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Are Indigenous Peoples Better Off Under Evo Morales? Towards Understanding the Effects of Decolonization Policy on Social Inclusion in Bolivia

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ARE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES BETTER OFF UNDER EVO MORALES? TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF DECOLONIZATION POLICY ON SOCIAL INCLUSION IN BOLIVIA

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

This undergraduate thesis examines how to measure the influence of the Evo Morales administration's decolonization policies on the social inclusion of indigenous peoples in Bolivia. Given the ongoing colonial legacy of exclusion of indigenous peoples in Bolivia, the Morales administration has created a national agenda to decolonize the state and improve conditions for the marginalized, oppressed, and excluded indigenous peoples. In examining the *nacionalización de los hidrocarburos*, the *ley de la reconducción comunitaria y reforma agraria*, the *plan nacional de desarrollo*, the *ley de la educación*, the *ley de deslinde*, the *ley de marco de autonomías,* and *TIPNIS*, in combination with decolonization theory and previous studies, this thesis seeks to link the relationship between decolonization policy and social inclusion, as well as uncover certain contradictions between the government's rhetoric and practice and encourage future research. While the Morales administration appears to have made progress towards decolonization and social inclusion, it has also implemented policies that contradict these efforts.

KEYWORDS

Decolonization Policy, Social Inclusion, Indigenous Peoples, Evo Morales, Bolivia

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LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIOC: *Autonomía Indígena Originario Campesino*. Indigenous Originary Peasant Autonomy.

IOC: *Indígena Originario Campesino*. Indigenous Orignary Peasant.

MAS: *Movimiento al Socialismo.* Movement Toward Socialism.

TIOC: *Territorio Indígena Originario Campesino*. Indigenous Originary Peasant Territory.

TIPNIS: *Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure.* Isiboro Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory.

VMD: *Viceministerio de descolonización*. Vice-Ministry of Decolonization.

YPFB: *Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos.* Bolivian Fiscal Petroliferous Deposits.

INTRODUCTION

The effects of colonization are still very present in postcolonial societies. The current conditions of Latin America are proof that colonialism has an ongoing historical legacy of ethnicity and racism, one that does not end after formal independence but "continues in the form of a social-cultural hierarchy of European and non-European" (Quijano and Wallerstein, 1992). During the conquest of the Americas, the Spaniards implemented a caste system in the New World. In this system, identities were simplified to *españoles*, *criollos*, *mestizos*, *indios*, *negros*, and *mulatos*. According to Anibal Quijano's concept, "coloniality of power," this racial categorization established a discriminatory discourse that was reflected in colonial structures and institutions and continues in the institutions and structures of postcolonial societies.

As a result, even after independence the "barbaric" and "uncivilized" perceptions of the *indios* remained and the "sociocultural complexes" of indigenous peoples were still perceived as an expression of "backwardness." Often times, the indigenous cultures were blamed for the country's lack of "civilization". In Bolivia, even indigenous tribute persisted until the early twentieth century. Additionally, throughout Latin America, many liberal governments created policies that aimed to include the indigenous peoples in national life but exclude their cultures, attempting to erase their "differentiated identities" from the national identity (Polanco, 1997). Unfortunately, these sentiments continue to exist today and indigenous peoples still make up the most excluded group in Latin America, facing discrimination with regard to basic rights to land, language, culture, governance, and social services.

The more we learn about this legacy of colonization, the more glaring the need for decolonization becomes. While decolonization is commonly understood as, "the end of formal political, economic, and military control of a colonized territory by another power," for this study, decolonization will refer to a more far reaching process that occurs within an independent nation, undoing the legacies of colonization, and in particular increasing social inclusion for indigenous peoples (Crawford, 2002). While no country has successfully decolonized, the ongoing effects of colonization demand a political project to reimagine and recreate decolonized national spaces, and Bolivia's political efforts to decolonize are worthy of further examination.

Bolivia, initially colonized by the Spanish in the sixteenth century, continues to suffer the consequences of colonization. Despite the fact that the majority of the population identifies as indigenous, indigenous peoples are still exploited, marginalized, and excluded. However, unlike most postcolonial societies, Bolivia's current administration, the Morales administration, has created a national agenda aimed at decolonizing the state. Today, Bolivia's first indigenous president, Evo Morales, of the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (Movement Toward Socialism, MAS), though a widely controversial political figure, is almost universally credited with recovering indigenous identity. He is also often commended for improving conditions for indigenous peoples, particularly those living in rural areas. If the advances of the Morales administration are the result of its decolonization policies, one would expect to observe increased social inclusion for indigenous peoples in Bolivia. Social inclusion refers to "the process of improving the terms for individuals and groups to take part in society" (World Bank, 2013). Given colonization's historical legacy of social exclusion, decolonization policy should logically bring about the increased social inclusion of the colonized.

While little has been done to measure the social inclusion of indigenous peoples in Bolivia, social exclusion does confirm poverty, and some studies have measured poverty among indigenous peoples. In 1994, a World Bank study demonstrated that there is a significant relationship between being poor and being indigenous in Bolivia. The frequency of poverty among indigenous peoples living in urban areas was about fifteen percent higher than that of nonindigenous peoples. Additionally, on the national level, 73.5% of the indigenous population was living under the poverty line with 37% of them living in extreme poverty, and the poverty gap between the indigenous and nonindigenous population only worsened between 1997 and 2002 (Gigler, 2009). Unfortunately, measuring the poverty of indigenous peoples does not capture the whole picture. Since the election of Evo Morales in 2006, no studies have sought to measure the social inclusion of indigenous peoples, nor the effect of his administration's decolonization policies on the social inclusion of indigenous peoples. Due to the lack of data available, it is beyond the scope of this paper to empirically examine whether the policies of the Evo Morales administration have increased social inclusion. Instead, this thesis discusses how one can begin to measure the influence of decolonization policies on the social inclusion of indigenous peoples in Bolivia, in turn, laying the groundwork for future study and analysis.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Since there has been a significant amount of literature produced in the fields of subaltern and postcolonial studies, the following is only a snapshot of a vast body of literature. However, it does include several prominent thinkers like Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, Mahatma Gandhi, Paulo Freire, Walter Mignolo, and Enrique Dussel, among others. This literature review first aims to provide its readers with a general understanding of decolonization theory and to establish the relevance of decolonization in postcolonial societies. Secondly, it presents different approaches to decolonization, mainly psychological, economic, and educational methods. Lastly, this literature review seeks to establish that the social exclusion of the colonized is a consequence of colonization and, therefore, the social inclusion of the colonized should be an outcome of decolonization.

Decolonization theory

Decolonization theory has its roots in the work of Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, and Gayatri Spivak. First, Fanon's discussion of decolonization, which focuses on the national war for liberation in Algeria, is foundational for decolonization theory. In *Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon (2004) identifies compartmentalization, the reduction of identities to fit a "simple and opposed dichotomy," as a notable result of colonization that requires "undoing." In Algeria, like in most of the colonized world, relations were reduced to the colonizers and the colonized. The colonizers established the colonized identity and employed it to dehumanize and exclude the colonized. Since colonial institutions keep the colonized in submission, these two distinct "species" or "races" continue to divide the world, resulting in continued exclusion for the colonized.

