data Collection and Text Creation

Data collection involved literature reviews, entries from a personal journal, transcriptions of recorded conversations, an analysis of available documents, and personal observation. The entire research process was recorded in a personal journal, which became another source of data and took the form of a text to be analyzed through the procedures for textual analysis described below. The personal journal was an important source of data, since it showed significant changes over time in the researcher's interpretation and knowledge of the process and the theory. Conversations were undertaken both on a formal and informal basis. Each of these conversations was recorded and transcribed with the permission of the research participant. The transcription along with the preliminary analysis were then sent to the participants for review and possible revision. Participants had the opportunity to reflect on both the

conversation and the preliminary analysis. Once the transcript was approved by the

conversation partner, it was made a part of the research data for this study. In some

cases, a follow-up conversation was undertaken in order to more deeply explore issues

raised during the first conversation or to cover any areas that were missed. Informal

conversations were a part of this research and followed the established procedures as

closely as possible.

Data Analysis

The analysis of data with the participatory hermeneutic approach to research was

a creative and imaginative act. I was appropriating the proposed worlds disclosed

through the texts. As I was exposed to the texts, I changed in such a manner that I saw

the world differently; hence I became a different person through the research process. I

followed the sequence for data analysis presented in Herda (1999: 98–99).

1. Fix the taped conversations through transcription.

2. Examine the transcripts.

3. Substantiate the themes with quotes from the transcripts.

4. Examine the themes in light of the theoretical framework of critical hermeneutic

    categories selected.

5. Send transcriptions to the research participant.

6. Set a context for the research discussion.

7. Discuss groupings of themes and sub-themes within each category in light of the theory and problem at hand.

8. Discuss the research problem at a theoretical level.

9. Search out implications for the written discussion that provide insight and new direction for the issue or problem under investigation.

10. Identify those aspects of the research that merit further study.

11. Relate the study to myself in terms of what I learned and what role the study played in my life.

Pilot Study

Introduction

A pilot study was conducted during the fall of 2006 in order to explore the issues that are here being proposed for study. One conversation was undertaken using an abbreviated version of the research processes discussed above. These processes were utilized in the pilot study, which in turn produced helpful insights for further study and aided in the development of appropriate research questions and categories. The

description of the pilot study that follows covers the topics of the participant, theory,

discussion, and implications.

Participant in Pilot Study

My research conversation partner for this study was Jin S. Yang, the Korean-

American Republican mayor of Corte Madera, California. Mr. Yang has a long resume

as both an entrepreneur and a social service worker. In 1999, Yang was elected onto the

Town Council of Corte Madera. He served as the town's vice-mayor in November 2001

and is currently presiding as mayor. In February 2002, he became the Chairman of the

Twin Cities (Corte Madera, Larkspur) Police Council.

Theory Used in Pilot Study

The theory used in this study is the same as that discussed above in the

"Conceptual Framework" section, with an emphasis on the narrative theory of Ricoeur

and Heidegger's concept of authenticity.

Discussion of the Pilot Study

The conversation with the participant listed above was helpful and informative

in the development of the questions and categories for this research. The entire text of

the data synthesis, text analysis and implications can be found in Appendix E. This pilot

study reviewed data from a conversation with Mr. Yang. Taking data from this source

and subjecting it to analysis through the lens of critical hermeneutical theory has led to

the following implications. This pilot study was useful in helping me determine if this

topic was actually what I wanted to pursue for my dissertation. In the end, it was found

to be of great interest. More specifically, I tested my questions and found that they were

effective for carrying out our conversation and led the conversation to revealing and

provoking areas. Originally, I had four categories. After this pilot study, I reduced the

number of categories to three. I found this more manageable.

Language and Translation

The conversation in the pilot study was conducted in Korean and translated into

English prior to its transcription.

Timeline

The pilot study was carried out as described above. The rest of this research was

completed from June through December of 2007. I anticipate turning the first draft of

my dissertation in to my chair February 4, 2008, and turning in the final version to the

rest of my committee members approximately April of 2008.

Journal

The entire research process was recorded in a personal journal which became a source of data. A journal excerpt can be found in Appendix F.

Background of the Researcher

I am a doctoral student at the University of San Francisco. I received my M.A. in Counseling Psychology from the University of San Francisco in 2003, and a B.A. in Psychology from the University of Rochester in New York in 1997. I have been a marriage and family therapist intern at the Asian Perinatal Advocates of San Francisco General Hospital, specializing in the serving of low-income families with children with developmental deficiencies.

I have many needs at this time of my life. I am about to finish my studies and am also working hard to promote my own spiritual growth. I have become a father recently. Starting a family is certainly among the most exciting and memorable aspects of one's life, but it's also challenging. Financial commitments become significant at the same time as personal responsibilities multiply and reach an entirely new level. I am motivated, ready, willing and able to start the new journey of my life and to become the person that I am meant to be.

Summary

The above section presented the conversationally-based research protocol. The research process was discussed in terms of the research site, entrée, participants, research categories, research questions, data collection, text creation, and the means of data analysis. This process was based upon the creation of a text and, through the analysis of that text, the unfolding of the possibility of being personally affected by it.

Chapter Four presents the data and analysis. Quotes from the conversations are integrated with theory to interpret the results of the analysis. The analysis will lead to social and personal implications for action.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

Today, our will to meaning is frustrated on a worldwide scale. Ever more we are haunted by a feeling of meaninglessness which is often accompanied by a feeling of emptiness. It mainly manifests itself in boredom and apathy. While boredom is indicative of a loss of interest in the world, apathy betrays a lack of the initiative to do something in the world, to change something in the world. Our industrialized society is out to satisfy all human needs, and its companion, consumer society, is even out to create ever new needs to satisfy; but the most human need—the need to find and fulfill a meaning in our lives—is frustrated by this society.

Authenticity

Authenticity imparts to our lives a commitment to making those lives our own by fully owning up to what we do and who we are. Being authentic, we confront the fact that our life stories add up to a greater whole. Becoming authentic may not radically change the contents of our lives, but authenticity does change how we live.

Dr. Kim is a 33 years old dentist and the president of Frisco Dental Clinic in

Burlingame, California. He stated:

> I don't really know what I am meant to do. I feel that everybody has some kind
> of destiny or purpose in life, but I am dumbfounded about what I'm supposed to
> do. I ask myself everyday "what am I really here for, but never can come up
> with an answer. I know that in life we're not supposed to have the answers to
> everything, and we as human beings always seem to ask the questions that are
> hard to be answered… like why am I really here and what is my purpose on
> earth… I guess in time we'll see, or maybe not. I'd just like to know where I'm
> supposed to be and what exactly I'm supposed to be doing. Maybe I am
> fulfilling my purpose already… not really sure.

Dr. Kim told me that he often wondered if his life was on the right track. "I

have many things to do, before I die…but I don't think I have enough accomplishments

yet." During our conversation, he seemed to be under a lot of stress. I later learned that

Dr. Kim was deeply involved in his career and personal life, but he felt he was just

striving to achieve social approval and to meet the expectations of others. Although he

was a responsible adult, he was not clear about what his life purposes were. He stated,

"I think I do things in order to achieve social approval or to attain the rewards that come

from having acted properly."

Given such a means/ends orientation to life, he tended to live strategically,

trying to figure out the most cost-effective means to obtaining the ends he desired.

