Residential Segregation and Rethinking the Imperative of Integration

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THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE CITY

Edited by Sharon M. Meagher, Samantha Noll, and Joseph S. Biehl

Taylor & Francis
Not for distribution
Introduction

In this chapter I consider the place of the topic of racial and ethnic urban residential segregation factors into political philosophy. I begin with a short history of residential segregation and the ghetto, and their role in systems of racial domination and oppression, and remarks on the general neglect of this topic in contemporary political philosophy, including in nonideal political philosophy, which proports to take on examples of real-world injustices and inequalities. I then examine, from the standpoint of liberal-egalitarian political theory, what segregation, as a concept, entails, and its harms to individuals, communities, and societies. Segregation in all its forms (residential, educational, and employment, as well as in political and legal systems) is an instance of injustice and inequality and a major component of processes that maintain injustice and inequality, so it requires correction and rectification of some sort. Desegregation and integration are typically forwarded as solutions to the ills and injustices of segregation. They seem synonymous, but are they? To answer this question, I survey the prominent conceptualizations of both during the civil rights movement and the contemporary debate over those terms and political theoretical positions. In the conclusion I outline my partial defense of the idea of integration.

History

The separation of groups carved out by conceptions of race has been an intrinsic feature of those concepts, and the extrinsic expression of that separation has taken on many oppressive, dominating, and frequently brutal forms touching on all the facets of human life (Frederickson 2002). Racial divisions were made apparent, visible for all to see – whether demarcated via artificial outward signs or through the designation of physiological features as racial marks – and then those signs or marks were used to enforce codes that governed differences in dress, modes of production and consumption, and distinct living quarters, areas for worship, and even burial grounds. For as long as humans had the idea of race, they have expressed and enforced racial differences in space and in their places (Sundstrom 2003: 83–95).

We have the division of the countryside, regions, and cities: the Jewish village, the Jewish quarter, and the emergence of the Jewish ghetto. This spatial separation is a must because it physically marks separate geographies and topographies for “those” people, so their stain, their
“dirty blood,” will not taint the clean and pure. As the modern idea of race emerged in the 19th century the separation needed to be contained lest lustful spiritual or corporeal weakness overcome us, and we commit crimes against our race by blending the physical qualities of our bodies and blood. This separation could be enforced through the separation over a few meters – the servants or slaves are to live separate lesser structures. This was the case in the United States during the era of slavery. The slaves needed to be kept close, but not too close. There were, of course, frequent and institutionalized breeches of this policy. The paradigmatic example is Thomas Jefferson’s declaration that blacks and whites were worlds apart and needed to be kept so, while he had intimate relations with his slave Sally Hemmings, who was the inherited slave of his white wife and her half-sister (Gordon-Reed 1997, 2008). This is not so incomprehensible; such exploitative relations were common while the stated and outward-facing values of the American slave system made them “publicly” incomprehensible and beyond the pale of acceptance or admission. To maintain both the lie and the domination, racial and ethnic separation needed to be fiercely maintained to protect the privileges and power, along with the imagined reputation of the moral, spiritual, and corporeal purity of white Anglo-Saxon Americans.

Modern forms of urban racial separation begin with the European Jewish ghetto, where a group is centralized in a city, concentrated in a district, their isolation enforced, and the exposure between them and the rest of society limited (Duneier 2016). Examples of Jewish ghettos stretch across Europe and into Russia and Russian-speaking states; the most notorious, however, are those formed during World War II by the Nazis in Germany, Nazi-occupied states, and other Axis Powers, such as the Kraków Ghetto in Poland, and the Le Marais Ghetto in Paris, France.

Ghettoization as a pattern is site-specific. It takes different forms at different sites, sometimes determined by regional, national, or international social systems and practices. This site-specificity extends to conceptions of racial, ethnic, or religious identity, and norms and procedures of group control, oppression, and domination. The urban residential segregation of black Americans (at least in the pre–World War II years) in the rural, semirural, and urban South, such as in the cities of Memphis, Tennessee, where black neighborhoods were in closer proximity to white ones, differed from the larger and more racially concentrated black ghettos of the industrialized North, such as was seen in the Harlem neighborhood in New York City, or is still seen in some neighborhoods of the South Side of Chicago.