In another one of his works, *Black Skin, White Masks*, Fanon (2008) explains that this colonial division has certain psychological impacts. Given the efforts of the colonizer to destroy the culture of the colonized, often times the colonized loses his or her native culture and adopts that of the colonizer. Regrettably, as the colonized tries to appropriate the culture of the colonizer, the colonized can develop an inferiority complex. Fanon explains that since the white colonizers have perpetuated an association of "blackness" with "wrongness," "A normal Negro child, having grown up within a normal family, will become abnormal on the slightest contact

with the white world." This association begins at an early age and is further perpetuated by the media's representation of black people as villains (Fanon, 2008). Decolonization, as a result, calls for the creation of a new people, free from submission and inferiority (Fanon, 2004). This, in turn, should result in the social inclusion of the colonized.

Fanon (2004) further argues that for decolonization to occur, the "ruling species'" or the colonizers' economy, lifestyle, and culture must be destroyed violently and be replaced by that of the colonized. When this violent process is complete, the colonized "thing" transforms into a liberated man. He justifies violence, noting that if the colonizers do not treat the colonized like human beings, then the colonized should not be obliged to treat the colonizers with the morals and principles assigned to humanity (Fanon, 2004). Fanon also rationalizes this violent process in his discussion of national culture, in which he establishes three phases. During the first phase, the "superiority" of European culture is used to justify conquest and colonialism. In this phase, national culture is "a culture under interrogation whose destruction is sought systematically." In the second phase, national culture produces anti-colonialism. However, only in the third phase, after the violent, national liberation struggle, is the "demise of colonialism" achieved and nationhood produced. Fanon asserts that violence is necessary because nationalism and revolution can produce culture but culture cannot produce nationalism and revolution.

While Fanon wrote about formal decolonization, Edward Said (1979), the father of postcolonial studies, speaks of decolonization in a postcolonial society, examining the ongoing legacies of colonization. Oftentimes, even after the colonial power is overthrown, much of the colonial structures and institutions are maintained, and therefore the exclusion of the colonized continues. In his work *Orientalism*, Edward Said builds off of Fanon's understanding of compartmentalization. He defines "Orientalism" as the collection of false assumptions, largely influenced by colonial and imperial motives, that have shaped Western attitudes towards the Middle East. The "Occident" assumes that it must represent the voiceless, "Orient." In other words, in the eyes of the West, the Orient was destined to be ruled and dominated. This prejudice is a result of the existing colonizing discourse. Since the media continues to promote the Orient as an inferior being, racism is sustained. However, Said does not view this discourse as fixed. Instead, he questions the notion that the Orient was biologically inferior to the European and

incapable of self-governance. Even though discourse can reinforce colonial power, it can also be mobilized to resist colonial power.

In one of the most influential texts of postcolonial theory, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," Gayatri Spivak (1988) expands on this discussion. This time in the context of India, she notes that those that have the power to speak, the Westerners, speak for those who cannot, the subaltern. Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist coined the term, subaltern to refer to the populations that are denied a voice in society and socially and politically excluded from its institutions. Spivak's discussion centers on the white man's barbaric discourse surrounding *sati*, the practice whereby the widow kills herself, often on her husband's pyre, shortly after his death, the practice that the British used to justify imperialism. While Spivak does not necessarily condone the practice, she does take issue with the idea that the privileged, white man could save the subaltern, the "brown women." She explains, that white men are not "saving brown women from brown men," but silencing the subaltern (Spivak, 1988). Decolonization, therefore, first requires that the subaltern speak and are heard.

Decolonization of the mind

While most scholars agree on the relevance and need for decolonization, many key thinkers often disagree with Fanon's notion that violence is necessary for decolonization to occur. Wilson and Yellow Bird (2010), for example, focus on decolonization of the mind, "the intelligent, calculated, and active resistance to the forces of colonialism that perpetuate the subjugation and/or exploitation of our minds, bodies, and lands, and [that] is engaged for the ultimate purpose of overturning the colonial structure and realizing Indigenous liberation." This process begins by questioning the legitimacy of colonialism. Unfortunately, decolonization of the mind is much easier said than done. For one, the recovery of indigenous languages is an integral part of this process and if no actions are taken to revive indigenous languages, many of them risk extinction, and the subsequent loss of their philosophies, traditions, and cultures (Wilson and Yellow Bird, 2010). This, however, requires a much more far reaching approach than a personal decision and isolated reflection.

Ghandi's political decolonization theory, *Hind Swaraj*, echoes much of the theory discussed above. His colonial critique highlights two steps: demystification and reversal.

Demystification, similar to decolonization of the mind, is the process of understanding that Western civilization is only superior according to the criteria that it set itself. In a colonial state, it is difficult to realize that technology, infrastructure, government, education, medicine, and judicial systems of the West are not the only criteria for civilization, that there are other methods and practices of achieving self-rule, health, and justice. Therefore, for decolonization to occur, the validity of the colonial system must be challenged. However, Gandhi asserts that demystification alone is not sufficient. The next step towards decolonization is reversal, the recovery of precolonial ideas and practices. This step demands the revalorization of languages, cultures, customs, traditions, ideas, and practices that the colonizers deemed as inferior (Kohn and McBride, 2011).

Decolonization of the education system

Since education has the capacity to participate in both of these steps, a common approach to decolonization is the reformation of the education system. In his text, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Paulo Friere describes an education system rooted in praxis, "reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it," as the means to transform subjugated human beings into liberated human beings. He distinguishes between the "banking" education model that dehumanizes students and teachers and promotes oppression and exclusion and the "authentic" education model, where there is a mutual, humanizing relationship between students and teachers, where education is a means of conscientization, a critical awareness of social reality achieved through action and reflection, and where the classroom can be a space for dialogue that liberates the colonized (Friere, 1970). This classroom can encourage the decolonization of the mind and demystification. Walter Mignolo suggests that love is the solution to the violent, controlling, and colonial nature of Friere's "banking" system. He coins this solution, "bilanguaging love" and describes it as the, "...final utopic horizon for the liberation of human beings involved in structures of domination and subordination beyond their control" (Mignolo, 2000).

In addition to the importance of praxis and the practice of solidarity in the education system described by Freire and Mignolo, the content introduced in the classroom can also play a key role in decolonization. In the context of Botswana, Pandey and Moorad (2003) discuss the

importance of creating an innovative curriculum to "accommodate, appropriate, invite, and tolerate the old, the new, the outlandish, and so on to forge a new education," and decolonize. Their study explains that critical models of curriculum in postcolonial Africa emerged after the irrelevance of Western models of curriculum was realized. Additionally, upon understanding that critical pedagogy is a relevant part of the process of the decolonization of the education system, they began to question: "What can Africa contribute to critical pedagogy in search of an ethical dimension for its application in African classrooms?" Their pedagogy reflects Africa's vision to replace rather than heal their colonized and oppressed status. Therefore, the curriculum reflects the best of African cultures as well as certain advances in science, technology, and political democracy, among other ideas, developed in the West. Another primary objective of the new curriculum is to address the lack of knowledge and infrastructure available for natives to speak and express themselves. In sum, they argue, "A critical pedagogy to raise this consciousness of individuals must be grounded in ['humaneness, human oneness']. This is the ethics of emancipatory education required to decolonize the new nations coming out of the throes of oppression" (Pandey and Moorad, 2003).