Mai-Mai Q. Ho, LCSW, is the Executive Director of APA. An immigrant from

Hong Kong, she speaks Cantonese, Mandarin and Toishanese. She received her Master

of Social Work degree from the University of California, Berkeley, and is a licensed

clinical social worker. She is chair of the Asians Committee, which is part of the San

Francisco Department of Human Services Family Preservation and Support program; an

Advisory Council member of the SafeStart Initiation; a Steering Committee member of

the San Francisco Family Support Network; and a Board member of the California

Family Resource Association at the state level. For her, a good life is in the services she

performs for humanity. She said:

> Giving is fun, and more and more people have to recognize that even if you are
> disposed to do it, you don't have to wait until you die; that the needs are now
> and tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and you ought to be able to plan your
> resource distribution so that you can do it and see what good it does and reap
> the joy and fun of seeing something happen. I don't believe in doing it when
> you do die. I believe in doing it now.

> Ms. Ho believed that society would be considerably sicker without philanthropy

and volunteerism. She went on to say, "It would be very sick without the resource

allocations and very sick without the leadership because you can't leave it to the

government. Much of what we do in our society has to be supported by the private

sector."

She talked about creating a better environment and promoting personal

responsibility. She said:

> If you are in a position to create a better environment in your lifetime, if you're
> in a position to do something about the community and you don't, I think you
> are missing out on a lot of reward that you should get. You're really not living
> up to the responsibility that you should have as someone who is healthy and
> wealthy, not only in terms of dollars but in terms of time to help the community
> be a better place to live because you were there....

> Kwan J. Oh is the pastor of the San Francisco Full Gospel Church. He was sent

there 40 years ago by Pastor David Yonggi Cho of the Yoido Full Gospel Church. He

came to the United States with his family, five hundred dollars, and a Bible. According

to him, his purpose in life was to serve Christ. He said:

> Each of us was made for a particular purpose, even if we don't know what it is.
> When you want to know about purpose and design, it is only natural that you
> have to go to the Designer and to the One who gave you purpose.

> He went on to say:

> Life should be seen as an eternal process of joyous spiritual discovery and
> growth: in the beginning stages of earthly life, the individual undergoes a
> period of training and education which, if it is successful, gives him or her the
> basic intellectual and spiritual tools necessary for continued growth. When
> individuals attain physical maturity in adulthood, they become responsible for
> their further progress, which now depends entirely on the efforts they
> themselves make.

> He believed that many people live their lives without ever reflecting on life

itself or its meaning for them. He said:

Their lives may be full of activities. They may marry, have children, run a business, or become scientists or musicians, without ever obtaining any degree of understanding of why they do these things. Their lives have no overall purpose to give meaning to separate events, and they may have no clear idea of their own nature or identity, of who they really are.

According to him, we must look at our inner lives. "Our hearts must be right for us to bear fruit that is in accordance with God's ways." He urged me to take responsibility for my own way of life. He also asked me to pray often. He said:

We readily acknowledge that God alone is to be the rule and measure of our prayers. In our prayers we are to look totally unto him and act totally for him, and we must pray in this manner and for such ends as are suitable to his glory.

Jo Sanzgiri has been the Dean of Organizational Programs at the Alliant International University since 1993. She has authored and co-authored many articles published in academic journals. According to her, life is a web of intertwined souls which collide at the most unexpected points. She elaborated on this by saying:

When you stop fighting the web and go with the natural order of things, everything falls into place. The nature of life is harmony, the motivation is hypocrisy. We are never fully satisfied, but that is the precise thing which keeps us going and traveling through new experiences until we find the one precise object which will keep us fulfilled throughout the rest of our lives. We must find our passion. Be it in another person, in our job, in an idea, when we find passion, we make a difference in this web, for we are no longer just flowing with it, but we are making it easier for others to travel. That is the meaning of life. To grow and help all others grow through loving what you do and who you are, and then eventually who others may be.

According to her, the meaning of life is and always will be a mystery. She

believed that if she just kept living to the fullest and to the best of her ability, she could

be happy. She added:

> It's not the destination, but the journey. I think those that search for an actual
> meaning will miss it along the way…but at the end of the journey they'll see
> the roads they've traveled and finally realize it was the journey…the destination
> is reaching a point in your life when you can truly appreciate your journey; and
> everyone else's.

Byung J. Yu is the president of Koreana Plaza in Oakland, California. I asked

him what his purpose in life was. He answered:

> What is my purpose in life? What was I sent here to do? I think I have almost
> found it. My great love for charity…donating, fundraising, finding creative ways
> to help others, using my money for the good of helping others, that's what I
> want my purpose in life to lead me to. I hope that I am heading in the right
> direction. It sure does feel like it. It has become a way of life for me…to the
> point where I would rather be doing that, than working in an office job. I will
> continue to work towards my purpose in life…and enjoy the ride.

He told me that he was very poor when he came to the United States 20 years

ago. His dream was to become a rich man. Byung J. Yu has since become rich and a

well known entrepreneur in the Korean community of the Bay Area. He told me that his

dreams changed over time.

> I want to positively impact someone else. I want to do this more. I intend to
> volunteer at the local city hospital this year, as well as support a few of my
> favorite charities. I have made it a goal to find other creative ways of helping

others as well. I would like to live in such as way that allows me to do something that will benefit someone else every day. We all can use help, regardless of our financial status, or how healthy and wealthy we appear. Just to experience the concern from another is priceless to any human being.

Wan Ki. Lee is my father and the auditor at Kwang Hee Fashion Plaza in Seoul, Korea. He has always been my mentor and life coach. I asked him what he thought it meant to lead an authentic life. He stated:

> For me, being authentic means knowing and trusting yourself, honoring the conscious and subconscious minds. Being authentic means listening within to hear the truths that lay awaiting our discovery beyond the inner chatter of day-to-day living. Then once these truths are discovered, to bring them to life by living them through conscious action. It is through action not thought that one becomes authentic.

In response to the question of what he thought was an inauthentic life, he answered:

> Being inauthentic would be to believe it but not act upon it. Maybe you don't act upon it because you're afraid or lazy or too busy, putting it off till a more convenient time… I think it is never convenient to be authentic. Being authentic means trusting deep inner wisdom and acting upon it whether it is pleasant or not, whether it's convenient or not.

During our conversation, I came to appreciate the importance of looking beyond the superficiality of life and finding meaning and purpose in a way that resonates as truth in our hearts and souls, as well as in our minds. He believed that being authentic did not mean living an ultimate truth. He felt that, "It means living the truth

you know and feel within, today. Acting today in a way that reflects this truth. Being

true to yourself." He went on to say:

> The meaning of life is to experience the joys and the despairs that life has to
> offer. To live life to the fullest squeezing as much into each day as possible, and
> making a difference each day to someone or something, contributing to the
> universe. To figure out what the true meaning of life is. To find out why we are
> here. To be passionate in everything I pursue.

Authentic living is often characterized by resoluteness. Heidegger (1962: 384)

states that resoluteness pulls us back from "the endless multiplicity of possibilities

which offer themselves as closest to one" and enables us to be clear-sighted about what

is demanded by the current situation in which we find ourselves. It therefore calls for

simplifying our lives so that we can identify what the most promising "basic

possibilities" are for ourselves. Having identified those possibilities, we then make them

the focus of our existence. I came to understand through this research that where the

inauthentic life was disjointed, dispersed and directionless, an authentic life was

focused, coherent, and totally engaged.