In addition to the model of the Jewish ghetto other models arise: the settler versus native divisions in modern colonies, the separation and organization of indigenous peoples into reservations, camps, townships, or informal settlements (Goldberg 2002). The urban ghetto in North America as it is understood today, which is primarily but not exclusively associated with black Americans, began to form after the Civil War with the migration of African-Americans to the industrializing cities of the North and West. The stereotypic examples of black American ghettos are associated with the American North (e.g., New York City, Baltimore, and Washington DC) and the Midwest (e.g., Chicago, St. Louis, and Minneapolis), but they were also produced in the liberal states of the West, such as Los Angeles and San Francisco in California, where they were expanded and the poverty and disparity in them deepened precisely at the time when segregation was declared unconstitutional and illegal and fair housing laws were established (Rothstein 2017). This history is obviously relevant to normative thought about ethics, politics, democracy, justice, and equality. Despite, or perhaps in spite of, the centrality of racial and ethnic segregation in the production of American life, the topic has only a few only a few high-profile appearances in the history of philosophy and political theory. This is in contrast to the much fuller history of empirical scholarship and analysis of race, racism, and segregation in the social sciences and social theory.
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The one strong and early exception to this has been in African-American political theory. In the late 18th and early 20th centuries, African-American intellectuals have debated whether blacks should assimilate or amalgamate with or into Anglo-Saxon America, or conserve their collective identity, group solidarity, and culture by maintaining some degree of cultural, institutional, and spatial separation. The participants, among others, in that debate were Martin Delany, Frederick Douglass, Booker T. Washington, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Anna Julia Cooper. Completely separate from that line of discussion, Frederick Engels (1935) in the late 19th century analyzed the separation and the clearing out of working-class neighborhoods in industrializing cities by the growing middle classes. It was, however, within the discussion among African-American intellectuals and political leaders in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that the issue was most thoroughly discussed.

This line of discussion, starting with criticism of and resistance to slavery, and to the racial discrimination that followed, has been ever-present in African-American arts and letters and in the post-1960s emergence of African-American philosophy. One prominent fragment of the debate within black philosophy has been about the conservation of race. That debate continues, since being reignited by Anthony Appiah’s (1986) critique of W.E.B. Du Bois’s “The Conservation of Races” (1995). It is a debate mostly about the retention of group identity and solidarity rather than the maintenance of racially marked distinct spaces and places, although its arguments have implications about whether desegregation or integration is a justified ameliorative response to state-sponsored coerced residential segregation. This debate influences contemporary debates about segregation, desegregation, and integration, because it raises issues of group loyalty, solidarity, and the conservation of group identity and culture.

Outside of the American context, some European philosophy reacting to the atrocities of World War II and opposing colonialism has also analyzed ghettoization and the forced spatial separation of groups. Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1985) stands out for its analysis of Jewish segregation in its analysis of the evolution of totalitarian political forms. Arendt attempted to extend her analysis of education and residential segregation to the American context in her controversial article “Reflections on Little Rock” (2000). She criticized the push to integrate public schools, and particularly the role children had to necessarily bear in this history. Her analysis was remarkably tone-deaf and uninformed about the history of antiblack racism in the United States and the history of African-American political movements, opposition to segregation, and the strategies of those movements to respond to Jim Crow segregation (Gines 2014). Rudimentary race and place analyses were also offered by Jean Paul Sartre (1948) and Simone de Beauvoir (1953) in the years following World War II, but the most incisive and influential was Frantz Fanon’s (1963, 1967) writings on the colonial condition, in which he describes the layout of Algiers in a manner that reflected his existentialist-phenomenological analysis of the formation of racial identities. His description is essential for understanding the dynamic between race and place and the way the racial-state violently exercises its power in the landscape and makes its divisions concrete in the cityscape. It is worth quoting in length:

The colonial world is a world cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers are shown by barracks and polices stations. In the colonies it is the policeman and the soldier who are the official, instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and his rule of oppression. . . . In the colonial countries, . . . the policeman and the soldier, by their immediate presence and their frequent and direct action maintain contact with the native and advise him by means of rifle butts and napalm not to budge. It is obvious here that the agents of government speak the language of pure force. The intermediary does not lighten the oppression, nor seek to hide the domination; he shows them up
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and puts them into practice with the clear conscience of an upholder of the peace; yet he is the bringer of violence into the home and into the mind of the native.