Philosophy of liberation

Additionally, in Latin America, in the early 1970s, the philosophy of liberation, a decolonial movement, emerged in response to the region's continued dependence on Europe and the United States, criticizing Western philosophy for favoring European interests and identities and ignoring its role in violence, exclusion, and domination. While the primary contributors to this philosophy, Arturo Andrés Roig, Horacio Cerutti Guldberg, Agusto Salazar Bondy, Leopoldo Zea, and Enrique Dussel, were inspired by different philosophers and described different means of achieving liberation, there are some common characteristics. Firstly, these scholars tend to agree that liberation begins with the oppressed. The marginalization of Latin America in the larger global context provides them with a unique perspective or "insight," the ability to recognize the violence and exclusion custom to modernity (Kohn and McBride, 2011). Secondly, this philosophy calls for emancipation and calls on "national-popular movements" to bring about this radical social change. Thirdly, liberation philosophy always serves as a critique of modernity:

> There are two dimensions of this critique of modernity. One is simply the idea that the values and practices brought to Latin America by the Spanish conquistadores cannot be understood simply as civilization, progress, and prosperity. The violent conquest and the hierarchical, exploitative system that is set up revealed the hypocrisy of the European values of equality and universalism, and rationality. European "civilization" cannot simply be dismissed because it is deeply and inevitably part of Latin American history, but the traditional creole and mestizo narrative that celebrates this history must be tempered by the recognition that the Spanish brought more barbarianism than civilization. The philosophical version of this point is that the value system of modernity was not simply the autonomous achievement of Europe but was instead a myth that emerged in response to Europe's bloody encounter with the New World. (Kohn and McBride, 2011)

Lastly, most liberation philosophy is influenced by dependency theory, the theory that resources flow from the "poor," "underdeveloped" nations to the "rich," "developed" nations, enriching the "developed" nations at the expense of the "underdeveloped" nations. Dependency theory was developed in the late 1950s by Raul Prebish and his colleagues. In the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, they concluded that economic growth in the richer, developed countries often produced serious economic problems in poorer, lesser developed countries. This theory contradicted the neoclassical theory, which assumed that economic growth was beneficial to all. However, ever since colonialism, poor countries have exported primary goods to rich countries, where these goods were used to manufacture products that were then sold back to the poorer countries at a higher cost. Thus the poor countries never earned enough from their exports to pay for their imports. While Prebish's initial solution to the problem was flawed, Marxist theorists have since concluded that the solution lies in dismantling the colonial, capitalist system itself (Ferraro, 2008). In sum, the philosophy of liberation demands a shift, led by the colonized, from the systems, institutions, and discourses of the colonizers to those of the colonized.

Decolonization policy

Despite the widespread need for decolonization, few countries have included these goals in their national agendas and policies. For most countries, decolonization policy did not go much farther than independence and the end of formal colonial rule. However, for some countries,

there was an extra step, the implementation of policies opposed to the domination of international corporations and in favor of the nationalization of industries. These economic movements for self-sufficiency and domestic economic growth, grounded in dependence theory, also served as a mechanism to cut ties with former colonial hegemons.

In Burkina Faso, upon taking office in 1983, Thomas Sankara imposed a period of self-adjustment that allowed the country to reach food self-sufficiency within four years. During this period, he also increased the production of cotton and promoted the clothing industry, so that all clothes could be made in Burkina Faso (Savadogo and Wetta, 1992). Sankara's policies not only improved the domestic economy but they also lessened the country's dependence on its colonial hegemon. Likewise, in Latin America, many countries have nationalized its major industries at one time or another. The most well-known example is Cuba. In 1960, in an attempt to distance itself from the United States, the regional hegemon, Castro nationalized all foreign-owned property, United States-owned property in particular, and in 1961, he also nationalized all property owned by religious organizations. Williams (1975) concludes that such radical reforms are most common in countries with similar economic and political structures, or with like problems, often newly independent countries. Even in Europe, small states have nationalized industries to diminish external economic dependence and regain control of the domestic economy (Katzenstein, 1985). By breaking economic ties with the hegemon and lessening dependence on the hegemon, states are free to create a new, decolonized society.

Decolonization policy and indigenous peoples

Even though these economic actions may be part of the solution, they are not the whole solution because they fail to address the need for the self-determination of the oppressed, marginalized, and excluded indigenous peoples. Further action and additional policies are needed to decolonize and address the exclusion of indigenous peoples. Canada, for example, has made some progress towards decolonization and the subsequent social inclusion of indigenous peoples. Specifically, Canadian universities have been working towards an accessible postsecondary education system for Aboriginal peoples since the 1970s. However, this increased accessibility has not been complemented by a change in university curricula. Most postsecondary curricula assume that "Eurocentric knowledge represents the neutral and necessary story for 'all' of us." This assumption ignores and devalues Aboriginal knowledge and uses education as a method of

assimilating Aboriginal peoples rather than liberating them. This realization has prompted the University of Saskatchewan to explore decolonizing methodologies that will work to "restore Indigenous ecologies, consciousnesses, and languages after Eurocentric colonization and the destruction it authorized from its viral sources, and to understand how this history continues to imprison the thought and constrain the conduct of colonizer and colonized alike" (Battiste et al., 2002).

However, decolonization policy is not always limited to economic and education policy. In Latin America, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia are the few countries that have created a national agenda aimed at decolonizing the country. Each country has rewritten its constitution to reflect the multiculturalism and legal pluralism, "a plurality of continually evolving and interconnected processes enmeshed in wider power relations" of the country (Sieder, 2002). The 1991 Constitution of Colombia declares the equality of cultures and guarantees its constituents the right to cultural diversity. The 2008 Constitution of Ecuador, however, takes it one step further and explicitly promotes the rights of indigenous peoples, and the 2009 Constitution of Bolivia takes it even another step further to include plural educational rights (Gargarella, 2014; Hayes, 2017).

Social inclusion

The discussion of decolonization theory and policy presented above highlights the importance of addressing the exclusion and oppression of marginalized groups. It demands that the voices of the subaltern are heard and that their practices and ideas are recovered and revalued. Therefore, the process of decolonization should lead to greater social inclusion of indigenous peoples. The World Bank (2013) defines social inclusion as "the process of improving the terms on which individuals and groups take part in society—improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of those disadvantaged on the basis of their identity." Oftentimes, individuals make the mistake of only looking at the poverty of indigenous peoples. While poverty is certainly an important criterion, it is not the only measure of well-being nor is it the only indicator of social inclusion. Fortunately, in recent years, the World Bank has been a major advocate for social inclusion, dividing the concept into three domains: markets, services, and spaces (see Table 1). The World Bank recognizes that policies and programs have the potential to address more than one domain. Exclusion in one domain can cause or reinforce exclusion in

another domain. Therefore, social inclusion requires not one policy or program, but a sequence of interventions.

Table 1: Policies and programs that address social inclusion (World Bank, 2013).

