“‘Twas Three Years After *Twombly* and All Through the Bar, Not a Plaintiff Was Troubled From Near or From Far”—The Unremarkable Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Re-Expressed Pleading Standard in *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*

By Daniel R. Karon*

War’s over. Wormer dropped the big one.

What? “Over”?

Did you say “over”?

Nothing’s over until we decide it is!

Was it over when the Germans bombed Pearl Harbor?

Hell, no!

- Germans?

- Forget it, he’s rolling.

And it ain’t over now.

‘Cause when the going gets tough . . .

(Patriotic instrumental music)

. . . the tough get going! Who’s with me?

Let’s go! Come on!1

---


---

* B.A. (1988), Indiana University, Bloomington; J.D. (1991), Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University. The author teaches class-action law as an Adjunct Professor of Law at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University; lectures on class-action law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University; and serves on the Loyola University Chicago School of Law Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies’ U.S. Advisory Board. He manages Goldman Scarlato & Karon, P.C.’s Cleveland office and specializes in plaintiffs’ consumer-fraud and antitrust class-action litigation. He chairs the ABA’s National Institute on Class Actions, co-chairs the ABA’s Class Action and Derivative Suits Antitrust Subcommittee, and was an editorial-board member and contributing author to the ABA Litigation Section special publication, *Class Actions Today—Jurisdiction to Resolution*. He has published many law-review and bar-journal articles on class-action topics, and he lectures nationally on class actions for the ABA and other bar associations.

---

571
Introduction

Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly decision, many commentators predicted a similar fate for antitrust and other civil complainants as suffered by Mr. Blutarsky’s famed (or infamous) Delta House. Considerable commentary quickly sprang up regarding the Court’s supposed new and restrictive pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. These commentators insisted the standard meant likely—if not certain—doom for countless antitrust and other lawsuits.

But while Twombly seems to have shocked the legal profession, the case actually did nothing to eviscerate, much less affect, Rule 8’s long-standing pleading pronouncement. To the contrary, it reaffirmed it. For this reason, Twombly is remarkable only for its unremarkability—an unremarkability that some seek to elevate to something it isn’t. Despite these plentiful views, Twombly’s language—coupled with the Court’s pre-existing pleading principles—simply does not support the restrictive interpretation that many insist.

Part I of this Article describes Rule 8’s origin and explains its intended application. Part II chronicles Rule 8’s history of restriction and misapplication, and the Supreme Court’s contribution to ensuring Rule 8’s treatment in a manner consistent with its drafters’ intentions. Part III then examines Twombly, focusing on the Court’s consideration, expression, and application of Rule 8’s pleading standard in more modern circumstances. Finally, Part IV explains how the Twombly Court, in keeping with the Court’s longstanding goal of preventing Rule 8’s misapplication, reaffirmed the intentions of Rule 8’s drafters and re-expressed Rule 8’s liberal pleading requirements.

I. Origins of Rule 8

Rule 8 requires merely a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Described as “a

---

jewel in the crown of the Federal Rules,” Rule 8’s drafters intended it to resolve past pleading abuses at common law and beyond.  

A. Common-Law Pleading and Its Complexity

Common-law pleading was originally oral, but this standard has changed over the centuries towards a more detailed written requirement. As forms of action were developing and becoming far more complex, the limitations of oral pleading presented considerable difficulties. A plaintiff had first to choose the right form of action, then the plaintiff’s lawyer would exchange pleadings with the defense counsel to generate a single issue for resolution. By proceeding through numerous pleading stages—denial, avoidance, or demurrer—the parties would reduce the pleadings to a solitary dispositive factual or legal issue. In this manner, common-law pleadings were slow, expensive, and impractical. As a result, trial largely became an afterthought to the pleading process.

The gamesmanship that common-law pleading engendered required parties to employ highly stylized and technical pleading formu-
lations known as “color,” even for the simplest disputes.13 Color had scant relation to the underlying facts and thus told a defendant little about the plaintiff’s claim.14 But this was of no consequence, as defendants often prevailed after plaintiffs bungled the common law’s hyper-technical pleading requirements.15

As pleading practice prospered, decisions on the merits became more and more infrequent.16 What had begun as a seemingly workable pleading construct turned into a “wonderfully slow, expensive, and unworkable” plan.17 Common-law pleading caused protracted disputes “by lawyers anxious to get admissions without committing themselves”18 and spawned wide-ranging dissatisfaction that ultimately led to pleading reform.19

B. The Field Code—Not Such a Dream

In 1848, at the same time as similar reforms were occurring in England,20 David Dudley Field began spearheading pleading reforms in New York. In drafting the New York Code (“Field Code”), Field endeavored to “eliminate decisions based on technicalities.”21 Instead of stylized language, the Field Code required that complaints contain a “statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended.”22

While reformers hailed Field’s efforts, the Code did not deliver as expected.23 Instead, lawyers encountered a “quagmire of unresolvable disputes as to whether allegations were ultimate fact, evidence, or conclusions—a categorization critical to whether the allegation was proper under the [C]ode.”24 According to the Code, “[o]nly ultimate

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Fairman, supra note 6, at 555 (quoting Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts 467 (1994)).
18. Id.; see also Clark, supra note 7, at 458.
19. Fairman, supra note 6, at 555.
20. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 438.
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings, and Proceedings of the Courts of This State, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 521).
23. See Fairman, supra note 6, at 555.
24. Id.; see also Marcus, supra note 6, at 438 (The Field Code’s new pleading rules “invited unresolvable disputes about whether certain assertions were allegations of ultimate fact (proper), mere evidence (improper), or conclusions (improper).”).
facts satisfied [its] pleading standard; evidentiary facts and conclusions within a pleading could not state a claim.” It was often difficult for courts to distinguish between facts and conclusions because so “many [legal] concepts, like agreement, ownership, and execution, contain a mixture of historical fact and legal conclusion.” As a result, an increasing number of disputes arose over “whether allegations were evidence, facts, or conclusions of law.” The Field Code rapidly devolved into a pleading system “that rivaled the waste, inefficiency, and delay of the common-law practice it was designed to reform.”

C. Finally, the 1938 Federal Rules

The origin of the 1938 Federal Rules dates back to the American Bar Association’s twenty-ninth annual meeting in St. Paul, Minnesota on August 29, 1906. Roscoe Pound, dean of the University of Nebraska College of Law, initiated matters with a blistering speech entitled The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice. The purpose of Pound’s remarks was to recount the “real and serious dissatisfaction with courts and lack of respect for law which exist[ed] in the United States . . . .” He noted multiple reasons for his dissatisfaction with the American legal system, but he emphasized his displeasure with “our American judicial organization and procedure.”