(Fanon 1963: 38)

Fanon's analysis and description was deeply influential, and it was depicted by in the unforgettable opening scenes of The Battle of Algiers (1967), which pans across the visible division of the French from the Arab quarters of the city. Further his analysis of race, colonization, and colonized places and the anticolonial struggle of the natives influenced the emergence of the Black Power movement in the American civil rights movement and the subsequent debate over segregation and self-separation. Notably, the Black Power movement spread across the United States, but it was centered in American cities, such as Oakland, where the Black Panther Party was birthed (Stokely & Hamilton 1967). Despite the history of the occasional entrance of the segregation debate in postwar European and anticolonial philosophy, it disappears in the rise of mainstream ethics and political philosophy. This is no surprise given the depoliticization of American philosophy in the shadow of the Red Scare, and the near absolute absence of ethnic, racial, or gender diversity in philosophy during that period and well afterward. Anglo-American philosophy, or Continental philosophy in the United States, was simply not interested in the social and political thought and concerns of nonwhites (Mills 1998). That situation has been subject to a long and slow process of change in the profession, which is evident in the continuation and flourishing of a host of debates, including the subject of this survey.

The history of race in America and history of philosophy outlined above serve as the context for the recent debate in academic philosophy over residential segregation and the differences between, and justification of, desegregation or integration. So, it is a bit arbitrary to pick a date and a set of papers to designate the start of this particular debate, but it is accurate to trace the current debate back to at least Bernard Boxill's Blacks and Social Justice (1992) and the series of articles and books from other philosophers that it inspired. Not that Boxill and those who followed wrote about residential segregation per se, but the set of issues that Boxill discussed and the arguments he employed framed the contemporary debate in African-American philosophy that was focused on residential segregation. The set of works that started the specific debate include works by Iris Marion Young (1990, 2000), Jonathan Kaplan and Andrew Valls (2007), Elizabeth Anderson (2010), Sharon Stanley (2017), and Tommie Shelby (2016), as well as my own works (Sundstrom 2003, 2004, 2013). Additionally, the debate within American and African-American philosophy over residential segregation overlaps but is distinct from the political theoretical debate over educational segregation.²

Segregation

Residential segregation is commonly understood to be due to de jure practices, such as Jim Crow laws or other state-sanctioned forms, such as “redlining” by banks and other financial institutions, discrimination by real estate professionals, or racial covenants by neighborhood associations that commit to exclude nonwhites, or otherwise more blunt mechanisms by forcing blacks, Latinos, Asian-Americans, and other targeted groups to live in districts designated for them. Every racially segregated community in the United States were affected by these and other state-sanctioned practices (Pietila 2010; Rothstein 2017). The compulsory force was usually, in the United States, enforced and justified by federal power, state, or municipal power. The purpose of the separation was to maintain control by whites over other groups in the United States; depending on the region, different policies were enforced to satisfy this purpose, from direct discrimination of landlords and real estate agents, to broader municipal, state, and
federal policies. This control was needed to maintain power of one group over another, but also to separate them politically, socially, economically, and culturally, and to often control against interracial intimacies of all kinds. The racial geography of the United States was shaped by these state-sanctioned practices and their effects are deeply embedded and endure in American life.