DOMAIN OF INCLUSION	**INSTRUMENT/INTERVENTION**
Markets	
Land	Titling of land Establishment of gender parity in inheritance laws Redistribution through land reforms Dissemination of information about land rights to excluded groups Accommodation of communal land patterns
Housing	Housing projects for slum dwellers, the poorest, people with disabilities, and migrants
Labor	Affirmative action/quotas Training on employability skills Short-term wage subsidies to firms Enforcement of anti-discrimination laws Maternity, paternity, and child-care benefits Coaching and mentoring for youth from excluded groups
Financial	Preferential credit Mobile phone banking
Services	
Health	Conditional cash transfers Subsidized health insurance Integration of cultural norms and values of the excluded into service delivery Raising awareness on HIV/AIDS in infrastructure projects Transport vouchers

Education	Affirmative action/quotas Tuition and other cost exemptions Multicultural curriculum Teacher training in inclusive education Bilingual/alternative teaching Accessible teaching methods and flexible curriculum
Information/information and communications technology (ICT)	Distance/online learning for the excluded Use of ICT to disseminate information on inputs and prices Mobile phone applications to monitor outcomes and perceptions
Social protection	Social pensions Disability pensions
Water and sanitation	Separate toilets for girls in schools Assurance of women's access to irrigated land and water
Infrastructure	Women-only transport services Accessible transport, buildings, and curb cuts for people with disabilities Improvement of safety through street lighting, pedestrian walkways, and crossings Involvement of communities in maintenance of local infrastructure, disaster management, and environmental planning and conservation
Spaces	
Physical	Establishment of safety in public places Training on gender-based violence (and recourse to it), including separate training for men and women to reduce gender-based violence Reservation of spaces in markets
Cultural	Recognition of multiple languages, customs
Social	Institutionalization of different forms of family life, such as same-sex marriages

	Information campaigns to change stereotypes Passage of anti-discrimination laws Raising awareness among excluded/stigmatized groups/individuals about their rights Advocacy by public figures on behalf of stigmatized groups/individuals Fostering of critical thinking by general public or stakeholders whose discriminatory behavior is particularly harmful, such as health care providers, police, the judiciary, journalists, and educators Promotion of interaction between excluded and non-excluded groups Public celebrations of heroes of oppressed; building of memorials Official apologies Arts and culture
Political	Affirmative action/quotas Counting in official statistics
Institutional	Separate entities of enforcement

While the World Bank is a good starting point for addressing social inclusion, it is important to note that social inclusion is not synonymous with assimilation. Indigenous peoples should not have to abandon their own beliefs, customs, and traditions to gain access to the markets, services, and spaces available to the dominant group(s). Corntassel (2012) warns against this "illusion for inclusion." Social inclusion within a colonial system often mobilizes an indigenous rights discourse to produce political and economic "solutions" rather than "sustainable, spiritual foundations," and likely pushes "the energies of transnational Indigenous networks into the institutional fiefdoms of member countries" (Corntassel, 2012).

Contribution to the literature

In this sense, true social inclusion can only be achieved through decolonization. Therefore, this study will operationalize decolonization as a means of undoing the discriminatory and exclusionary legacies of colonialism, in turn, increasing social inclusion for indigenous

peoples. Even though studies have been conducted on the Morales administration and its policies, there are still gaps in the literature. This comprehensive study of the "decolonizing" policies of the Evo Morales administration seeks to fill one of those gaps, addressing the claim that this administration has not fully addressed the colonial state but instead promoted it (Johnson, 2002). To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies that examine the effect(s) of the Evo Morales administration on the social inclusion of indigenous peoples in Bolivia.

Therefore, the primary objective of this thesis is to analyze the efforts made by the Evo Morales administration to decolonize Bolivia and their effects. It is important to note that no other government has placed decolonization at the center of its national agenda to the same extent as Bolivia. Despite the fact that many countries are still suffering the consequences of their colonial history, outside of Bolivia, the discussion of decolonization is primarily limited to decolonization theory and the wars for independence. Globally, many indigenous communities are employing a discourse of decolonization to challenge oppression, exclusion, and marginalization. However, in the case of Bolivia, the government itself has applied this discourse. This has led me to wonder whether or not the indigenous peoples of Bolivia are actually better off under the Evo Morales administration and to formulate the following research question: How should one measure the influence of the Evo Morales administration's "decolonizing" policies on the social inclusion of indigenous peoples? Unfortunately, I currently lack the resources to explicitly measure the impact of these policies on the social inclusion of indigenous peoples. Instead, this research aims to bring existing literature and data into conversation with one another and lay the groundwork for future impact evaluations.

METHODOLOGY

Methods

In order to answer my research question, I will analyze *la nacionalización de los hidrocarburos, la ley de reconducción comunitaria de la reforma agraria, el plan nacional de desarrollo*, *la ley de la educación*, *la ley de deslinde*, *la ley marco de autonomías,* and *TIPNIS*. According to the Evo Morales administration, all of its domestic policies aim to contribute to the government's overarching goal of decolonization. These are nearly all the major policies of the Evo Morales administration, with the exception of his coca policy, which I have omitted from

this study because it is a topic in and of itself. Additionally, the policies I have selected often specifically target the self-determination and social inclusion of indigenous peoples. Within the national development plan, I focus my analysis on the *Bolivia Digna* strategy and its *Bono Juana Azurduy* and *Bono Juancito Pinto* because, of the four strategies, this strategy most specifically targets social inclusion. In addition to the policies themselves, I will examine the existing literature on decolonization theory, studies and reports conducted by other scholars on some of these policies, the existing literature on social inclusion, and the relevant data available in Bolivia for measuring the social inclusion of indigenous peoples.

Analysis

My analysis is two-fold: evaluating decolonization policy and unpacking social inclusion. First, I will employ the decolonization theories discussed in my literature review to evaluate whether and how the Morales administration's decolonization policies improve social inclusion for indigenous peoples in Bolivia. A decolonizing policy is one that works to undo the colonial legacies that continue to marginalize indigenous peoples, establishing indigenous self-determination and autonomy and increasing social inclusion for indigenous peoples. While there are few studies, there are scholars that have studied some of the decolonization policies of the Evo Morales administration. Therefore, I will also incorporate the previous findings of Albó, Drange, Hilborn, Johnson, Marco-Navarro, McNeish, Molyneux and Thompson, and Shoaei into my own analysis of these policies.

Second, when available, I will discuss the literature that examines the impacts of some of his administration's policies and their contribution, or lack thereof, to the social inclusion of indigenous peoples, an expressed goal of the administration's policies. Given the multidimensional nature of social inclusion, the measurement of the social inclusion of indigenous peoples is a considerably difficult task. It requires a thorough investigation of the services (social protection, information, electricity, transport, education, health, water), markets (land, housing, labor, credit), and spaces (political, physical, cultural, social) that are accessible for the indigenous peoples of Bolivia (World Bank, 2013). Unfortunately, much of this data is currently nonexistent or inaccessible. For starters, the Bolivian census does not separate the indigenous and nonindigenous populations but instead separates the rural and urban populations.

While many studies have used rural as a substitute for indigenous and urban as a substitute for nonindigenous, the "rapid urbanization" of indigenous peoples in recent years has outdated this technique (Gigler, 2009). As a result, my findings will rely primarily on qualitative forms of data to discuss what we should see, the data that does exist, and why and how this could be a result of decolonization policy.