Judith Glass, Ph.D., is a licensed clinical psychologist and a certified trainer,

educator, and practitioner in psychodrama, sociometry, and group psychotherapy. She

received her Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from the California School of Professional

Psychology-San Diego in 1995 and her M.A. in Drama Therapy from New York

University in 1984. Dr. Glass is the chairperson of the Board of Examiners of

Psychodrama, Sociometry, and Group Psychotherapy. The Board is in charge of

certification standards of psychodrama. Dr. Glass talked about addictions, boredom, and

misery. "As a counselor, I often see people who want to grow spiritually but who are

using addictions as shortcuts to their goals. Over the years I've identified two major

conditions that persons trapped in addiction claim for staying addicted: boredom and

misery."

Dr. Glass told me that these misguided people used heavy drinking, compulsive

shopping, internet pornography, shoplifting, eating disorders, and more to alleviate the

negative emotions that they were experiencing—in order to escape from their boredom

or pain and achieve what felt like a spiritual high.

Many people in our society feel the hurts of their past, feel powerless in the

present, and fear for their future. Many have tried to find spiritual solace and peace but

it has eluded them. Feeling resentful of their prior suffering and justified in their

victimized mindset, such people escape the here and now in any way they can. As can

clearly be seen in the resulting circumstances of these addicts, that permanent meaning

and significance has not materialized.

Dr. Glass went on to say:

As a counselor, I verbally acknowledge these two kinds of Secret Keepers'
genuine need to live a sincere spiritual life. Every human being has this need
built deep into their genes, I believe. But I point out the downward spiral of the
destructive risks and consequences of their choices. I aim to help them see the
futility of reaching their spiritual goals by using addictive substitutes and
shortcuts. Instead, I coach them on discovering the rewards of shedding their
secret-keeping habits and revising their beliefs and attitudes in order to live the
honest, open, transparent life, a way of living that releases them to be the
person they were born to be.

Dr. Glass told me that resolution for bored people was gradually found as they

learned to deconstruct their distorted views by revising their beliefs and self-talk. For

miserable people, resolution came in the form of learning to identify the distorted

thoughts that were linked to hurtful feelings from childhood suffering or injustice, and it

further solidified when they learned to practice acceptance and forgiveness. According

to Heidegger (1962), humans are self-constituting and self-composing beings. Our ways

of being are not determined in advance by any sort of biological process or essential

characteristic, but are rather something each of us makes in the course of taking over

public possibilities and making commitments as to what we will be in our actions.

Using addictive substitutes and shortcuts will not solve anything in our life. We have to

understand that we are free to determine our own potential. We need to focus on what

we can do differently with our lives for ourselves and for others.

The above quotes and discussions all pertained to authenticity. The following

section presents data and analysis on narrative identity.

Narrative Identity

According to Ricoeur (1992: 114) narrative identity rests upon "a structure of

experience capable of integrating the two great classes of narratives: the historical

narrative and fictional narrative." Ricoeur (1992: 116) proceeded to define two major

aspects of the concept of identity as "sameness" and "selfhood." Differences between

these two aspects of identity emerge from the temporal nature of their existence. For

Ricoeur (1992: 116), the problem was that "personal identity revolves around the search

for a relational invariant capable of giving it the strong signification of permanence in

time." Ricoeur further stated:

> The first pole appeared to us to be symbolized by the phenomenon of character, by which the person can be identified and re-identified. As for the second pole, it appeared to us to be represented by the essentially ethical notion of self-constancy. Self-constancy is for each person that manner of conducting himself or herself so that others can count on that person. Because someone is counting on me, I am accountable for my actions before another (Ricoeur 1992: 116).

Byung J. Yu wanted to create a company in which the skills, intelligence, and

ideas of each person were valued and utilized. He said:

> To me, employee participation means that everyone must have the opportunity
> to identify and help solve real problems where they work. I want people to
> come to work every day thinking about how they can make things better—and
> knowing that they will have the opportunity to have their ideas heard and
> implemented.

He believed that an organization without an identity is also an organization

without discourse. He articulated:

> In such cases, people within the organization need to re-articulate the
> organization's narratives and rebuild its images. What is most interesting, most
> vital, and yet still most misunderstood about this process of change is that in
> order for it to be successful, it must transgress existing communicative patterns,
> styles, and formats. I think organization cannot change if it maintains its
> existing communication processes, styles, forms, and procedures.

Identity is constructed at the intersection of narratives and images. Narratives

are the internal stories people within organizations tell themselves; images are the

external accounts of how others perceive the organization. When narratives and images

clash or no longer support each other, an organization's identity becomes conflicted and

problematic. This conflict can have significant implications for organizational

leadership, strategic vision, employee morale, company ethics, and ultimately the

survival of the organization. An organization that loses its identity has no motivating

structure and no reason to stay in business.

Wan Ki. Lee was born February 6th, 1945, in Pyongyang, North Korea. He and

his family hated the brutal communists, so he came down to the South. He was only five

years old when the Korean War took place. "I walked and walked day and night." He

described the painful blisters that developed on his heels. "I walked from Pyongyang to

Busan...can you believe it?" He lived in Daegu and then later in Seoul. I asked him who

the most significant people in his life were. He stated:

> My father was a physical training instructor at the Korean Military Academy.
> After the war, life wasn't easy. My father and mother worked so hard to support
> me and my younger brother. We were not rich, but we were able to live like a
> middle class.

He told me that his father never spent money for himself. "He spent money for

his family only…He was devoted, generous, and very hard-working…I think my father

was the most significant person in my life." This brought on thoughts of my own father,

who retired two years ago. Wan Ki Lee went on to say, "I worked so hard until I retired.

I didn't have time to think about what my purpose of life would be. I just wanted to live

a normal and simple life."

He told me that he always wanted to help others. "Son, help others whenever

you can." He asked me to take care of myself, my family, my community, my country,

and the world. He bade me, "You cannot live yourself. You are in a communal society. You need to be attentive to others. That is the way to open up their heart."

The ethical way of interacting with others is also the way that preserves our own constancy of character, and hence our own narrative identity—it is in keeping our word and being reliable for others. In making a promise, we are saying that others can count on us, and it is this which makes us accountable.

Because our personal identities are narrative identities, we can make sense of ourselves only in and through our involvement with others. We can change ourselves through our own efforts and can reasonably encourage others to change as well.

I asked Wan Ki Lee how he would like to change in the future. He stated, "I want to volunteer for community service. I want to help and support others in needs. I want people to remember me as an honest and good man."

In this, I realized the need for us to discover our authentic selves. We need to attune to our deepest needs and passions and abandon the inauthentic self defined by fears and other people's expectations. I believe that inquiries into what constitutes the best life for humans must be grounded in an understanding of what humans are in their ordinary lives as agents in a shared-life world. If we can grasp what it is to be human,

then we will be able to see more clearly what 'virtues' are needed in order to fully

realize our being.

According to Ricoeur, the most important feature of his narrative identity is his

ethical aim. Ricoeur (1992: 172) defines the ethical intention as aiming at the 'good life'

with and for others, in just institutions. Ricoeur's enquiry, rather, is into the ethics of

virtue; it is an enquiry into what it means in general to be a good person—what virtues

one must possess—rather than an enquiry into 'applied ethics' or 'moral philosophy',

which attempt to decide whether certain actions are 'good' or 'bad', either in absolute

terms or in certain situations. The "aiming at" part of the "aiming at the good life"

formula is also, we should remember, a narrative journey: the good life is a life worthy

of being recounted. This is the ethical aim of Ricoeur's own work on narrative.