Pound’s comments were the catalyst of the 1938 Rules, but his proffered changes were slow to be implemented. Only after count-

26. Marcus, supra note 6, at 438.
27. Caldwell, supra note 11, at 999.
28. Fairman, supra note 6, at 555–56; see also Charles E. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading § 47, at 300–03 (2d ed. 1947) (observing the requirements for pleading negligence under the Field Code were more demanding than under common law); Marcus, supra note 6, at 438 (“Pleading decisions caused increasing difficulty for even the most common claims. For example, the detail needed to allege negligence was regularly recalibrated. Such fencing among lawyers led to stagnation that interfered with resolution of disputes on their merits.”) (citation omitted).
31. Id. at 396.
32. Id. at 397.
33. Walker, supra note 29, at 93, 94–95.
less committees, protracted debates, and largely ineffective administra-
tive efforts\textsuperscript{34} did Congress finally approve the 1934 Rules Enabling
Act.\textsuperscript{35} The Act, which was all but identical to an earlier ABA propos-
sal,\textsuperscript{36} provided Congress the authority necessary to pass the 1938
Rules.\textsuperscript{37}

In 1935, after a year of accomplishing very little, the Supreme
Court appointed an advisory committee to assist in developing a uni-
form federal procedure.\textsuperscript{38} The Committee’s reporter was Yale Law
School dean, Charles Clark.\textsuperscript{39} In addition to Clark and the Committee
Chairman—former Hoover administration attorney general and Coo-
lidge administration solicitor general, William Mitchell—the Commit-
tee included eight practicing business attorneys and four senior
academics from prominent law schools.\textsuperscript{40}

Following two years of meetings, “[the Committee] submitted its
final report to the Supreme Court on April 30, 1937.”\textsuperscript{41} The Court
adopted the final report and forwarded it to the Attorney General.\textsuperscript{42}
Attorney General Homer Cummings then sent it to Congress,\textsuperscript{43} and
Congress approved the report by inaction,\textsuperscript{44} thus creating the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Clark described the Rules as “a significant
reform, involving the due subordination of civil procedure to the ends
of substantive justice . . . .”\textsuperscript{45}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{34} Id.
\textsuperscript{\textsection} 723b, 723c (1934)); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U.
\textsuperscript{36} Burbank, supra note 35, at 1099.
\textsuperscript{37} See James S. Cochran, Note, Personal Jurisdiction and the Joiner of Claims in the Fed-
eral Courts, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1463, 1489 n.146 (1986) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure were created under the authority of [the Rules Enabling] Act . . . .”)
\textsuperscript{38} Walker, supra note 29, at 96; see also Order Appointment of Committee to Draft
Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774 (1935); Stephen N. Subrin, How
pointed by the Supreme Court, reflected both the conservatives, and the professional, pro-
fessorial liberals who had joined in supporting uniform federal rules.”).
\textsuperscript{39} Walker, supra note 29, at 96.
\textsuperscript{40} Id. at 97.
\textsuperscript{41} Id.
\textsuperscript{42} Orders Re Rules of Procedure, 302 U.S. 783, 783 (1937).
\textsuperscript{43} Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645,
647 (1939).
\textsuperscript{44} Walker, supra note 29, at 98.
\end{flushleft}
Clark intended the Rules to serve four key functions: “(1) giving notice of the nature of a claim or defense; (2) stating the facts each party believes to exist; (3) narrowing the issues that must be litigated; and (4) providing a means for speedy disposition of sham claims and insubstantial defenses.”

Rather than eliminate pleadings as initially advocated by Clark, the Committee drafted Rule 8 such that it did not incorporate such highly charged words as such “fact,” “conclusion,” and “cause of action.” The Committee settled on requiring a party only to plead a “short and plain statement of a claim” entitling the pleader to relief.

To emphasize Rule 8’s simplicity, the Committee included a series of form complaints that satisfied the Rule’s standards. For example, Form 9 reversed decades of pleading-related litigation by finding appropriate the allegation that “defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.” Underlying this simplicity was Clark’s aversion to the use of a “mere formal motion” to challenge the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s pleadings because it “really decides nothing of substance.” Indeed, pleadings need “do little more than indicate generally the type of litigation that is involved.”

Clark and his fellow drafters’ generous pleading standard stemmed from their belief that litigants should have their day in court. This belief served as the basis for why they designed the Rules to encourage determination on the merits, not on the pleadings:

46. Wright & Miller, supra note 7, § 1202.
47. Fairman, supra note 6, at 556; Marcus, supra note 6, at 439.
48. Fairman, supra note 6, at 556; Marcus, supra note 6, at 439.
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 (“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”).
51. Fed. R. Civ. P. app. of forms Form 9 (now Form 11); Marcus, supra note 6, at 439.
52. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (Judge Clark issued the opinion, and indicated the plaintiff had “stated enough to withstand a mere formal motion, directed only to the face of the complaint, and that here is another instance of judicial haste which in the long run makes waste.”); Marcus, supra note 6, at 440.
54. 2A James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 8.03 (2d ed. 1996); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (“The new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving . . . .”)
55. Fairman, supra note 6, at 557.
The notice in mind is rather that of the general nature of the case and the circumstances or events upon which it is based, so as to differentiate it from other acts or events, to inform the opponent of the affair or transaction to be litigated—but not of details which he should ascertain for himself in preparing his defense—and to tell the court of the broad outlines of the case.57

Since pleadings were intended primarily to provide notice to litigants, the drafters included additional methods for addressing such functions as fact-finding and issue narrowing.58 The Rules’ expanded discovery methods allowed litigants to get to the merits of a case in several ways, such as by developing facts through discovery,59 narrowing issues through discovery or partial summary judgment,60 and eliminating meritless claims through summary judgment.61 When considered alongside the other Rules, it becomes evident that Rule 8’s notice function “operates as a keystone to an entire procedural system . . . ”62

II. Rule 8’s Misapplication and the Return to Sensibility

A. Reaffirming Rule 8’s Liberal Application

Rule 8 was not universally accepted.63 The question was whether the requirement that a pleader allege his or her entitlement to relief also meant he or she must allege a prima facie case.64 Believing so, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference adopted a resolution supporting an amendment to Rule 8(a)(2) to require a pleader’s short, plain statement also to “contain the facts constituting a cause of action.”65 The primary decision fueling this effort was now-Judge Clark’s own opinion in *Dioguardi v. Durning*.66

*Procedure and Erie*, 54 *Brook. L. Rev.* 1, 2–3 (1988) (noting that drafters intended Rules to allow litigants to resolve disputes based on facts not form).