Housing discrimination was formally outlawed by the passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Squires 2018). Those laws did not end segregation; indeed, it survived through a variety of means, leading many to think of post-1968 patterns of residential segregation as examples of de facto segregation, or as the result of individual and private choices driven by economic forces or preferences in tastes. The historical economic and legal history shows, however, that former de jure patterns and practices of segregation were replaced by policies that were intended to conserve and extend segregation; such as, for example, exclusionary zoning laws that forbid the development of multifamily units or smaller homes or homes on small lots that would be affordable to lower-middle class or working-class buyers, public housing, or otherwise affordable housing developments, which had the effect of keeping blacks, Latinos, and poor whites out of exclusively white middle-class and wealthy neighborhoods and suburbs. The fight over such zoning laws, as illustrated in the legal battles over residential segregation and affordable and inclusive housing development in Mount Laurel, New Jersey, illustrates a part of this ugly history. To zero in on residential segregation and its effects, contemporary political philosophy has followed the lead of leading studies of segregation in the social sciences. Particularly influential has been the work of Massey and Denton (1993). One prominent conception and corresponding measure of segregation is called the “dissimilarity index.” It is understood as “the degree to which two or more groups live separately from one another, in different parts of the urban environment” (Massey & Denton 1988: 63). A richer sense of degree of segregation, however, is given by considering several other indices in addition to dissimilarity, and typically these are exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering (Massey & Denton 1988: 74–78). When a group, neighborhood, or zip code is characterized by more than one of these and to a great degree, it is said to experience “hypersegregation,” which in America typically applies to segregated black neighborhoods. Moreover, those hypersegregated neighborhoods are also sites of concentrated poverty and disadvantage, which continue to fundamentally affect the lives and life chances of the ghetto poor (Rugh & Massey 2014). The social scientists, legal theorists, and public intellectuals that have critically analyzed segregation have also enumerated its many harms. Political philosophers and theorists have added to that enumeration. Iris Marion Young (2000) and Elizabeth Anderson (2010) have argued that segregation, and especially hypersegregation, is unjust as condition and process, and it is an instantiation of systemic group inequality. It is a condition of unjust disparity, and causes further disparities in education and access to political power and economic opportunity. Residential segregation, and its related effects that reinforces segregation in other domains, such as education and employment, are clear instances of the denial of basic rights, political and legal equality, due process, and access to fair equal opportunity (Kaplan & Valls 2007). Additionally, segregation clearly involves the dimensions of mis- and mal-recognition that Iris Marion Young explicated as the five faces of oppression: economic exploitation, social and economic marginalization, lack of power over one’s work, cultural imperialism, and systemic violence (1990). Anderson adds to Young’s analysis by detailing how racial discrimination and its enforcement through segregation creates and reinforces stereotypes, or cognitive biases, and contributes to the process of racial stigmatization. The cognitive biases that are reinforced, according to Anderson, involve “the attribution of negative stereotypes to dishonorable personal traits, which rationalize antipathy toward the group” (2010: 46). This process of group stigmatization reinforces, according to Anderson, six cognitive biases: (1) group favoritism or ethnocentrism; (2) shared reality bias; (3) illusory correlation bias; (4) stereotype
incumbency bias; (5) power bias; and (6) system justification bias (2010: 44–88). Group stigmatization causes harm by in-turn reinforcing the “public standing” of the group and individuals in the group and can have negative effects on public policy, self-image, and reinforce and justify discrimination. It is especially important to understand that in addition to the material harms outlined above and related to the harms of recognition and group stigmatization, is the attack on the dignity of the group. Black social and political critics emphasized the dehumanization of segregation and its distorting and degrading of the minds and bodies of those suffering this oppression – and the moral distortion and degradation of white Americans who imposed the oppression. Segregation, when it is compelled, thwarts individual and group autonomy. Additionally, the mechanisms which enforce it, such as legalized racial subordination and discrimination, unequal legal treatment and protections of individual, and unequal access to social goods and services, are themselves major distributive injustices. Furthermore, these distributive justices have intergenerational effects, for example in educational attainment and wealth tied to housing equity, which results in deeply socially embedded enduring injustices (Rothstein 2017; Shapiro 2017; Spinner-Halev 2012). Those distributive justices, in turn, buttress and result in further relational inequalities. Both types of inequality point to a deeper moral rot because both sorts are signs that society excludes, discounts, or neglects the basic or moral equality of excluded groups. The political toll of the injustice of segregation, the “price of the ticket” in James Baldwin's (1993) sharp phrasing, is that segregation offends our moral and democratic ideals and practice by leading to injustices in (a) the organization of democratic membership, (b) governance, and (c) and in democratic culture. Segregation is deeply at odds with the very idea of a just, well-ordered society.