Limitations

I was unable to conduct research in Bolivia on this specific question, given limited resources. However, I draw extensively from my experiences living and studying in Bolivia with the School for International Training in Spring 2017 and use the insights I gathered from conversations and observations to connect the relevant bodies of literature and existing data. Given the difficult nature of studying this topic, my findings are highly dependent on my approach, on how I have defined decolonization and social inclusion, and the information that is accessible to me. I expect to find that even though there are benefits to decolonization policy, not all policies are as decolonizing as the rhetoric of the current administration suggests and, while the social inclusion of indigenous peoples has improved, there is still significant progress to be made. In my discussion of these policies and concepts, I hope to bring to light the relevance and benefit of future study.

THE MORALES ADMINISTRATION

In order to fully appreciate the Morales administration's policies, more context is needed. Evo Morales of the MAS was first elected in 2005 with a historic 54 percent of the popular vote. The MAS is generally associated with the harder left, or the "pink tide," like the governments of Venezuela and Cuba. During his first term as president, in addition to rewriting the constitution, Morales implemented several economic programs and social reforms. Morales was then reelected in 2009 with 64 percent of the popular vote (Webber, 2011). Later, in 2013, he asked the constitutional court to allow him to bypass the two-term limit. The court allowed it because he served his first term before the new Constitution of 2009. In 2016, Morales called for a referendum that would allow him to run for a fourth term. However, 51 percent of voters rejected the amendment. Determined to run again, Morales brought the case to the constitutional court, which concluded in November 2017 that the term limit discriminates against the president.

Supposedly, denying a person the right to be elected is a violation of human rights (Vivanco and Pappier, 2017). Thus, making Morales eligible for yet another term in office. In light of this, the following section aims to establish the events that brought about the first indigenous president of Bolivia and his administration's stance on decolonization.

The rise of Evo Morales and the MAS

The frequent exploitation of indigenous peoples in Bolivia often provoked indigenous-led protests that paved the way for the election of the first indigenous president. Most significantly, the Water War of 2000 and the Gas War of 2003 forced former President Sánchez Losada to resign from the presidency. The Water War was sparked by the government's decision to privatize Cochabamba's public and communal water source and sell them to the U.S. multinational corporation, Bechtel. This decision led to an unaffordable increase in the price of water and brought about a massive, three-month long mobilization, largely organized by the indigenous Quechua population, that eventually prompted the government to abandon its plan to privatize the water source. A few years later, the Sánchez Losada government made a second attempt at privatization, trying to open the gas industry to foreign participation. The government's intentions to sell Bolivian gas to transatlantic markets and build a pipeline through the Andes to Chile prompted the Gas War. Again, a massive protest ensued, primarily led by the indigenous population. The government's response to the protests was often violent and included the massacre of indigenous peoples in Warisata, the center of the Aymara altiplano and the killing of many unarmed protesters, blocking the road from El Alto to La Paz. The subsequent fall of Sánchez Losada in 2003 was followed by the brief presidencies of Carlos Mesa and Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé. In hopes of putting an end to massive indigenous protests, on December 18, 2005, Evo Morales was elected president and the MAS won over 12 of the 27 senate seats and 72 of the 130 deputy positions (Klein, 2011). Upon inheriting an extremely unequal society, the Evo Morales administration set out to carry out a radical transformation.

La nueva constitución del estado plurinacional de Bolivia

In 2009, the Bolivian Constitution was rewritten to reflect the multiethnic character of the country. Before the election of Evo Morales, there had been long and large, nationwide protests pressing for a new constitution to re-found Bolivia. The most prominent voice was the Unity

Pact, a coalition of indigenous organizations that demanded that the constitution decolonize and "radically alter the structure and system of the state towards a system called 'plurinationalism'" (Hilborn, 2014). When finally rewritten, the constitution was intended to reflect the interculturality of the country and represent the ethics of indigenous communities. Additionally, the state pledged to protect *pachamama* (Mother Earth), to protect the environment. It also guaranteed to protect traditional cultures, to respect and promote traditional cosmology, medicine, rituals, symbols, and dress, to allow indigenous communities to operate according to their own political, judicial, and economic systems, and to implement a plurilingual education system (Klein, 2011). However, even though the constitution has been widely praised for its "recognition of the precolonial existence of the *indígena*, *originario*, *campesino* (IOC) nations and peoples, the official re-designation of the state as 'plurinational' and openings towards juridical pluralism," altered much of the Unity Pact's vision for the Constitution. Even though it did promote the concept of indigenous autonomy, certain measures of central state control were reintroduced into the Constitution and the ability to recover and reconstruct precolonial territories was restricted (Hilborn, 2014).

El viceministerio de descolonización

In the same year, Evo Morales founded the Vice-Ministry of Decolonization (VMD), which operates as a branch within the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. In essence, the purpose of the VMD is to promote decolonization in Bolivia. In addition to organizing traditional ceremonies and events, the VMD also releases publications on the topic of decolonization and depatriarchalization, speaks on the threat of capitalism and United States imperialism, carries out projects intended to support decolonization, and works with other ministries to systematically promote decolonization. The VMD most closely represents the administrations perspective on decolonization, explaining it as, "a process of recuperating indigenous values and culture while removing negative aspects of colonial culture," an alternative to modernity. However, many of the VMD's projects, celebrations, and traditions are "state orchestrations of indigenous culture" that do not take into account the pre-existing indigenous practices. Despite the plurinational identity of Bolivia, a nation of 37 recognized indigenous cultures, the VMD tends to homogenize indigenous culture, advocating for a single Bolivian society and marking indigenous autonomy as a threat to central authority. Overall, the VMD appears to advocate for "the consolidation of a

strong and centralized 'indigenous state' founded on an abstract and imagined sense of indigenous culture" (Hilborn, 2014).

FINDINGS

Morales and the MAS came to power after the Water War and Gas War, a period of intense exclusion and exploitation of the indigenous population. Therefore, the same psychopathology that Fanon describes in *Black Skin, White Masks* can be applied to the indigenous peoples of Bolivia, who were regularly associated with backwardness and barbarianism and continuously silenced and repressed. As a result, the decolonization of the Bolivian state calls for the creation of a new people, free from submission and inferiority. It also calls for the inclusion of indigenous voices. In many ways, Morales, the first indigenous president of Bolivia, is an example of the subaltern speaking. As described above, Bolivia's new constitution and new VMD most closely represent the Morales administration's goals with regards to decolonization. While the MAS does advocate for indigenous rights, the social inclusion of indigenous peoples, and a new, decolonized, inclusive society, not all parts of the Constitution nor all facets of the VMD reflect this mission. The following discussion of many of the Morales administration's domestic policies and their effects on the social inclusion of indigenous peoples also reflects this pattern of inconsistency.