Ricoeur's (1992: 171) aim is to "establish the primacy of ethics over morality."

By "morality," he means the norm, or set of rules, that are established for us to be able

to live our lives in a moral way. By ethics, he means the aim of living a life that might

be described as good. So, in privileging ethics over morality, Ricoeur wants to say that

he is privileging the aim towards living a good life over an examination of rules which

might be followed in order to be considered good. If we want to live a "good life", we

must have an "ethical intention", and, as we have seen, this is defined by Ricoeur (1992:

172) as "aiming at the good life with and for others, in just institutions." But how will

we know if a life has been "good"? The answer is: by examining it, which really means,

by reading it as if it were a story. Ricoeur was much impressed by Socrates' dictum that

a life worth living is a life worth recounting. So, once again, there is a direct parallel

between narrative and life. Life is a narrative: in living, we create the story of our lives.

So far Ricoeur's ethics have been highly dependent on narrative, and, more

particularly, on narrative that is seen as an intermingling of the fictive and the historical.

On the fictive side of the equation, great privilege has been accorded literary fiction, as

is demonstrated by Ricoeur's choice of various early twentieth-century novels to

demonstrate the working of time in fiction. Ricoeur often talks as if all fiction were

literary fiction; at the very least, it could be said that he sees literature as the highest

form of the fictional. In this way, literature—especially the great novel—becomes an

example, or even a model, of how we might understand our own lives. When Ricoeur

moves his analysis into questions of continuity of character and keeping one's word,

literature further becomes a model of how we might live a good life.

Ricoeur's ethics is a version of virtue ethics. It seeks not to scrutinize which

particular deeds are good or bad, but rather to consider what constitutes a 'good life.'

For Ricoeur, life is a narrative. In life, we have what Ricoeur calls a 'narrative identity.'

'Identity' here is identity in the sense of *ipse* rather than of *idem*. In other words, despite

our being different, in terms of both physical and moral attributes, at different times in

our lives, we are still the same people. We maintain this sameness of personhood by

having self-constancy; it is this that constitutes our character. If we prove ourselves

reliable, we show ourselves to be people of good character despite the changes that may

happen in our lives

I believe that freedom comes before necessity in every human action. I, first

and foremost, desire the realization of my very self, the actualization of a meaningful

life. To be myself is to make real my potentialities for existence, the possibilities of my

being.

We all must face our own mortality over and over again. Dr. Kim recounted the

loss of his father three years ago. After listening to his story, I came to realize how

precious life was. He recounted:

> When I lost my father in my life, it made an immediate adjustment in my
> priorities. The day my mother, and my two older sisters, and I had to clean out
> my father's belongings after he had passed away, I thought about the fights I

used to have over things that were not so important. It made me sick to think about the way I bickered and argued. Now I wondered how I could have spent my time, knowing that a life I love can be gone in an instant.

Dr. Kim told me that it was a humbling experience to watch his father lying in a hospital bed with numerous tubes connected to his body, his life in the hands of the doctors and God. "Rich or poor, famous or not, we all bleed the same." After his father's death, he learned to treat everyone with respect, regardless of what they looked like, who they were or what they had. He went on to say:

> I always thought that grief was a simple process. You feel sad for about a year, and then you get over it and move on. I've since learned that grief is a much longer process than that. When my father died, I lost not only him, but also my identity, my security, my lifestyle, and my life as it was. My friendships changed, as did my family as I knew it. The grief process I went through will always be a part of who I am.

He was not sure whether he would ever be as happy again. I told him that happiness was a puzzle of many tiny pieces, forming a greater picture where suffering and pain had to exist because they were important parts of the design. I said:

> They give shape to the other parts that are free and have no meaning by themselves, unless you learn something with their existence. Accept suffering when necessary, but try to be happy whenever you can, for any reason you may find.

According to Richard Kearney, stories are what make our lives worth living. He writes (2002: 156) that, "there will always be someone there to say, 'tell me a story',

and someone there to respond. Were this not we would no longer be fully human."

Ms. Ho felt that all her purposes for living were the opportunity to love. She stated:

> It may change form or expression, but love never dies. I feel that once we feel love for someone, we always love them—even from a past life. We love forever and love is forever, but it changes us as much as we allow ourselves to accept how very much we are loved, too.

> She asked me to remember how many times I have protected and helped

someone. She went on to say:

> Remember the things you gave others, the happiness you provided them... remember it all. For now on, try to be always very sensitive and think about all the aspects of reality. The other people who are close to you are like parts of your own body.

> I realized that what she said was right. My happiness depended on others; even

though I thought that I could be happy in my own private world while others were

suffering on the outside.

According to Ricoeur, in determining to do something, we likewise determine

ourselves. We find and affirm ourselves in our acts. In Ricoeur's words: "In the same

way that a project opens up possibilities in the world, it opens up new possibilities in

myself and reveals me to myself as a possibility of acting. My power-to-be manifests

itself in my power-to-do" (1978: 69). The 'possible' is thus an essential component in

self-understanding. What is important to note is the central place which Ricoeur accords

to the notion of possibility and its projection in his project of determining and

understanding human existence.

Ms. Ho talked about the importance of taking action when she stated:

If you are in a position to create a better environment in your lifetime, if you're in a position to something about the community and you don't, I think you are missing out on a lot of reward that you should get. You are really not living up to the responsibility that you should have as someone who is healthy and wealthy, not only in terms of dollars but in terms of time to help the community be a better place to live because you were there.

During conversation with Ms. Ho, I told myself to be wise and open my arms

with compassion. I would help everyone, forgive my enemies, and always be the one to

bring wisdom, love and peace. I would like to make everyone happy with my actions

and will feel happier seeing their smiles than my own.

Narrative identity is the dialectic concept integrating two concepts of identity,

the ethical dimension of selfhood and the self-perpetuating dimension of sameness. The

following section presents data and analysis on imagination.

Imagination

Language shapes our world: the way we learn to describe the world influences

the way we learn to see or experience it. As individuals, we make meaning by

connecting new experiences to existing understandings. Richard Kearney suggests we

open our minds and make meaning by connecting new experiences, such as beliefs,

culture, knowledge, values, norms, vision, and morale, to existing understandings in

peer-to-peer, peer-to-text, and text-to-text conversation. Richard Kearney invites us to

write a new life story and live a new life.

> In our conversation, Ms. Ho talked about her imagining of the future:

> I want to live in a place where happiness exists in everyone's heart and lasts forever, without disappearing like all the ephemeral happy moments of your life in a world constantly frightened by terrorism, poverty and indifference to human rights.

She wanted her children to always have hope. "When things get tough, I want my

children to not be bogged down with anxiety or despair, but to see possibilities ahead."

> I asked Dr. Grass what she foresaw for herself and higher education in the

future. She replied:

> Americans are notoriously pragmatic and prone to be preoccupied with technique, the technological know-how of problem solving. Since we tend to set for ourselves only those problems that can be solved whether in science or technology, the difficult, complex, interrelated social problems that are not amenable to technological solution fail to get sustained attention.

> She told me that education in America did not prepare students to assume

responsibility for the plight of the weak and powerless in society. She went on to say:

> It tends to socialize one into unquestioning acceptance of the status quo, partly by inattention to the inequities that result from institutional arrangements and

the way power is exercised and partly by justifying the existing system in the
name of the traditional American values of liberty, equality, property, and
religion. Because these values are interpreted largely in terms of economic
individualism, they do not function very well as critical standards for the
evaluation of public policy. Issues such as health care, assistance to single
mothers, and health and safety in the workplace can be adequately addressed
only in the context of community.