57. Clark, supra note 7, at 460–61.
58. Fairman, supra note 6, at 557.
60. See id.; Fed R. Civ. P. 56.
62. Fairman, supra note 6, at 556–57; see also Wright & Miller, supra note 7, § 1202 (“The only function left to be performed by the pleadings alone is that of notice.”).
63. See Wright, supra note 10, at 476 (positing that lawyers skilled in old pleading style may have fueled criticism of Rule 8); Fairman, supra note 6, at 558.
64. See Wright & Miller, supra note 7, § 1202 (discussing difficulty in establishing what constituted a claim showing an entitlement to relief).
65. Claim or Cause of Action—A Discussion on the Need for Amendment of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253–54 (1953) (committee reports that there should “be a pleading requirement in civil actions in the Federal Courts that a complaint must allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action”).
66. 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
Dioguardi involved a payment dispute that resulted in the Collector of Customs’ delay in releasing John Dioguardi’s medicinal tonics. After holding Dioguardi’s tonics for a year, the Collector finally sold them at auction. Dioguardi filed a pro se complaint alleging that the Collector had “sold [his] merchandise to another bidder with [Dioguardi’s] price of $110, and not of [the Collector’s] price of $120,” and “that three weeks before the sale, two cases, of 19 bottles each case, disappeared.”

The United States moved to dismiss Dioguardi’s complaint for failure to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. Following the district court’s order granting Dioguardi leave to amend, he filed a second complaint conveying “obviously heightened conviction that he was being unjustly treated[,]” but the district court again dismissed it. On appeal, Judge Clark, writing for the Second Circuit, reversed: “[H]owever inartistically they may be stated, the plaintiff has disclosed his claims that the collector has converted or otherwise done away with two of his cases of medicinal tonics and has sold the rest in a manner incompatible with the public auction . . . .” Judge Clark added that “[u]nder the new rules of civil procedure, there is no pleading requirement of stating ‘facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,’ but only that there be ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .’”

Given Rule 8’s purpose, the Second Circuit’s decision stood to reason. Had the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, Dioguardi never would have had the chance to demonstrate his claim’s merits, which may well have proven true. Because the United States moved to dismiss rather than for summary judgment, the district court’s decision short-circuited any possibility of honest factual resolution. But the Second Circuit’s reversal eventually generated tremendous controversy because on remand Dioguardi failed to prove his claim, and the district court entered judgment for the United States. Given the Second Circuit’s affirmance, Dioguardi became a flashpoint

---

67. Id. at 774–75.
68. Id. at 774.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 775.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
76. Dioguardi v. Durning, 151 F.2d 501, 501–02 (2d Cir. 1945).
for critics who supported strict pleading rules as a way to conserve judicial resources.77

Nevertheless, after Dioguardi the Federal Rules Advisory Committee rejected the Ninth Circuit’s proposed amendment and instead drafted an extensive note rebuffing Rule 8’s criticism.78 The Committee’s note explained that, contrary to any criticism, “Rule 8 envisages a statement of circumstances, occurrences, and events in support of the claim . . . .”79 The Committee further rejected the idea that Dioguardi had approved filing a complaint alleging insufficient information to disclose a basis for relief.80 Instead, the Committee indicated that Dioguardi’s amended complaint stated sufficient facts, which the court properly construed as sufficient, as pleaded, to sustain his cause of action.81 As a result—and contrary to critics’ insistence—the Committee declared that Rule 8 required no amendment:

[T]he rule adequately sets forth the characteristics of good pleading; does away with the confusion resulting from the use of “facts” and “causes of action”; and requires the pleader to disclose adequate information as the basis of his claim for relief as distinguished from a bare averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it.82

In this manner, the Committee reaffirmed its goal of Rule 8’s liberal application and articulated the level of detail (or not) necessary for pleading a sustainable complaint.

B. Reaffirmation at the Highest Level

Although the Supreme Court never adopted the Committee’s proposed final report,83 in 1957 the Court quelled any uncertainty regarding Rule 8’s liberal application when it decided Conley v. Gibson.84

Conley involved a class-action lawsuit brought by African-American railway workers against their union because their union had allegedly breached its duty to represent them and other members fairly.85 According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the railroad claimed to abolish
forty-five African-American union members’ jobs, only to refill them with white workers.\textsuperscript{86} Despite the plaintiffs’ insistence, the union had failed to protect them against the railroad’s discrimination or to provide them protection comparable to the union’s white members.\textsuperscript{87} Among other responses to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the union moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it did not describe specific facts of the union’s alleged discrimination.\textsuperscript{88} The district court granted the union’s motion, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.\textsuperscript{89}

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, explaining that the plaintiffs’ complaint complied with Rule 8’s liberal pleading standard.\textsuperscript{90} The Court first declared that a court cannot dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”\textsuperscript{91} And because the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint, if true, would have constituted a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation owed to its members, the Court ruled that the district court should not have dismissed the complaint.\textsuperscript{92}

The Court next reiterated the factual detail necessary to plead a cause of action under Rule 8:

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is “a short and plain statement of the claim” that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.\textsuperscript{93}

The Court noted that the Rules’ illustrative forms easily demonstrate this liberal standard and that “simplified ‘notice pleading’ is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules . . . .”\textsuperscript{94} The Court rejected the notion that the Rules considered pleading as a skillful game where the slightest mistake could doom a plaintiff’s complaint and instead embraced Rule 8’s approach to facilitate decisions on the mer-
its. With the Court’s holding, the common law and Field Code’s rigorous symmetry and fact-intensive requirements became a thing of the past—or so it seemed.

C. The Expansion of Rule 9’s Particularity Requirement and the Reaffirmation of Rule 8’s Forgiving Standard

Rule 8 does not contemplate situations requiring enhanced pleading particularity because that is addressed by Rule 9, which states, “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” This heightened pleading requirement is based on the belief that allegations of fraud and moral turpitude can cause inordinate damage to a defendant’s reputation, so plaintiffs should not be permitted to plead such allegations generally. Rather, plaintiffs must describe specific facts constituting a defendant’s alleged fraud.

