ASIA PACIFIC perspectives

a publication of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies

Volume 13, Number 1: Spring/Summer 2015
Guest Editor’s Introduction

Articles

Protestant Funeral Processions in Southeast China: From Gangnam Style to Overt Evangelization

Chris White 5

Using Geospatial Data to Study the Origins of Japan’s Post-Occupation Maritime Boundaries

Thomas French 28

Paternalism and Peril: Shifting U.S. Racial Perceptions of the Japanese and Chinese Peoples from World War II to the Early Cold War

Brandon P. Seto 57

The TPP Debate in Japan: Reasons for a Failed Protest Campaign

Ulli Jamitzky 79

Think Piece


Pablo Figueroa 98

Graduate Student Paper

The Question of Japanese-ness: Repatriation and Guilt in Postwar Japan

Kilby Hammond 102

©2015 University of San Francisco Center for Asia Pacific Studies
Guest Editor’s Introduction

Asia Pacific Perspectives is a journal with broad vision. The interdisciplinary work highlighted in its pages considers the links between Asian states, and between the region and the world. As an international historian, I am pleased to be guest editor of an issue that maintains the expansive view which APP is known for, and that ties the present to the past.

In this issue, Chris White considers one legacy of China’s nineteenth century interaction with the West, the practice of Christianity in southern China. Drawing on his extensive fieldwork, White argues that local funeral practices strengthen and engage modern Chinese Christian communities, while also serving as a tool for proselytization. Thomas French too blends the past and present, bringing digital mapping tools to visualize historical records on fishing vessel captures in the waters of North East Asia following World War II. This approach offers a new way to evaluate the current maritime sovereignty disputes between China, Korea, and Japan.

Returning to the theme of East-West relations, Brandon Seto provides a survey of the role racism has played in American relations with China and Japan. From World War to Cold War, Seto argues, American understanding of these major Asian powers has been dominated by themes of paternalism and fear. Seto describes the fluidity with which Americans shifted between these two paradigms, as China and Japan alternated positions as allies and enemies of the United States. Ulli Jamitzky returns the focus to modern Asia, as he examines the movement within Japan against large multilateral trade deals like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). His article examines Japan’s domestic politics, with implications for the country’s future as a major trading power.

This issue also includes a Think Piece, in which cultural anthropologist Pablo Figueroa analyzes the claim of “uniqueness” in Japanese art. Considering the history of art photography in Japan, he finds that globalization and social media have a profound impact on Japanese artists today, and that their work is best understood within the context of a globalized art community.

The editors are pleased to include on our website the winner of the graduate student essay prize. Kilby Hammond, a recent graduate of the Masters in Asia Pacific Studies program at USF, has written a thoughtful essay examining the experiences of Japanese repatriates following World War II. He uses memoirs and secondary literature to explore the connections between repatriation, questions of war guilt, national identity, and memory.

We thank Jan Vaeth, who is leaving the Center for Asia Pacific Studies this month, for his dedication and work on the journal. We also thank Amanda Dzida for her efforts in web editing to bring Asia Pacific Perspectives to you, its readers.

Dayna Barnes
Guest Editor and 2014–15 Kiriyama Fellow
Center for Asia Pacific Studies
University of San Francisco
Protestant Funeral Processions in Southeast China: From Gangnam Style to Overt Evangelization

Chris White, Max Planck Institute

Abstract:
Christian funeral services and processions, replete with Christian-inspired banners and signs, church bands, and conspicuous crosses, are ways in which Protestant communities in South Fujian actively promote their faith. These events, which are often quite evangelistic, are more than simple demonstrations of faith. They are also formative because the expressions of social cohesion are meant to elevate the status of the church community or family in the eyes of society at large. This article will demonstrate that the renao (socially vibrant) atmosphere of Protestant funerals reflects how such activities are important avenues for church communities to gather and celebrate.

Key Words: Protestant, funerals, South Fujian

Introduction
“Oooh, sexy lady!” One can imagine the scene, with the music of the popular hit Gangnam Style playing in the background, the dance team in a rural village in South Fujian enthusiastically performed their “horse dance,” following the motions made famous by the South Korean pop star Psy. However, what made this event in the fall of 2013 particularly interesting is that the performers were members of the local Protestant church dance team and the performance was part of the funeral service of a departed fellow church member. Not only did church members dance at the service, but the ceremony was a “Christian funeral,” presided over by church leaders and accentuated by red crosses adorning the scene, emblazoned on clothing, musical instruments, and banners. The celebratory atmosphere, punctuated by international pop music, dance teams, a long funerary procession, and Christian paraphernalia combine for an interesting display of local customs and religious belief.

The relaxing of restrictions placed on traditional customs during the Maoist years, coupled with economic growth during the last three decades, has resulted in a resurgence of a vibrant religious life in rural South Fujian. As Kenneth Dean notes, ritual events found in this region “are not remnants of a rapidly vanishing traditional past but are instead arenas for the active negotiation of the forces of modernity.” Funerals offer a microcosm of the revival of traditional rituals and customs. Today, as before the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), funerals are celebratory affairs often involving loud music, bright colors, sumptuous banquets, lively performances, and public processions. Most funerals organized by Chinese Protestant communities follow many of these local conventions, but also appropriate such activities to reflect a distinctly Christian identity.

This article, based on personal observation and informal interviews with dozens of pastors and rural church members, will look at how Protestant communities in rural South Fujian are in the process of negotiating funeral
practices, producing ceremonies that reflect their embeddedness in the local society while simultaneously exhibiting their religious identity as Christians.\textsuperscript{2} To be sure, there are some funerary rituals that most Protestants in South Fujian refuse to do. Examples of these absent actions may include offering fruit or alcohol sacrifices for the departed, burning incense, creating an ancestral tablet for the deceased, bowing in front of the corpse (though some Protestants in areas of South Fujian may do this), or more overt contradictions such as inviting Buddhist or Daoist religious specialists to perform rituals. In fact, the conspicuous exclusion of some rituals could be thought of as a ritual itself, or as a “non-ritual.”\textsuperscript{3} However, this article will focus on what actions and rituals are present in most Protestant funerals. Specifically, the analysis here will center on the funeral procession and how Protestant communities adapt local customs common in rural areas of South Fujian.

Chinese funeral practices have long been a topic of interest for historians and anthropologists because they reflect organizational networks and social allegiance.\textsuperscript{4} In their edited volume on funerals in the Late Imperial era, James Watson and Evelyn Rawski note that “the rituals performed at marriage and at death were central to definitions of Chinese cultural identity.”\textsuperscript{5} Discussion of how the dual status of Chinese and Christian is expressed today in South Fujian funerals is an important topic because from it we can see how Chinese Protestant communities form boundaries and construct identities that both distinguish their group from other religious groups and promote their faith in a manner comprehensible to the non-Christians around them.

This article will begin with a brief history of Protestantism in the region and background on a recent funeral held in South Fujian. Next is an examination of some of the major aspects found in most Protestant funeral processions in general. Following this, we will look at specific characteristics of these events, highlighting the evangelistic, public, and celebratory natures of such processions. Overall, the discussion here shows that Protestant communities are comprised of active agents in the construction of a visible Christian identity through funerals and their processions.

**Historical Background**

As one of the first treaty ports at the end of the First Opium War, Xiamen was opened to Protestantism in 1842. Within a decade, three mission agencies had put down roots in the city, the (Dutch) Reformed Church in America (RCA), the London Missionary Society (LMS), and the Presbyterian Church of England (PCE). Soon after, the RCA and PCE churches merged and authority devolved to Chinese church members. The result was the establishment of a Chinese church independent of the missions in the 1850s.\textsuperscript{6} LMS-affiliated churches joined this union in 1920. The independence of Chinese churches in this region meant that while missionaries were influential and involved in crafting church polity on activities such as funerals, they were not arbiters and often had little control on the actual practices that Chinese Protestants performed. The expulsion of missionaries in the 1950s and the early independence of the Protestant churches in South Fujian mean that there are few vestiges of a missionary past in Christian rituals today.
Chinese Protestant funerals in the area, beginning with the first Protestant funeral in 1848, were from the outset distinctly both “Christian” and “Chinese.” The Christian and Chinese characteristics of Protestant funerals in South Fujian continued even after the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Pictures of Protestant funerals from the 1950s and early 1960s show family members in traditional Chinese mourning garments at churches and with crosses or Christian messages adorning the coffin entourages. Such overt religious displays, though, were stamped out beginning in the mid 1960s. Religious rituals, including funeral celebrations, experienced revitalization in the 1980s after the implementation of the Reform policies of Deng Xiaoping. However, it has been in the last two decades that rural Protestant groups in the area have had the ability and confidence to highlight their faith through funeral productions.

The restoration and revitalization of Christian elements to rural funerals in South Fujian can be clearly seen in the funeral of Mrs. Liu Yinglin, which will be referred to throughout the analysis below. Mrs. Liu was born in Hui’an County in 1905. Her father was of the first generation of preachers in Hui’an, a hotbed of LMS activity and Christian expansion in the late Qing Dynasty. Growing up in a Christian home, Mrs. Liu was imbued with a focus on education. She studied at a Christian girls’ high school on the small island of Gulangyu. Returning to Hui’an after graduating, she started her own church-affiliated elementary school. In the 1920s she married Zhuang Xiuting, also a graduate of Christian schools. After completing his studies at Talmage College (a mission school more like a high school), Xiuting initially served as a teacher and headmaster of church schools in Yongchun and Hui’an, then served as a preacher for various churches in Hui’an before being ordained as a pastor of the church in Wangchuan village. However, due to the land reform campaign of the early 1950s in which all rural churches were closed (at least temporarily), the couple and their family were forced to return to the Zhuang ancestral home to work the land. They lived there together until 1993 when Zhuang Xiuting passed away. The couple had 9 children and a total (at the time of Mrs. Liu’s death) of 105 descendants. The children (the eldest being 87) were preparing for the Spring Festival at the family home when Mrs. Liu, at the age of 110 years, passed away on Jan. 30, 2014. The family immediately shifted their preparations from welcoming the New Year to organizing proper funeral arrangements for the family matriarch.

**Protestant Funeral Processions**

The most public aspect of rural funerals is the procession. The main purpose of this ritual is what Watson calls the “expulsion of the coffin,” that is the transporting of the body to the burial ground. However, this act is also an opportunity for performance and to attract attention. The procession normally starts after the funeral, which is either held at a church or more commonly at the deceased’s home or ancestral hall, and terminates outside the limits of the village where the body is then transported to the crematorium.

The funeral service for Mrs. Liu was presided over by a respected local church member and was held in the courtyard of Mrs. Liu’s home (which is referred to by the family as “Canaan” [jiānān], the Old Testament name for the Israelites “promised land”) where hundreds of villagers and Christians from
churches throughout the region crammed in to witness the service (Image 1). Following the wake was the funeral procession, which departed from the family home. Depending on relational proximity to Mrs. Liu, family members were arranged and announced by the emcee according to a set order, with church friends and guests following in the procession. Mrs. Liu’s sons flanked the casket, which was carried with poles by pallbearers. Trailing the casket were elderly relatives (including some of Mrs. Liu’s daughters), most of whom were seated in the backs of pedaled tricycles. Behind these relatives were various groups of mourners, including “church bands,” as well as a church “drum team,” and then more distant relatives. At the end of the procession was a local “drum team” comprised of elderly village women followed by the final group which consisted of members of the local street committee. It is significant that these two groups, neither connected to the church, were relegated to the end of the procession, after the various church groups.

In total, there were 647 people who took part in the funeral and the whole procession stretched for over half a kilometer. The procession travelled nearly 3 miles, winding its way through narrow alleys and then traversing the length of the main village road. While there were many options for shorter, more direct paths to the destination (where the coffin was loaded into a vehicle), the funeral organizers clearly opted for a longer route in which more spectators would see the procession. At around the halfway mark, the procession stopped for about 10 minutes and water was handed out to all the mourners. In accordance with local custom, the coffin of Mr. Zhuang (originally buried in 1993), was exhumed and joined the procession for the last 50 meters, so both husband and wife entered the hearse and were taken to the crematorium together. The size of the procession made it a large event for the whole village. Dozens of spectators lined the streets or stopped to watch as the procession went by. One local resident commenting

![Image 1: The funerary wake, held in the courtyard of Mrs. Liu’s home, was attended by hundreds of guests. This photo shows some of the guests crowded around Mrs. Liu’s decorated coffin. (photo by author)]
on the pomp and circumstance of the procession remarked, “with a person like this [of this magnitude], even the emperor must give way.”

**Funeral Attire**

Today’s Christian funerals mostly follow local customs regarding vestments. The exact protocol governing appropriate funeral attire changes depending on the locality, but those familiar with a village’s traditions can clearly see the degree of relatedness to the deceased or the generational level of the participant through the clothing and accessories worn. In general, white, coarse mourning garments (often worn over normal clothes) are donned at least for the procession if not the funeral itself. In many villages in South Fujian, as was the case for Mrs. Liu’s funeral, wearing a blue mourning dress or a blue headband would indicate the male had married into the family of the deceased. In addition, all the sons and the eldest grandson wore hemp belts outside of their white robes. In this instance, all guests who drove cars were given red strips of cloth to attach to their vehicles (though the vehicles did not take part in the procession). In some districts in the region, a white sackcloth vest worn on the outside of the white mourning robe shows the direct sons of the deceased. Such local traditions are seen as natural or normal for local Chinese Protestants.

**Coffin Ornamentation**

A paper mache cover, usually decorated with red crosses and words such as “rest in the Lord” (anxi zhuhuai) commonly sits over the casket. Normally, as was the case for Mrs. Liu, a large red cross will also be placed atop this coffin cover (Image 1). Such decorative displays are made specifically for each funeral and tend to be quite colorful and eye-catching. At first glance, they are clearly Christian. What would have probably been controversial for the missionary in the early 20th century, but which seems acceptable for many church members today is that this paper mache covering (and the funeral wreaths—see more on this below) is usually burned at the end of the procession. Burning items at the end of funerals has long been a custom in South Fujian, as it is in most rural areas of China. The original reasoning was that by burning (fake) items made from paper, such as clothing, mansions, money or other necessities, the descendants were providing comfort for their departed loved ones in the afterlife. While such a practice may not seem theologically compatible with Christian belief, many Protestants in South Fujian do not dwell on such topics. Most see no contradiction in their identity as Christian and their practice of burning the paper coffin covers. The feeling of most rural Christians is probably similar to one Christian I interviewed who simply said, “What else would we do with the coffin cover?” Instead of reflecting on the story or reason behind many rituals, most participants see their actions as common or normal. In many cases, the rituals that are carried out at Protestant funerals are simply what are expected.

In this sense, Christian funerals can be understood as guided by orthopraxy, or correct action. Nearly three decades ago, Evelyn Rawski and James Watson debated whether Chinese funerary rituals were governed by orthodoxy or orthopraxy. While a full discussion of this controversy between historians and anthropologists is outside the scope of this article, it seems to me that neither
option may be suitable for Protestant funerals in South Fujian. The question most Christian communities face is not what is the correct belief or what is the correct practice, but what rituals consolidate the group and reflect the social cohesion they seek. We may understand this concern as “ortho-belonging,” or the desire to manifest correct group adherence.

The idea of “ortho-belonging” corresponds to analysis by Richard Madsen. In a recent article, Madsen argues that a major attraction to Christianity for new converts is the new forms of community the church can offer. Madsen suggests that the growth in numbers of Christians over the past three decades is due in part to the collapse of previously strong social units, such as coops or work teams. As Madsen suggests, religious adherents in China carry out ritual practices “because they want to be a part of a community of practitioners.”

Funerals in South Fujian offer tangible opportunities for Protestants to gather and generate fraternal sentiments.

Funeral Music and Objects

Bands are an integral part of funeral processions and large Protestant funerals may invite more than one band, as seen in the example of Mrs. Liu, whose funeral included five complete brass bands, all coming from different churches in the district. The arranging of bands in the procession is also significant. The band from the Chongwu Church, nearly an hour away from where Mrs. Liu lived, was given prominence in her funeral procession because of its professionalism (it was considered the “best” band) and the distance it travelled to attend the event. Many rural church congregations form brass bands specifically for weddings and funerals, but funeral processions offer the most public opportunities for expression. Similarly, rural churches that cannot maintain a band may have dance or drum teams, often consisting of middle-aged or elderly women. Church networks are employed in inviting bands or teams for funerals. Some church bands have their own vans and travel fairly large distances when requested to play at funerals. I spoke with one preacher in rural Anxi who told me that his church band had only six members, but it was important that the church kept its band because of the service it provided for funerals. Two other church leaders in different areas of South Fujian explained that their churches do not have brass bands, but for Christian funerals, they will hire the “local” or “secular” bands, but ask them to play “Christian music.” One pastor told me that the local band in his town specifically learned two Christian songs to appeal to this market.

The bands, whether Christian or not, are decked out in professional uniforms and led by a conductor. The church bands usually also include signs showing their church name and phone number and a cross. Likewise, the largest tuba and/or bass drum are often emblazoned with a large red cross and the name of the church. This was the case at Mrs. Liu’s funeral in which each church band had its own distinct uniforms and was led by a conductor with a large baton beside an attendant holding a sign with the name of the church they were representing (Images 2, 3, and 4).
Images 2, 3, and 4: The photo on the top shows the Chongwou Church band, the most professional of the church bands in the procession, led by a prominently displayed first-place award. This band was the first in the procession and meant to welcome the casket entourage. A church band is seen in the picture on the bottom left, led by their distinctively Christian sign. Similarly, the flag in the picture on the bottom right displays a large red cross announcing the “drum team” from the Shanyao village church. (photos by author)
One of the most visible aspects of rural funerals is the colorful wreaths displayed during the wake and carried throughout the procession. Wreaths are often given (or rented) by churches in memory of the deceased and clearly state the church name on the ribbons attached to the wreath. Likewise, banners for the deceased will often refer to him/her as a Christian (or “brother/sister”) and are commonly decorated with crosses. In one recent funeral in Anxi, the pastor was asked to write the characters on the lead banner, which read “Father of Five Generations.” Clearly, the pastor is seen as a religious specialist and could be compared to a Buddhist/Daoist/Lisheng specialist who would be called upon to perform similar services. In addition, many Protestant funerals also have large evangelistic signs or pictures as part of the procession (see more on this below). Slogans such as “Forever with the Lord” or “Believe in the Lord for Eternal Life,” are prominently displayed in the processions.