Integration

When faced with segregation what is seemingly called for seems to be its opposite: demographic diversity in cities and diversity in neighborhoods that is proportional to the demographic diversity of the city. Policies that are meant to bring about these results are respectively thought of as engaging in desegregation or integration. Those practices seem synonymous, but they have distinguishing characteristics. Roughly, desegregation is the ending or reversing of official segregationist policies and practices in economic, politics, and many social institutions and places (except for those that are intimately private), while integration goes further by advocating for the blending or distributing of populations across institutions and neighborhoods. It additionally implies a higher degree of communication and cooperation than desegregation.

To understand what integration means and requires, it is useful to start with a minimal, quantitative conception. Integration may be understood as the opposite of what is revealed by multidimensional measures of segregation. For example, taking the index of evenness that is used in calculations of the dissimilarity index, integration occurs when “every neighborhood has the same proportion of each group as the city as a whole” (Denton 2010: 36). However, a strict proportionality does not match common intuitions about neighborhood diversity and seems unnecessary. It focuses too much on end-states rather than on the normative motivations for integration.

The normative justification for integration is based on equal moral worth and citizenship. Integration is a requirement for a society that is well-ordered, just, democratic, and stable. It explicitly implies an equal right and access to the basic structures of society, and to the opportunities and subsequent public and private benefits and burdens that arise from those structures. In contrast, desegregation seems narrow and necessarily leads to a society that affirms social cooperation and mutual respect that goes beyond what is required by legal formalities. Martin
Luther King, Jr., gave voice to the distinction between integration and desegregation in his 1962 speech “The Ethical Demands for Integration,” wherein he stated,

Integration is creative and is therefore more profound and far-reaching than desegregation. Integration is the positive acceptance of desegregation and the welcomed participation of Negroes into the total range of human activities. Integration is genuine intergroup, interpersonal doing. Desegregation then, rightly, is only a short-term goal. Integration is the ultimate goal of our national community.

(King 1986: 118)

King’s argument for integration was based on the moral worth of persons, the requirement of freedom in order to live a dignified life as an equal citizen, and the solidarity of the human family. It is also, primarily, based in the Christian theological view that humans are created in Imago Dei and are recipients of agape, or the love of God (Sundstrom 2017). James Baldwin offered another demanding vision of integration. Like King’s view, Baldwin’s was theologically loaded. This is apparent in his rhetoric of love and acceptance, which is connected to his black Protestant background. Although Baldwin had quit his formal ties to the Pentecostal church of his childhood, he continued to draw on some of the language and symbols from his religious past to add depth and to convey the severity of America’s problem with race. His inheritance of this religious background is openly apparent in the title and text of his famous work The Fire Next Time (1993). This deserves accentuation because of his demanding conceptions of integration in that work and his other essays. In the first essay of that book, “My Dungeon Shook,” which was addressed to his nephew, he claimed integration did not entail black people “becoming like” white people, nor did it involve the “impertinent” claim that white people should “accept” black people – that view was condescending and cast integration as a gift from whites that blacks should accept with humble gratitude. Rather, blacks, according to Baldwin, should accept whites because without that loving, redemptive acceptance that mirrors undeserved divine grace there would be no hope for whites or the nation. Baldwin wrote,

The terrible thing, old buddy, is that you must accept them. And I mean that very seriously. You must accept them and accept them with love. For these innocent people have no other hope. They are, in effect, still trapped in a history which they do not understand; and until they understand it, they cannot be released from it.