Despite Conley’s apparent clarity, lower courts began raising the pleadings bar by imposing Rule 9’s heightened standard on cases involving securities fraud, conspiracy, and civil rights violations. For instance, in Elliot v. Perez, the Fifth Circuit adopted a heightened pleading standard for cases involving government actors serving in their individual capacity, reasoning that immunity from liability also provided protection against burdensome discovery and litigation. To ensure this protection, the Fifth Circuit required a plaintiff’s complaint to “state with factual detail and particularity the basis for the claim which necessarily includes why the defendant-official cannot successfully maintain the defense of immunity.” The Fifth Circuit extended this holding in Palmer v. City of San Antonio where it explained that its heightened pleading standard applied not only to

95. Id. at 48.
96. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Despite Rule 9’s application to situations involving “mistake,” scant cases exist invoking this basis.
97. See Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting Rule 9(b) evolves from interest in protecting defendants from harm to reputation or goodwill when charged with serious misconduct); see also Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure, at 288 (3d ed. 1999) (explaining common law disfavored fraud claims because they involved allegations of immorality).
98. Marcus, supra note 6, at 447.
99. Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985).
100. See id. at 1479.
101. Id. at 1473.
102. Palmer v. City of San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1987).
cases involving immunity to public officials but to all civil rights cases filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.\textsuperscript{103}

The Supreme Court seemed to have the Fifth Circuit’s retrenchment in mind when it accepted \textit{Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence \& Coordination Unit}.\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Leatherman} involved two episodes of police misconduct in executing search warrants.\textsuperscript{105} In the first case, Charlene Leatherman and her son Travis were driving in Fort Worth, Texas when they were stopped by police.\textsuperscript{106} Officers surrounded Leatherman’s vehicle and informed her that her residence was being searched.\textsuperscript{107} Leatherman and Travis returned home to find that officers had ruthlessly shot and killed their two dogs, Shakespeare and Ninja.\textsuperscript{108} Although the search of the home yielded absolutely nothing incriminating, officers stood on the Leatherman’s front lawn “for over an hour, drinking, smoking, talking, and laughing, apparently celebrating their seemingly unbridled power.”\textsuperscript{109}

In the second incident, police obtained a warrant to search Gerald Andert’s home after detecting odors associated with the manufacture of amphetamines.\textsuperscript{110} At the time of the search, Andert was a sixty-four-year-old grandfather mourning his wife’s death from cancer.\textsuperscript{111} Officers burst into his home without knocking or otherwise announcing themselves.\textsuperscript{112} And although Andert did nothing to provoke the officers, they pushed him backwards and issued two blows to his head with a club.\textsuperscript{113} The officers also forced Andert’s family, who remained unaware of the officers’ identity, to lie face down on the floor and subjected them to a torrent of threats and obscenities.\textsuperscript{114} After an extensive yet completely fruitless hour-and-a-half search, officers left the residence.\textsuperscript{115}

\begin{itemize}
\item[103.] \textit{Id.} at 516–17.
\item[104.] \textit{Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence \& Coordination Unit}, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
\item[105.] \textit{Id.} at 164–65.
\item[106.] \textit{Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence \& Coordination Unit}, 954 F.2d 1054, 1055 (5th Cir. 1992).
\item[107.] \textit{Id.}
\item[108.] \textit{Id.} at 1055–56.
\item[109.] \textit{Id.} at 1056.
\item[110.] \textit{Id.}
\item[111.] \textit{Id.}
\item[112.] \textit{Id.}
\item[113.] \textit{Id.}
\item[114.] \textit{Id.}
\item[115.] \textit{Id.}
\end{itemize}
The Leatherman and Andert plaintiffs sued several municipalities, alleging failure to train officers properly in executing search warrants and confronting dogs. Three defendants argued the plaintiffs’ complaint failed to plead facts adequately under the Fifth Circuit’s heightened pleading standard as expressed in Elliot and Palmer, and the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against all defendants.

On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiffs did not argue that their complaints met the circuit’s heightened standard; rather, they encouraged the court to abolish it. Constrained by Elliot and Palmer, and considering that even the plaintiffs admitted that their complaint fell short of this standard, the Fifth Circuit declined:

[W]e, as a panel of this court, must politely decline [plaintiffs’] invitation to reexamine the wisdom of this circuit’s heightened pleading requirement. Until such a time as the en banc court sees fit to reconsider Elliot or, more specifically, Palmer, and in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court decision undermining our settled precedent, I find myself constrained to obey the command of the heightened pleading requirement.

The Supreme Court accepted the Fifth Circuit’s invitation to consider its heightened pleading standard. In a five-page opinion, the Court unanimously struck down the Fifth Circuit’s restrictive interpretation, explaining that “it is impossible to square the ‘heightened pleading standard’ applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules.” The Court added that the Rules required more particularized pleading in two discrete instances—fraud and mistake—and that Rule 8(a)(2) required merely that a complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Accordingly, the Court reversed the order dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint, with Chief Justice Rehnquist adding this final admonition:

[If] Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result which must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation. In the absence of such an amendment, federal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of

116. Id.
117. Id. at 1058.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1061 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
120. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
121. Id.
discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later.\textsuperscript{122}

The Court’s unequivocal reaffirmation seemed to suggest an end to lower courts’ heightened-pleading efforts, but more challenges lay ahead.

D. Déjà Vu All Over Again

Since history tends to repeat itself, perhaps it is not surprising that lower courts continued applying heightened pleading standards even after \textit{Leatherman}.\textsuperscript{123} This intransigence caused the Supreme Court—again—to reaffirm Rule 8’s liberal application unanimously in \textit{Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.}\textsuperscript{124}

\textit{Swierkiewicz} was an employment case involving Akos Swierkiewicz, a fifty-three-year-old Hungarian native.\textsuperscript{125} Swierkiewicz was a senior vice president and chief underwriting officer for Sorema N.A., a reinsurance company.\textsuperscript{126} After the company demoted and eventually fired him, Swierkiewicz sued, alleging national origin and age discrimination.\textsuperscript{127}

The district court dismissed Swierkiewicz’s complaint, believing he “ha[d] not adequately alleged a prima facie case, in that he ha[d] not adequately alleged circumstances that support[ed] an inference of discrimination.”\textsuperscript{128} In a four-page, unpublished opinion, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, insisting, “[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that a complaint consisting of nothing more than naked assertions, and setting forth no facts upon which a court could find a violation of the Civil Rights Acts, fails to state a claim under Rule

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{122} \textit{Id.} at 168–69.
  \item \textsuperscript{123} \textit{See}, e.g., \textit{Rippy v. Hattaway}, 270 F.3d 416, 424–25 (6th Cir. 2001) (heightened pleading standard applied in qualified immunity case); \textit{Dill v. City of Edmond}, 155 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 1998) (heightened pleading standard applied in immunity case); \textit{Schultea v. Wood}, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“When a public official pleads the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in his answer, the district court may, on the official’s motion or on its own, require the plaintiff to reply to that defense in detail.”); \textit{Edgington v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr.}, 52 F.3d 777, 779 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995) (heightened pleading standard applied in case against government officials for money damages); \textit{Dunbar Corp. v. Lindsey}, 905 F.3d 754, 764 (4th Cir. 1990) (same).
  \item \textsuperscript{124} 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
  \item \textsuperscript{125} \textit{Id.} at 508.
  \item \textsuperscript{126} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{127} \textit{Id.} at 509.
  \item \textsuperscript{128} \textit{Id.}
12(b)(6)." The Supreme Court accepted Swierkiewicz’s request to elucidate Rule 8’s requirements.