The procession for Mrs. Liu was spearheaded by commemorative wreaths given by various organizations. In total, there were 36 wreaths, each one carried by a church helper wearing a festive, bright uniform. The first wreath was given by the government of a distant provincial capital where the eldest son resided, reflecting his status within the family and society. Other wreaths were sponsored by local organizations and various churches in the area. Following the wreaths was a large vertical red banner (approximately 5 meters tall—it often had to be lowered to fit under electrical wires) carried by about 8 male relatives. A cross was displayed on the top of the banner and below this read “Mother of 7 Generations” and “110 Years Old” and then below, “Mrs. Zhuang Liu Yinglin Funeral Banner” (Image 5). Two smaller flat banners followed, the first in black with a red cross and the words “Zhuang Family, Mother of 7 Generations,” and the other banner being white with a large red cross and the words “Rest in Peace in the Lord.” Both of these smaller banners were carried by women relatives (Image 6).

*Images 5 and 6: The picture on the left shows a couple of the 36 funerary wreaths, followed by the large red banner adorned with a cross. Below is the casket entourage with banners and a picture of the deceased leading the casket. (photos by author)*
Despite the misgivings of missionaries in earlier eras, portraits of the deceased are an ingrained part of Protestant funerals in South Fujian today. Depending on the village, a certain descendant will be asked to carry a picture of the deceased, usually near the head of the procession. In the case of Mrs. Liu, this picture was placed on a cart (on top of which was a large, red paper cross) with a young descendant (a great, great, great grandson, the eldest male of the most recent generation) riding behind it, but often times it is carried by a young descendant at the front of the procession. The picture is often surrounded by decorations, usually including a large red cross. Others have a Christian message or Bible verse printed directly onto the picture, which often includes the name of the departed referring to them with the Christian title “brother” (dixiong) or “sister” (jiemei) (Image 7). While Protestant families would normally not have ancestral tablets, today they keep pictures of recent ancestors. Usually only one copy of these pictures would be made and prominently displayed on the wall at the home of the deceased or of the eldest son. Instead of burning incense or placing tablets in front of these pictures, many families surround them with Christian ornaments, such as a poster of a cross or Christian calendar, or border the pictures with Christian couplets.

Image 7: This picture was carried at the head of a Protestant funeral procession in Hui’an. The top of the portrait reads “Christian Sister Zeng Shang at Rest in the Lord,” and the bottom lists the dates of birth and death.

Protestant Funeral Processions as Evangelistic

Holding a Christian funeral is a statement act—it often has significant implications that reflect the deceased’s identity and relation to the family or local society. However, such funerals are also recognized as ready occasions for a public endorsement of the faith and even as opportunities for evangelism. The son of a deceased church leader in Anxi I interviewed was happy when the pastor spoke during the wake because the villagers, most of whom were not Christians, actually listened to the message. He made the point of mentioning to me that this was significant because in many cases funerals are one of the only chances these villagers have to hear the gospel.
The preachers and pastors I spoke with throughout South Fujian repeatedly mentioned that funerals, events that deal with existential questions and offer a relatively captive audience, are very conducive to evangelization. I attended one funeral in the region in which the pastor gave what could be considered an “altar call,” challenging all those in attendance to repent and accept Jesus. Not only do religious leaders view such occasions as opportunities to proclaim one’s faith, family members also often do this. For example, the funeral wake for Mrs. Liu culminated with a speech by Zhuang Honghua, Mrs. Liu’s eldest son and clearly the family leader. Honghua began his speech by saying, “I’m a [Communist] Party member, but I’m even more a Christian.” He went on to say, “Because I’m a Christian, I can be a better Party member.” Honghua, who is the retired Vice Party Secretary of a large, provincial medical university, attributed his achievements (as a provincial model worker, previous representative to the National Congress, etc.), to his Christian upbringing. Likewise, Honghua reflected on how many descendants his mother had (105) and how many of these were university graduates (over 60) or held professor-level posts (over 20). These accomplishments were said to be a reflection of God’s blessing on the family.

The evangelistic opportunity afforded by Protestant funerals is explained in a recent instructional video produced by leaders at a rural church in Hui’an and distributed free of charge to churches throughout the region. The DVD shows how to hold an “appropriate” funeral service, offering suggestions on what to preach at services and how to evangelize through symbols and actions during funerary processions. The local church that produced the video uses 12 large signs summarizing the gospel story, from creation (with a picture of the Garden of Eden) to the birth, death, resurrection, and second coming of Christ (Image 8). The last sign ends with the proclamation, “God Only Gives You One Chance to Choose, Don’t Choose Incorrectly!!!” These signs, carried by volunteers during the funeral procession, are often displayed outside the crematorium during services held there.

*Image 8: This picture shows a Christian funeral using “gospel signs” to evangelize during the procession. (photo from huansonghuijia video)*
The video additionally presents a list of do’s and don’ts on terminology to be used throughout the service and on funerary wreaths. It explicitly notes that “during Christian funerals [homecomings], we [Christians] should use terminology appropriate for our Christian identity, so as to be a witness and glorify God.” For example, Protestants are told to not use “die” (si), either in writing or in speech, but rather “homecoming” (huaju), since the departed is in heaven. The video also suggests that the music played by church bands should be referred to as “holy music” (shengyue) and that instead of the commonly used characters “respect” (zun) or “grieve” (dao), funeral wreaths should display the characters for “praise” (zanmei) or “worship” (jingbai).

Implicit in the production of this video is the space afforded by funerals for religious proselytizing. The public spectacle of funerals couples with the delicate topic of regulating how to commemorate the death of a loved one, resulting in a legitimate opportunity for the Protestant community to express itself largely without fear of any government interference or reprisals. Most governing authorities, at least in South Fujian, would think it intolerable to restrict funerary rites. The restoration of dynamic, exuberant funeral services in rural South Fujian means that there is more latitude for local church communities to display and promote their own faith. While some areas of China continue to experience occasional restrictions on Christian activities, such as the cases of churches and crosses in Wenzhou being torn down in 2014, during my conversations throughout rural South Fujian, local state interference in funeral expressions was never mentioned as a concern of church leaders or lay believers.

In a recent conference paper on funerals in Southern China, Bram Colijn identifies Christian proselytizing at funerals with Donald Sutton’s concept of “heteroprax standardization” or “the standardizing of practices largely or wholly beyond the control of the state and without regard to its intent.” In this sense, the public and blatant evangelistic techniques employed by Christian communities in South Fujian, while in opposition to the state’s noted restrictions on proselytizing, are nonetheless common.

Recent scholarly discussion of religion, particularly Christianity, in China has moved away from a resistance and repression model that emphasizes state constraints on religious practices. The previous paradigm overemphasizes the political nature of religious belief, but is being replaced by more nuanced analyses that highlight the negotiated space that is available for religious belief and expression. Overt displays of Christian symbols or subtle evangelism at funerals do not fit the resistance-repression rubric. Actions such as hanging Christian calendars in one’s home or business, pasting Christian couplets outside one’s doors, wearing Christian jewelry, hanging a cross on a car’s rearview mirror or carrying Christian signs at a funeral are all common, normal expressions of a Christian identity that are not regulated, not political, and not thought of as “dangerous” or subversive.

Protestant Funeral Processions as Formative

The exclusivity required by Christian faith requires that some local rites are absent from Protestant ceremonies. Protestant funerals are often contentious times for they bring to the forefront the fact that Chinese Christians have made
apparent breaks with local religious beliefs and practices. Drawing this line and rejecting some customs can single Christians out for ridicule or even more overt forms of persecution. It is precisely because of the potential friction that church communities tend to unite and actively promote their religious identity on such occasions. The “non-rituals,” as well as the explicit Christian aspects of funerals create differences with local traditions, but they also create similarities within the church community. Robert Weller and Adam Seligman refer to such ways of thinking and acting as constructing “groups” and “gaps.”

For many rural Protestants in South Fujian, attending a funeral for a church member is often less about paying respect to the deceased (or even his/her family) and more about an expression of unity and communal strength. I witnessed one rural church service that announced the death of a church member and the funeral details via Powerpoint, without even listing the deceased’s name. Instead, the announcement simply called him a “brother” and asked the congregation to gather the following morning at 9:00 a.m.

In some ways, this corresponds to anthropologist Adam Chau’s ideas on the concept of “reciprocity” in preparing for and attending funerals. As Chau notes, “funerals are social events in which social debts are incurred and re-paid, gestures of sentiments are expressed and reciprocated, social ties are re-affirmed and reproduced, and most importantly the social and moral worth of the household in question is evaluated and judged.” Protestant funerals in South Fujian, however, seem to offer reciprocity to a certain church community rather than an individual family. The prevailing notion for many rural church members seems to be something like, “I will attend this Christian funeral in another village and expect members from that village’s Protestant community to support a funeral in my family or village in the future.”

In his analysis of Catholic funerals in the Ming and Qing dynasties, Nicolas Standaert notes that lineages used funeral ceremonies as a way to “reaffirm the corporate identity” of the family. Standaert goes on to note that historically, “as Christian communities manifested themselves on the occasion of a funeral, they reveal[ed] inclusive as well as exclusive characteristics.” Funerals today offer a similar opportunity for rural churches. Overt displays of a Christian identity are not merely an evangelistic tactic, but are also a demonstration of social cohesion and strength. In the case of Mrs. Liu’s funeral, leaving the family courtyard, procession walkers were arranged in an aisle about three to four people wide. The aisle was cordoned off by white ropes on either side that stretched approximately 500 meters. This was to keep order in the procession and separate those on the inside, that is those participating in the procession, from those simply watching (Image 9).
A large portion of those who participated in the procession at Mrs. Liu’s funeral were members of churches throughout the Hui’an region. While the local church in the village averages less than 200 worshippers on normal Sundays, the procession included hundreds of “non-relative” Christians from the surrounding area. Many of these came from rather distant churches. Mrs. Liu’s eldest son explained to me that the family did not feel they could invite many local villagers to the funeral because they were afraid their mother’s funeral would overshadow the funeral of their father. He noted that in 1993 when his father passed away, there were many representatives from the larger Zhuang lineage who participated in the procession. However, local custom mandates that a wife’s funeral should not be bigger than her husband’s, so the family did not invite local distant relatives. Despite this, the funeral was clearly a very large event and was well-attended by many guests from outside the village.

For Protestant funerals, a large attendance is more than just a show of respect, but also a demonstration of a personal faith, and a reflection of Christianity in general. In this respect, I see Chinese Protestant funerals not as simple cosmetic ritual expression, but as formative. This corresponds to Rubie Watson’s analysis of funerals in Southeastern China. Watson claims that funerals are “not so much occasions for the assertion of already existing groups as opportunities for creating new groups.” She goes on to say that “in participating in funerals individuals create, change, reaffirm, and deny social relations.”

Active participation in public funerals is an important avenue for rural church members to confirm their status as Christians. For new church members, such a step may be fraught with challenges and risk (such as alienating relatives or inciting ridicule), which therefore increases the significance of such participation. As Watson argues, such rites are “active; they are part of the change itself.”

While the absence of some ritual expressions and the alteration of others mark Protestant funerals as unique, they are not performed in a cultural vacuum.
I tend to think of Protestant funeral processions in South Fujian as a dialogue with society at large. For any successful dialogue to be achieved, the Protestant funeral must be done within the confines of the local culture; that is it must be understandable to society. A complete discarding of prevailing rituals would risk alienating the exact groups the church community is hoping to dialogue with. Instead, what Protestants in South Fujian do is adapt existing customs and rituals, imbuing them with Christian symbols and content.

This dialogue is not always successful and the sides are often not evenly matched. For example, one Christian funeral procession in the outskirts of Quanzhou City faced complications when their path to the Christian columbarium passed through a village which viewed the influence of death and Christianity to be polluting. It was not until the procession had entered the village that the Protestant community realized it had deeply offended the local villagers. After the procession, the organizers were pressured into giving the village a “donation” to placate their anger. Subsequent funeral processions leading to the large Christian columbarium have been forced to take a detour around the confines of the village.

Similarly, the recent funeral procession of a departed church leader in Anxi wove its way through four neighboring villages on its way to the hearse. While the neighboring villages were not opposed to having a Christian funeral procession traverse their territory, they did require firecrackers to be let off before entering the borders of each village to ensure evil spirits were not accompanying the procession. The story of a funeral of a young Christian in Tong’an also shows how Protestant communities in many ways play by the rules of the dominant culture. In this instance, the funeral tent and the beginning of the procession was held outside the boundary of the village. While most funerals are held in the center of the village, local custom mandates that funerals in which the deceased died due to an accident must be held outside the village. Thus the funeral for this “brother,” who had died in a car wreck, was held on the outskirts of the village.

The public manifestation of Christian faith afforded by funeral processions offer Protestant communities the chance to demonstrate their religious networks and social solidarity, but this is accomplished with distinctly local conventions. As Standaert writes, Christian funerals “identify and consolidate the identity of participants as Christians but...also [allow] them to remain integrated within the wider Chinese community.”

**Protestant Funerals as Power Structures**

What may be most apparent about the Christian characteristics of Protestant funeral processions in South Fujian is how conspicuous the Christian symbols are. This can be described as a display of what I have termed “Christian conspicuous consumption.” The “Christian conspicuous consumption” of funeral processions refers to the conscious effort of the family and church community to publicly parade their faith through signs, symbols, size, and atmosphere. However, such actions are also expressions of wealth, status, and power of the individual family and the Protestant community in general. Francis Hsu, in his classic study *Under the Ancestor’s Shadow*, explains that Chinese communities (Hsu is speaking of lineages, but I think we can substitute church
here) demonstrate extravagance or ostentation in ceremonies such as funeral processions because “the greater their excesses… the greater will be their prestige and power.” A missionary in Fujian in the 1870s reported on the affluence he witnessed at funerals:

They [Chinese] waste on the lifeless form what suffering humanity sadly needs for its comfort and well-being. And not only is the regard shown for the dead excessive, but a pretentious display is made for the glory of the living. Chinese Christians too are in danger of falling into this error. I have known a few cases where they have unreasonably run into debt in connection with burials, professively to prevent it being said that Christians lightly regard the persons of their deceased relatives and friends.

C. K. Yang argued that demonstrative behavior from the family had the dual effect of consolidating lineage relations and enhancing the social status of the family in society at large. According to Yang, large funerals had the purpose of reasserting the status of the family and could show, in the words of Standaert, that the group was not “weakened by death.” If we regard the church as similar in function to a lineage, like the historian Jessie Lutz suggests, then the position of Christian communities and even the Christian faith is reinforced through active participation in funerals.

More recent research has corroborated analysis of earlier scholars. Ellen Oxfeld looked at Hakka funerals in neighboring Guangdong in the 1990s and found that rural families in Reform Era China (1979-present) consider funerals as opportunities to demonstrate power and wealth. For Oxfeld, “funerals become templates on which families can assemble their social skills and material resources… [whereupon] their status in the community is judged and ratified.” Likewise, Linda Sun Crowder analyzed Chinese funerals in San Francisco, arguing that “the impression made by the funeral and the opinions of the observers [are] consequential.”

At the death of one Christian in rural Anxi County, the local pastor asked the family if they wanted a “big” funeral or a “small” one. The son of the deceased explained to me that the family opted for a big funeral because the village where his father lived did not have a strong Christian presence. In this instance, the deceased’s family did not want a large funeral for evangelistic purposes, but rather to ensure the family would not be bullied by non-Christian neighbors or pressured into performing rituals they deemed incompatible with their Christian faith. By asking the pastor to arrange for a “big” funeral, the family was in effect asking him to “gather the troops.” The result was that the funeral saw hundreds of guests from churches throughout the county gather to participate in the funeral procession. Most of the Protestants from outside the village did not even know the deceased, but they understood the significance of their presence at a Christian funeral. During the procession, these members displayed a black ribbon with a red cross pinned to their clothes. These ribbons were brought by the individual church members who would use them for all Christian funeral processions. In this example we see how church networks can be employed to increase the number of participants who express their religious status and the strength of the church community through the use of clothing accessories and religious symbols.
Not only can a successful funeral procession exhibit strength to those outside of the church, it can also assert the influence or standing of a family within the church community. For Mrs. Liu’s funeral, 27 pastors and preachers participated in the service, most dressed in their pastoral vestments. Such a show not only gave “face” to the family in the eyes of society at large, but also enhanced the status of the family within their local church and the Christian community in the region. Considering that Mrs. Liu’s father and husband were very influential members in the Hui’an church, the leaders of the Hui’an two committees (Lianghui, or the Three Self Patriotic Committee, and the local Christian Council) were given prominent place during the service, and this in turn gave prestige and elevated the position of the family in the church.

**Protestant Funeral Processions as Celebrations**

Chau has recently highlighted the importance of *renao*, or what he describes as “red-hot sociality,” the lively, loud, colorful excitement generated at communal gatherings in rural China. While funerals may not offer the same platform for *renao* as the temple festivals Chau investigates, the chance to assemble together, socialize, perform, and commemorate, all in a public setting furnished by Protestant funeral processions should not be overlooked. Though church membership dictates that some activities are off limits to the Protestant community, this does not mean that a desire to socialize or celebrate is in any way diminished. Outside of the religious symbolism and communal identity provided by funeral processions, these activities are part of the experiential and performative nature of ritual life in rural South Fujian. Christian communities would be remiss if they failed to embrace such observances.

Christian funerals are often attended by or at least witnessed by non-Christians and things like blaring church bands, bright decorations of crosses, or flamboyant funerary wreaths and banners are like a vibrant, grassroots advertisement for the church or the Christian faith in general. Furthermore, such ornaments and lively music aid in the creation of an overall festive or social atmosphere. The story of the church team dancing to *Gangnam Style* is just one example of how Christian funerals attempt to generate a boisterous ambience. In fact, in most instances, the more rambunctious the ceremony, the more successful it is thought to be. In addition to invited bands and dance teams, most Protestant funerals also incorporate congregational singing. I have witnessed a few funerals in which hymn books or copies of songs were passed out for all those in attendance to participate in the ceremony.

Two pastors in Hui’an commented to me that Protestant funerals in their districts tended to be much more *renao* than non-Christian funerals. Their explanation for such a phenomenon was that Protestant funerals relied upon more extensive ties to gather people. Many religious celebrations in South Fujian are large and lively because of the various temple alliances and *fenxiang* (incense sharing) networks in which new temples align with established temples through gathering incense given to the deity worshipped there. Funerals, on the other hand, are usually limited to lineage and village ties. For Protestant families, though, funerals often include extra-village/lineage connections through church networks.
Though this was never mentioned in my discussions with church leaders and rural Protestants, one also wonders if the size of Protestant funeral processions and the renao generated by such events, which are clearly disproportionate to the population or influence of Protestants in society at large, are in some ways compensatory for the “non-rituals” exhibited. Church members may feel that the excesses in terms of numbers and pomp of Protestant funerals help offset or counterbalance the absence of some practices.