Dr. Grass wanted to do more research on complex and interrelated social

problems. Preparing her students to assume responsibility for the voiceless was her

main educational goal for the future. She talked about the limits of Cartesian rationality

and positivistic research. She stated:

> Teachers, administrators, and educational policy makers must make daily moral
> decisions about the 'right' thing to do. Positivistic research is of little help to
> such practitioners because it assumes that research exists only to describe and
> help make predictions and, of course, has no value dimensions. It is unequipped
> to evaluate educational purposes or to assess various strategies for improving
> schooling. Educational knowledge obtained through the use of physical science
> methods, then, is not simply unhelpful to practitioners, but potentially very
> misleading because of its attempt to erase the moral dimension of human life.
> When the morality of an educational act is removed as a research consideration,
> the data produced inevitably reproduce the inequity of the status quo, for it has
> no mechanism to question and to visualize what might be a just situation.

> She went on to talk about the rationalistic trap:

> Researchers fall into a rationalistic trap when they fail to grasp the limits of
> Cartesian rationality. In attempting to make sense of the convolutions of
> everyday life in social and educational spheres, they overlook the significance
> of the non-rational and the irrational. The straight road of rationality, the
> superhighways of positivism, miss the cultural and geographic detail of the

crooked path. The qualitative domain allows us to walk the crooked path, to explore particularity, intuition, emotion, rage, cognition, desire, interpretation, experience, positionality, passion, social theory, and knowledge in relationship to one another. As researchers bring these features together, they create a whole greater than the sum of the separate parts.

Herda (1999: 22) reminded us, "to authentically address our local and global challenges, we must move beyond changing our techniques in research to changing first ourselves as researchers."

Dr. Glass believed that these researchers/interpreters were actually better teachers. She explained, "As I learn to make sense of lived situations and reflect on my own beliefs and behaviors, I am better prepared to teach for rigorous levels of understanding."

Traditional classrooms have students lined up in desks in several rows. When the bell rings, students know to be in their seats, attentive, and waiting for the teacher's instructions. The teacher stands up in front of the class, looming over the students. The teacher has all the power, controls everything that happens, and is the absolute authority in the classroom.

Samuel Cuddeback is currently on the Executive Committee of the California Association of Independent Schools (CAIS) and the Bay Area Teacher Development

Collaborative (BATDC). He is in his eighth year on the Town School for Boys' Board

of Trustees. At Drew, he teaches an English class, advises a tenth grade cohort, and

attends as many games and performances as possible. His wife Meg and he have two

daughters, Sara and Tali. Sam enjoys writing in his journal and reading and discussing

books with Drew School parents and guardians, among other things. On the weekends,

he is training to become the next Lance Armstrong.

In our conversation, Mr. Cuddeback shared his own opinions and perspectives

on education:

> To make change, to keep this country strong, to bring peace to the world, the
> voices of the masses must not remain silent. Decisions cannot continue to be
> made by the dominant culture for the good of the people. We believe that the
> only way to achieve a true, free, fair, democracy and a democratic education is
> to stop training the majority of people on this earth into silence, and a minority
> of the elite into power. Education should be learning to voice and not allowing
> yourself to be oppressed.

He claimed that teachers were no longer seen as demigods at Drew. "Our teacher

is someone there to learn, just like everyone else. He told me that the classrooms of

Drew were facilitated by motivating teachers who truly loved and cared for the students.

"We all work together to learn collaboratively…The teacher is no longer the problem

solver with all the answers… He is a problem poser who stands by the side of his

students and struggles to find the answers by looking at the world and thinking critically

about everything that is going on in the world."

According to Mr. Cuddeback, everyone had a voice and knew the power that

voice carried. I discovered that education started with dialogue and collective sharing in

his classroom, growing into a collective experience that led to the collective action

outside the classroom; learning was no longer restricted to the confines of the classroom

walls. With his efforts, students were able to get a sense that what they were learning

was something that was relevant to their lives and to understanding who they were in

the world.

> Voicing lets students express themselves, but dialogue lets students learn. Dialogue helps teachers and students become learning partners; now learning is a give and take relationship. Dialogue is a discussion where everything anyone has to say is viewed by the entire class as a valid opinion. We learn to risk by sharing personal experiences with everyone in the class, building trust, tolerance, and solidarity. Students are validated, nurtured, and encouraged to participate, especially when they see others participating.

> He went on to say:

> There is no fear of being told your answers or opinions are wrong nor is there fear of being scorned by anyone for our opinions. We know that no one will laugh at us. Everyone learns that there can be many right opinions on one subject and to live in a multicultural society you need to learn to respect every individual's point of view. Students become open-minded and learn to respect others for their differences as well as to be proud of themselves, their histories,

cultural truths, and experiences.

Understanding is the way of knowing in the practical interest, and this way of knowing is what comes forward in conversation. Gadamer (1991: 304) writes that "the individual is never simply an individual because he is always in understanding with others." Through language, we create our social reality.

Gadamer (1991) views understanding as a matter of negotiation between oneself and one's partner in the hermeneutical dialogue such that the process of understanding can be seen as a matter of coming to an "agreement" about the matter at issue. Coming to such an agreement means establishing a common framework or 'horizon,' and Gadamer thus takes understanding to be a process of the 'fusion of horizons.' All understanding involves a process of mediation and dialogue between what is familiar and what is alien in which neither remains unaffected.

I realized from these conversations that teachers were not just neutral transmitters of knowledge. I could see that teachers' personal, social, and cultural beliefs, values, and backgrounds and their teaching were intimately connected.

Mr. Cuddeback wanted to be a better teacher, who combined reflection and action in the interest of empowering students with skills and knowledge. He stated:

I am merely concerned with promoting individual achievement or advancing students along career ladders, but I am concerned with empowering students so they can read the world critically in order to change it through the power of struggle and community.

He wanted his students to be responsible global citizens. He elaborated on this

by stating:

We know that education managers frequently make decisions based on economically rationalized 'bottom lines' rather than on the needs of students. This is consistent with the ongoing corporatization of schools and is one of the educational by-products of 'globalization.' These practices are contracting the opportunities teachers have with their students towards greater understanding of the political and moral structuring of society. As these opportunities contract we run the risk of leading students into the world without the ability to situate themselves, to identify themselves, as responsible and aware global citizens.

Mr. Cuddeback told me that he tried to make Drew more rigorously academic

and more practical in the world. He talked about the importance of knowing his

students. He pointed out that:

If teachers don't know their students, what they know and don't know, their fears and their dreams, their failures and successes, they cannot help them construct a compelling and in-depth view of the world and their role in it. Without such insight, teachers cannot help students become knowledge workers in a knowledge-driven world. Students will find it difficult to make sense of existing data while learning to produce their own knowledge. When educators know their students, become experts in subject matter, and are adept knowledge workers, they are beginning to put together the skills that will help them become great teachers who motivate and inspire their students. As such teachers engage students with the world, they simultaneously make schools more rigorously academic and more practical in the world.

In order to help students construct a compelling and in-depth view of the world and their role in it, teachers must have genuine conversations with students. A change in teachers' or students' horizons should be the underlying quest of each conversation.

Conversation is the key to understanding self and others. As Herda suggested:

> It requires discussion and conversation with others to reach a conclusion grounded in action about what things mean and the way things are done. This activity involves changing people's patterns of thought and action, which in turn, happens only when an individual has achieved a fusion of horizon (Herda 1999: 129).