Consistent with Conley and Leatherman, the Court reversed the Circuit Court’s dismissal, holding that employment discrimination complaints need not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie claim; rather, these complaints must merely allege a “short and plain statement of the claim . . . .” The Court added that while its holding in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green required a private, non-class plaintiff to prove his or her discrimination case by a preponderance of the evidence, this evidentiary burden did not create a pleading standard. Having already “rejected the argument that a Title VII complaint requires greater ‘particularity,’ because greater particularity would ‘too narrowly constric[t] the role of the pleadings,’” the Court reiterated that “the ordinary rules for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint apply.”

The Court went further to add that “under a notice pleading system, it is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case because the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply in every employment discrimination case.” For example, “if a plaintiff is able to produce direct evidence of discrimination, he [or she] may prevail without proving all the elements of a prima facie case.” But under the Second Circuit’s heightened pleading standard, a plaintiff lacking direct evidence of discrimination when filing his or her complaint would nevertheless have to plead a prima facie case of discrimination, even though discovery might uncover direct evidence.

---

129. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 5 Fed. App’x 63, 64 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Martin v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Mental Hygiene, 588 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir. 1978)).
131. Id. at 515.
132. Id. at 508 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
133. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas involved a plaintiff’s civil-rights claim against his employer, alleging his employer’s refusal to rehire him as an aircraft mechanic because of his race and involvement in the civil rights movement. The Court sustained plaintiff’s complaint, explaining that an EEOC finding of reasonable cause was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to plaintiff’s civil-rights claim.
134. Id. at 802.
135. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)) (“The McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination.”).
evidence.140 “It thus seem[ed] incongruous,” the Court believed, “to require a plaintiff, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, to plead more facts than he [or she] may ultimately need to prove to succeed on the merits if direct evidence of discrimination is discovered.”141

But the Court’s ruling was not grounded so much in substantive employment-law doctrine as it was in the Federal Rules. Revisiting Leatherman, the Court re-emphasized that Rule 8’s exceptions appear in Rule 9(b): “The Federal Rules do address in Rule 9(b) the question of the need for greater particularity in pleading certain actions, but do not include among the enumerated actions any reference to complaints alleging municipal liability under § 1983.”142

Just as Rule 9(b) makes no mention of municipal liability, neither does it refer to employment discrimination. As such, employment complaints, like most others, “must satisfy only the simple requirements of Rule 8(a).”143 If a defendant believes a complaint fails to provide sufficient notice, then the defendant can move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e),144 while the court can deal with meritless claims through Rule 56’s summary-judgment mechanism.145 And continually mindful that greater specificity for pleading particular claims must come through amending the Federal Rules—not by judicial intervention—the Court stated, “[t]he liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”146

Considering Conley, Leatherman, and Swierkiewicz together, then, adduces the following observations.147 First, a plaintiff’s complaint serves a notice function and informs the defendant of the claim and its basis.148 Factual detail is not necessary at the pleading stage149 be-

---

140. Id.
141. Id. at 511–12.
142. Id. at 513 (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coor-
dination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 514.
145. Id.
146. Id.
148. Id.; see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005) (“Under Rule 8(a), applicable to ordinary civil proceedings, a complaint need only provide ‘fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))).
cause the Rules provide later opportunities to develop these facts.\textsuperscript{150} Next, dismissal is inappropriate when it remains possible for a plaintiff to adduce facts supporting his or her claim.\textsuperscript{151} Finally, the pretrial process, which includes broad discovery,\textsuperscript{152} is the appropriate mechanism for weeding out improper or unmeritorious claims.\textsuperscript{153}

Then, along came \textit{Twombly}.

\textbf{III. Understanding \textit{Twombly}}

As of March 2008, lower courts had cited \textit{Twombly} more than 9400 times,\textsuperscript{154} many concluding that \textit{Twombly} had established a new pleading standard under Rule 8.\textsuperscript{155} But examining \textit{Twombly} actually indicates nothing of the sort.

\textsuperscript{150} Spencer, \textit{supra} note 3, at 438 ("[F]actual detail was unnecessary at the pleading stage . . . .").

\textsuperscript{151} Spencer, \textit{supra} note 3, at 439; \textit{see also} Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48 ("[S]implified ‘notice pleading’ is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues."); Spencer, \textit{supra} note 3, at 438 ("[S]ubsequent phases of the litigation would elicit such details and frame the issues in the case.").

\textsuperscript{152} Spencer, \textit{supra} note 3, at 439; \textit{see also} Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) superseded in part by statute, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) ("We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case.") (citation omitted); Spencer, \textit{supra} note 3, at 439 ("[T]he pleadings were not the proper vehicle for screening out unmeritorious claims. Rather, other pretrial procedures—namely broad discovery and summary judgment—were the proper vehicles for ferreting out claims lacking merit.") (citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{153} Ward, \textit{supra} note 9, at 893.

\textsuperscript{154} \textit{See, e.g.}, Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009) ("The Court replaced the \textit{Conley} standard with a new standard in \textit{Twombly}, which prescribed a new inquiry for [courts] to use in reviewing a dismissal: whether the complaint contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.") (quoting The Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was designed to open up competition in the local telephone markets by requiring local-exchange carriers (“ILECs”), like the Twombly defendants, to facilitate the entry of new competitors. The Act requires ILECs to sell access to parts of their networks at wholesale rates, thereby allowing competing-local-exchange carriers (“CLECs”) to circumvent the high cost of building their own infrastructure.