In recent years it has become popular for funerals to be recorded and DVDs of the ceremony passed out to family members. Oxfeld recounts how this practice was beginning to occur in the 1990s among wealthy families. Today, in South Fujian, it is a common element of many rural funerals. In fact, one preacher in rural Anxi has started a small side business videotaping Christian funerals. For a small fee, this church worker will video the wake and funeral procession and edit the content, inserting occasional Bible verses and background Christian hymns into the final production. For families of the deceased, holding an appropriate funeral (which often means, among other things, large and vibrant) is a major event. It entails expense and reliance on vast social networks. Recording this event is simply a reflection of the importance a correct funeral celebration holds for the family.

**Conclusion**

In summary, Christian funerals in South Fujian offer a platform to publicly celebrate the faith, but they also are looked upon as opportunities for the Protestant community to promote their faith. In this way, Chinese Protestant funeral processions are viewed not simply as obligatory, but rather as favorable circumstances to demonstrate the faith of the deceased and their family, and to exhibit the community and strength of the church, as well as the status of the family.

Chau’s research suggests that scholars have overlooked some key elements of funerals and rural rituals in general by focusing too much on the religious acts or beliefs of participants. Instead, he argues that viewing funerals as social events rather than religious rituals may yield more fruitful analysis. For example, Chau states that funeral guests do not pay “too much attention to the intricacies of symbolic actions conducted or orchestrated by the ritual specialists,” but they do readily notice and evaluate such things as the size and festiveness of the funeral. This article maintains that for Protestant funerals in South Fujian, religious aspects are integral. It is not the mere absence of certain components that delineate Christian funeral processions from non-Christian ones, but the addition or transformation of other elements that aids in this expression of a distinct identity. Funeral processions, replete with Christian-inspired banners and signs, church bands, and conspicuous crosses, help the Christian communities form a new identity. However a more nuanced look at such activities reveals how funerals exhibit the importance of social networks and demonstrations of power. Many attendees of Protestant funerals view such activities as a chance to strengthen group identity, for they offer an opportunity for communal celebration. The social exchange, even renao, that funerals provide are important ways for Christians to celebrate.
Notes


2 This article will only focus on Protestant funerals and follows the Chinese convention of using “Christian” and “Protestant” interchangeably.


4 The Dutch sinologist J. J. M. de Groot, who lived in Xiamen for many years, meticulously recorded the customs related to death and funeral practices in the area. See de Groot (1892–1910) and (1884). In addition to de Groot’s work on funerals in South Fujian, later scholars also researched the rituals surrounding death and burial in this area of China. A review of this literature is not provided here, but the reader is directed to footnote 8 in Kenneth Dean’s article for a somewhat dated but nevertheless helpful summary of other sources discussing funeral rites in South Fujian. Kenneth Dean, “Funerals in Fujian,” *Cahiers d’Extreme-Asie* 4 (1988): 19–78.


7 The first Chinese Protestant to die in Xiamen was Wu Tu, who had a stroke in an LMS church on Christmas day, 1848. He died in the church the following day. According to a missionary report, the funeral was “entirely in harmony with the Christian profession of our deceased friend.” However, the report goes on to explain that while the ceremony was Christian, it was also Chinese: “The mourning-dresses, the coffin, the manner in which it was borne to the burying-ground, and every other circumstance, were all thoroughly Chinese, only with the exclusion of everything connected with idolatrous rites and observances,” in “China: Death of a Native Christian,” [LMS] *Missionary Magazine* (November 1849): 63.

8 Some personal names in this paper have been changed.

9 Most of the information regarding Liu Yinglin is from conversations with her children, particularly Mr. Zhuang Honghua. The author is grateful to the Liu/Zhuang family for allowing him to attend the funeral of Mrs. Liu and providing him with information about the family history.

10 For more on the political campaigns of the 1950s that affected churches, see M. Searle Bates, “Churches and Christians in China, 1950–1967: Fragments of Understanding,” *Pacific Affairs* 41.2 (1968): 199–213. Although the Zhuang family home, where Mrs. Liu had lived since leaving Wangchuan, is in Shanyao, a small village in Quangang, a part of Quanzhou City, this area historically belonged to Hui’an.

11 Mrs. Liu’s age was calculated in sui, the Chinese reckoning for years.


13 Though relatively rare, a recent phenomenon in South Fujian is the construction of Christian ancestral halls. Some of these are built specifically as places for funerary rites to be carried out for lineage members. See White, “Sacred Dwellings: Christian Ancestral Halls and Homes in Southern Fujian,” in Yangwen Zheng (ed.), *Sinicizing Christianity* (tentative title) (forthcoming).

14 During Mrs. Liu’s funeral procession, a few of the younger descendants were already wearing white shirts, so saw no need to put on the white mourning garments.

15 Watson and Rawski, *Death Ritual*.

17 While this article will not discuss the economics of funerals, it should be noted that most bands (whether church or “secular”) are paid for their services. One pastor emphasized to me that when the band from his church performed at a funeral, they did not receive money and would not stay for the funeral banquet, so as to avoid gossip that the church members were simply looking to profit from participation in the band.

18 In more urban areas, wreaths are usually not burnt (and coffins do not have paper mache covers) at the end of the service. In these cases, wreaths are simply rented and the names of the sending parties and their message to the family are written on ribbons that are replaced.

19 Actually, the deceased was only the “father” of four generations, but it is the local custom in this village to add one more generation to the youngest male generation.

20 In South Fujian, at least some missionaries before the founding of the PRC disapproved of using photographs of the deceased in the procession. The RCA’s monthly mission magazine, The Mission Field records the funeral for one pastor in Tong’an in 1917. The missionaries attending the procession note that following the funerary wreaths and banners “there came a small model of a sedan chair all decked up with flowers and fancy ornaments and at the back a large picture of the deceased. (This we were not particularly pleased to see for it seemed to be quite an evident compromise with the heathen custom—the only difference being that the latter have the ancestral tablet instead of the picture.).” Lyman A. Talman, “A Chinese Funeral,” The Mission Field 30 (1918): 494–95.

21 In this instance, although she was a church deacon, the deceased’s husband and some of her children (as well as many in attendance) were not Christian, making it more imperative and timely for the pastor to give such a message.

22 This video, self-produced in 2007 by the Dongyuan Church in Hui’an, is entitled huansonghuijia (Farewell Homecoming).


25 This is in agreement with Chau, who suggests that local officials “are not interested in cracking down on superstitions because they do not derive any benefits from doing so.” See Adam Yuet Chau, Miraculous Response: Doing Popular Religion in Contemporary China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 215.


30 Ibid., 182.

Ibid, 204.


White, “Family Matters.”


Chau, *Miraculous Response*. Chau also uses the Chinese term honghuo to express this idea. In South Fujian, this term would be laujijt (or lau-jiet).

Part of the reason why funeral processions are such performative events is because they are public; but they are also so public because they include performative aspects.


The standard hymnal used in South Fujian (which is in the local Minnanhua dialect) has a few funerary songs that some churches have copied into a small booklet that can easily be carried by church members to funerals.

Oxfeld, “‘When You Drink Water, Think of Its Source.’”

CHau, “Hosting Funerals and Temple Festivals.”

Ibid., 51.
**Glossary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Simplified Chinese</th>
<th>Traditional Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>brother</td>
<td>dixiong</td>
<td>弟兄</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canaan</td>
<td>jianan</td>
<td>迦南</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>die</td>
<td>si</td>
<td>死</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grieve</td>
<td>dao</td>
<td>悼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>holy music</td>
<td>shengyue</td>
<td>圣乐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homecoming</td>
<td>huijia</td>
<td>回家</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farewell Homecoming</td>
<td>huansonghuijia</td>
<td>欢送回家</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incense sharing</td>
<td>fenxiang</td>
<td>分香</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnanhua dialect</td>
<td>Minnanhua</td>
<td>闽南话</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>praise</td>
<td>zanmei</td>
<td>赞美</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>red-hot sociality</td>
<td>renao</td>
<td>热闹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>respect</td>
<td>zun</td>
<td>尊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rest in the Lord</td>
<td>anxi zhuhuai</td>
<td>安息主怀</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sister</td>
<td>jiemei</td>
<td>姐妹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>two committees</td>
<td>lianghui</td>
<td>两会</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>worship</td>
<td>jingbai</td>
<td>敬拜</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>years</td>
<td>sui</td>
<td>岁</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Geographic Places**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anxi</td>
<td>安溪</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongwu</td>
<td>崇武</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dongyuan</td>
<td>东园</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui’an</td>
<td>惠安</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quanzhou</td>
<td>泉州</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quanzhang</td>
<td>泉港</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanyao</td>
<td>山腰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongan</td>
<td>同安</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wangchuan</td>
<td>蜀川</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiamen</td>
<td>厦门</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


**Chris White** is a post-doctoral researcher with the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity. He holds a PhD in Modern Chinese History from Xiamen University and an MA degree in East Asian Studies from the University of Pittsburgh. His research, combining history and anthropology, focuses on Protestantism in Southern Fujian.

The author would like to acknowledge generous support from the Kay Family Foundation for portions of the fieldwork used for this article.
Using Geospatial Data to Study the Origins of Japan’s Post-Occupation Maritime Boundaries

Thomas French, College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University

Abstract:
This paper, based on archival research undertaken in the General Headquarters (GHQ) / Supreme Command of Allied Powers (SCAP) archives and employing geospatial data, examines the origins of a number North East Asia’s territorial disputes through looking at the seizures of Japanese fishing boats during the initial postwar years. Through the hitherto unexploited medium of geospatial analysis, the paper looks at the mass seizures of Japanese fishing vessels by the maritime arms of the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea (and US Military Government of Korea), the USSR, the Republic of China, and the UN naval forces in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The paper examines and maps the incidence of the capture of these vessels as well as contextualizes the captures within the importance of the fishing industry to Japan, and Japan’s neighbors’ differing positions on their maritime boundaries with Japan. The policies of GHQ/SCAP and the Japanese government towards the seizures are also examined, as is the role the fishermen themselves played. The paper concludes by employing a geospatial dataset to test assumptions about the nature of the seizures of fishing vessels during the period and their significance in relation to today’s territorial disputes in the region.1

Keywords: geospatial data, Maritime History, fisheries, territorial waters, Occupied Japan, The Korean War

Introduction
Despite taking place in a period some fifty years past, and within an early Cold War environment which differs from the current political and security reality of contemporary East Asia, the topic of seizures of fishing vessels by Japan’s neighbors can be highly illustrative when studying current tensions in the region. For example, all three of Japan’s current major territorial disputes have their origins in this era and the politicization of these disputes, including their connection to national identity and nationalism, also arguably first occurred at this time. Other elements of the contemporary disputes over resource management and the limits of territorial sovereignty in the region also have direct roots in this era. Finally, the postwar use of fishermen as proxies, and of paramilitary maritime arms as instruments of the enforcement of territorial claims in the region, likewise begin here.

This competition between Japan and its neighbors over the economically and politically valuable maritime space connected to the contested islets and their fisheries persists. The interplay between the value and costs of such contested resources are complex, as Manicom’s recent study notes.2 The complexities surrounding the current confrontations over these contested zones are further
revealed by looking at what Paul O’Shea terms the “sovereignty game” existing between Japan and its neighbors, “in which both sides employ various resources and techniques in order to exercise sovereignty over the disputed territory and/or prevent the other state(s) from doing the same.” One of these “techniques” is the use of fishing craft as proxies to assert or challenge claims over disputed space. The alleged “cabbage strategy” of the PRC “of consolidating control over disputed islands by wrapping those islands, like the leaves of a cabbage, in successive layers of occupation and protection formed by fishing boats, Chinese Coast Guard ships, and then finally Chinese naval ships” as noted by Ronald O’Rourke, provides interesting and seemingly direct evidence of the use of fishing craft in such a way, albeit in the South China Sea, rather than the East China Sea.

Whether organized, as the “cabbage strategy” concept implies, or “spontaneous,” i.e., involving fishermen acting independently, competition and confrontation between fishing vessels and their countries’ paramilitary maritime arms certainly form a part of the current contests of control of maritime space in East Asia. Hence any examination of the origins and course of Japan’s present territorial disputes would certainly benefit from further study of the origins of this level of the sovereignty game.

Despite the potential usefulness of fishing vessels in staking/disputing claims, it is important to also note the potential for fisheries to be part of potential solutions to such confrontations. As has been mentioned by Chisako Masuo, joint scientific management of fisheries can result in a de-escalation of confrontation and can act as a route to sustainable and mutually beneficial results. A recent example of this potential for co-operation is the 2013 Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement. Alongside this recent rapprochement, it is important to note that much of the latter half of twentieth century saw relatively peaceful and cooperative relations between Japan and its neighbors over fishing rights, albeit with occasional use of the issue for political ends by all states involved. As noted in this article, the influence of nationalism inside the political discourse of the states, and power politics between the states involved, can derail mutually beneficial arrangements.

Alongside its relevance for today’s tensions, the history of fishing disputes around Japan in the early postwar period also links to wider trends in the historiography of Japan and the region. Increasing in focus among these, as it is in the current scholarship on many regions, is the role of maritime space and maritime affairs. Since Masataka Kosaka’s seminal work on Japan as a maritime state, various studies have looked at Japan as a maritime power and the sea’s influence upon Japanese history and there has been a recent revival in this area of the historiography of modern Japan, offering new and interesting interpretations of Japan and its modern history. For example, Tessa Morris-Suzuki notes in relation to the era examined by this paper that the once unified space of movement existing under the Japanese Empire fractured along often imposed ethnic and political lines during the Allied Occupation (1945-1952), especially in relation to the seas around Japan. This idea also interweaves with William Tsutsui’s argument that the Japanese Empire can be seen as an oceanic enterprise that was just as focused on maritime space as it was on “terrestrial” space, much
in the same way as the British Indian (Ocean) empire is currently viewed by some historians, as noted by Eric Taliacozzo.\(^9\)

A central element of this “pelagic empire,” as Tsutsui terms it, was the exploitation of maritime resources, especially through fishing. This paper examines the postwar collapse of this “empire,” which occurred much in the same vein as Japan’s “terrestrial” empire, but also the recovery and later expansion of its central agent—fishing craft. These craft and their often hostile interactions with Japan’s neighbors form a lens through which the changes Japan went through in this era can be viewed, and one which gives us a new perspective on modern North East Asia’s territorial disputes.

The study of the revival of the fishing industry and the consequences it had on Japan’s relations with its neighbors also has direct bearing upon interpretations of Occupation era Japan. An initial area of note is that GHQ policy towards the fishing industry seems to directly contradict the now already-questioned “reverse course” narrative, in that with the fishing industry GHQ stressed recovery before reform and that such efforts did not reduce or change direction significantly in the latter Occupation years.\(^10\) In contrast, a hybrid approach of revival within constraints (literally with the MacArthur Line in this case) was pursued from the start.

Despite not conforming to some elements of the “reverse course” narrative the revival of the fishing industry did connect to the internal and external Cold Wars confronting Japan, as noted below.\(^11\) The fishing disputes, especially with the PRC and USSR, did form Cold War frontiers between Japan and its communist neighbors, and the captures themselves also influenced the strengthening of Japan’s maritime security arms and the deployment of US military units to counter potential captures.

A potential further key impact on the historiography here is the influence of Japan’s food security upon broader GHQ policy. As well as helping to maintain the health of the Japanese population, and hence Japan’s political stability, the importance of the revival of the fishing industry, arguably at the expense of Japan’s neighbors, has broader implications for studies of the period. For example, many current studies, notably Kimie Hara’s work, suggest the deliberate lack of clarity on the side of GHQ over the status of key areas of later dispute (the Pinnacle Islands in particular) was motivated by Cold War concerns.\(^12\) A potential significant impact of the data presented here could be to support an argument that the emergence of the disputes was equally influenced by the imperative of obtaining additional food for Japan’s malnourished and rapidly expanding population. The pressures of fishing inside a constrained and already over-exploited zone arguably pushed many fishermen into waters claimed (sometimes seemingly subsequently) by Japan’s neighbors, increasing tensions, necessitating a response, and arguably opening play in the sovereignty game.

As well as the potential contributions to the scholarship mentioned above, this paper also takes an original approach to the issues discussed here by linking the emerging trend in maritime history to the use of geospatial data as a tool of analysis and a new form of evidence for historians. By employing archival sources both as documentary evidence and also as a source of geospatial data
to map, literally, the limits of the vestigial pelagic empire of Japan, this paper provides an entirely new perspective on this issue. This method provides a more measurable set of data with which to understand the fluid but as yet largely unexamined phenomenon of the capture of Japanese fishing craft. Furthermore, by using the positions of the captures as a method to chart the actual practically enforced limits of the control of the states involved, new insights into the actual behavior of the actors concerned, the limits of their capabilities, and the practical realities of the situation denuded of its surrounding political rhetoric and bluster, can be attempted.

The preceding analysis is presented below, first in an initial section contextualizing the issue of the fishing boat captures in relation to Japan’s pre-war fishing industry, the policy of GHQ, and the position of the Japanese government after 1945. This is followed by a section discussing the geospatial mapping process of the capture data including a commentary on the level of accuracy of the data itself. The article concludes with a final section offering a brief initial analysis of the data’s impact on our understanding of the captures and their influence on Japan’s ongoing territorial disputes with its neighbors.

**Japanese Fishery Operations before 1945**

Japan lies in zone where the cold northern Pacific meets the warm water of the Japan Current. These conditions allowed Japanese fishermen to productively fish close to shore for millennia and marine products became a central feature of both the Japanese diet and Japanese food culture. In the early modern era expansion of the fisheries and maritime production also offered a way to expand Japan’s resource base, supplementing a terrestrial base restricted by the Edo Bakufu. With the Meiji Restoration and the adoption of western technology, Japan’s fisheries entered a rapid era of modernization and expansion. Japan’s fisheries rapidly grew sometimes alongside, and sometimes in advance of, empire, both on the high seas and within the coastal waters of other states and territories. Japan’s fishermen ranged far and wide, expanding from their coastal waters to the near seas fringing their newly won empire, and later towards a truly global reach, with fleets sent to fish across the Pacific, southern Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Arabian Gulf, and Antarctic waters.

This range and scale of operations has led many to label Japan as “the world’s greatest fishing nation prior to WWII,” although this greatness came at a cost. The willingness of Japanese fishermen to use their technological advantage alongside diplomatic and military pressure in waters far from Japan earned them an aggressive and predatory image in the minds of some of the local fishermen they displaced and many in the wider international community. As is noted below, this image persisted even after 1945 and contributed to the management of the “MacArthur Line” and GHQ’s broader policy towards the Japanese fishing industry.

With expanding territory on land and a growing domestic population, Japanese fisheries made a significant contribution to feeding the Japanese empire. Around 85 percent of animal protein consumed in Japan in the immediate years before the Second World War came from the approximately 4.5 to 4.8 million metric tons of fish and shellfish caught on average by Japan’s fishermen every
Alongside the production of the home islands and the imports from the empire, this source of protein helped make the Japanese empire theoretically self-sufficient in food supply prior to 1941.