Herda also noted:

> We cannot understand unless we move from one horizon to another. Our horizons are finite, but they are not limited. It is in relationships that we come across new worlds, new ways of doing things. It is in relationships that we can have a backdrop with which to see who we are, to learn and to change our history (Herda 1999: 129).

According to Mr. Cuddeback, good teachers are able to change students' beliefs and conceptions. He explained:

> Lecturing appears to dominate instruction at the university level as it does at the secondary level; students rarely are forced to state, much less to examine, defend or justify their beliefs or ideas. Consequently, while they may remember what a lecturer has said in order to pass a test, the information they commit to short-term memory may not alter their own frameworks for making sense of the world, of themselves, and of others. Their deeply rooted beliefs and conceptions …remain untouched by the words of text or teacher.

His goal was to give his students the ability and desire to learn.

I don't want them to dread coming to school every day. I want them to be excited and anxious to learn new things. I would hope to accomplish this by having them do many creative, hands-on activities with each other and eliminating a lot of textbook and busy work. With textbooks, students may get some information. But from my past experience, I think what they learn there is easily forgotten and often not very well understood.

He believed that learning was best appreciated if it was seen as a process of

discovery that generated in people new understandings about themselves and the world

around them. "Because it is a process of discovery, learning offers all of us an increased

capacity for self-creation."

Dr. Sanzgiri talked about the importance of moral imagination. "Some students

are oriented to see new possibilities; others do not appear even to be aware of their

responsibility to explore other possibilities. When a college student begins to see a

moral connection between herself or himself and public life, it alters the meaning of

education."

Richard Kearney proposes (2002: xii) the possibility of a postmodern

imagination, capable of preserving the functions of narrative identity and creativity—or

what he calls the "poetics of the possible". This includes a response to the postmodern

dilemma with a reinterpretation of the role of the imagination as a relationship between

the self and other, a democratization of knowledge and culture, as ethically and

poetically attuned to the lost narrative of historical meaning, and as inclusive,

empathetic, versatile, open minded, and diversive.

Dr. Sanzgiri told me that the moral imagination might be understood as the

capacity to empathize with others and to discern creative possibilities for ethical action.

She went on to explain:

> The moral imagination considers an issue in the light of the whole. The whole
> is not only the complex interrelated functional aspects of society, economic,
> political, social institutions. It is also the traditions, beliefs, values, ideals, and
> hopes of its members, who constitute a community with a stake in the good life
> and a hopeful future. The moral imagination broadens and deepens the context
> of decision making to include the less tangible but most meaningful feelings,
> aspirations, ideals, relationships. It encompasses the core values of personal
> identity, loyalties, obligations, promises, love, trust, and hope. Ethical judgment
> consists in making these values explicit and taking responsibility for judging
> their implications for action.

The term imagination refers to the generating of new images of the world and

of new relationships that create a shared reality in which the self acts and builds an

identity in relation to others. Kearney emphasized the productive power of imagination

when he discussed Ricoeur's definition of imagination. He stated:

> Ricoeur thus links the productive power of language and that of imagination.
> For new meanings to come into being they need to be spoken or uttered in the
> form of new verbal images. And this requires that phenomenological account of
> imagination as appearance be supplemented by its hermeneutic account as
> meaning. Imagination can be recognized accordingly as the act of responding to

a demand for new meaning, the demand of emerging realities to be by being said in new ways (Kearney 1998: 5).

It is narrative, Kearney posited (1995: 184), that "brings us to the door of ethical action but it cannot lead us through." As agents of our actions, we must be willing to walk through the door that imagination offers and make a stand for the just and ethical.

The function of imagination is the capacity to open up new worlds in and through the language yielded by text. The creation of new meanings has the capacity to transcend the limits of our actual world to capture the past, and to project a future of possibility so we can live our lives with purpose and meaning. An understanding of the possible worlds opened up through the imagination also permits a new understanding of ourselves as being-in-the-world.

We are living in a postmodern culture where we tend to just drift along with the latest fads. After having conversations with the participants, I realized the importance of not setting aside my dreams, and not neglecting my imagination. I should never lose touch with the power of my own dreams and imagination and my desire to live an authentic life.

Summary

Chapter Four presented the data and analysis. Quotations from the

conversations were integrated with theory to offer a research text. Data were presented

under the categories of authenticity, narrative identity, and imagination.

The following chapter will present the findings and implications, followed by

the reflections of the researcher.

CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, REFLECTION

<u>Introduction</u>

The research process used was conducted in the hermeneutic tradition, holding

language and ontology as the same. Rather than pursuing tools and technical

conclusions from the extraction of scientific variables, this tradition pursues a path of

social inquiry through the language, history, tradition, thought and actions revealed by

the social text of people living meaningful lives. My role as researcher was that of an

active participant seeking understanding through conversation. There will be three

sections in this chapter. The first section is findings. The second section draws

implications for further research, followed by a brief reflection.

<u>Findings</u>

Authenticity and Authentic Life

1. We must either choose our own lives or have our lives chosen for us by

the social forces already in operation when we were born. There are no given,

automatic meanings in human life. We must create whatever goals we will pursue. But

before we can even consider inventing our own life purposes, we must become well-

integrated, thoughtful people.

2. In the inauthentic mode, we get caught up in the business of getting along and getting ahead. We, as authentic beings, should not avoid responsibility and listen to the crowd, the anonymous "they" who define reality and say how things should be done.

3. Authenticity is not a mode of Being but of Being a human. Without Dasein, there can be no authenticity as a mode of Being of human. To be authentic is to be a struggling agent trying resolutely to overcome passivity in life. It is the project of winning self-possession, of creating and owning one's self within the situation as interpreted by the human agent. Passivity and authenticity are incompatible.

4. Becoming adults requires years of learning and growing. Each of us grew up in a fully-developed human culture, replete with rules, regulations, and assumed life meanings. Even if we were not pleased with the enculturation we received, there was no way to avoid or to skip that part of human development. We had to become integrated conformists before we could consider becoming more autonomous.

5. We can get lost in the daily routines and chores laid out by the public world, sucked into doing what we do without any sense of the wider context of

meaning to which our life belongs. We should not drift along with the latest fads,

striving to achieve social approval and playing multiple roles without imparting any

integrity or cohesiveness to our existence. Instead, we need to be wholeheartedly

involved in our own life. We should not flee from our responsibility to own up to our

own lives.

      6. To live an authentic life, we need to be true to ourselves. I came to

understand that being authentic means living our truths as a day-to-day practice, not

holding them as mere intellectual concepts. All truths must be lived, not just believed.

That is why we are here in a body in time and space. This is what life is truly about. We

each have an opportunity to practice what we believe.

      7. Courage and cowardice help explain how and why we often fail to live

up to an ethic we affirm in principle and want to enact. In many respects, acting

according to moral values involves risks, sacrifices, and uncertainties, which can make

such an enactment difficult and challenging. Honesty is not something that is risk-free

or cost-free. The honest people are courageous in the sense that they appreciate such

conditions, and the liar is, in this respect, a coward. We could conclude from this that

liars are not really affirming deceit as a good as much as they are fearing the

consequences of telling the truth.

8. The key task in ethics is not a radical challenge to our values but a recognition of how much courage it takes to lead a moral life. Ethics, itself, is a human potential, the possibility of becoming a person who can live well with others. Attention to the human condition in all its facets would be a valuable addition to moral education.