Twombly involved a group of purchasers of local telephone or high-speed internet services who filed a class-action antitrust lawsuit against four ILECs who “together controlled over ninety percent of the market for local telephone and high-speed internet services in the continental United States.” Plaintiffs alleged that the ILECs had thwarted the CLECs’ efforts to enter the ILECs’ local-service markets by conspiring “(1) to collectively keep CLECs from successfully entering [the ILECs’] markets, and (2) to refrain from attempting to enter each other’s markets as CLECs.” Plaintiffs added that defendants’
refusal to compete as CLECs in each others’ territories constituted parallel conduct that plaintiffs’ considered probative of a conspiracy, and that competition would have occurred had defendants not conspired to avoid it.160

The district court read the plaintiffs’ complaint to allege merely conscious parallelism:

[W]hile plaintiffs may allege a conspiracy by citing instances of parallel business behavior that suggest an agreement, courts must be cognizant of the fact that, while “[c]ircumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy[. . .] ‘conscious parallelism’ has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely,” . . . [P]arallel action is a common and often legitimate phenomenon, because similar market actors with similar information and economic interests will often reach the same business decisions.161

Based on the plaintiffs’ allegations of conscious parallelism, the district court dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.162 The court explained that “Plaintiffs ha[d] . . . not alleged facts that suggest[ed] that refraining from competing in other territories as CLECs was contrary to defendants’ apparent economic interests, and consequently ha[d] not raised an inference that their actions were the result of a conspiracy.”163

But the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the district court had applied an unfairly restrictive pleading standard.164 Rightly observing that no heightened pleading standard applies in antitrust cases,165 the Second Circuit believed that plaintiffs’

160. Id. at 178.
161. Id. at 179.
162. Id. at 188.
163. Id.
165. Id. at 108; see also George C. Frey Ready-Mixed Concrete, Inc. v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp., 554 F.2d 551, 553–54 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting argument that “antitrust claims, because of their complexity, must be pleaded with greater specificity than other claims”); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 322–23 (2d Cir. 1957) (“[M]any defense lawyers have strongly advocated more particularized pleading in this area of litigation. . . . But it is quite clear that the federal rules contain no special exceptions for antitrust cases.”). Some courts have even explained that antitrust cases are less suitable candidates for dismissal at the pleading stage than other kinds of litigation because evidence of the claimed illegality frequently rests in defendants’ exclusive control. See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976) (“[I]n antitrust cases, where ‘the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,’ dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be granted very sparingly.”) (quoting Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 308 U.S. 404, 473 (1902)).
allegations of solely conscious parallelism provided more than “a bare bones statement of conspiracy or of injury under the antitrust laws.”

The court expressed that to survive a motion to dismiss an antitrust case, the claimant “must allege only the existence of a conspiracy and a sufficient supporting factual predicate on which that allegation is based,” adding that “pleading of facts indicating parallel conduct by the defendants can suffice to state a plausible claim of conspiracy.” Believing it reasonable to infer collusion from the plaintiffs’ conscious parallelism allegations, the court invoked Conley as its basis for concluding that plaintiffs’ “allegations [were] sufficient ‘to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim [was] and the grounds upon which it rest[ed] . . . .’”

Not dissimilar from its motivation for considering the lower courts’ rulings in Conley, Leatherman, and Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Twombly “to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct . . . .” The Court first explained that conscious parallelism without more “falls short of ‘conclusively establish[ing] an agreement or . . . itself constitut[ing] a Sherman Act offense,’” because such conduct is no less consistent “with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.” Justice Souter, writing for the Court, then dove directly into considering plaintiffs’ complaint against Conley’s pleading standard.

The Court began its analysis by repeating Conley’s instruction that not only does Rule 8(a)(2) require a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” but this statement must also “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” These “grounds,” explained the Court, require more than “mere labels and conclusions”; they “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

166. Twombly, 425 F.3d at 109 (quoting Heart Disease Research Found. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972)).
167. Id. at 114.
168. Id. (citing Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 325 (2d Cir. 1957)).
169. Id. at 118–19 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
174. Id.
175. Id.
Applying these standards to the plaintiffs’ antitrust complaint, the Court held that properly pleading such a complaint requires including enough factual allegations to suggest the defendants made an illegal agreement.\textsuperscript{176} The Court added that this plausibility (or believability) at the pleadings "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement . . . even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts is improbable . . . ."\textsuperscript{177} Accordingly, the Court directed that the plaintiffs’ allegations of conscious parallelism and conspiracy as the grounds upon which the plaintiffs’ antitrust complaint rested were insufficient to suggest conspiracy with any believability,\textsuperscript{178} and instead the plaintiffs’ complaint needed facts raising at least "a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action."\textsuperscript{179}

After so ruling, the Court went to great lengths to explain that it did not intend to upset its historical interpretation and application of Rule 8. “The need at the pleading stage,” the Court instructed, “for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”\textsuperscript{180} Plaintiffs’ allegations of conscious parallelism without “further circumstances pointing toward a meeting of the minds”\textsuperscript{181} (i.e., the grounds upon which such an allegation rested\textsuperscript{182}) failed to comply with Rule 8’s standard.

Turning next to \textit{Conley}’s “no set of facts” language, the Court noted a literal reading of this language would allow a court to sustain a complaint based on “wholly conclusory statement . . . .”\textsuperscript{183} Believing this literal reading and extension was inconsistent with Rule 8’s historical application, the Court—while not upending Rule 8’s fact-pleading requirement—retired \textit{Conley}’s “no set of facts” phrase, describing it as an “incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by show-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{176} \textit{Id.} at 556.
\item \textsuperscript{177} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{178} \textit{Id.} at 556–57.
\item \textsuperscript{179} \textit{Id.} at 557.
\item \textsuperscript{180} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{181} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{182} See \textit{Conley v. Gibson}, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
\item \textsuperscript{183} \textit{Twombly}, 550 U.S. at 561.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
ing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”

The Court explained that its adoption of this phrase in *Conley* was intended to “describe[ ] the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not [to establish] the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.”

The Court believed nothing contained in the plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly, realistically, or believably suggested a conspiracy. Therefore, it reversed the Second Circuit’s order sustaining plaintiffs’ complaint. Immediately before so ruling, the Court again emphasized that it did not intend to raise Rule 8’s historical notice-pleading standard: “[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”

The Court further emphasized that any such changes rested solely in the congressional domain and that until Congress initiates a change, Rule 9’s heightened pleading requirements apply in extremely narrow circumstances:

In reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any “heightened” pleading standard, nor do we seek to broaden the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, which can only be accomplished “by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.” On certain subjects understood to raise a high risk of abusive litigation, a plaintiff must state factual allegations with greater particularity than Rule 8 requires. Here, our concern is not that the allegations in the complaint were insufficiently “particular[ized]”; rather, the complaint warranted dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief plausible.