The fishing industry was also a major employer, directly providing work for over 1.5 million people. Around half of these were farmers who engaged in fishing as a secondary or supplementary form of employment, often on a seasonal basis. For example, as John Stephan notes, seasonal demand just in the Kuriles provided 20,000 to 30,000 jobs. This seasonal employment provided a welcome source of extra food and income for many, particularly in the economically depressed rural Japan of the 1930s.

The fisheries also provided a substantial source of export income for Japan. Canned salmon and crab from the waters off Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands and canned tuna from the waters south of Japan sold very well in Europe and the United States. Alongside other exports stemming from fishing and whaling such as fish meal, whale oil and vitamins, export of marine products generated considerable amounts of foreign exchange and made such exports one of Japan’s top three export commodities. These foreign currency earnings were highly valuable in purchasing the materials needed to feed Japan’s war effort on the Asian mainland from 1931 onwards, such as scrap iron, iron ore, rubber, and oil. As such, the economic dimensions of the industry became a primary national focus in the pre-war years and the fishing industry was given generous government support to expand and improve its operations.

Despite these remarkable successes, like its terrestrial counterpart, Japan’s pelagic empire began to disintegrate rapidly after the tide of conflict turned against it. Alongside the general push for greater self-sufficiency by Japan from 1937, and spurred by US and European embargoes, Japanese fishermen began to reduce the range of their expeditions and focus more on domestic and imperial waters. This refocusing on local production was further necessitated after the outbreak of hostilities with the Western Allies in 1941. This return to local waters brought a sharp but short-lived increase in local production. From 1942 onwards production rapidly declined due to various factors. First amongst these was the loss of craft to widespread Navy requisitioning. Added to this were the Allied air, surface fleet, and submarine attacks which ultimately cost Japan 90 percent of its merchant marine during the war. The impact of the latter on the fishing industry was substantial, contributing (alongside shipwrecks) to Japan losing approximately 300,000 fishing craft of various types, including all Japan’s large factory ships and 95 percent of its otter trawlers by 1945. Many fishermen were also lost in such sinkings, and their colleagues’ mass conscription into the armed forces further reduced the numbers available. Wear and tear on the vessels and equipment which survived and the impossibility of providing replacements due to shortages of material such as hemp and cotton for making nets as well as the critical scarcity of oil and fuel, were also major contributors to the rapid collapse of the once proud industry after 1942.
GHQ’s Fisheries Policy

The Allied Occupation thus took responsibility for an industry ravaged by years of conflict and fisheries under pressure from unsustainable exploitation. Although later heavily supportive of the industry, the Allied authorities initially confined the fishing fleet to harbor to ensure the security of the landings of Occupation personnel. Security formed from this point on, alongside the economic recovery of Japan, one of the two key elements of GHQ’s fisheries policy. The fishing zone permitted to be used by the Japanese was gradually expanded, first to coastal waters only, then further out into the Pacific and Sea of Japan in late 1945, and again in 1946, and finally further south and east in 1949 and 1950 (see Figure 1). At each point the security of both US personnel and the Japanese fishermen was taken into account, clearly influenced by the captures noted below. Security factors also played a significant role in the later intensification of the captures during the Korean War, when small craft off the Korean coast were involved in smuggling, supplying the communist forces and laying mines, resulting in a strict UN blockade of the coast and more stringent treatment of Japanese craft crossing the permitted fishing zone’s outer limit (the so called “MacArthur Line”).

Alongside the need to maintain the security and safety of both the US forces and Japanese fishermen (in that order), the second principal core of GHQ’s policy was that of assisting the economic recovery of Japan. Unlike many other Occupation policies and in direct contradiction of the now-challenged “reverse course” theory, support for the revival of the fishing industry under GHQ preceded attempts to reform its practices and patterns of ownership. The central reason behind this was largely one of necessity, due to Japan’s severe food shortages in the immediate wake of the war. Supporting the revival of the
fishing industry helped not only provide desperately needed foodstuffs, but also gave a boost to the economy and helped provide work for some of the millions of impoverished repatriates returning from Japan’s former empire. Thus GHQ sought to promote the revival of the industry and the expansion of the area within which it could operate, first by expanding the MacArthur Line and later by encouraging the industry’s international expansion through the resumption of Antarctic whaling, and finally by rehabilitation through measures such as membership of the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention (which at the same time secured US and Canadian coastal fisheries).

Despite this policy of the revival, rehabilitation, and managed expansion of the vestiges of Japan’s pelagic empire, unfortunately for Japan and its neighbors, GHQ left the status of certain key islets and rocks in arguably ambiguous circumstances with regard to sovereignty. This happened partially due to circumstances beyond its control, and also due to the needs described above. Furthermore, as is noted below, GHQ also did not do enough to discourage the assumption by Japan’s neighbors that the MacArthur Line represented the limits of Japanese post-Occupation territorial waters, further contributing to subsequent territorial problems. This situation, and the subsequent global evolution in the practice of the laws of the sea in relation to access to maritime resources and exclusive economic zones, greatly enhanced the importance of formerly obscure stones in the seas of Northeast Asia.

**Japan’s Fishing Industry**

Japan’s fishermen received assistance in reviving their industry, albeit under both financially and territorially constrained conditions. Fishermen benefited from the expansion of the areas they were allowed to fish, although unfortunately these mostly consisted of many of the most previously overexploited fisheries around Japan. Nevertheless the government provision of assistance to revive the industry alongside the simultaneous GHQ prioritization of the industry in terms of supplies and funds contributed to a substantial revival. As such, many former fishermen and new entrants to the industry operated within Japan’s fisheries zone.

The relatively high price of foodstuffs in general and fish in particular induced many to enter or re-enter the industry. Good catches could provide a good return, sometimes running into millions of Yen for larger boats, but the increasing competition from those entering, or returning to, the industry also contributed to the overfishing of the zone around Japan and the desire to push beyond that on the part of some fishermen. Knowledge of the rich fisheries just out of their reach which they had fished until just recently, including the so-called “Ginza Sea” off Cheju Island; the rich salmon, trout, saury and crab waters around the Kuriles; and the yellow croaker, mackerel and other fish available in the East China Sea, proved tempting for many. Brief forays into the forbidden zone were also a seemingly effective way to increase the likelihood of substantial catches when facing the fierce competition inside the line. The costs and benefits of crossing the line were also likely obvious to many fishermen, with the boat and its crew only at risk for the often brief period they were over the line and with the catches being untraceable (and often quickly consumed).
after returning to Japan. Aside from the motives noted here, the very thin spread of Japanese inspection vessels (see below) also provided an opportunity for those willing to take the risk of crossing the line.

For those willing to take the chance, many adopted various ruses to minimize their risk of capture during such forays, including operating at night without lights, operating without markings, and possibly in one encounter, providing only the Japanese versions of identity documents, or even unrelated documents in Japanese, when boarded by US sailors. Another common tactic employed by those violating the line was to misreport their position to the Japanese and US authorities as being well inside, whilst operating deep in forbidden waters, a practice which may have an impact of the reliability of some of the capture data examined below. Of course much of the confusion over the position of vessels was down to the limited navigational aids present on most vessels, although the presumably deliberate misreporting of locations certainly took place in many instances. The misreporting of position also extended after the event in many cases of capture too, with boat crews often claiming they were not outside the permitted fishing zone in order to avoid admitting their guilt, and hence, further punishment.

The violation of the line was seemingly widespread and some in GHQ believed it was also occasionally organized en-masse, with one alleged attempt to violate the line by twelve boats working together being discussed in a meeting in early April 1951. It seems that economic concerns, or even mere subsistence, formed the principal motivations behind such behavior. A desire to defy GHQ rules and restrictions similar to that noted by Matthew Augustine amongst Okinawan fishermen may have also played a secondary role in some cases. The clear desire of many fishermen to operate beyond their permitted zone despite the risk of capture can be illustrated in the UK Foreign Office comments on the events immediately following the end of the MacArthur Line on 25 April 1952: “the removal of this restriction on the movements of Japanese fishing fleets was greeted with a wholesale stampede to the hitherto prohibited areas . . . this has resulted in a sharp increase in the number of Japanese fishing vessels seized by Soviet patrols.”

Aside from illegal and clandestine tests of the boundaries of the fishing zone, and in a further clear indication of their desire for a larger zone, the fishermen, their unions and those Japanese politicians willing to assist them, regularly pushed for extension of the MacArthur Line. A notable example of lobbying by the fishing industry was the 1,000,000-signature petition presented to MacArthur and Dulles by former Minster without portfolio in the Katayama cabinet, Hayashi Heima. The petition, given to Dulles during his visit to Japan in early 1951, asked for unrestricted fishing rights which Hayashi argued would reduce friction with Japan’s neighbors, provide food for its increasing population, and would help Japan “earn its living.” The British Foreign Office took a slightly more cynical position on these demands, stating the true wish of the industry was to have “as much scope as possible in its encroachments upon the near-territorial waters of other countries in the Far East.” In this case, the petition made little difference and the MacArthur Line remained unchanged until the end of the Occupation. However, the application of pressure by the fishermen, their
families and the unions did have a catalyzing influence on GHQ when dealing with the capture and imprisonment of Japanese fishermen, sometimes speeding actions to secure their release from custody.46

**The Japanese Government**

Within this context, as it often did during the Occupation, the Japanese government found itself between a rock and a hard place. With GHQ limits on the size of the fishing zone imposed from above and vociferous demands from below from the fishing industry for expansion, the Japanese government found itself in a thankless position. The necessity of increasing food production and the much-needed economic boost maritime products provided (especially in terms of the dollar exports that canned crab, salmon, and tuna earned) also increased the pressure on the Japanese government. A final factor influencing the Japanese government was the impact that the seizures had on Japan’s relations with its neighbors, especially if the Japanese government were to be seen to not be doing enough to restrain its fishermen, or even worse, tacitly encouraging the fishermen to stray beyond the MacArthur Line. The fact that Japan was not fully sovereign and had no formal diplomatic contact with foreign governments further complicated this situation.

In order to mitigate GHQ’s ire at a perceived ambivalence to infractions by the fishermen and to provide some of the protection the industry demanded, the Japanese government established a fisheries monitoring patrol fleet in 1949. This operated alongside the coastguard, Maritime Safety Board (MSB), and US air and sea patrols in policing the line. However, due to budget restrictions, Japan could only afford to maintain eleven monitoring vessels (two for the Pacific coast and nine for the Japan Sea coast) for the entirety of its extensive coastline and fishing zone. Furthermore, these vessels were unarmed, not permitted to cross the line themselves, and at least initially, had no judicial power beyond that of mere observation.47 Unsurprisingly these meager resources produced little in the way of discernible results. The highly limited success of this effort raises the question as to whether the Japanese government took a deliberately ineffectual approach towards policing the line. This could certainly be argued, but the fact that Japan imposed severe penalties on those caught crossing the line (large fines and up to ten years in prison) could also indicate a genuine desire to control the fishing fleet. Furthermore, the dire economic conditions in Japan, and hence paucity of available funds, meant a more substantial patrol fleet was out of the question. Together these two factors would seem to suggest the Japanese government genuinely attempted to do the best it could with the highly limited means at its disposal, albeit with negligible success.

**Notable Trends in History of the Captures**

*North—The Kurile Islands/Hokkaido*

As noted above, the waters around the Kurile Islands and those close to the northern coast of Hokkaido had long provided Japanese fishermen a rich source of trout, salmon, saury, atka mackerel, crab and cod.48 However, with the capture of the islands in August 1945 much of this important source of foodstuffs and
export commodities was lost to the Soviet Union. This rich source of catches just beyond the MacArthur Line, the proximity of the islands to coast the of Hokkaido, and Soviet proactive enforcement of their differing interpretation of the limits of Japanese fishing waters led to a significant number of seizures of fishing boats in this area. This situation led to one of the largest incidences of captures of Japanese vessels by any of Japan’s neighbors occurring off the coast of Hokkaido. Coupled with this was a distinct militarization of this frontier as the reality of the Cold War set in, with US, Japanese and Soviet vessels closely monitoring each other and gathering intelligence from the fishermen caught by, and between, them. This situation saw the increasing incidence of the internment and interrogation of Japanese fishermen by the Soviets, and the deployment of MSB and US Navy vessels to the area to monitor Soviet activity near the Japanese coast and more actively discourage the capture of Japanese vessels.

**West—The Korean Coast**

An interesting element of the captures attributed to South Korea is this era is that for most of the period examined by this study, South Korea was either occupied by the US (1945-1948), and hence not fully sovereign, or the Korean Navy was under US (nominally UN) command (1950-1953). This complicates any argument presented over territorial claims challenged or protected by these captures, in that they were made by one occupied territory against the fishermen of another, while both were under the aegis of the same semi-connected US occupation. The interplay between the Koreans, Japanese and their respective occupations (the US military government in Korea [USAMGIK] and GHQ) are also of interest. The initial assumption by USAMGIK that the MacArthur Line demarcated the limits of Japanese and Korean territorial waters was a point of lasting significance. Despite being told by GHQ this was not the case and subsequently adjusting the behavior of the Korean patrol and naval craft under its command, the underlying assumption that the line marked a maritime boundary was internalized or adopted by the South Korean government and formed the basis of the later unilaterally declared “Rhee Line.” Alongside clearly indicating one of the origins of the current territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan, this also indicates a new unexplored dimension in the historiography of GHQ itself—that of disputes between it and its interconnected neighboring occupation: USAMGIK.

A further interesting element of the history of the fishing boat seizures, and one which relates to the current territorial dispute, is that of the use of the dispute for political purposes in South Korea. Sung-Hwa Cheong argues that the Rhee regime first employed the captures and misplaced (and manipulated) fears of expansion of the MacArthur Line closer to Korea as a political tactic to stir nationalism at home to assist him during a difficult period of his leadership in 1949. The fact that the issue was not brought up by the Rhee regime until then is highlighted by Cheong as evidence of its essentially manufactured political nature. Following this first instance, the use of this dispute and others in the region for nationalist political purposes by state and non-state actors on all sides is clearly in evidence in contemporary North East Asia.
**South—The East China Sea**

Relatively speaking, the captures conducted by the Republic of China (ROC) were the least problematic for GHQ and the Japanese government. While initially taking a significant number of craft, the ROC later shifted its attention and vessels to defense of the Taiwan Straits. Furthermore, as the ROC became increasingly dependent on the US for its survival, it likewise became less willing to antagonize GHQ and increasingly willing and able to work through its diplomatic representative in Tokyo to return many of the Japanese crew it had captured.⁵⁸

This position directly contrasted with that of the captures by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The captures by the PRC, which greatly increased from mid-1951 onwards, caused serious concern inside GHQ and the Japanese government, directly resulting in the Yoshida letter upon which the map data used in this paper is based. The reasons for this level of concern were numerous: first and foremost was the aggressiveness of the PRC vessels in the pursuit and capture of Japanese vessels. Japanese craft, both civilian and inspection craft, were directly fired upon and chased at length by PRC craft on several occasions.⁵⁷ A further cause for concern was the fact that, at least initially, the PRC returned none of the crew or vessels it took. Later the crews were returned en-masse but most of the vessels were never recovered.⁵⁸ An additional cause for concern with regard to the release of the captured boats and crew was that the Occupation (and by extension the Japanese government), unlike with the ROK, ROC and even USSR, had no diplomatic relations with the PRC. This made negotiations over return and prosecution of errant fisherman by Japan or GHQ almost impossible. The fact that the PRC was also fighting the US in Korea (albeit behind the façade of “volunteer forces”) further complicated this process and heightened fears by both GHQ and the Japanese government that the captures could perhaps escalate into what Shigeru Yoshida termed a “critical social and economic problem.”⁵⁹ A final major cause of concern on the part of the Japanese government were the alleged claims expressed by the capturing PRC authorities to the Japanese fishermen that, in the words of Yoshida: “all the East China Sea belongs to the Chinese Communist Sovereignty [sic].”⁶⁰ The fact that these alleged claims predate, and arguably contradict, the later 1953 *Renmin Ribao* article used by some to argue the PRC did not consider the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as part of its territory at this point is also highly significant.

**Mapping the Captures**

**The Data**

Of all the captures, those conducted by the PRC created the greatest concern in the Japanese government and were expressed by Yoshida in a 1951 letter to MacArthur accompanied by an exhaustive study of the captures by the Japanese government.⁶¹ This set of data included the records of 233 individual captures by the ROC, the PRC, USAMGIK/Republic of Korea, and the USSR from late 1945 to 17 February 1951. Each of the 233 individual capture records noted the coordinates/area in which the vessel was captured, which state/authority captured it, the vessel’s name, its mass, its engine size, the date it was captured, the status
of its crew, whether or not its captors returned the vessel, and any other data judged to be relevant by the Japanese government (see Figure 2). This set of data is employed by this study to analyze the incidence and dynamics of the captures of Japanese fishing vessels by Japan’s neighbors.

The Japanese government’s study clearly provides a rich source of data and hence is of great value in attempting to map and analyze the fishing boat seizures of this period, although questions must be raised, as with any source, over its accuracy and reliability. An initial point to note is that this is, of course, a Japanese government document and one which was produced to accompany a request from Yoshida to GHQ for greater protection for the vessels. This position could be used to question the validity of the data contained within it, and at the time concerns were expressed by GHQ’s Natural Resources Section (NRS), particularly over the data being “padded” with vessels taken as reparations. GHQ subsequently checked the data against its own records on the captures.

Several discrepancies in the two sets of data were noted although these were not considered to be especially significant, as William Neville (then head of NRS’s fisheries section) noted in a memorandum to G3 in which he claimed: “In general NR’s check is in agreement with the list as submitted.”

Despite the general agreement of NRS with the Japanese government data, one issue of note with this data set is that although judged to be generally accurate by NRS, the locations of many of the individual captures are approximate. Most fishing vessels fishing off Japan’s coasts at this time possessed at least some navigational aids but the provision of absolutely precise coordinates was impossible in most circumstances. Even GHQ suffered itself in this regard, for example giving a vastly differing set of coordinates for a one of the captures listed in the data (#10 Unzen Maru). Most of these inaccuracies stem from input error or miscalculations in the base data, by both those on the scene and those recording the data in the Japanese government/GHQ. Indeed, an examination of the map produced to accompany this paper: “Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945-1951,” reveals some quite obvious errors in the base data, with one capture placed in the inland sea and another in the center of Hokkaido (see Figure 3).
Alongside these reporting/transcription errors, another less straightforward explanation exists for the incidence of potential inaccuracies in the data—the risk of further repercussions for the boat crews involved. As noted at an April 1951 meeting between NRS and the other GHQ/US military arms, it was certainly not in the interests of Japanese fishermen to report that they had been fishing beyond the MacArthur Line, as by doing so they acknowledged their guilt and potentially opened themselves up to future prosecution.\textsuperscript{66} As such, it could be argued that the incidence of Japanese fishermen violating the MacArthur Line was even greater than the data set suggests. However, the very common presence of other vessels which witnessed the captures and the presumably accurate distress calls issued by the vessels as they were being captured could be used to argue that the co-ordinates given are largely accurate. This position could also be said to be strengthened by the fact that the data does not include vessels captured and released on the same day, although it could also be argued that those released so swiftly were unlikely to have crossed the line anyway. Of course, also unrecorded are the arguably more numerous group of vessels which crossed the line undetected and uncaptured.