9. We need to understand what becoming ethical involves or requires—not simply knowing values, but knowing how values constitute our very being in the world, and what it takes to be able to enact our values. We need to pay attention to our sense of self and to the existential demands and difficulties of the ethical life.

10. Authenticity calls for an ongoing life of significant actions. It is actions that shape our authenticity.

Implications for further research and recommendations

Although most human sciences have modeled themselves on the physical sciences—which were developed to study structures of reality outside the realm of meaning—several disciplines have come to be concerned with understanding configured through narrative forms. These disciplines—history, literature, and particular

areas of psychology—can provide models for the investigation of narrative for all of the human disciplines.

A fuller appreciation of the importance of the realm of meaning for understanding human beings will require a different kind of training for scholars in the human sciences. This training will need to include a study of the structures and relations of a linguistically organized reality. It will also require a redefinition of the human sciences: instead of understanding themselves as natural sciences, the human sciences need to see themselves as multiple sciences. The object of their inquiry, the human being, exists in multiple strata of reality, which, although interrelated, are organized in different ways.

The stratum unique to human beings is organized linguistically, and the human disciplines need to hone the tools for working with linguistic data much as they have done for physical data. The kind of knowledge that can be obtained from the realm of meaning with its linguistic structures is different from that obtainable from the material and organic realms. This knowledge is developed through hermeneutic techniques, and consists of descriptions of meaning. Knowledge of the realm of meaning cannot be organized into covering laws, and it does not provide information for the prediction and

control of future linguistic events.

The object of inquiry for the human sciences is the reality of human experience, both that present in and that hidden from awareness. Human experience is hermeneutically organized according to the figures of linguistic production. A function of the human sciences is to read or hear and then interpret the texts of human experience. These disciplines do not produce knowledge that leads to the prediction and control of human experience; they produce, instead, knowledge that deepens and enlarges the understanding of human existence. This kind of knowledge of the texts of experience is derived from a whole set of skills, such as an awareness of how texts create and carry meaning, how structures and prototypes organize the parts of expression into meaningful statements and discourse, and how transformative principles relate meaning to different types of discourse. Knowledge of human experience requires the use of interpretive or hermeneutic approaches, approaches that resemble the techniques and rational procedures used by history and literary theory.

The design of curriculum must be reconsidered in light of the knowledge we have gleaned from the analysis of the value dimension of research. When formulating educational policy, we are in essence applying research outcomes to practice. Without

the benefits derived from understanding the value-dimension, confusions about educational purpose are bound to arise. The inability of many educational leaders to discuss the social role of schools or to have a clear view of the conflicts implicit in diverse plans for educational reform may be evidence of researchers' neglect of the value dimension.

I believe that the notion of research adequacy needs to be extended. Scientific research is not adequate simply because it is valid and reliable in the positivistic sense. Adequacy must take into account moral considerations, purposes, and ethical premises. I recommend scholars do more educational research which will succeed to the degree that it encourages a public conversation about the ways schools and educational agencies contribute to a just and ethical society.

I believe that the model for research and knowledge-generation should not be the idealized and universal logic of scientific research because this is an inappropriate model. In social and educational research, knowledge is concerned not with generalization, prediction and control, but with interpretation, meaning and illumination.

Hermeneutic/interpretive epistemology focuses on human action and assumes

that all human action is meaningful and hence has to be interpreted and understood rather than methodically known in a natural science sense. There is a questioning of the wholesale application of methods appropriate to the natural sciences since such methods cannot elucidate the meanings of human actions. If the concern is with meaning within social interactions, then confining research to the observable or empirically 'given', as a positivist/empiricist epistemology does, is to miss out on the most important dimension in social enquiry.

To explain the social world, we need to understand it, and hence we need to understand the meanings that construct and are constructed by interactive human behavior. Human action is given meaning by interpretive schemes or frameworks. The positivist/empiricist model fails to recognize the capacity of human beings not only to experience the world empirically but also to interpret it.

Interpretation is meaning-giving, a representing of the world through significatory systems such as language and culture. This has to assume the prior existence of a social order and social interaction which is a 'given' background to all human actions. We are 'immersed' in the historical and cultural contexts of this given world.

As researchers engaged in the human action and social practice of research, we are also seeking to make sense of what we are researching and we do so through interpretive schemes or frameworks. Unlike the situation in the natural sciences, both the subject and object (other people) of research have the same characteristic of being interpreters or sense-seekers and sense-makers in social research. It follows, therefore, that it is impossible to make a strict subject-object separation between the researcher and the researched on the grounds that they have radically different characteristics. Subjects and objects and people and world are co-constituted and mutually constituting.

It is important to understand that teachers are not the only educational actors who engage in research. If we are serious about Dewey's notion of a democratic community where all parties have a voice in the formulation of policy, then parents and community members must be participants in the public conversation about education.

I do not doubt that, for the foreseeable future, most of the issues currently on the social policy agenda will stay there; however I would hope that if more of us come to see policy-making as a deeply human enterprise—one we can all take some role in— then progress towards a more just and reflective society will become possible.

Finally, this study suggests the need for further research with participants from different regions of the world. It would be valuable to explore how people from different societies and cultures view creating and living authentic lives and to see if the categories of authenticity, narrative identity, and imagination emerge from their conversations. More conversation and reflection about these concepts are necessary to aid others, to question their own work and lives, and to develop an interconnected sense of being.

Reflections

Autonomy, making our own life-choices, 'doing it my way', though a part, is not the totality of what makes up authenticity, or being one's own person. I believe that, to be any kind of a person, one's life must have a unity to it, the continuity and coherence of which comes from constructing one's life as a work of art. To me, authenticity is focused autonomy.

I want to be open to the present, future, and past. I want to constantly develop new and creative meanings, uncontaminated by the pressures of social life and everyday concerns. My life is precious; I can live it only once. I believe that the impulse to live authentically can be strengthened by confronting the anxiety I experience in the

anticipation of death and the acknowledgment of my own finitude.

As there is no proof of the impossibility of authenticity, the search for it will continue. The strong effect of this search for authenticity is significant in itself, despite the ontological or ethical difficulties involved. The search may not authenticate me, but it does make me human. The very wish to live genuinely, the very attempt to become authentic, expresses a courageous determination not to despair or to yield to the powerful processes of leveling, objectification and depersonalization. I believe that to be human is to search for one's true self and to yearn for authentic relations with others. While it is hard, almost impossible, to attain public authenticity within the prevailing social ethic, with its instrumental personal and economic relations, it is certainly feasible to attempt to do so—to take responsibility for our actions and to foster a true concern for others.

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Appendix A:
Letter of Invitation and Research Questions

University of San Francisco
Letter of Invitation and Research Questions

Date

Participant's Name and Title
Company or Organization
Address

Dear Mr.

Thank you for agreeing to participate in an exploration of my dissertation topic.

Your participation in this research is contingent upon your signing a consent form, a copy of which you will keep. By signing, you will be granting me permission to audio record and transcribe our conversation(s). In this way, our conversation(s) will provide data for the analysis of the subject I have described. Once transcribed, I will provide you with a copy of our conversation for your review, comments, and editing. You may add to or delete any section of the conversation at that time. Once I have received your approval of the transcript, I will proceed with the work of analyzing our conversation. Your name and affiliation, the data you contribute, and the date of our conversation will not be held confidential.