(1993: 8)

The release of white Americans from the willful innocence that avoids the recognition of their complicity in the continuing immiseration and destruction of black Americans is needed, according to Baldwin, because they were “our” brothers, and the fate of brothers is intertwined (1993: 9–10). Hence, Baldwin prescribed that black and white Americans confront the evil of white innocence to face the truths of America’s antiblack racism and their entwined fates. According to Baldwin: “If the word integration means anything, this is what it means: that we, with love shall force our brothers to see themselves as they are, to cease fleeing reality and begin to change it” (1993: 9–10).

Contemporary integrationists may not call for spiritual affinity, but they most certainly call for spatial, moral, and political affinity (Fiss et al. 2003). The most prominent defense of integration in political philosophy was offered by Elizabeth Anderson in her book The Imperative of
Integration. Her definition of integration communicates what she holds is the social and political role of integration:

The ideal of integration... aims at the abolition of racial segregation and its attendant inequalities, not of racial identities. It permits the use of race-conscious policies to achieve racial integration and equality and accepts that some degree of racial solidarity and affiliation on the part of the racially stigmatized is needed to spur integrative policies and cope with the stresses of integration. Thus, integration should also not be confused with the dissolution of black institutions or with the absence of racial clustering in neighborhoods. It consists in the full participation on terms of equality of socially significant groups in all domains of society.

(2010: 113)

The recent history of the implementation of integration is found in fair housing, education, and fair employment law and policy. That legacy has been, at best, mixed, and at worst, a failure (Rothstein 2017; Squires 2018). The primary contemporary examples of pro-integration policies are those that focus on the mobility of families between and across cities and the deconcentration of poverty (Fiss et al. 2003). “Mobility” means the ability to access neighborhoods, which itself can be understood not only in the ability to pay rent or buy a home in a neighborhood but also in the to overcome informal or legal obstacles. Examples of such efforts are the Gautreux assisted housing program, which operated in Chicago from 1966 to 1998, and the Moving Toward Opportunity demonstration project (MTO), which grew out of the Gautreux project and sought to integrate families from poor neighborhoods to those with less poverty, as well as some instances of the post-1990 “Housing and Opportunity for Everyone” (HOPEVI) policy, which redeveloped past public housing and built new units—along with a set of more recent additions to and alterations of those policies.

The MTO project is the example that Elizabeth Anderson discusses in her defense of the ideal of integration. The results of that and other mobility programs, however, are mixed, so much so that critics tend to dismiss their efficacy and even their moral legitimacy. This rejection is unwarranted. MTO programs have had, although they are limited, generally positive effects on the lives of participating families (Chetty & Hendren 2015; Chetty, Hendren, & Katz 2016). Similar concerns about efficacy have been registered about HOPEVI developments, but their effect on the quality of life in public housing and the reduction of concentrated poverty has been substantial. In short, the benefits have largely affected children, and the younger the child and the longer they have been exposed to better-resourced neighborhoods, the better for their long-term outcomes, including college attendance, earnings, and single parenthood rates. Mobility programs can lead to increases in quality of life and opportunities for participating families with young children.

Integration, therefore, as attempted by those programs, is justified as a matter of social, and in particular, distributive justice, and has the aim of achieving distributive and social equality. It also benefits the functioning of participating individuals and families and thus supports their autonomy and freedom. Segregation has negative consequences, so integration has equally serious positive consequences in improving the quality of life and opportunities for those who would benefit from greater access to education and housing resources. Moreover, integration in public life and the political culture, not only benefits the individual and families, but it also improves the democratic life of society (Fiss 2003). It is for these reasons that Anderson perceives in integration not only the opportunity for the development of the capabilities of individuals
and increased access to further opportunities for them and their families, but also larger social
and political benefits (2010: 2). Therefore, for its advocates, integration is a communicative and
relational ideal. It directs society to value civic friendship and to keep in mind its binding
force. Further, as Anderson indicated, it serves as a basis for a cosmopolitan relation. In liberal-
egalitarian theories of justice, integration is also associated with the idea of reciprocity, the rela-
tions between individuals engaged in social cooperation bounded by principles that drives from
mutual agreement and benefit.