The reason for the Court’s extensive pacifying language was its critical evaluation of *Conley’s* interpretation and application of Rule 8. On this basis, some judges and commentators have concluded that because the Court used the adjective “plausible,” which simply meaning “having an appearance of truth or reason,” when describing the grounds upon which a complaint’s factual allegations must rest, *Twombly* spawned a new and more restrictive pleading standard. But

---

184. *Id.* at 563.
185. *Id.*
186. *Id.* 566.
187. *Id.* at 570.
188. *Id.*
189. *Id.* 569 n.14 (citations omitted).
the rumors of the death of Rule 8’s age-old pleading standard have been greatly exaggerated.\textsuperscript{191}

**IV. Twombly Did Not Change Rule 8’s Historical Pleading Standard**

The \textit{Twombly} Court’s instruction that “we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”\textsuperscript{192} should have surprised no one, as it mirrored the Court’s longstanding precedent refusing to impose heightened pleading requirements extending beyond simple notice pleading. This directive makes perfect sense because insisting on anything more at the pleading stage requires a plaintiff to prove his or her case to a summary-judgment standard absent discovery—nearly always an impossible task—which of course is why such allegations are not required.

The Court instructed that a complaint’s factual allegations must make some practical sense. But this believability requirement has always been implicit in and an integral part of Rule 8, and the \textit{Twombly} Court merely expressed what has always been the case. Indeed, even the Second Circuit, when sustaining the plaintiffs’ complaint, instructed that the complaint must “include conspiracy among the realm of plausible possibilities,”\textsuperscript{193} believing like the Court that this plausibility consideration did not raise plaintiffs’ pleading requirement. That the Court’s ultimate opinion differed from the Second Circuit’s as to whether plaintiffs’ parallel-conduct allegations actually constituted the requisite short-and-plain statement can hardly be taken as suggesting that the Court invoked some sort of elevated pleading standard, especially when the Court insisted that it had not.

Indeed, to suppress any confusion, less than two weeks after \textit{Twombly}, the Court repeated that Rule 8(a)(2)’s simple short-and-plain-statement requirement provides central guidance for federal courts. In \textit{Erickson v. Pardus},\textsuperscript{194} a prisoner filed a \textit{pro se} Section 1983

\textsuperscript{191.} See \textsc{Mark Twain, The Wit and Wisdom of Mark Twain: A Book of Quotations} 46 (Paul Negri ed., 1999) (“The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.”).

\textsuperscript{192.} \textit{Twombly}, 550 U.S. at 570.


\textsuperscript{194.} 551 U.S. 89 (2007). After \textit{Erickson}, the Court decided \textit{Ashcroft v. Iqbal}, No. 07–1015 U.S. 1 (May 18, 2009), where the Court dismissed a complaint alleging high-level government officials had “adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected [him] to harsh conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national origin.” \textit{Id.} at 1. But while the \textit{Iqbal} Court drew heavily on \textit{Twombly} as its basis for dismissal, \textit{Iqbal} is meaningful
action alleging that prison medical officials had diagnosed him as requiring treatment for hepatitis C but had discontinued his treatment because they suspected he had taken illicit drugs. The prisoner claimed he was suffering liver damage due to his untreated disease, and that its progression could cause irreversible liver damage and possibly death. The prisoner’s complaint added that he was in imminent danger as hepatitis C had already killed other inmates. Although the prisoner’s complaint alleged the defendants’ conduct had violated his Eighth Amendment rights, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing his complaint, explaining he had made “only conclusory allegations to the effect that he ha[d] suffered a cognizable independent harm . . . .”

This dismissal visibly troubled the Court. “The holding,” the Court explained, “departs in so stark a manner from the pleading standard mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that we grant review.” The Court ruled that the lower courts had erred by concluding the prisoner’s allegations of a cognizable independent harm were “too conclusory,” and in doing so invoked Twombly and its reiteration of Rule 8(a)(2)’s core pleading requirement:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” In addition, when ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.

The Court even highlighted Rule 8(f)’s mandate that “[a]ll pleadings shall be construed as to do substantial justice” and concluded that “[t]he case cannot . . . be dismissed on the ground that petitioner’s allegations of harm were too conclusory to put these matters in issue.”

Thus, within two weeks after Twombly, the Court reaffirmed Twombly’s simple message and again validated what federal courts
have held for decades: Our civil pleading system, as encompassed in Rule 8(a)(2), has always required and still requires a short-and-plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief. To this end, multiple lower courts have cited *Twombly* as a basis for sustaining complaints pleaded consistent with this venerable standard. And concomitantly, where complaints lack minimal facts, courts have continued granting motions to dismiss after invoking *Twombly*. For as Justice Souter even more recently explained in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, the very believability of a complaint’s allegations are suspect, such as where plaintiff alleges “claims about little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel,” the complaint continues—as always—to fall short of satisfying Rule 8’s liberal standard.

203. *Id.* at 93.

204. See, e.g., Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3rd Cir. 2008) (*Twombly* does not require “detailed factual allegations” or “pleading with particularity”; rather, it “requires only a short and plain statement that the pleader is entitled to relief in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is the grounds upon which it rests.”); Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]aking *Erickson* and *Twombly* together, we understand the Court to be saying only at some point the factual detail in a complaint may be so sketchy that the complaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim that the defendant is entitled to under Rule 8.”); In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Litig., 566 F. Supp. 2d 363, 370 (M.D. Pa. 2008) ("[T]he claims presented need not be alleged with particularity, but there must be sufficient factual averments that place the defendants on notice of the bases for the claims; and plaintiff’s entitlement to relief on the bases for the claim presented against a particular defendant must be plausible."); Hiltabidel v. Herald Standard Newspaper, No. 2:08-cv-409, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49668, at *4 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2008) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss because complaint’s allegations rendered plaintiff’s claims plausible); Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 532 F. Supp. 2d 735, 741 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citing *Twombly* as basis for denying defendants’ motion to dismiss because federal courts should evaluate such motions based on reasonable, pre-discovery inferences drawn from the facts alleged and in the proper context, such as where antitrust plaintiffs can only necessarily know so much before committing to take full discovery, including depositions); Walker v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 491 F. Supp. 2d 781, 788 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (noting *Twombly’s* confirmation that a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” and finding the complaint sufficient under Rule 8(a)(2) to put defendant on notice and establish plaintiff’s standing); Castaneda v. City of Williams, No. CV07-00129, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42980, at *5 (D. Ariz. June 12, 2007) (applying *Twombly* and refusing to dismiss plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim since plaintiffs “satisfied these minimum pleading requirements”).


207. *Id.* at 10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
But if *Twombly* did not affect Rule 8’s pleading standard, why did the Court see fit to accept review, this time *dismissing* plaintiffs’ complaint rather than sustaining it as had occurred in *Conley, Leatherman,* and *Swierkiewicz*? Was it merely “to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct . . . ?”208 Or might a more looming issue have also affected the Court, one that dovetailed conveniently into its articulated issue?