A further notable point regarding the dataset is its timeframe. The captures recorded within it go up to 17 February 1951 and hence only cover the beginning of a phenomenon which persisted into the mid-1950s, arguably even intensifying after 1952. Furthermore, due to the chronological frame of the data itself, certain key events such as the Daiichi Daihōmaru Incident of 4 February 1952 are not included. Of course incidents like this would ideally be contained in the data but their absence does not in itself undermine the value of using the dataset to examine the period which it covers, and of course has no bearing on the accuracy of the data which is featured in the dataset. Furthermore as many of the subsequent captures took place in the same zones as those depicted in this dataset, their inclusion, although desirable, would arguably add little in terms of geospatial analysis.
A final shortcoming of the data is that some captures only give a grid reference as a location. These refer to the grid of 30 arcminute x 30 arcminute boxes GHQ used to divide the fishing zones around Japan. As each of these boxes covered a relatively large area, the position of captures giving only their grid reference as a location have been placed by the author at the center of the given grid, in order to approximate their actual position. Other vessels give their location of capture as “unknown” or give obscure geographical references. The latter groups have been estimated where possible, but those unable to be located, alongside the vessels whose capture location is given as “unknown” have been placed in ports known to have been used to store captured vessels, such as Pusan.

Despite these shortcomings and errors (errors discovered in the data to date account for less than 10 percent of the total), the data set can be of some use when examining the capture of the boats by the various states/authorities involved. Moreover, as each capture listed definitely occurred (and was confirmed to have taken place by GHQ and the Japanese government), any inaccuracies relate to the fine detail of the exact location of the capture. As such, a small amount of individual capture location data may be inaccurate to a minor degree but if, as this study does, a broader perspective is adopted, the larger trends within the captures can still be observed and analyzed, both in terms of spatial and chronological distribution.

**The Maps**

In producing the maps employed in this study, the Japanese government dataset discussed above was used, alongside a number of other pieces of geospatial data. Principal among these was the GHQ map of the MacArthur Line’s expansion, titled: “SCAP Authorized Fishing Areas” (see figure 4).

![Figure 4. SCAP Authorized Fishing Areas, 1950](image-url)
This data was also supplemented with other points for reference including the co-ordinates of the 1952 Rhee Line, the UN naval blockade of Korea, the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo/Takeshima) and the Pinnacle Islands (Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands). Alongside these lines and points of interest, each individual capture was recorded with all available data as a single point in Google maps+ to produce the map “Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945-1951” (see Figure 5).

![Figure 5. Image of “Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945-1951”](image)

In addition to the full static map produced using Google maps+, two further maps were produced using the same data within the online mapping tool CartoDB. The first of these is an animated map with individual captures flashing in date order at their capture locations and in colors representing the capturing authority. The 1946 position of the MacArthur Line was also included for reference (see Figure 6).

![Figure 6. Image from “Visualization: Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945-1951”](image)
CartoDB was also used to plot the data on a final map showing the intensity of the captures in different locations. This map depicts the captured boats at the location of their capture, with all captures shown by individual orange dots. Where these dots overlapped, and hence the incidence of the captures was higher, the dots’ shade darkens to red (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats: 1945-1951 (Intensity)

**Initial Analysis of the Data in Relation to Contemporary Territorial Disputes**

The dataset described above and the two maps and visualization produced from it can be employed to examine the captures themselves, but also the current territorial issues which relate directly to them. This section presents some initial conclusions/interpretations of the data in regards to these disputes, upon which future research using the maps can hopefully be built.

**The Pinnacle Islands (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)**

The nearest capture listed in the data is 45 nautical miles (NM) (83.34 km) north of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. As the islands themselves were 25 NM (46.3 km) behind the MacArthur Line, the area around them could be fished legally and without interference. As such they seem very quiet in relation to other...
parts of the East China Sea in terms of captures. This seems to suggest that if the abovementioned alleged claims to “the entire East China Sea” by the PRC were genuine it seemingly lacked the willingness and/or ability to challenge Japanese/GHQ control over the islands, or at least this section of the MacArthur Line at this stage. Nevertheless, the fact that captures occurred deeper behind the MacArthur Line further north could also be used to challenge this hypothesis (see Figure 8).

![Figure 8. Captures Closest to the Pinnacle Islands](image)

**The Kuriles and Hokkaido**

The incidence of captures here indicates that the Soviet Union was, as the documentary evidence suggested above, arguably the most assertive in enforcing its interpretation of the limits of its own and, by extension, Japanese territorial sovereignty in the waters around Hokkaido. That the Soviets seemingly did not recognize the MacArthur Line, as noted by the MSB at the time, seems justified by the incidence of captures far inside the line, and in some cases within 0.6 NM (just over 1100 meters) of the Japanese coast (see Figure 9).
A further interesting point which can be perceived when viewing the visualization is that there are blooms of captures off the Hokkaido coast at certain times of the year. These correspond to the fishing seasons of certain key species caught in the region, especially salmon and saury. This incidence of greater captures corresponding to the peak fishing season for such fish strongly supports the argument presented above that economic motivations formed the principal reason for many fishermen to cross the line, especially in this region.

**Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima/Dokdo Islands)**

Despite the vociferous protests instigated by the Rhee regime from 1949, and the interweaving of the Liancourt Rocks into the problem after 1952, it seems the connection to the capture of fishing boats at this juncture to the rocks is indirect. No captures seem to have taken place in the vicinity of Takeshima/Dokdo between 1945 and early 1951.
The closest definite capture was a relatively sizable 106 NM (196.31 km) south of the rocks. However as these captures were much deeper into the permitted fishing zone it could be argued that Korean claims and their willingness to stress their sovereignty by capturing errant Japanese vessels extended far deeper into the Japanese zone than the Liancourt Rocks. An alternative argument here could also be that as these captures formed the most northerly of all those taken by the ROK, the Liancourt Rocks themselves, sitting some distance further north, could have been uncontested by the either or both sides at this stage, with the rocks only taking on significance later as a boundary marker for the Rhee Line.

A further interesting point here is that despite the current focus on the Liancourt Rocks, it seems that the area around Cheju was of much greater importance to Japanese fishermen, and Korean patrol vessels, in this era. With eight times as many captures (3 to 24) when compared to the Liancourt Rocks, the seas around Cheju seem to have been the principal contested zone at this stage. The prevalence of captures here also perhaps indicates the economic and food supply motivations behind the incursions by the Japanese fishermen, with the chance of sizable catches from the rich fishing grounds there perhaps seemingly being seen as justifying the risk of capture (see Figure 11). The waters around Cheju were a source of various types of fish, while those around the Liancourt Rocks were only famed for abalone, a less important and harder to harvest resource. It is therefore likely that the Japanese fishermen’s greater interest on Cheju rather than the Liancourt Rocks was motivated by the importance of the fisheries concerned, rather than pushing any territorial claims.
Conclusion

This paper has presented, through the context of the seizures of Japanese fishing vessels during the Occupation era, the potential usefulness of historical geospatial data both as a medium through which to examine specific historical issues and, by extension, the territorial disputes of contemporary North East Asia. These conclusions, with their basis in geospatial data and their relation to a line originally intended to be unconnected to sovereignty, arguably more accurately represent the ebb and flow of the actually enforced territorial limits of the actors involved than other forms of documentary evidence employed to date. The data presented here alongside the documentary sources upon which it is based could said be to present evidence that concerns over the food and economic security of Japan by GHQ, the Japanese government and Japanese fishermen were at least as strong as, and arguably stronger than, concerns over maritime sovereignty in this era. As noted in the introduction, this interpretation of the evidence could be used to challenge the assumptions made in some studies of the origins over Japan’s territorial disputes.

It is hoped that the maps and visualization presented here will be further employed by researchers studying the topics discussed above in the future and that they can be enhanced and built upon with additional data, especially from Chinese, Korean and Soviet sources. By adding alternative, and potentially conflicting perspectives to the GHQ/Japanese viewpoint presented here, these contributions could greatly enhance the conclusions presented here, and add the perspectives of Japan’s neighbors on these disputes, possibly including their own “infractions” of their neighbors’ maritime territory.

Although it is something of an initial experiment in the field, it is hoped that this paper may also serve as an example of the usefulness (where coordinates,
routes, or logs are available) of geospatial data within the discipline of maritime history, for example in tracking movement within maritime spaces, patterns of trade, and management and practice of resource gathering within the pelagic empires of other countries and regions.
Notes

1 This article is based on a paper first given at The European Association of Japanese Studies Conference, Kyoto University, 28–29 September 2013.


10 For more on questions over the coherency of the “reverse course” narrative see Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy (London: Continuum, 2002), 473.

11 For more on the “internal” and “external” Cold Wars see Thomas French, “Contested ‘Rearmament’: The National Police Reserve and Japan’s Cold War(s),” Japanese Studies 34.1 (May 2014): 25–36.


14 Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 274.


NRS 1913, COMNAVFE to CINCFE, April 19, 1951. The phrase “MacArthur Line” is used interchangeably by scholars in reference to the various positions of the line itself.

This map appears in Historical Section, GHQ, “History of Non-Military Activities in Japan, 1945 through 1950, Volume XIV, Natural Resources—Part B, Fisheries,” Tokyo, GHQ/SCAP, 1951.


NRS 1913, Katayanagi to SCAP, “Measures to Prevent the Violation of the Japanese Fishing Area Limitation,” August 10, 1948.


*Japan Times*, April 24, 1951; NRS 1913, SCAP to Commander, “United States Naval Forces, Far East,” March 15, 1951; NRS 1913, Commander Naval Forces, Far East to SCAP, March 15, 1951.


Ibid.


*Japan Times*, February 8, 1951.

*Japan Times*, February 8, 1951.


NRS 1913, Katayanagi to SCAP, “Measures to Prevent the Violation of the Japanese Fishing Area Limitation,” August 10, 1948.


50. NRS 1916, Mita to CNFE, undated.


52. For more on the transfer of ideas between the two occupations, particularly in regard to local security forces, see French, National Police Reserve: The Origin of Japan’s Self Defense Forces (Leiden: Global Oriental, 2014); French, “Contested ‘Rearmament’”; 25–36.


54. Some brief analysis of the initial struggles over ultimate authority over Korea between GHQ and USAMGIK appears in Takemae’s work, but there has been little more published on the relationship between the two. This is especially surprising when considering the voluminous amount written on, and importance attached to, the internal politics inside GHQ. See Takemae, Inside GHQ.


60. Ibid.


63. The differences mainly related to a difference in time frame; NRS 1914, Neville (NRS) to G3, April 1951.


65. Note the presence of modern infrastructure and contemporary land borders, a further shortcoming of some geospatial mapping services/sites.


68. The “Rhee Line” is depicted in Morris-Suzuki, Borderline Japan, 30; NRS 1914, “Memorandum for Record, Seizures of Japanese Fishing Boats by Koreans,” April 3, 1951.


Again, modern infrastructure and contemporary land borders are displayed.

The light green and red lines respectively indicate the late 1945 and 1946 limits of the “MacArthur Line.” The green diamond indicates the location of the Pinnacle Islands. Note contemporary ferry services and the position of un-locatable captures near Taipei.

Note error in base data (inland capture).


The light green and red lines respectively indicate the late 1945 and 1946 limits of the “MacArthur Line.” The light blue line indicates the 1952 “Rhee Line.” The green diamond indicates the position of the Liancourt Rocks.

Japan Times, April 24, 2013.

See note 78 for explanation of line colors.
Maps and Visualizations


References

Primary Sources
GHQ/SCAP Archives, National Diet Library, Tokyo.
ESS (B)
NRS 1911-1916
SCA-1, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Directives to the Japanese Government (SCAPINs)
UK Foreign Office Records, British National Archives, Kew.
FO 371/76218
FO 371/83846
FO 371/83847
FO 371/83849
FO 371/92621
FO 371/99417
FO 371/110420
FO 371/141444

Other Primary Sources
Japan Times. Various editions.
Ibid. 1949.
Secondary Sources


**Thomas French** is an Associate Professor in the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University. He is a specialist on US-Japanese relations and the Occupation of Japan, and his broader research interests include Japanese security, the Japanese arms industry, and the Self Defense Forces. He is the author of National Police Reserve: The Origin of Japan’s Self Defense Forces (Global Oriental, 2014), the first-ever book-length examination of the force which preceded the current SDF. He is currently working on a number of projects including an examination of the role of rearmament on Japan’s automotive industry, and a monograph on the history of the SDF. He is also a Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society and the UK Higher Education Academy.
Paternalism and Peril: Shifting U.S. Racial Perceptions of the Japanese and Chinese Peoples from World War II to the Early Cold War

Brandon P. Seto, Loyola Marymount University

Abstract:
Long before the carnage of the Pacific Theater in the Second World War commenced, U.S. government officials, scholars, shapers of public opinion, and the general public questioned the nature of Asian peoples. At the war’s outset, when faced with a visceral enemy and a prominent ally amongst the countries of Asia, officials and opinion-makers alike set out to educate the citizens of the United States about their Asian friends and foes. Many eminent historians such as John Dower, Yukiko Koshiro, and Christopher Thorne have chronicled the racial perceptions of the peoples of the United States and Japan towards one another during World War II and in the early stages of the Cold War, while other scholars have examined the U.S. racial perceptions of the Chinese in these same periods. Members of both scholarly groups acknowledge the transference of various stigmas and associations from Japan to China in the postwar period. As an analysis that looks at prevalent American racial attitudes toward the Japanese and Chinese peoples in both World War II and the Early Cold War, this article will help readers to understand better the nature of this transference. It will provide an introductory assessment of the varying U.S. orientalist and racial perceptions of the Chinese and Japanese peoples from World War II to the early postwar period.

Key Words: race, foreign policy, World War II, Cold War, China, Japan

Introduction and Background
Working from the assumption that racial attitudes and perceptions are fluid social constructs, this article examines the shifting American definitions of the Japanese and Chinese in terms of either paternalism or fears of the Yellow Peril. For the purposes of this article, the Yellow Peril refers to the orientalist conception of a threatening Asian “other” united in intrinsic opposition to the United States and its allies, and devoted to their destruction. The ways that American perceptions of the Chinese and Japanese can change between perilous threat and paternalistic ward in relation to U.S. perspectives, beliefs, and current interests are central to this analysis. More broadly, this case highlights the role that racial perceptions play in U.S. relations.

Such an examination presents a different sort of peril in terms of generalization and conclusions made regarding the groups under consideration. Paternalistic notions and perceptions of a perilous Asian threat represent two prominent characterizations of the Chinese and Japanese peoples in the minds of many Americans. While these characterizations are the focus of this article, additional popular and academic views on the Japanese and Chinese people existed. These included, among others, economic concerns and gendered portrayals. The author wishes to stress that this article represents an attempt at
an accessible, explanatory synthesis of these far-ranging and complex issues. By doing so, the author seeks to provide a wide-angle perspective of American racial perceptions regarding the Japanese and Chinese peoples during these periods in the hopes that particularly students and non-specialists will gain a more comprehensive understanding of these historical trends. This study is not meant to be exhaustive in terms of cataloging all related U.S. racial beliefs, but rather demonstrative of their existence and influence on various groups within the American people regarding perceptions of the Chinese and Japanese. Aspects or implications of these perceptions continue to inform the United States’ relations with these two countries to the present day and this article invites readers to observe and to ponder the role of racial perceptions in U.S. foreign relations with China and Japan.

Fleshing out this context requires a small amount of background information. Orientalism refers to the notion of intrinsic otherness about the peoples of Asia and the Middle East as they seem to look, act, think, worship, and value in ways diametrically opposed to those of Europe and North America.\(^1\) For example, whereas the United States is supposedly an open democratic society that values individualism and human life, so-called oriental peoples were thought to prefer oppressive, cruel, authoritarian societies and care nothing for the individual or for human life. In the case of both the Chinese and Japanese, the American historical experience with these two peoples in the time leading up to the Second World War subsequently informed many Americans’ wartime perceptions of them.\(^2\)

Even before the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan, the American peoples’ relationship with Chinese revolved around the paternalistic notion of the people of China as the Americans’ little yellow brothers, who needed U.S. help and guidance if they were to survive and to prosper. The Chinese were to be molded in the American image and it was imperative that they follow the United States’ direction. Following the decay of the imperial system, propping up China’s fledgling democracy became imperative to the U.S., especially in the face of the Japanese onslaught of the 1930s.\(^3\)

In contrast, Japan exemplified the Yellow Peril in the early twentieth century. A popular novel written by Homer Lea in 1909 called *The Valor of Ignorance* spun a tale of the Japanese invading the Western United States and conquering large portions of the Pacific Coast.\(^4\) Although such an eventuality seemed far-fetched, U.S. conflict with Japan was not impossible. Despite the ostensible support of Teddy Roosevelt for the Japanese and later Japanese membership in the Entente in World War I, American policymakers did not envisage Japan as a true equal power. One can look at Woodrow Wilson’s rejection of the Japanese proposal of a racial equality amendment to the League of Nations Covenant, and subsequent Japanese ire, to glimpse the possibility of conflict to come.\(^5\) The 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria stoked such concerns.

Before 1931, the U.S. had treated Japan with some degree of paternalistic dismissal despite its efforts to “modernize” or “Westernize” after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Nevertheless, many U.S. officials believed that the chief threat to U.S. interests in Asia would be Japan, but continued to underestimate the Japanese even after their invasion of Northern China which touched off the
Sino-Japanese War in 1937. The nation that claimed to have combined Euro-American technique and knowledge with Japanese spirit did not, in the eyes of most U.S. leaders, register as a true great power. Of course these feelings would change rapidly with the beginning of World War II in the Pacific and the birth of a Japanese bogeyman imbued with all the fears of the Yellow Peril.  

**Perceptions of the Japanese around the Time of World War II**

As tensions mounted in 1941 and the possibility of war with Japan grew, many in the United States Military did not believe that the Japanese would pose much of a challenge. A young U.S. naval officer and later a rear admiral, Gene LaRocque, stationed at Pearl Harbor in the summer of 1941 recalled his and many of his peers’ estimation of the Japanese, “We’d thought they were little brown men and we were the great big white men. They were of a lesser species. The Germans were well-known as tremendous fighters and builders, whereas the Japanese would be a pushover.” Prior to encountering the Japanese in combat, many misconceptions abounded with respect to their physiological defects and lack of ingenuity, not to mention their fighting skill. LaRocque elaborated on the widespread impression that “the Japanese didn’t see well, especially at night—we knew this as a matter of fact. We knew they couldn’t build good weapons, they made junky equipment, they just imitated us. All we had to do was get out there and sink ‘em.” Although conflict could certainly occur, in many ways the thought remained that Japan and its subjects lagged behind the United States and its citizens and thus did not pose a serious threat. The Japanese had yet to morph into Asian bogeymen.