While the conversations and transcripts in this research are collaborative, the writing that comes from them will be my product, and may include some of your editing. You therefore consent to forgo anonymity under these conditions. You acknowledge that you have been given complete and clear information about this research, and it is your option to make the decision at the outset about whether to participate or not, and can withdraw at any time without any adverse consequences.

Below you will find a series of proposed questions. These questions are intended as guidelines to direct our conversation(s). I would like to emphasize that I am seeking stories that reflect your personal history and experience with the topic at hand. My hope is that our conversation will provide an opportunity for us both to reach new understandings.

Reflecting upon your experiences, please consider the following questions:
What makes for a well-lived life?
What is the story of your life that most dramatically portrays who you are?
Who are the most significant people in your life that have given you ideas of what is important for living authentic life?
What is the story of your life that shaped your present life?
How will you become different in the future?
What is your imagination for yourself and society for the future?

Again, thank you for your willingness to meet.   Please call (415-931-5263) or email (jl007c@yahoo.co.kr) me if you have further questions.   I look forward to seeing you soon.

Sincerely Yours,

Jong Ho. Lee
Researcher, Doctoral Student
University of San Francisco
Organizational and Leadership

Jl007c@yahoo.co.kr
Telephone (415) 931-5263, (415) 577-0769

Appendix B:
Research Participants

Name	Title	Organization / Affliation
Kwan J. Oh	**Pastor**	**San Francisco Full Gospel Church**
Dr. Judith Glass	**Professor**	**California Institute of Integral Studies**
Harry H. Kim	**CPA**	**Kim & Lee Accounting Company**
Byung J. Yu	**President**	**Koreana Plaza**
Samuel Cuddeback	**Headmaster**	**Drew College Preparatory School**
Eung S. Kim	**President**	**Lions Club**
Wan K. Lee	**Auditor**	**Kwang Hee Fashion Plaza**
Dr. Sol. Kim	**President**	**Fresco Dental Clinic**
Dr. Jo Sanzgiri	**Professor**	**Alliant International University**
Mai-Mai Ho	**Executive Director**	**Asian Perinatal Advocates**

Appendix C:
Letter of Confirmation

Date
Participants Name and Title
Company or Organization
Address

Dear Mr.:

Thank you very much for allowing me the opportunity to have a conversation with you.
I look forward to meeting with you, and to our conversation.

Sincerely Yours,

Jong Ho. Lee
Researcher, Doctoral Student
University of San Francisco
Organizational and Leadership

Jl007c@yahoo.co.kr
Telephone (415) 931-5263, (415) 577-0769

Appendix D:
Thank you and Follow-Up Letter.

Date
Participants Name and Title
Company or Organization
Address

Dear Mr.:

Thank you for taking time to meet with me on ---------------.   I appreciate your willingness to participate in my research project.   I believe our conversation will be valuable part of my dissertation.

I have attached a copy of transcribed conversation.   This transcript once reviewed and approved by you, will provide the basis for data analysis.

Please take some to review the attached transcript and add changes or clarifying comments you believe are appropriate.   I will contact you in two weeks time to discuss any changes you have made.

Again, I thank you for your participation.

Sincerely Yours,

Jong Ho. Lee
Researcher, Doctoral Student
University of San Francisco
Organizational and Leadership

Jl007c@yahoo.co.kr
Telephone (415) 931-5263, (415) 577-0769

Appendix E:
Journal Excerpt.

Oct. 15. 2007

What is good life? I don't really have an answer, but I think good life can be determined by the individual in terms of his own satisfaction. The meaning of my life is given by my own limits: selecting certain activities of the ones which my capacities make available to me, and what is to count as my satisfactory performance. Happiness is the unhindered pursuit of such activities and relations within these self-set limits.

But how am I to understand the setting of these limits? They mark what contents me, and not momentarily, but, in so far as happiness is the end for my life as such, in a stable and abiding way. What is at issue is a satisfaction of myself, one which, therefore, is adequate to cope with my life as a whole. I can achieve some stable plan of this kind only if I exercise my capacities with an eye to settling on limits, and on ones which I can be reasonably confident that I shall find lastingly satisfying.

Having determined these, my future is to be a continuation of my past, since it is to be organized in the light of what that has led me to believe will prove satisfying for my life. Of course, I may change my mind about this, but I shall do so, in so far as I

look to happiness as the end, in terms of arriving at some overall conception of what satisfies me through which I can then live my life.

Happiness as the end for my life as such involves a certain conception of the problem of my existence: it is one of discovering through my experience a general conception of what will prove of lasting satisfaction which I can then use in order to plan and relate to my future.

Appendix F:
Consent to Be a Research Participant

University of San Francisco
Consent to Be a Research Participant

Purpose and Background

Mr. Jong Ho. Lee, doctoral student at the University of San Francisco has asked me to be a participant in his research exploring issues of living authentic lives and finding meaning in the midst of everydayness.

Procedure

I agree to be a participant in this study. I am aware voluntarily conversations between myself and this researcher will occur. These conversations will reflect my insights and opinions about my experience in life. I agree that Jong Ho. Lee may record our conversation on audio tape, which will be transcribed. A copy of the transcript will be returned to me for review, editing, and approval before it is subjected to analysis. I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time, that I may discontinue the conversation at any point, and request any changes or deletions. My participation in this research project is voluntary, and any data I contribute to this study will not be confidential. I agree that all data collected during the research process and my name be used in the dissertation and subsequent publications.

Risks and discomforts

I am free to decline to answer any questions or stop the conversation at any point. I may also withdraw my participation at any time. I understand that I may request to remove my entire transcript from the study. I also understand that I may identified and quoted in the dissertation and subsequent publications.

Benefits

I will receive no monetary compensation for my participation.   The anticipated benefit of this conversation to me is the opportunity for personal reflection about the issues at hand.

Alternatives

I am free to elect not to participate in this study.

Cost

There will be no cost to me in taking part in this study.

Questions

If I have any question or comments about the study, I may contact Mr. Jong Ho. Lee at 1770 O'Farrell Street, #13, San Francisco, CA, 94115, USA, (tel.) 415- 577-0769, 415-931-5263 or (email) jl007c@yahoo.co.kr.   It may also contact his advisor Dr. Ellen A. Herda, at the University of San Francisco, (tel.) 415-422-2075.   Should I not wish to address comments to wither of them, I may contact the office of institutional Review Board of Protection of Human Subjects Monday through Friday between 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM pacific Standard Time by calling (tel.) 415-422-6091, or by writing to the ORBPHS, Department of Psychology, University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, CA, 94117, USA.

Consent to Participate in Research

Your participation in this research is contingent upon your signing a consent form, a copy of which you will keep. By signing, you will be granting me permission to audio record and transcribe our conversation(s). In this way, our conversation(s) will provide data for the analysis of the subject I have described. Once transcribed, I will provide you with a copy of our conversation for your review, comments, and editing. You may add to or delete any section of the conversation at that time. Once I have received your approval of the transcript, I will proceed with the work of analyzing our conversation. Your name and affiliation, the data you contribute, and the date of our conversation will not be held confidential.

While the conversations and transcripts in this research are collaborative, the writing that comes from them will be my product, and may include some of your editing. You therefore consent to forgo anonymity under these conditions. You acknowledge that you have been given complete and clear information about this research, and it is your option to make the decision at the outset about whether to participate or not, and can withdraw at any time without any adverse consequences.

Participant's Signature   Date

Researcher's Signature   Date

Researcher's Name (Print)   Date