La nacionalización de los hidrocarburos

On May 1, 2006, shortly after his historic election, Morales nationalized the hydrocarbon industry, making *Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos* (Bolivian Fiscal Petroliferous Deposits, YPFB) the official Bolivian state owned oil company, and the only company that could control claims. This reform declared the oil reserves the property of Bolivia and, therefore, excluded transnational companies from their previously greater shares of profits. This reform was also followed by the nationalization of other industries. As a result, the state's profits from the mining and hydrocarbon industries grew from $250 million in 2006 to over $2 billion in 2008 (Shoaei, 2012). This policy reflects the VMD's emphasis on the threat of global capitalism and United States imperialism to decolonization efforts. In nationalizing its industries, the Bolivian government attempted to separate itself from the regional hegemon. This practice, rooted in dependency theory, aimed to liberate Bolivia economically. However, while an important step

towards ending neoliberalism and foreign domination, the nationalization of industries did not directly address the problem of social exclusion of indigenous peoples in Bolivia. Nevertheless, the profits are said to have helped finance social programs that would diminish social exclusion (see Figure 1).



Figure 1: Oil revenue in Bolivia (in millions of US dollars) (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2016).

La ley de reconducción comunitaria de la reforma agraria

Land reform was one of the more popular consequences of the nationalization of industries in Bolivia. During the month of September, 2016, in an attempt to reconcile centuries of discrimination and exclusion of indigenous peoples, Morales implemented a land reform act to redistribute land to the "poor" and indigenous peoples. Over 200,000 square kilometers of land were redistributed to the poor. While this reform was first implemented in 2006, it was later incorporated into the new constitution of 2009. During this three-year span, approximately 23 million hectares of land were redistributed (Shoaei, 2012). In terms of social inclusion, access to land is a notable achievement, particularly in many indigenous communities, where the land is

often cultivated and farmed and serves as a source of livelihood. It is expected to create opportunity and enhance dignity for indigenous peoples. Therefore, this land reform should result in a measurable improvement in the well-being of indigenous peoples.

The World Bank (2013) recognizes land reform as an appropriate intervention for addressing social inclusion, one that often results in a decline in exclusion and inequality. However, it also acknowledges that land reform is not a cure-all solution for exclusion and inequality; additional interventions are likely necessary. For example, in Brazil, while land reforms increased access to land for the poor, "outside settlers," these new settlers faced opposition from the land's former inhabitants, who challenged the legitimacy and economic stability of their use of the land (Lindemann, 2010). Additionally, in West Bengal, only households that also invested in inputs like seeds and technology experienced observable gains from the land reforms (Deininger et al., 2009).

Regardless, in order to evaluate progress towards social inclusion, it is also necessary to question whether or not land reform is decolonizing. Since their lands were illegitimately seized during colonization, one could argue that decolonization demands that all land be placed under the control of indigenous peoples. Today, redistributing all Bolivian land does not appear realistic. Instead, indigenous peoples likely need to settle for recognition. Therefore, land reform, though insufficient alone, is a positive step towards both decolonizing the state and increasing social inclusion for indigenous peoples.

El plan nacional de desarrollo

Issued six months into his presidency, *el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo: Bolivia Digna, Soberana, Productiva y Democrática para la construcción del Vivir Bien* is the first official social development strategy of the Evo Morales administration. Bolivia has a long history of both colonialism and neoliberalism and a more recent history of external colonialism, domination by powerful countries and international and transnational corporations, that has promoted poverty, inequality, exclusion, and dependency. This plan aimed to begin the process of dismantling colonialism and neoliberalism and creating a new society, a plurinational, communal state. As its name suggests, the *plan nacional de desarrollo* consisted of four strategies: the "socio-communitarian" strategy (*Bolivia Digna*), the sovereign international

relations strategy (*Bolivia Soberana*), the economic strategy (*Bolivia Productiva*), which includes the *nacionalización de los hidrocarburos* and the *ley de reconducción comunitaria de la reforma agraria,* and the "social power" strategy (*Bolivia Democrática*). Each strategy shared a common goal of incorporating Bolivia's cultural identity, the knowledge of their ancestors, and technological advancement to create a new society and eradicate poverty and social exclusion (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2006; Johnson, 2009).

At first glance, the national development plan seems to be making important strides towards decolonization. The concept of *vivir bien*, or living well, provides a foundation for the plan. *Vivir bien*, "a philosophy that values life, seeks balance with oneself, and with others, seeks for both individual and collective living well, promoting the respect and harmonious coexistence between human beings and nature," is a traditional indigenous philosophy that the administration has defined as an alternative to capitalism and modernity (Plan de desarrollo económico y social, 2016). The administration's decision to work towards a new paradigm of balance, one that blends the most positive aspects of traditional and modern society, is supported by most political decolonization theory. Kohn and McBride (2011) conclude that:

> In order to legitimize a break with the past and a vision of the future, founders must act in the name of a people that does not yet exist. They must turn either to the past or to the future in order to perform a kind of alchemy, that of transforming people into *a* people. Both strategies entail certain dangers. Relying on an imagined community from the precolonial past naturalizes the people and may end up justifying parochialism and exclusion. Founding a polity for the new man may justify the pursuit of certain collective goods at the expense of original freedom.

In working towards a new paradigm, the Bolivian government is working "in the name of a people that does not yet exist." Kohn and McBride argue that the nation must either return to the past or work towards the future for transformation. As Bolivia is working to return to its precolonial, indigenous roots without abandoning the advances of modern technology, the country seems to be blending the past with the future. Since colonial legacies manifest in much of modern society, this approach is also wrought with "certain dangers."

With this in mind, the following analysis of the development plan will focus on the *Bolivia Digna* strategy, the strategy that most closely sought to, "[eradicate] poverty, all forms of

exclusion, marginalization, and social, political, cultural, and economic exploitation; in addition to generating a pattern of distributing income, wealth, and opportunities" (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2006, my translation). *Bolivia Digna* included conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs like the *Bono Juancito Pinto* and the *Bono Juana Azurduy*, intended to help the country create a new, socially inclusive society. From 2006 to 2014, MAS argues that there has been an observed reduction in infant and maternal mortality rates and school dropouts because of the *Bono Juana Azurduy* and *Bono Juancito Pinto*, respectively.

While this sounds effective, upon closer examination, under the lens of decolonization, the impact of the *Bono Juana Azurduy* becomes more complicated. In 2009, the Evo Morales administration implemented this *bono*, giving women a total of approximately $261 USD if they attend prenatal checkups during pregnancy, give birth in a state medical facility, and bring their child to medical checkups until age two (Johnson, 2009). The *bono* is believed to have benefited 765,000 children and 523,000 pregnant women from 2009 to 2014 (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2016). It also established "waiting houses" that provide women living in faraway communities with a place to stay close to the hospital before they give birth. However, these are often unpopular because they require women to leave their home, their family, and their responsibilities. Even progressive healthcare and development workers have criticized the *bono*, labeling it as a "step backward towards mercantilism and dependency from long-standing efforts by social movements and progressive NGOs to raise awareness and empower women with regard to health knowledge and health-seeking behavior" (Johnson, 2009). In fact, many of the conditions violate women's sexual and reproductive rights. The *bono* attempts to inflict birth spacing, requiring that beneficiaries wait two years before claiming a second transfer. If they become pregnant during that two-year period, they are not eligible for the *bono*. Additionally, if a woman miscarries or aborts, she cannot apply for a transfer for an additional three years. The government assures that these requirements are in the best interest of a women's health. However, most women agree that they are being unjustly penalized. These restrictions are likely a reflection of the fact that women's agencies were left out of the decision making process (Molyneux and Thompson, 2011).