This outlook pervaded not only the armed forces, but also the government, academia, and the public at large. John Dower has chronicled the multifaceted underestimation of the Japanese by various groups in the United States. Throughout the years preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, Americans remained convinced that among many other things, the Japanese suffered from physiological defects like nearsightedness, balance problems, and numerous vague issues related to brain function. Furthermore, they lacked the industrial and military prowess of the American people to produce effective weapons of war, and to employ them in a skillful and strategic manner. Rather, the Japanese relied upon poor facsimiles of Euro-American technology and convoluted and irrational thought processes that would inevitably produce farcical military engagements when faced with a Euro-American adversary.

Of course all of this would change on December 7, 1941, when the Japanese transformed in the imagination of the U.S. government, military, and citizenry into a superhuman threat, compounded by fears of the Yellow Peril. Disbelief quickly turned to disdain, bitter hatred, and a search for vengeance. After the war ended, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the U.S. commander at Pearl Harbor during attack, was questioned as to why he was caught so thoroughly off-guard by the Japanese assault. His response to these inquires revealed both his underestimation of the Japanese people and his persistent racism as he exclaimed “I never thought those little yellow sons-of-bitches could pull off such an attack, so far from Japan.” Put another way from Larocque’s perspective, “It turns out they could see better than we could and their torpedoes, unlike ours, worked.”
Indeed the Japanese would have to pay for their impudence, as they had stoked the fire of U.S. outrage, and put the nation face-to-face with the possibility of defeat by a yellow horde armed with Western knowledge and all of the savagery and mysticism of the Asian race. To combat this threat, many in the United States would dehumanize the Japanese people as the living manifestation of everything that was not American and thus, the worst kind of evil.

The Japanese manifestation of the Yellow Peril endangered the conceit of the United States and European leadership that they could not be challenged by a mere Asian power. Their worldview revolved around the assessment that whiteness would always trump any Asian opponent no matter how threatening they might be. While this had been called into question with Japan’s 1905 defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had not tested its mettle against the United States directly. The Japanese attack on Hawaii tore down the edifice of American confidence, as historian Thomas Borstelmann has noted that “Japanese audacity in attacking U.S. territory had challenged the very structure of white supremacy that suffused American life in 1941.”

This shocked reverberated into the hearts, minds, and societies of the Euro-American world as it “threatened not just the political order of the western Pacific, but also the social order of the United States and the European colonies.” Borstelmann adroitly points out the supporting sentiment expressed by Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles that “The thesis of white supremacy could only exist so long as the white race actually proved supreme.”

Pearl Harbor called white supremacy into question and brought the Yellow Peril to the United States’ doorstep. *Time* magazine crafted a particularly dramatic impression in one of its earliest post-attack magazine covers featuring Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander-in-chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet. Forgoing subtlety, *Time* made the true nature of the enemy abundantly clear. The cover depicted both the background and Yamamoto’s face “entirely in a vivid and lurid yellow.” *Collier’s* magazine eschewed foreboding albeit human depictions of the Japanese and instead printed a cover picture “portraying a Japanese general as a blood-sucking bat flying over the United States ready to drop a bomb.” In publications and in the popular consciousness of the people who read them, the Japanese could exist as malicious subhuman creatures bent on the destruction of the American nation itself.

Following the opening gambit of the war, Japanese territorial advances throughout the Pacific including the Philippines and portions of Southeast Asia also called the order and outlook of white superiority into question. After losing the Philippines, the main U.S. Pacific base in Asia, and getting word through newspapers and newsreels of Japanese depravity and merciless treatment of American POWs, vast segments of the American public were sent reeling. Within months, the pall of Japanese imperialism approached Australia, the last major Pacific Allied stronghold. In *Paramount News* newsreel compilations of wartime proceedings, viewers were exposed to grim stories of the march of Japanese conquest. During a 1942 reel, the narrator exclaims “The Japs have made a fantastic conquest clear to the gates of India and Australia, and now Alaska!” referring to the Japanese invasion of the Aleutian Islands in that same year. With American soil compromised, far more than military and political
superiority hung in the balance. The danger posed by the Japanese transcended hazard to land, life, and limb, and extended to the paradigm of white superiority over Asian peoples.

From this fear flowed a multitude of stereotypes and stigmas related to the Japanese and their ominous, irredeemable nature. Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor in January 1942, a government report compiled by the U.S. Office of War Information revealed that forty-one percent of Americans held the opinion that the Japanese “will always want to go to war to make themselves as powerful as possible.” Americans felt that they were facing a foe fueled by militarism and an intense desire to dominate. This conception contrasted sharply with America’s idealized self-image as a reluctant but ready and valiant defender of freedom.

While bigotry towards people of Japanese descent long predated World War II, conceptions of their sub-humanity merged with visions of a cruel, unstoppable juggernaut storming across the Pacific. E. B. Sledge, a Marine who fought in the Pacific War on Guadalcanal and Peleliu commented after the war, “You developed an attitude of no mercy because they had no mercy on us. It was a no quarter, savage kind of thing.” Much of this take-no-prisoners attitude came from indoctrination that U.S. servicemen encountered during their training. Sledge’s boot camp drill instructor had exhorted the recruits “Don’t be afraid to fight the Japs dirty.” Experience of the general inhumane treatment of both sides in the Pacific Theater likely affirmed this conclusion. Sledge reflected that “This hatred towards the Japanese was just a natural feeling that developed elementally.”

While this sentiment may have felt elemental, in actuality it sprung from the dominant consensus of U.S. society regarding the nature of the Japanese. Many servicemen in the Pacific Theater were inundated by stories replete with vile characterizations of the Japanese. Roger Tuttrup remembered the narrative imparted to him by the Marine Corps as being filled with assertions that “the Japs are lousy, sneaky, and treacherous - watch out for them.” Robert Lekachman, who served in the Army, recounted that he “had been fed tales of these yellow thugs, sub-humans, with teeth that resembled fangs. If a hundred thousand Japs were killed, so much the better.” All of these traits stood in contrast to the presumption of righteousness on the United States’ side. An enemy this heinous deserved no consideration. The Japanese had to be defeated and if meeting them on their own terms would remove the danger, then so be it. In this way, wholesale slaughter would relieve the burden of the Yellow Peril on the United States.

It was not enough simply to slay Japanese on the battlefield. In case of the United States’ citizenry, widespread anxieties related to the Yellow Peril arrived on their shores with the first wave of immigrants from Asia. From these earliest days to the time in question, Asians, whether American citizens or not, were seen as perpetual foreigners in the United States. When the war began, suspicion of all peoples of Japanese descent, including citizens, pervaded the West Coast and beyond. After Pearl Harbor, second generation Japanese Americans called *nisei* had their businesses boycotted and often fared no better than their first generation parents called *issei* when it came to falling prey to hysteria and violence. One *nisei*, Charles Kikuchi, recorded some instances of people in the
United States lashing out at those of Japanese descent indiscriminately as though they were all threats to the nation. Kikuchi recounted a police officer sneering at a *nisei* storeowner saying “You ask me to be decent after what you ‘Japs’ did to Hawaii?” Furthermore, he related an incident where a “Crowd in Montana attempt[ed] to lynch a ‘Jap.’” Also, some peoples of Chinese descent, fearful of such orientalist anger, chose to wear “Chinese flags so they won’t be mistaken for Japanese.” Rationality could not compete with the dragnet conflation of all persons of Japanese descent, and sometimes even other Asian-descended peoples, as traitors or a menace to the United States.

The feeling for many in the press, the government, and the public at large was that those of Japanese descent could never be loyal to the United States, and instead would always serve Japan. As the *Los Angeles Times* put it “A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched—so a Japanese American, born of Japanese parents—grows up to be a Japanese, not an American.” California Attorney General Earl Warren, later Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, captured the essence of the danger posed by these supposed enemies from within, when he stated that they “may well be the Achilles heel of the entire civilian defense effort,” and that “Unless something is done it may bring about a repetition of Pearl Harbor.” All Japanese and Japanese Americans seemed to be spies and saboteurs in waiting.

Appeals to do something about this supposed nascent threat came from many members of the government, military, and society at large. These urgings played into pre-existing ideas about people of Japanese descent and helped precipitate Franklin Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066. This order gave Lieutenant General John DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command, the authority to inter over 120,000 people of Japanese descent on the West Coast, two-thirds of whom were American citizens. Apparently the gross violation of their civil liberties paled in comparison to the need to contain the imagined fifth column threat emanating from within the United States.

As the war dragged on, many Americans grew ever more fearful of Japanese atrocity, cruelty, and zealotry. As American forces gradually turned the Japanese back and pushed closer to their home islands, resistance stiffened. This fortified U.S. resolve to punish and to defeat the Asian enemy. Matthew Jones, in his excellent study of the role of race and nuclear weapons in Asia asserts that “the bitter fighting during the Pacific island campaigns…paved the way for Hiroshima and Nagasaki: the devastation of the two cities was regarded by most Americans as just retribution for the treacherous attacks in 1941.” This is not to say that racial hatred was the deciding factor in the whether or not to drop the atomic bombs on Japan, but it certainly must have functioned as a reassurance for many Americans regarding the decision. Reflecting his ambivalence on the usage of the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, President Harry Truman stated “I can’t bring myself to believe that, because they are beasts, we should ourselves act in the same manner.” Ultimately Truman conceded that dropping the second bomb was necessary and he overcame his doubts for the time being. Despite this vacillation, one thing was certain, the Japanese were beasts and they had to be stopped one way or another.
Perceptions of the Chinese around the Time of World War II

While the United States strove to crush the Japanese menace, it also worked to engender positive feelings, associations, and support for its primary Asian ally in the region, China. This became even more urgent now that the Chinese were helping the United States contain Japanese forces on the Asian mainland. For all the talk of alliances and even of the leadership role the Chinese would play in the postwar world, much of the U.S. regard for the Chinese during World War II remained couched in the realm of paternalism. This manifested in many ways from a resolve to save the Chinese from Japan, and the need to promote China as a stable ally in the region over whom the United States could maintain influence and a degree of control.

Most of the general populace in the United States agreed with the developing consensus that Japan was the “villain” while China was the “good guy.” Earlier American experience with the Chinese in the form of missionary, commercial, and cultural encounters, according to Rana Mitter, encouraged a misperception that the “Chinese aspired to become like Americans, and that it was the job of the Americans to train them to achieve that goal.” Consequently the Chinese needed U.S. support and assistance as Americans had a duty to guard their little Asian brother. Continued Japanese atrocities, like the brutal rape and destruction inflicted on the Chinese capital of Nanjing only undergirded these assumptions. Subsequently, the United States would funnel hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to its beleaguered Chinese friends in order to stave off collapse under the weight of Japanese tyranny.

Embedded deeply in much of the American population’s feelings about China, there existed an image of the Chinese people as a noble and virtuous victim of Japanese rape and abuse. This formulation reveals the influence of paternalistic perceptions of the Chinese. The violence wrought upon them by the Japanese hardened the hatred of many in the United States towards Japan while it concurrently enshrined the victimhood of the Chinese as a sort of damsel in distress. In whatever form, the idea of the Chinese as a loyal, albeit lesser, people took root in American understanding of their allies. Popular magazines like Life emphasized the great kinship of China with the United States by calling them “a great potential force for freedom and democracy in Asia.” Naturally to reach this potential, China required the wisdom and the patronage of the United States. Publisher Henry Luce, an ardent supporter of the Chinese, captured the spirit of paternalism here as he regarded China as “America’s ward.” Steeped in these parental terms, Luce turned the efforts of his publishing empire including Time, Life, and Fortune magazines to promoting within the public’s imagination the resolution that China “would be raised up to become a Christian, democratic, industrial nation that mirrored its American ‘parent.’” Not only did the United States have a responsibility to protect and to save its Asian charge, but also to uplift it. The Chinese would better themselves by internalizing U.S. political, economic, and cultural ideals. To accomplish this, the government of the United States and its constituents looked to the leader of Nationalist China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Although Chiang vacillated between the need for governance in China and his often competing and overruling desires for power, wealth, and diminishment of his communist rivals, he generally
received favorable evaluations by the American public. Chiang enjoyed the near pathological support of Henry Luce and members of Congress known as the China Lobby. Relentlessly, they pushed for greater support for China overall while glorifying Chiang. The American public found themselves bombarded by countless articles and editorials extolling the virtues of Chiang and his leadership.

Members of the U.S. military painted august portraits of the Generalissimo even in the late 1930s when Admiral Harry Yarnell, commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet praised Chiang as a “Man of Destiny” and one who “personified Chinese resistance to Japan.” U.S. missionaries in China often called Chiang and his wife “the most enlightened, patriotic, and able rulers.” In reality Chiang ran a corrupt, often ineffectual government, and hapless military campaign against the Japanese. Conspiracies and weaknesses both personal and professional bedeviled him, and this fact was not lost on his many detractors in the United States. For the time being however, he figured as the most viable leader aligned with U.S. interests in the region. While it meant U.S. officials had to overlook his many faults, the United States threw its support behind Chiang. Many inside and outside the U.S. government believed that this backing constituted a virtual blank check to remake China in America’s image.

Many U.S. authors’ favorable treatment of the Chinese people helped to reinforce these positions amongst the American public. Often these authors heralded what they saw as the virtue of the Chinese and depicted them as the antithesis of the loathsome Japanese. Pearl S. Buck’s well-known 1931 novel, The Good Earth, portrayed the Chinese peasantry as “facing incredible natural and human-made hardships with courage and devotion to family.” Later, The Good Earth would become the most popular movie ever made in the United States, up until that point, about Asians. While definitely not the entire story, the popularity of such portrayals displays their acceptance by the American public as a representation of the Chinese. Buck persistently supported the Chinese and did much to represent them as good Asians, as opposed to the Japanese. Her motives appeared pure but the tone of these concepts carried with it elements of romanticism and paternalism. The Chinese existed as simple, hardworking people who have learned to endure almost perpetual tragedy. Public opinion polls showed that Americans viewed the Chinese most commonly using the words “honest, hard-working, brave, and religious.” For the time being, much of the public described Chinese values as kindred to those of the United States.

For Buck, rescue could come in the form of U.S. financial and military aid as she depicted the Chinese as “anti-Japanese resistance fighters” akin to “American pioneers” or “armed peasants” who could fight for and promote the cause of democracy in Asia. Again, the considerable audience for Buck’s work and the concept of the “Americanized Chinese peasant” bespeaks of what Colleen Lye has called the “resonance with the U.S. need for developing a proxy presence in Asia.” While Buck evoked the supposed nostalgic pioneer commonalities between Americans and the Chinese, a status relationship nevertheless existed in the popular conception. However much the Chinese may have reminded Americans of their imagined rugged, democracy-spreading past, the role of the Chinese was cast mainly in terms of how they could serve U.S. interests.
Even Chinese communists received propitious reviews from American citizens who read the works of authors Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley, both of whom had traveled widely in China. Snow recounted his travels with the Red Army in China in his 1938 work *Red Star Over China*, which presented communist leader Mao Zedong in an positive manner. Smedley’s *Battle Hymn of China*, published in 1943, depicts her experiences with the Red Army and also characterizes its cause in a complimentary fashion. Interestingly, both books attained wide readership and favorable reviews from the American public. It appeared that whether communist or nationalist, the Chinese complemented Americans as innate allies.

Shortly after the United States joined the war, *Time* magazine ran a now infamous article which provided a guide for Americans to discern their Chinese friends from their Japanese enemies. Along with a picture diagramming the various generalized features of the two peoples, which called forth some unseemly pseudoscientific parallels, the magazine printed a description which bears some partial repetition,

The Chinese expression is more likely to be placid, kindly, open; the Japanese more positive, dogmatic, arrogant. Japanese are hesitant, nervous in conversation, laugh loudly at the wrong time. Japanese walk stiffly erect, hard heeled. Chinese, more relaxed, have an easy gait, sometimes shuffle.

From this categorization, the Japanese existed as antagonistic and hostile, whereas the article portrayed the Chinese as good-natured and even charming. Somehow the language also evokes the image of the Chinese as amiable simpletons. Opinion-makers like *Time* worked to advance the view of the stark divide or essential difference between the two peoples.

Alliance with the Chinese seemed quite natural, especially given that they were what the *New York Times* called “a loyal ally with… inexhaustible manpower.” U.S. alliance and aid married with the legions of potential Chinese troops would make a tremendously effective opposition force against Japan. Looking ahead to the postwar world, U.S. leaders placed China at the heart of their Asian policy. Secretary of State Cordell Hull remarked that “If there was ever to be stability in the Far East, it had to be assured with China at the center of any arrangement that was made.” Franklin Roosevelt famously envisioned a postwar order maintained by the ubiquitous Four Policemen, one of whom being China, who would provide stability in Asia, a perennial U.S. concern.

There existed alongside feelings of altruism and empathy a brutal strategic calculus in assisting the Chinese. They could serve “as a vast punching bag on which the Japanese would wear themselves out...If U.S. aid allowed Chinese resistance to continue, Japan’s military expansion could be stymied.” The Chinese could bog down significant Japanese military forces on the mainland. While saving its little brother in Asia, the United States could also reap the benefits of their seemingly indefatigable ally. As many in the press and inside the U.S. government lauded the Chinese people, they repeatedly referred to China as a spoiler who could preoccupy Japan. The much more advanced and capable United States could then come in and finish the job.

For FDR this logic extended into the postwar period where, as one of his hypothetical Four Policemen, China would serve as a de facto proxy for the
United States in the new international order. The president formulated this idea much to the chagrin of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who rather unfortunately labeled this as a “faggot vote” for the United States. In this dynamic, Churchill fretted that the Chinese would act as a puppet in support of the U.S. agenda, outnumbering the already beleaguered British. As a junior partner, China enjoyed U.S. aid and support, but they came with the expectation that the Chinese would reinforce U.S. interests in wartime and aid in the creation of a new international order at the war’s conclusion.

**Becoming Friends with the Japanese in the Early Postwar Era**

For the Japanese, the end of the war meant a nation devastated and an empire lying in ashes. From those ruins rose a reconceived Japanese nation, one based on U.S. ideals and values. This reborn Japan would occupy an eerily similar place in the U.S. imagination as wartime China had. As ideological rivalries threatened to consume China, Japan would evolve from specter of Yellow Peril to the American people’s new little Asian brother. The time for reform had come, and with it a shifting both of alliances in Asia and comprehensions of the Chinese and Japanese people.