Desegregation

There is more to the idea of desegregation than it being the preliminary to integration.

At the heart of the distinction between these two ideas, and according to the defenders
of the desegregation as a priority, is the normative view that there is nothing wrong with the
separation of a group as such, if that separation is self-separation, or more controversially self-
segregation, and is done autonomously by the individuals of the group acting collectively, and
is done without infringing on the rights of others (Young 2000; Kaplan & Valls 2007; Shelby
2016). For desegregationists this position has a moral priority over integration and should have
a legal and policy one, too; this camp often advocates group empowerment through community
and neighborhood development. Being a desegregationist, however, does not necessarily entail
opposition to integration for those who voluntarily choose it. Desegregationists put the empha-
sis on autonomy, and distributive and social equality. Insofar as individuals choose to cluster with
other members of their groups, without excluding others or otherwise violating their rights,
and as long as this clustering or voluntary “separation” does not lead to or extend distributive
injustice or lead to social inequality, there is nothing inherently morally objectionable about
truly voluntary residential separation.

Iris Marion Young makes this point in her arguments about residential segregation, hous-
ing, and regional democracy in her theory of inclusive democratic participation (1990, 2000).
She supports desegregation but not integration because, among other things, integration has
focused on moving poor people, and in particular poor people of color, from their communi-
ties, thereby disrupting those communities and thwarting the desires of some of those moved
to stay in their home communities. Integrationist’s preoccupation with where people live,
especially where poor black and brown people live, according to Young, misses the crux of the
problem, which is the inequitable spatial distribution of public goods and services. Instead of
integration, Young favors an approach she calls “differentiated solidarity,” which values identity
pluralism and allows for the clustering of groups, as long as it respects the rights of participants
and others, and stresses local democratic participation in the organization and administration of
community affairs.

Likewise, Tommie Shelby in Dark Ghetto (2016) stresses the obligation the state has to
desegregate schools, neighborhoods, and other institutions – giving the black ghetto poor access
to the goods, services, and opportunities they have a right to – but resists claims like Anderson’s
of placing any imperative on the black ghetto poor to integrate. This reflects the position of
Jonathan Kaplan and Andrew Valls in their arguments for desegregation (2007). Contemporary
integrationists who are committed to contemporary mobility programs in one form or another
regard segregation itself as the “linchpin” of the problems that flow from segregation; for them
segregation is morally suspicious and inextricably linked with distributive and social injustice.
Shelby, in contrast to the new integrationists, shifts the focus from demography and geogra-
phy to the unequal distribution of primary (social and natural) goods. He argues that “blacks,
including poor blacks, should be free to self-segregate in neighborhoods and this practice is

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not incompatible with justice” (Shelby 2016: 67). He “also maintain[s] that we should not regard residential integration as a legitimate mechanism for correcting the unjust disadvantages the ghetto poor face, where programs like Gautreaux and Moving to Opportunity are the paradigm” (2016: 67). Instead of integration as residential evenness, he advocates for a position he calls “egalitarian pluralism.” That position, according to Shelby, “requires desegregation, social equality, and, importantly, economic fairness. It does not require residential integration. Nor does it oppose it. It does not proscribe voluntary self-segregation in neighborhoods. Nor does it call for it” (2016: 67). The minimal demands of a liberal-egalitarian approach start with desegregation because what is specifically required is the provision and engendering of the necessary primary goods, and the specific capabilities that flow from them, that individuals need to flourish.

Desegregation requires access to these goods but does not insist on the more extensive goals of integration. Insofar as segregation is de jure, then it is obviously unjust because it fails to meet the demands of equal citizenship, but insofar as separation is voluntary or de facto, then the problem is the concentration of poverty rather than racial clustering, as long as ethnic and racial clustering does not negate or impede the rights of those who are outside the group. Therefore, while desegregation is required, demands to integrate are illegitimate. In addition to the political legitimacy objection to integration policies, a historically justified mistrust of the state is another reason for a preference for desegregation. Indeed, the troubled legacy of segregation in America and the administration of its fair-housing policies magnify the illegitimacy of the demand, especially among the ghetto poor, to integrate.