The *bono*'s failure to accommodate traditional indigenous medicinal practices and its ability to incentivize the abandonment of these practices is even more problematic for

decolonization. While the increased accessibility of western medicine in indigenous communities might lead to a decrease in the infant mortality rate, the financial relief of the *bono* also pressures the colonized to abandon their customary practices and adopt those of their colonizers. In many indigenous communities, it is tradition for the mother to give birth in her home. Indigenous women, skeptical of western medicine, place their trust in midwives and traditional herbal medicines. With that said, the *bono* does permit certain traditional practices. Women are allowed to use traditional herbal medicines, give birth in the standing position, and have a close relative present. However, these concessions and accommodations are not sufficient. Many indigenous women still prefer to give birth at home with the assistance of a midwife and, although the bono does not explicitly require hospital births, participants can be "temporarily suspended" from the program if they give birth at home (Molyneux and Thompson, 2011). In sum, if the Morales administration were truly committed to the recovery of indigenous traditions, it would not implement a policy that incentivized the abandonment of their traditions.

While the Evo Morales administration affirms that the *bono* has led to greater social inclusion, these issues suggest that their true impact is not clear and requires more explicit measurement. Additionally, the *bono* demands greater questioning: can the Bolivian government simultaneously increase access to western medicine and promote traditional medicinal practices? In effect, how can the Morales administration effectively blend traditional and modern society to create a new, decolonized society? Also, and perhaps most importantly, what do the indigenous beneficiaries themselves think of the *bono*?

As it turns out, previous studies focused on the implementation of this *bono* have actually uncovered that the majority of the criticism comes from the recipients themselves. Many indigenous women have not been treated with respect because of their identity and socio-economic status, citing language barriers as a source of discrimination. Additionally, the indigenous beneficiaries have been labeled as lazy and have been accused of having children for the sole purpose of receiving the cash transfer. Women have even reported that their homes and clothes have been inspected. If it appears that their standard of living has increased, they have been threatened with loss of the bono (Molyneux and Thompson, 2011). While an increase in access to health services may be an important step towards social inclusion, this step is likely discounted due to the increase in discrimination.

El *Bono Juancito Pinto* is another conditional cash transfer that was implemented in 2006 with the funds from the hydrocarbon industry. The *bono* distributes $28 USD a year for children in primary school with the intent of keeping more children in school. While this *bono* does not make any specific efforts to decolonize, it is intended to increase social inclusion by increasing access to education for indigenous peoples. In fact, the World Bank (2013) considers conditional cash transfers an intervention capable of addressing many domains of social inclusion. Additionally, the Bolivian government cites that between 2006 and 2014, the number of children and adolescents that benefited from the bono increased from 1,084,967 to 2,132,393 (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2016).



Figure 2: School dropout rates in Bolivia, 1997 – 2014 (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2016).

While the Morales administration affirms that the *bono* has had a large, positive impact, especially with regards to the dropout rate (see Figure 2), different studies have drawn varying conclusions. Marco-Navarro (2012) found evidence that the policy reduced school dropouts and

increased school attendance. Additionally, he concluded that the graduation rate has seen stark increases with little difference in regard to gender and urban vs. rural populations. Recently, García and Saavedra (2017) conducted a meta-analysis of conditional cash transfers in the developing world, which concluded that there was no statistically significant increase in school enrollment. Regardless of the impact of the bono, the quality of public education is still a major issue. Even if the *bono* increases access to education, it does not address the quality of the education. The more pressing question is whether or not the education system itself is decolonizing and inclusive.

La ley de la educación

Although its effectiveness is not cut and dry, the education law seeks to tackle what the *Bono Juancito Pinto* cannot address, the quality of education in Bolivia. In fact, the law was intended to establish an "originary indigenous education," a transition towards "socio-cultural, territorial, political and ideological self-determination" (Howard, 2009). It attempts to replace the colonizing, out-of-touch-with-reality, and individualistic education system with a decolonizing, depatriarchalizing, productive, and "socio-comunitarian" one. It also emphasizes interculturality, the "interrelation" and interaction of the knowledge, expertise, and technology of each culture with other cultures. Interculturality is dependent on the notion that no culture is superior to another culture. It emphasizes the recuperation, strengthening, and development of indigenous cultures and, in turn, promotes equality, solidarity, complementarity, reciprocity, and justice (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2010).

Additionally, this policy incorporates decolonization's call for the recovery of indigenous languages. The *ley de la educación* places the use and promotion of indigenous languages at the forefront of the policy, creating the *Instituto Plurinacional de Estudio de Lenguas y Culturas* (Plurinational Institute of Languages and Cultures). According to the law, in monolingual communities, where the indigenous language is the predominant language, the primary language in the classroom should be the indigenous language and the secondary language should be Spanish. On the other hand, in monolingual communities, where the predominant language is Spanish, the primary language in the classroom should be Spanish and the secondary language should be the indigenous language of the region. In trilingual or plurilingual communities, the

indigenous language used in the classroom will be determined by specific territoriality criteria. Additionally, linguistic policies will be implemented to recuperate endangered languages (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2010).

The implementation of a regionalized curriculum further addresses the recovery of indigenous traditions and histories custom to decolonization. Previously, the Bolivian education system prepared its children to live in a distant, imagined world, far from the reality and context of the indigenous communities. This system inadvertently or not, encouraged its students to forget their own traditions and customs. Therefore, in an effort to address the gap between the education system and indigenous reality, the new education law mandates study plans, methodologies, and processes that will promote the cultural identity of the indigenous communities. Further, it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Education to design, approve, and implement a curriculum, taking into account the perspectives of education experts and indigenous voices, that is based in the plurinationality of Bolivia and preserves its "harmony and complementarity." However, the law also permits the indigenous communities and nations to develop their own community education processes in agreement with the productive activities of the community, which, in essence, promotes indigenous self-determination (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2010).

Furthermore, the *ley de la educación* is not limited to primary and secondary education, but also addresses the decolonization of the country's universities. The establishment of three indigenous universities, one Aymara, one Quechua, and one Guaraní, in 2009, is particularly significant. The law states that these undergraduate and graduate academic institutions are centers for professional development, research, and innovation. From an "academic, scientific, communitarian, and productive space," these universities also aim to recover, strengthen, and foster indigenous languages and knowledge (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2010, my translation). Based on a visit to the Universidad Indígena Boliviana Aymara "Tupac Katari," it is evident that their curriculum is rooted in Aymaran values and designed not as a means of escape from the students' impoverished, excluded communities but as a method of promoting productive and meaningful returns to their indigenous communities.

In many ways, the *ley de la educación* is a model for decolonization policy. Its promotion of indigenous cultures, beliefs, traditions, values, and languages is strongly supported by decolonization theory. However, what still requires investigation, is the implementation of the policy. Unfortunately, this is not a simple task. It would require a thorough examination of the curriculum and extensive classroom observation. Current research, while limited, suggests that the policy has yet to be implemented in all parts of the education system and many teachers have not yet been trained on the new policies and how they should be implemented. However, evaluations suggest that when implemented, the new policy has had a positive impact on interculturality: indigenous students have improved their knowledge of their mother tongues and cultures and have increased their self-esteems (Drange, 2012). If successful, the *ley de la educación* could be the most influential decolonization policy of the administration. Given the power of education, if implemented correctly, a decolonial education is likely the most effective tool to decolonize the mind. Hopefully, it would lead the next generation of thinkers to implement more progressive and inclusive policies.