Recall the atmosphere that preceded *Conley, Leatherman,* and *Swierkiewicz.* Despite contrary congressional and Supreme Court mandates, lower courts had continued to elevate Rule 8’s pleading standard. Each time these unauthorized efforts reached a critical point and the Court was presented with an opportunity to correct things, the Court did so by entering the fray and sounding a seemingly enduring call to lower courts to refrain from improperly changing the law.

Not unlike the atmosphere that preceded *Conley, Leatherman,* and *Swierkiewicz* (and in keeping with the reality that history has a way of re-re-repeating itself), the *Twombly* Court seemed mindful that “federal courts [were] continu[ing] to require heightened pleading in a variety of contexts,”209 despite the Court’s constant and contrary admonitions:

Despite strong words from the Supreme Court expressing its continued commitment to this rubric, heightened pleading thrives post-*Leatherman.* Courts cling to it in civil rights cases. Congress imposes it with the PSLRA210 and the Y2K Act.211 Both ignore the

209.  Elizabeth Roseman, Comment, A Phoenix from the Ashes? Heightened Pleading Requirements in Disparate Impact Cases, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2006); see also Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 1064 (2003) (“A uniform pleading standard with notice as the touchstone remains illusory. Yet the intentions of the drafters are clear. . . . [T]he Supreme Court reinforces notice pleading as the only choice.”).
210.  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 37 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z–1 and § 78u-4 (2006)). The PSLRA imposes heightened pleading requirements in actions brought pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the securities laws and “insists that securities fraud complaints ‘specify’ each misleading statement; that they set forth the facts ‘on which [a] belief’ that a statement is misleading was ‘formed’; and that they ‘state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.’” Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81–82 (2006) (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005)).

The Y2K Act requires that the complaint contain “specific information as to the nature and amount of each element of damages and the factual basis for the damages calculation.” The purpose of this and other related provisions is to provide for an early detailed disclosure of the plaintiffs’ claims to allow quick informal resolution by the parties, thereby avoiding costly litigation.
drafters’ vision, with predictable consequences. The simple notice pleading standard is replaced with an uncertain one. Uniform application of pleading practice is eroded by splits in the courts of appeals applying heightened pleading. Transsubstantivity gives way to different pleading standards for different substantive claims. In essence, the result is common-law pleading revisited. The consequences are not surprising. Whole categories of cases are deemed frivolous. Plaintiffs suffer prediscovery dismissal, often for failure to plead facts relating to the defendant’s state of mind. The Court has not once, but twice, tried to establish limits to heightened pleading in civil rights cases. In this context, two rights don’t make a wrong. However, given the post-Leatherman experience, it is unlikely that those courts that embrace heightened pleading will abandon it on the strength of Swierkiewicz.212

Given this defiant environment, it is not surprising that the Court reinvolved itself in the pleading-standard discussion. But this time the Court saw fit to dismiss rather than sustain the plaintiffs’ complaint based on the complaint’s allegations, not on Rule 8 and its accompanying standard. After reaffirming Rule 8’s pleading standard, the Court described its belief that the Twombly plaintiffs had failed to plead facts sufficient to satisfy this enduring standard. As the Court expressed repeatedly (and reiterated in Erickson), it never intended to raise Rule 8’s longstanding requirements. The Court’s similar reaffirmations in Conley, Leatherman, and Swierkiewicz resulted—on the facts of those


cases—in orders sustaining the plaintiffs’ complaints because those complaints were properly pleaded according to the prevailing and still-current standard. Yet, the complaint in *Twombly*, when considered according to this same standard—a standard that was at all times available to plaintiffs—simply did not.

Considering the *Twombly* complaint against the example described in Form 9 only amplifies the Court’s declaration that it did not adjust Rule 8’s pleading standard. Form 9 has always provided plaintiffs’ guidance because it considers a controversy that can just as easily be attributed to negligence as not. As such, based on Form 9’s facts the discovery process may properly commence, so the parties can reach a just resolution on the merits. But the *Twombly* complaint struck the Court as entirely conjectural (if not fabricated) in that no facts demonstrating an illegal agreement appeared to exist. The plaintiffs had alleged an illegal agreement that caused them damage, but they pleaded no facts (i.e., who, what, where, when, why) to support this conclusion as demonstrated in Form 9 (i.e., who—defendant; what—drove into plaintiff; where—Boylston Street; when—June 1, 1936; why—because defendant was negligent). Contrasting the *Twombly* plaintiffs’ “factual” allegations with Form 9’s factual allegations further confirms the Court’s objective to remain true to Rule 8’s longstanding ideals.

So the Court got it right when it said, “the complaint warranted dismissal because it failed *in toto* to render plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief plausible.”213 The majority believed, based on the notice the plaintiffs provided, that proceeding to discovery or beyond would have been both futile and unfair—circumstances that even Justice Stevens’ dissent admitted justify dismissal.214 In this manner, and on account of the Court’s reasoned interpretation of the complaint’s factual allegations, *Twombly* did not change the pleading standard on account of merely invoking the adjective “plausible” when describing plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. Rather, it reaffirmed this standard in the face of lower courts’ continued and unjustified restriction of it and did so while explaining this time that the complaint’s factual allegations failed to comply with the Court’s long-embraced standard.

As demonstrated then, *Twombly* marks no departure from Rule 8’s pleading standard. Rather, *Twombly* affirms it, simply re-expressing...
that a complaint containing implausible (if not far-fetched or even fabricated) allegations supported by no facts—such as solely parallel conduct to plead antitrust-conspiracy allegations as opposed to conspiratorial facts subject to naturally differing inferences—requires dismissal. When considered this way, Twombly’s holding was not that significant, after all.

Conclusion

Things are no different today than they were before Twombly, as Twombly merely reaffirmed Rule 8’s liberal pleading standard. Because the Court acted consistently with its multiple earlier efforts to educate the bench and bar on proper pleading practice, Twombly cannot fairly be understood to have enhanced Rule 8’s pleading standard. An honest reading of Twombly commands otherwise.

On account of Twombly, plaintiffs who plead—not prove—reasoned and believable fact-based complaints, as Rule 8 has always required, can reasonably expect courts to sustain them. Twombly merely describes the Court’s latest foray into preventing lower courts from wrongly adjusting Rule 8’s pleading standard in a way that many commentators, ironically, believe the Court itself did. As such, Twombly is hardly the “big one” that these commentators insist.

Rather, life and litigation march on after Twombly, hopefully in the manner that Judge Clark and the rest of Rule 8’s drafters intended. With Twombly, the Supreme Court did its job to ensure Rule 8’s proper application. Hopefully, the Court’s third time will prove a charm, and lower courts will finally regard the Court’s instruction and apply Rule 8 to plaintiffs’ complaints in the manner that the Rule’s drafters originally and eternally envisioned.