John Foster Dulles, diplomat and future secretary of state, argued that the Japanese hungered to join the elite Anglo-Saxon club and that the U.S. could take advantage of those feelings in order to build a model Japanese nation aligned with U.S. values and interests. The alteration of previous U.S. attitudes towards the Japanese demonstrates what John Dower has called the malleability of racial perceptions in Asia. Formerly the scourge of the region, the Japanese and their nation transformed into the United States’ project for rehabilitation and enhancement, along lines envisioned by U.S. leaders.

A Paramount News newsreel from 1946, entitled *The Search for Peace*, proclaimed that “Japan must never be allowed to march again…her fanatic barbarism, her war plans must be erased, and Japan’s mind must be trained to the ways of peace and cleansed of the will to war.” Invoking orientalist stereotypes, the narrator of the film went on to say that the American military was up to the task as “GI Joes have trained fez-bedecked Arabs and worked with highland natives,” and further that “much of the world looks to these United States as the guardian of civilization.” For Americans spanning from average moviegoers to political and military officials, the work ahead in Japan seemed clear. At first the former adversary needed to become a pro-democratic, peaceful nation, and later as geopolitical circumstances evolved, a U.S. ally in the Cold War. Despite this shift in goals with the 1947 Reverse Course in U.S. policy during the Occupation, paternalism remained a central facet of U.S.-Japan relations. The Japanese Yellow Peril had given way and now Japan had become the United States’ ward in desperate need of education in order to become a virtuous and good Asian nation.

These connotations all contain assertions of U.S. superiority and Japanese inferiority relating to their need to assimilate and to acculturate to purported American values and ideals like democracy and, in Douglas MacArthur’s opinion, Christianity. As the head of the Occupation, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas MacArthur described his role as a
father figure who would reform the misbehaving Japanese. He characterized his position as a “job of raising seventy million problem children.” MacArthur, having lived and served in Asia for many years, often claimed as other U.S. officials did, to have an exceptional understanding of Asian peoples. From his posting atop the Occupation hierarchy, he would disseminate all-too-familiar notions to those under his command.

On one occasion he explained that the course of Japan’s historical and racial evolution was due to the fact that as “Oriental peoples” they “suffer from an inferiority complex which leads them to ‘childish brutality’ when they conquer in war and to slavish dependence when they lose.” Neither MacArthur nor most members of his staff had any firsthand knowledge of Japan or its people before the war. Unfortunately, this did not prevent the Supreme Commander from making sweeping generalizations and mischaracterizations of the Japanese. Reflecting upon his work in the Occupation and the nature of the Japanese, he remarked that the Japanese “in spite of their antiquity measured by time, were in a very tuitionary condition. Measured by the standard of modern civilization, they would be like a boy of twelve as compared to our own development of forty-five years.” While this condescending comment provoked outrage among many Japanese people, MacArthur meant it somewhat favorably. In his estimation, the Japanese were a childish and misguided people, so it was no surprise that they had fallen prey to extremist ideologies and religions like an impressionable youth. Now the United States needed to help people whom MacArthur believed did not possess the ability to reform themselves. The defeated Japanese needed the sagacity of strong parent figure to put them on the proper course. Determinations such as these coupled with the Supreme Commander’s sweeping authority over the conduct and tenor of the Occupation shows that such thinking played a role in the execution of U.S. policy.

Members of SCAP, an acronym which also came to refer to the Occupation force as a whole, carried their own ideas of their fitness to rule and to remake Japan. Even the often well-intentioned New Dealers who came to work in Japan as part of a grander global crusade to bring about liberal reforms outside the United States were complicit in the belief that they knew what was best for Japan. U.S. troops serving in the Occupation force also laid claim to a good deal of racial condescension exemplified in the usage of terms like “Babysan” for Japanese women.

In many ways, the American Occupation of Japan resembled an updated version of the colonial projects of yesteryear. Armed with the same notions of paternalism, the United States set out on a new civilizing mission in Asia or a revised white man’s burden. As Dower has stated “Their reformist agenda rested on the assumption that, virtually without exception, Western culture and its values were superior to those of the ‘Orient.’” Steadfast in their conviction, MacArthur and his men descended upon the nation with confidence and bravado, self-assured that they had the prescription for its ills.

The Supreme Commander declared to the Japanese people on December 27, 1945, that they had been saved from the “shackles of militarism, of feudalism, of regimentation of body and soul.” He went on to declare that the Japanese could now enjoy democratic freedoms and a society free from “national
enslavement.” Whereas the militarists had led the Japanese family state astray, the new father figure, MacArthur and by extension the United States, would step in to make things right. From the outset, the Supreme Commander made it crystal clear to the Japanese who was in charge and who knew best for Japan. As a member of Occupation’s Civil Information and Education Section remarked to a Japanese newsman, “General MacArthur desires it to be understood that the Allied Powers do not regard Japan as an equal in any way.”

Japan was reconstructed with two central goals in mind: demilitarization and democratization. The United States according to the Supreme Commander could bring to “hundreds of millions of backward peoples, now easy prey to the ignorant fatalism of war,” what he called a “heretofore unknown spiritual strength based upon an entirely new concept of human dignity and human purpose and human relationship.” During the war, the United States had lambasted Japan as a nation of cattle or sheep that mindlessly obeyed the commands of their leaders to violent and disastrous effect. Now, these so-called “backward peoples” had a new shepherd to guide them out of darkness and into the light.

As impressions of the Japanese as a heartless and ferocious people faded, they were replaced by amicable, almost romanticized imagery. Life magazine’s 1945 Christmas edition featured descriptions of the return of Japanese soldiers to their farms and to their peaceful, bucolic, industrious lifestyle. Supposedly this process occurred all over Japan and the magazine entreats the reader to see the Japanese as a “frugal” and “hard-working” people who needed uplift and salvation. Journalist John LaCerda published in 1946 the book *The Conqueror Comes to Tea: Japan Under MacArthur* in which he explicated the Japanese character in a non-threatening and condescending manner as he claimed the average Japanese “is a sensitive and shy person, who suffers from a national inferiority complex.” The New York Times characterized the United States’ former enemies in 1947 as “docile, meek little Japanese.” Gone from the zeitgeist were images of the Japanese as beasts and monsters, and instead the American media reconceived them as pliant and agreeable people.

Japan’s place as the United States’ charge and student would become all the more important as the initial reform phase of the Occupation gave way to the recovery phase. In 1947, high ranking officials in the U.S. military and government called with increasing insistence for Japan’s rapid rehabilitation and installment as a partner in the burgeoning battle against communism. To counter the looming communist threat, Japan would serve as a bulwark against the insidious ideology. China’s fall to communism in October of 1949 brought forth fresh urgency for this new dynamic. The outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950 magnified this issue as the United States needed to secure a firm and devoted ally in Asia to counter the assault of monolithic communism and its masses of villainous Asian devotees.

Harry Truman and his successor, Dwight Eisenhower worked to “keep the Japanese on our side” while revitalizing Japan as what Dean Acheson called the “workshop of Asia” that would support the United States’ Cold War mission. Truman stated that he agreed with these notions as, “his own thoughts had been following the same line” regarding the potential for Japan. In this way,
Japan arose as the lynchpin of the United States’ policy in Asia and the Japanese became valuable allies. Navy and later Defense Secretary James Forrestal argued that in order to counter the communist threat that the U.S. needed to put “Japan and the other affiliates of the Axis back to work.” Though the Japanese would benefit from this relationship in many ways, especially in economics and defense, they persisted as a junior, albeit necessary partner. Like China before it, Japan would receive U.S. aid and assistance as the United States’ new little brother in Asia. These policies continued into the Eisenhower administration, which also viewed Japan as a subordinate nation. Patronage nevertheless occurred in Japan’s favor, on numerous occasions, as in 1955 when the United States pushed through Japan’s membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade over European objections.

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, U.S. officials presumed that they alone could undertake the new civilizing mission in Japan calling for its benevolent assimilation. The United States put forth demilitarization and democratization as a framework for rehabilitation and recovery, and then later superseded those tenets with the need to resurrect Japan as a junior partner in the Cold War. In both phases, altered racial perceptions of the Japanese as compliant, juvenile, naïve, but redeemable people guided the formulation and implementation of policy. Towards the conclusion of the Occupation, a 1951 Reader’s Digest article claimed the United States had brought about a “complete medical revolution” in Japan, which made it the “healthiest” nation in Asia. The United States with its considerable maturity and wisdom had cured its sick patient nation and turned it into a reliable colleague whose people accepted that “the people of America are their friends.”

Rebranding the Communist Chinese as Enemies

Just as foes could become friends, friends could become foes, as the case would be with China. After a ruinous war, internecine conflict resumed in China, a nation plagued by weak central governance and widespread poverty. With the Japanese common enemy gone, the nationalists and communists turned their attention to the destruction of the other. Despite the vociferous calls of the China Lobby for the United States to aid the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) against the growing Chinese communist forces under Mao Zedong, many in the Truman administration increasingly viewed this fight as a lost cause. In a June 1947 memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) expressed the viewpoint that while the Nationalists indeed had weaknesses like corruption and decreasing favorability amongst the general Chinese populace, they were still the best force for countering the expansion of communist influence in the region. Despite the recommendations of the JCS, the failings of Chiang and the fissures of the KMT would inspire within the Truman administration a lack of faith in their viability. Many China experts in the State Department known as China Hands communicated the myriad problems weighing upon the KMT and the fact that without massive military and economic aid it would probably succumb to the communists. Secretary of State Dean Acheson would later cite these concerns in 1949 as an explanation of the Truman administration’s position that the Chinese
Nationalists and citizenry would lose China to the communists through their own faults, regardless of the actions of the United States. This eventuality came to pass with Mao’s declaration of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949.\footnote{62}

For many in the U.S. government and in society at large, China’s fall to communism constituted a cataclysmic event and in the eyes of some, a failure of Truman and his administration. Those who knew better had their voices largely drowned out by the excoriations of Truman’s critics. Many Americans developed an almost hysterical concern that the most populous nation in the world had become communist and was thus “lost” by the United States. The communist groundswell would merge with fears of monolithic communism and a resurgent Yellow Peril. A communist China that could call upon the Asian horde had teamed up with the Soviet Union, which had in 1949 developed its own atomic weaponry. Together, these events rekindled Yellow Peril paranoia in the United States. While the focus of this section of the essay centers on the Chinese, it is important to note that alongside fear of the PRC came inflammatory statements that asserted that the Soviets, with whom the Chinese communists were supposedly working in concert, were actually Asiatic as well and thus prone to all of the most vile orientalist stereotypes of Asians.

Following the rise of the PRC, the Chinese would take up the mantle held by the Japanese as fanatical, savage conformists with no will of their own save what Moscow and Beijing dictated to them. As Christian Klein has stated, “the news media presented the Chinese under Mao as an inscrutable mass of political fanatics, a conformist colony of blue-suited ants.”\footnote{63} Much of what made acid churn in the stomachs of Americans had to do with not only the reconceived villainy of the Chinese but also their ingratitude.\footnote{64} The Chinese had received a great deal of material and moral support from the United States. Subsequently, U.S. citizens and officials felt a deep sense of betrayal that scores of the Chinese people had turned against their American guardians after all that they had done for them.

Perhaps no single prior event did more to confirm the danger of communism than the eruption of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 with North Korea’s invasion of the South. This outbreak seemed to validate the paranoia of many Americans that communism was monolithic, expansionistic, and militaristic. It seemed to confirm that these Asian peoples were predisposed to extremist ideologies and behaviors. In addition to corroborating communist North Korea’s part, with the backing of the USSR, in the yellow menace, it also verified Chinese manifestations of this nightmare.

After largely successful U.S.-led efforts to push the North Koreans back into their territory, Douglas MacArthur, commanding U.S. and United Nations forces, advanced well into North Korea near the Yalu River and the PRC-North Korean border. MacArthur elicited Chinese consternation with his conduct of the campaign, and eventually prompted the invasion of Korea by Chinese forces on November 25, 1950. China’s involvement raised the stakes of the war and American racial paranoia. When word of China’s participation in the Korean War reached the United States, editors like Hanson Baldwin at the \textit{New York Times} speculated wildly about the mobilization of masses of Asians with evil intent.
He claimed that following the Chinese may be “Mongolians, Soviet Asiatics, and a variety of races” all of whom represented “the most primitive of peoples.” Perhaps the only thing more terrifying than one horde of Asians was their ability to call other sympathetic groups to their Anti-American banner.

With the U.S.-led forces rocked back on their heels by the Chinese thrust into Korea, old demons resurrected in the new incarnation of the Chinese Red Army. An American newsreel proclaimed that U.S. forces “were being routed by Chinese Red Army Legions, treacherously forced into this war by the unscrupulous leaders of international communism. The G.I.s battle new elements with everything they have, but the latest Communist perfidy in Korea makes the picture grim.” Traits formerly held by the Japanese appear here in redrafted form such as in the Chinese simultaneously being treacherous and manipulative while also acting like mindless cattle. Even if the Chinese were coerced by their leaders, newsreels like this one propagated the conception of them being too intrinsically weak to resist. The incursion of the Chinese Red Army had implications beyond security concerns, including Chinese duplicity, lack of scruples, and callous sacrifice of lives.

Narratives came pouring forth that exposed the nature of the nefarious Chinese communist forces. Dan Gilbert, an influential evangelical Christian writer, drew parallels between the Chinese offensive and the end of days detailed in the Book of Revelation. He stated that the “rampaging Yellow Peril [emphasis in original] will launch mass slaughters that will take the lives of one-third of the human race.” Invoking the intersection of the Red Menace and the Yellow Peril, Gilbert went on to claim that “The Yellow Peril will sweep on, reinforced by the Red Terror, to spread the deeds of the devil and the crimes of Communism all over the world.” China’s hordes possessed no qualms about sacrificing themselves or others, which made them unstoppable when combined with their human wave tactics. An account entitled Red China’s Fighting Hordes written by U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Brigg, who had survived captivity by the Chinese, portrays the enemy as “countless masses of uninformed robots” dominated by an inherent “sadism and brutality.” Along the line of the subhuman to superhuman dynamic previously embodied by the Japanese, the Chinese defied the expectation that they lacked technical proficiency. A member of the Eisenhower administration recalled, “I was brought up to think the Chinese couldn’t handle a machine. Now suddenly the Chinese are flying jets!” Along with these stereotypes, stories emerged that the Chinese and North Koreans could brainwash American POWs, which led to around twenty-two of them deciding to stay in Korea after the war.

Once again, Asians called upon their mystical and occult oriental powers to warp the brains of innocent Americans. This concern married with fears of infiltrators or sleeper agents in the United States helped make movies like the 1962 film The Manchurian Candidate a success. Language and depictions used to describe the Japanese during World War II resurfaced with regard to the United States’ new Asian foe. Resurgent danger in Asia required U.S. intervention in the region and vigilance on the homefront in order to pacify another fanatical, ruthless Asian threat.
The incoming Eisenhower administration inherited the Korean War from its predecessor and although Dwight Eisenhower had promised to resolve the Korean issue, he and members of his team had no doubts about the menace they faced. Attitudes relating to the Chinese remained consistent since the creation of the PRC and persisted through Eisenhower’s tenure and beyond. The new president labeled the Chinese as “completely reckless, arrogant…and completely indifferent to human losses.” Eisenhower hoped to find some solution to the Korean problem, but under U.S. terms and direction. Accordingly, he avowed that the United States had to take an activist role rather than “slinking along in the shadows, hoping that the beast will finally be satiated and cease his predatory tactics before he finally devours us.” Just as in the Japanese wartime case, the Chinese became a single crazed beast with no concern for life, least of all its own.

Even after the 1953 armistice in Korea, tensions would continue in the U.S.-PRC relationship which further explicated the nature of prominent American racial antagonism towards the Chinese. During the Offshore Island Crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1954-55, the U.S. and the PRC came eyeball to eyeball again. Eisenhower interjected the United States, as allies of Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China, into a territorial dispute involving most notably the islands Quemoy and Matsu. Both Taiwan and the PRC claimed ownership of these islands. For his part, Eisenhower trusted neither side as he lamented “We are always wrong when we believe that Orientals think logically as we do.” When it came down to it, regardless of political ideology, the U.S. found itself sandwiched between two groups of “irrational Orientals.” Whatever their beliefs, Asians “would rather lose everything than lose face.”

When asked about U.S. willingness to employ nuclear weapons in the conflict, Eisenhower’s national security advisor, Dillon Anderson opined, …if atomic weapons had been required to carry out our commitments to [Chiang] or trying to land American forces on the Chinese mainland with 700 million Chinamen, it would have not been the latter. Good God, they can breed them faster in the zone of the interior than you can kill them in the combat zone. Here again, if unleashing nuclear weapons upon the Chinese meant stemming the yellow tide of another sinister Asian people, then so be it. After all, so great was the size of the Asian horde, it seemed improbable to some that they could be stopped by conventional means. Beyond this crisis, the PRC would remain a thorn in the United States’ side even after the normalization of relations between the two nations during the 1970s. Bitter hatred, suspicion, and fear proved quite resilient in the minds of the American people.

Conclusion

Such fluid racial perceptions would follow both the Chinese and the Japanese through the remainder of the Cold War and beyond. By the 1970s the Japanese would enter into a new prosperity, often heralded as an economic miracle but one that endangered the United States. The Japanese bogeyman had again come knocking at the front door. Stigmas emerged reinvigorated and the Yellow Peril took on a competitive economic dimension. The Americans interpreted Japan’s
economic success as an attempt to do financially what they had been unable to
do through militarily means. For the People’s Republic of China, an updated
economic and military Yellow Peril persists in minds of many Americans, in
policy discussions, and perhaps most of all in headlines and popular culture.

This essay demonstrates that within the U.S. government, military, and
sources influencing or reflecting public opinion, attitudes of paternalism and
fears of the Yellow Peril regarding the Japanese and Chinese maintained a
stunning dynamism and persistence. Perhaps an explanation for the longevity of
these fears rests in their ability to be transferred so freely amongst Asian people,
considered by many in the United States as practically all the same. The easy
transferability of prejudice, coupled with American fears, misunderstanding, and
apprehension relating to the peoples of Asia, sheds light on this phenomenon’s
continued existence.
Notes


10 Terkel, *The Good War,* 190.


12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Japanese names are given in the Japanese style with surname first.