La ley de deslinde y la ley marco de autonomías

Despite the education law's ability to promote indigeneity, the Morales administration has also implemented policies that limit the rights of indigenous peoples, taking several steps backwards with regards to achieving social inclusion. For one, the *ley de deslinde* is generally considered unconstitutional because it limits the practice of indigenous justice. While Article 2 of the constitution supposedly granted IOC communities the right to their own forms of government and justice, this right was later limited to territories that had acquired *Autonomía Indígena Origenario Campesino* (Indigenous Originary Peasant Autonomy, AIOC) status. At the time, no communities had been granted this status and this new piece of legislation, rightfully, caused anger among many indigenous communities (Hilborn, 2014). In 2010, in their address to the senate, indigenous deputies stated, "To fail to acknowledge our capacity to be self-governed and to exercise our own political and legal systems (Art. 30-14, CPE) is to assume that our peoples lack the seriousness of ordinary justice, that we would not have sufficient maturity for it, as if we were minors. This would imply discrimination and even a form of racism" (Albó, 2012, my translation). By limiting indigenous autonomy, the Morales administration is upholding colonial practices, and further excluding indigenous communities.

Likewise, the *ley marco de autonomías*, the framework for indigenous autonomy and the establishment of AIOC territories, has received plenty of criticism for contradicting the constitution and returning to colonial practices. First, AIOC status is limited to communities that are already recognized as a municipality or a *Territorio Indígena Originario Campesino* (Indigenous, Originary, Peasant Territory, TIOC) by the state. Second, the application process consists of "onerous conditions and bureaucratic requirements." This long and slow process suggests that the MAS, in reality, is not committed to increasing the number of indigenous autonomies. Third, the state is heavily involved in the definition of the organizational structure of indigenous autonomies, making it difficult for the AIOCs to stray from the municipal structure and nearly defeating the purpose of indigenous autonomy (Hilborn, 2014). In restricting the self-determination and autonomy of indigenous communities, these policies blatantly contradict the administration's efforts to decolonize and serve to further oppress indigenous peoples.

TIPNIS

Regardless, these "decolonizing" policies, flawed or not, will never be enough to achieve decolonization and social inclusion if the government continues to silence and exploit indigenous peoples. The recent TIPNIS controversy, in particular, highlights the break between the current administration's rhetoric and practice. While TIPNIS also exemplifies the contradictions within its environmental discourse, this study will focus on the contradictions within its indigenous discourse. In 2011, the Bolivian government announced that it would be constructing a highway through the Isoboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS), home to many indigenous communities. This announcement led thousands of indigenous community members to mobilize, and march in protest for almost two months to the nation's capital, La Paz. Unfortunately, in September of 2011, indigenous protestors were brutally raided by the police outside of Yucumo. This incident at Chaparina was the first significant crisis of public confidence in the Evo Morales administration. In attempting to repress and silence the demands of the indigenous peoples, the Bolivian government contradicted its efforts to decolonize the state, hear indigenous voices, and promote indigenous rights (McNeish, 2013). The outcry that followed the massacre at Chaparina forced the government to cancel its plans to build a road and, instead granted TIPNIS a new, protected status, preventing invasive building projects. However,

six years later, on August 13, 2017, President Evo Morales revoked the park's protected status, allowing for the highway to be constructed after all.

While this incident may be the most glaring contradiction of the Morales administration, it is not the only one. Many of the Morales administration's other policies are also wrought with contradictions, in particular, the *Bono Juana Azurduy*, the *ley de deslinde*, and the *ley de marco autonomías*. In an effort to decrease the infant and maternal mortality rates, the *Bono Juana Azurduy* violates women's sexual and reproductive rights, fails to properly accommodate traditional indigenous medicinal practices, and increases discrimination. This *bono*'s ability to incentivize the abandonment of traditional indigenous medicinal practices especially highlights the important difference between inclusion and assimilation. Additionally, despite the administration's pro-indigenous rights discourse, the *ley de deslinde* and the *ley de marco autonomías* clearly limit indigenous justice and autonomy.

The other policies examined have fewer contradictions, but future study is still required to understand their effectiveness. Despite the fact that the *nacionalización de los hidrocarburos* and the *ley de reconducción comunitaria de la reforma agraria* do not appear as controversial, these reforms alone are not enough to decolonize the state nor end the social exclusion of indigenous peoples. The exclusion of indigenous peoples is much more systematic and requires an approach that tackles more than just access to land. Even though the decolonization of the education system has the potential to significantly improve the social inclusion of indigenous peoples, more study is required to truly understand the impact of the *Bono Juancito Pinto* and the *ley de la educación*. While the *Bono Juancito Pinto* does not have any glaring issues, its effectiveness is questionable. Of all the policies, the *ley de la educación* appears to be making the most progress towards decolonization and social inclusion, but little is actually known about its implementation.

CONCLUSION

Even though these contradictions may prevent Bolivia from fulfilling its process of decolonization, there are still lessons to be learned from the Morales administration's decolonization policies. Mainly, this study highlights the importance of including all voices in policy-making decisions. While Morales may identify as indigenous himself, he cannot speak for

all indigenous peoples if he does not take the time to listen to them. For example, the administration did not take the time to understand the position of indigenous women before implementing the *Bono Juana Azurduy*. Had the administration given these women a platform, the *bono* could have yielded a much more favorable solution. Additionally, as seen in the recent TIPNIS controversy, the Morales administration's policies will never be enough to achieve decolonization and social inclusion if the government continues to exploit and silence indigenous peoples.

The current effects of Morales administration's policies on the social inclusion of indigenous peoples may be disappointing, but that should not signal the abandonment of decolonization policy as a viable means of achieving decolonization and social inclusion. Scholars suggest that decolonization policy has the potential to evoke radical change. Unfortunately, in the case of Bolivia, not all policies are as decolonizing as the rhetoric of the current administration suggests. Therefore, even though some findings seem to suggest that the social inclusion of indigenous peoples in Bolivia has improved, there is still progress to be made, and it cannot happen without increased, authentic decolonization efforts.

Since many of their policies are not fully decolonizing, the Evo Morales administration's policies may not be proof of the intrinsic relationship between decolonization policy and social inclusion. Regardless, these conclusions are dependent on future research. This study begs the following questions: Can a state decolonize itself? If it cannot, who can? Is the problem state involvement or the inconsistencies and controversies of this state? Although it may currently appear that the problem is the inconsistencies and controversies of the Morales administration, future research is needed to confirm this. If decolonization policy is not a viable method of decolonizing, is Fanon right? Does the creation of a new, decolonial society require violence? The Morales administration might not be *the* model for decolonization policy but, for now, that does not indicate that decolonization policy is not a viable method of decolonizing. My hope is that this study will prompt future research into the implementation of some of these policies. Many of the Morales administration's policies could benefit from thorough impact evaluations, especially ones that focus on the social inclusion of indigenous peoples.

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