Conclusion

I am broadly sympathetic to Young’s, Shelby’s, Kaplan’s, and Valls’s Left to liberal arguments against integration, especially given the concerns about the historic failures of US integration policy and its manipulation to serve the interests of cities interested in redevelopment rather than those of the ghetto poor, but I am not entirely convinced by their skepticism and critique of integration programs. I agree with Anderson’s defense of integration but disagree with her accusation that American multiculturalism is to blame for the undervaluing and undermining of the value integration. I prefer an alternative position that defends a version of integration that emphasizes the building of local, neighborhood resources, for the sake of those communities but especially for the sake of the individuals who live in them. This brief survey of the debate is not the place for me to fully explain and defend my position, but I will offer a rough outline of reconciliation of the desegregation versus integration debate. My position is closely related to Young’s differentiated solidarity, insofar as it values both multiculturalism and democratic participation, but, in contrast with Young, I defend integration as an outcome of justice. My account parallels Sharon Stanley’s (2017) view that integration and racial solidarity can be reconciled, and that integration should be conceived as a process that can “incorporate deeply felt racial solidarities.” This approach is consistent with standard accounts of liberal-egalitarianism and their emphasis on distributive and social equality, but it takes lessons from the politics of recognition, participatory democracy, and the history of segregation in the United States. The concept of integration I offer does not start with an atomistic approach to individual well-being, so it does not focus on moving the ghetto poor to better sites of opportunity, although it also does not dismiss mobility programs as an option for those who prefer it. Instead, it advocates for the material support of neighborhoods because many individuals value their neighborhood communities and wish to see them conserved, and when those sites have access to public and private goods and services, support, and opportunities, they provide a foundation for healthy individuals and society. This approach in urban planning and policy is sometimes
understood as an emphasis in place-based reform or community or neighborhood development; it is contrasted with a focus on mobility programs.

As with Young’s and Stanley’s approaches, mine emphasizes solidarity, but instead of focusing on “differentiated solidarity,” which is a conception of solidarity based on group affinity, I focus on the local solidarity of neighborhoods, which are often of course also differentiated by ethnic, racial, and class identities, as can be witnessed in the neighborhoods of Brooklyn in New York City or those of North Oakland in Oakland. The justification for this focus is not based on the recognition of social identities and the claims of groups to neighborhoods. Rather it rests on the value of freedom, and, in this case, the right of individuals to participate in the democratic governance of their cities, districts, and neighborhoods, and it also rests on the value of equality, in that citizens of a well-ordered society rightfully expect distributive justice, and (given that all the poor residents cannot practically be relocated to sites of opportunity and that they may rightfully not consent to such relocations – and dislocations) that building communities through equitable development programs that are responsive to the geography of opportunity is a promising method of delivering to individuals and families the public goods they deserve as well as access to valuable private goods. Integration does not lead in this conception; rather, it follows closely on the heels of desegregation and equitable development. So, how ought we as society achieve integration? We must fully enforce the Fair Housing Act of 1968 to effectively outlaw racial discrimination in housing and ensure access of all residents to urban neighborhoods and metropolitan regions, and we must build housing capacity in American cities, protect and stabilize the housing needs of the poor and working-class residents to minimize homelessness and mitigate against housing insecurity and instability, and spread public resources (education, transportation, and so on) through all urban areas. Just cities are the condition for integrated ones.

Notes

1 For an invaluable collection that gathers together a significant number of the classic and foundational readings in African-American social and political thought and sorts them into categories based on their broad political schools, see Brotz (1992).
2 For a survey and critical analysis of that debate, see Merry (2013).
3 A liberal-egalitarian approach toward urban policy and affairs also appears in Williamson (2010) and Fainstein (2010).

References

Residential segregation and integration


Hemingses of Monticello: An American Family, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.


Further reading