21 Ibid., 67, 178.


29 Ibid., 9, 11.
30 Robert E. Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, Time and the American Crusade in Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 42.
31 Ibid., 11.
33 Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, 40–42.
36 Schaller, The United States and China, 50.
37 Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, 41.
39 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 122.
40 Takaki, Double Victory, 111.
41 Perlmutter, Picturing China in the American Press, 7–8.
42 Schaller, The United States and China, 53.
43 Ibid., 69.
46 Jodi Kim, Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique of the Cold War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 119.
47 Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton; The New Press, 1999), 223.
49 Kim, Ends of Empire, 102.
50 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 211.
51 Message to the Japanese People, Douglas MacArthur, SCAP, Tokyo, December 27, 1945; Appendix F—Statements by General MacArthur; Box 2084; Government Section; Administrative Division, Philosophy of the Occupation, 1945–1948, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Record Group 331; National Archives at College Park, Md.
53 Douglas MacArthur, SCAP, Statement to Congress, “In Support of Appropriations for Occupation Purposes,” Tokyo, February 20, 1947; Appendix F—Statements by General MacArthur; Box 2084; Government Section; Administrative Division, Philosophy of the Occupation, 1945–1948, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Record Group 331; National Archives at College Park, Md.
54 Shibusawa, America’s Geisha Ally, 135.
59 Schaller, *The United States and China*, 110.
61 Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*, 98.
63 Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*, 37.
70 Ibid., 82.
73 Ibid., 171.
Archives
National Archives II at College Park, Maryland

References


---

**Brandon P. Seto** holds the position of clinical assistant professor in the American Cultures Studies program at Loyola Marymount University. His research areas include U.S. Foreign Relations with East Asia and International History. He is particularly interested in the influence of race and religion on the American foreign and domestic policy realms.
The TPP Debate in Japan: Reasons for a Failed Protest Campaign

Ulli Jamitzky, University of Münster

Abstract:
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal has provoked one of the fiercest debates in Japanese politics in recent years. The highly influential lobby group JA-Zenchu (Central Union of Agricultural Co-operatives) has been the most vehement opponent of the TPP, but their efforts failed to prevent Japan’s current prime minister, Shinzo Abe, from joining the ongoing negotiations in the summer of 2013. There are also several other opposition groups, ranging from labor unions and the Japan Medical Association to members of Japan’s two main parties, the LDP and the DPJ. However, these groups were not able to form a larger and unified protest movement and therefore could not reach their political goal. This article will analyze the reasons why the vocal anti-TPP campaign was ultimately unsuccessful. In order to understand the behavior of the involved actors and groups, the article will focus on their diverse interests and motivations that reflect the comprehensive nature of the proposed trade agreement.

Key words: TPP, Japan, trade policy, JA-Zenchu

Introduction
The politics of trade policy in Japan are a controversial matter, especially since Japan started to establish a network of bilateral free trade agreements more than ten years ago. The reasons behind this policy shift are manifold. Previous research has shown that political as much as economic and geo-strategic interests have been major driving factors. Mireya Solis’ analysis of Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) policy as a reaction to competitive challenges in multiple areas is the most comprehensive recent work on the topic. In theory, Japan’s approach is multilayered, combining bilateral, regional and multilateral elements in its trade policy. In reality, however, the focus has clearly been on Japan’s EPAs and more recently on bigger and more comprehensive plurilateral trade projects, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or the agreement with the European Union (EU).

Many policy makers and interest groups still favor Japan’s traditional trade policy approach, centered on the multilateral World Trade Organization (WTO) and its forerunner the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In the past this system made it possible for Japan to exclude many of its agricultural products from tariff reduction. As a result, Japan’s rice market, for example, is currently still protected by a 778 percent tariff on imported rice that exceeds the minimum market access guaranteed through the WTO. Many officials in Japan’s trade-related ministries as well as politicians from its two biggest parties, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), are also critical of the further proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements. The leading actor in this broad and heterogeneous group is the Central Union of Agricultural Co-operatives (JA-Zenchu), Japan’s most influential agricultural organization with nearly 10 million members. Its opposition stems mainly from...
a conviction that bilateral and plurilateral agreements harm Japan’s sensitive agricultural industry and will eventually destroy the livelihood of many farmers.

On the other hand, many individuals and organizations promote and support Japan’s new trade policy. Keidanren, the country’s top business association, and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry have been calling for bilateral trade agreements since the late 1990s. The resulting antagonism between, generally speaking, more outward-looking and export-oriented large corporations versus more inward-looking and protectionist small-scale farmers has dominated the political discussion on this issue and has also hindered Japan from reforming its agricultural sector.

The question of how much Japan should open up its markets to foreign countries, companies, and investors is at the core of this argument. Aya Takada and Yuriy Humber conclude that “while Keidanren backs exporters who say that Japan needs accords like the TPP, JA Group says the accord will kill domestic agriculture.” This antagonism also exists on the ministerial level. The traditional opposition between the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), both staunch defenders of their constituencies’ vested interests, further aggravated this trend. The Japanese public, too, has been more or less evenly split between supporters and opponents of Japan’s participation in the ongoing TPP negotiations, making it a challenging area for politicians to win broad approval among the electorate.

As a result, most Japanese governments since the late-1990s have been hesitant to fully engage in the politics of EPAs, instead trying to balance the opposing interests of protectionist farmers and free trade advocates. Although Japan’s trade bureaucrats have started to consider EPAs as a possible supplement to its foreign economic policy, the government’s official position is still marked by a high level of indecisiveness in the field of trade policy. The failure to formulate and implement a more coherent strategy has brought criticism from academics and policy experts who see Japan falling behind in what has become a global race for bilaterals.

While this conflict continued to smolder in the background, Japan has slowly expanded its EPA network in recent years. As of February 2015, Japan has concluded a total of 14 agreements with countries in Asia, Europe and Latin America since its first agreement with Singapore in 2002. An agreement with Australia, which went into force in January 2015, marks the latest extension to Japan’s EPA network. Being Japan’s first agreement with a major food producer, it is of high importance. In addition, Japan is currently holding talks with several other countries, such as Canada and Colombia, and signed an agreement with Mongolia in February 2015.

Larger and more comprehensive plurilateral agreements are currently drawing more attention, in particular the US-driven TPP, but also the Regional

The TPP Debate in Japan / Jamitzky 80
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the negotiations with the EU. Japan is in the remarkable situation of being involved in several major negotiations without aggressively following a comprehensive trade policy strategy. This is in stark contrast to Singapore, Mexico and other countries that try to position themselves as regional hubs in the ever-expanding global network of bilaterals. Japan is also in a position where its leaders can deliberate on which trade project should be prioritized. This is an advantageous situation, as its two main trade projects in the Asia-Pacific region, TPP and RCEP, promote very different approaches on trade liberalization and the abolition of non-trade barriers. The two agreements also take different geopolitical positions towards China, either integrating it further into the regional and global trade system by promoting the RCEP or containing China’s rise through the conclusion of the TPP. In particular the TPP has become an indicator of Japan’s overall foreign-policy realignment with the US. In comparison to other agreements, the TPP has sparked by far the largest national debate in Japan. That debate, and in particular JA-Zenchu’s role as the most influential TPP opponent, is the focus of this article.

The TPP Discussion: Pros and Cons in a Heated Debate

Although Japan’s earlier EPAs all faced some domestic opposition at the time of their proposal and during negotiations, the debate regarding Japan’s possible entry into the TPP created an unprecedented level of conflict. Emphasizing the importance of this trade initiative and its far-reaching political and economic consequences, supporters and critics alike stepped up their lobbying efforts. Subsequently, numerous articles, press releases and books on the issue were published by pro- and anti-TPP groups. The debate soon grew highly emotional, as both sides argued that nothing less than the future of Japan rested on the outcome of this decision. When the government published a first outline of its future trade policy in late 2010, which also stressed the importance of the TPP, JA-Zenchu was quick to release its own report highlighting the negative impacts of joining the agreement. JA-Zenchu published papers and advertisements in which it turned the TPP debate into a decision on Japan’s national identity:

If Japan signs the TPP while ignoring the differences in land conditions and the volume of agricultural production among the negotiating countries, Japanese agriculture will no longer be able to fulfill all of its diverse roles, placing the livelihoods of a wide range of people at risk. (…) Now is the time to think about what Japan should do to achieve sustainable agricultural development, so that the Japanese people will be able to maintain their national identity.

The TPP and its encompassing debate mark a turning point not only in Japan’s changing trade policy approach, but also in the genesis of a broader protest movement. According to Aurelia Mulgan, the growing opposition to the TPP played an important role inreviving the influence and leverage of JA-Zenchu: “The TPP in fact revived Nokyo’s [Japan Agricultural Cooperatives] political fortunes and provided an issue whereby it could reconnect politically with farmers.” JA-Zenchu, long known for its protectionist stance on trade policy, soon became the leader of this growing, yet only loosely organized, movement.
of farmers, citizen rights groups and other interest groups that opposed the TPP. Although united in their protest against the TPP, the diversity of member organizations with different political agenda and at times contradictory interests has also made it difficult to initiate a wider social movement.

The business world has painted a very different picture regarding the impact of the TPP on the Japanese economy. Keidanren was quick to amplify TPP’s impact for Japanese companies and consumers, but unlike JA-Zenchu, most business representatives stress its positive economic effects and believe that joining the TPP is necessary in order to keep up with other nations with an extensive network of free trade agreements.

If Japan fails to join the TPP or is slow in doing so, the resulting competitive disadvantage would not only lead to a decline in Japanese companies’ sales in TPP member countries, but might also necessitate the transfer to TPP member countries of production bases for finished products and essential components that embody Japan’s advanced technologies. This would be a grave situation for Japan both as a nation built on trade and investment and as a nation built on technology, and might even shake the foundations of the Japanese economy.

In the absence of reliable data on the economic impact of Japan’s earlier EPAs, three studies on the potential impact of joining the TPP were published by the MAFF, the METI and the Cabinet Office, which reflect diverging political standpoints within the government on this controversial topic. These three datasets, each coming to a different conclusion, only added to the confusion about the TPP and underlined the government’s difficulty to find a coherent approach on trade policy. Whereas the MAFF estimated a loss of 3.4 million jobs if Japan joins the TPP, the METI predicted the creation of over 800,000 jobs. The Cabinet Office’s forecast was less dramatic, expecting an additional 0.54% GDP growth in 10 years. It is highly problematic to compare these numbers, as each study conveniently picked industry sectors that are expected to suffer, or contrarily to benefit, from the TPP in order to best support their stance. Based on such contradicting estimations, the TPP has become a watershed issue for Japanese domestic politics, with the debate taking an unprecedented harsh tone.

The Emergence of Japan’s Anti-TPP Protest Movement

Against the background of Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations in 2013, the next section will briefly illustrate the emergence of Japan’s anti-TPP protest movement. A special focus will be given to the role that JA-Zenchu took on in this movement. This will be followed by an analysis on why this broad and vocal protest movement ultimately failed to prevent Japan’s government from joining the negotiations.

JA-Zenchu—the Linchpin of Japan’s Anti-TPP Movement

In the case of Japan, domestic politics are pivotal in the formation of trade policy and the agricultural sector occupies a crucial role in this process. Mulgan has exposed the immense importance of the agricultural sector in Japanese politics in her landmark study, “The Politics of Agriculture in Japan.” Her work
demonstrates that Japanese farmers exert substantial political power due to their high level of organization and a voting system that is skewed to their favor. In Mulgan’s own words:

The agricultural sector has been too electorally powerful, too highly organised, too visible publicly and too well represented in the Diet and in the ruling party for the government to ignore the political ramifications of any major decision on agricultural policy.21

As a well-organized and powerful organization, JA-Zenchu has been able to mobilize its members and directly influence politicians and other policy makers on trade-related matters thanks to its connections to ministerial officials, farmers and politicians with close links to the agricultural industry. In the course of the TPP debate, JA-Zenchu succeeded in collecting over 11 million signatures for a petition against Japan’s entry into the TPP in less than a year. This was a truly remarkable feat, seeing that there were only 2.6 million commercial farmers in Japan in 2010.22 This demonstrates JA-Zenchu’s success in mobilizing a broad anti-TPP alliance beyond its core rural constituency. However, JA-Zenchu’s strong engagement in the TPP debate is not surprising, as Japanese farming households are expected to be most affected by the TPP. JA-Zenchu has tried to establish itself as an opinion leader in the national discussion surrounding this trade agreement.

In order to safeguard its own and its members’ interests, the organization is deeply involved in Japan’s trade policy making. To this end, JA-Zenchu also reached out to many other stakeholders, such as Japan’s Consumers Union and the Japan Medical Association (JMA), by organizing workshops and meetings on the issue. However, it was determined not to be perceived as anti-free trade and overly protective of vested interests, but rather as a defender of Japan’s national interest. This allowed JA-Zenchu to connect and collaborate with other protest groups which do not reject EPAs per se but rather oppose TPP’s unprecedented comprehensive and ambitious liberalization model.

An integrating approach made JA-Zenchu the leader of the emerging alliance of diverse groups opposing the TPP.23 As a result, the office of the anti-TPP group “Network to Protect Japan’s Food, Livelihood and Lives against the TPP” was set up at the JA-Headquarters, indicating the influence JA-Zenchu had in forging this alliance. The group was comprised of cooperatives from several industries. According to its official website the following organizations are listed as members: JA-Zenchu, National Chamber of Agriculture, National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives Associations, National Federation of Forest Owner’s Cooperative Association, Seikatsu Club Consumers’ Cooperative Union, Daichi wo mamoru kai (Group to Protect the Earth), Palsystem Consumers’ Cooperative Union, and the Japan Dairy Council.24 Mulgan further explains that JA-Zenchu was also able to forge an alliance with the construction industry by visiting factories and businesses in Tokyo to point out how the TPP would cause an inpouring of cheap labor from abroad and therefore bring about negative effects for local workers.25

JA-Zenchu also succeeded in creating ties with leaders in Japan’s medical and healthcare sector. On January 25, 2012, the two leaders of JMA and JA-
Zenchu held a joint news conference to express their opposition against the TPP, and the JMA representative, concerned over the effects of the TPP on Japan’s medical system, spoke out against the introduction of market principles to the Japanese system of universal healthcare. However, other organizations have also led cooperation between different anti-TPP groups. For example in October 2011, leaders of the JMA, the Japan Pharmaceutical Association and the Japan Dental Association met politicians of the Democratic Party of Japan to express their discontent with the government’s handling of the TPP issue.

Megumi Naoi and Shujiro Urata offer another explanation on why the anti-TPP movement was able to integrate so many different groups and organizations. According to them, uncertainty about the potential effects of the TPP led many people to feel that they might be negatively affected by the agreement. This group of “uncertain losers” then became the target of JA’s well-organized anti-TPP campaign, creating the fundament for a broad coalition of people who felt uneasy about the TPP and were in particular afraid that the agreement may have negative implications for their own job security.

Overview of Anti-TPP Protests

Protests by Japanese farmers and employees of JA-Zenchu began when former Prime Minister Naoto Kan declared his interest in joining the TPP negotiations in 2010. In February 2011, 300 people came together at a Japanese university in what Maslow calls “the beginning of intensified local protest against the TPP.” The distinctive feature of this emerging protest movement is its heterogeneity. It encompassed traditional as well as progressive farmers, other civil rights groups such as the Consumers’ Cooperative Union, and anti-globalization activists. The concern that Japan’s entry into the TPP would lead to a lower food self-sufficiency rate and negatively affect Japan’s rural areas were the main driving force at this early stage of protests.

Although critics of the TPP in Japan were successful in building a broad coalition by demonstrating that the TPP might affect various aspects of Japan’s economy, the protest of local farmers can be seen as the core of the anti-TPP movement in Japan. Protests in Hokkaido, one of Japan’s foremost farming regions, played a particularly important role, as local farmers were especially concerned about the looming effects of joining the TPP. The prefectural government in Hokkaido was also the first prefecture to publish an assessment of the potential effects of the TPP on the region’s agricultural sector. According to a report by the Tokachi General Subprefectural Bureau, up to 40,000 jobs in the subprefecture would be in danger due to the TPP. The outlook for Tokachi seems particularly severe as the local farm-related transport and logistics industry is expected to be strongly affected by a weakened agricultural industry.

The anti-TPP protests in Hokkaido serve as an exemplary case for the importance of local-level protests. The regional branch of JA-Zenchu, the Hokkaido Prefectural Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, was particularly successful in mobilizing its members when it organized large protest marches in Sapporo to demonstrate against Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s decision to join the TPP.
the TPP negotiations. The protests proved effective, and at the height of the domestic debate over the TPP, the Hokkaido Prefectural Assembly as well as the Sapporo City Assembly expressed their clear opposition to the TPP in January 2011. In March 2013, when Abe was expected to announce his decision on the TPP question, 1500 farmers gathered in Sapporo to express their discontent with Abe’s position. As expected, protests further intensified after Abe declared Japan’s entry to the TPP and around 7000 farmers took to the streets to protest against the ongoing TPP negotiations later that summer. As in the rest of Japan, the protest movement in Hokkaido also consisted of many interest groups. This included the Hokkaido Economic Federation, the Hokkaido Consumers Association, the Hokkaido Medical Association and members of several political parties.

As a reaction to this growing opposition, the national government decided to hold meetings at the local level in order to explain its trade policy and particularly the consequences on the local economy to their constituencies. In April 2013, nine such meetings were held in Hokkaido. Japan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI) also organized countrywide briefings and information sessions on the TPP to allay the concerns of company leaders. Pro- and anti-TPP groups alike ran campaigns on the local and national level, keeping the TPP issue on the political agenda.

Japan’s Entry into the TPP Negotiations: Defeat for Its Agricultural Lobby?

Despite its comprehensive media campaign and success on the local level, the anti-TPP movement ultimately failed to prevent Japan’s government from joining the TPP negotiations. In fact, while dominating the domestic debate on trade policy for many years, Japan’s highly influential farming lobby could only delay the country from entering the TPP talks. JA-Zenchu’s extensive lobbying efforts did however prompt Prime Minister Abe to deviate from his non-exceptional approach and exclude over 500 Japanese farm products from the TPP negotiations in 2013. Abe promised to protect Japan’s five “sacred” agricultural categories, which are rice, wheat, dairy, sugar and meat, in return for JA-Zenchu’s acceptance of his pro-TPP policy. In this respect, the agricultural lobby still reached its goal of protecting Japan’s agricultural industry despite Japan’s joining the TPP negotiations.

There are several explanations on why Abe was able to push through with the TPP despite domestic opposition. First of all, an increasing number of Japanese policy makers deemed it advantageous to join the negotiations at an early stage. They understood that it is to Japan’s benefit to be involved in the TPP talks in order to draft chapters on certain policy issues. This was preferable to being confronted with a more or less finalized agreement, which can only be accepted or rejected in its entirety later on. This assumption proved to be correct,
as of February 2014, only eight out of the 29 chapters of the TPP were agreed upon by the involved negotiating teams.39

One important reason behind Abe’s success lies in the changing demographics of Japanese farmers, who are now on average 66 years old.40 Japan’s rural areas are particularly affected by an aging population, shrinking birth rates and an ongoing migration to urban areas. The agricultural sector has declined in importance and JA-Zenchu is consequently losing influence and political clout.41 This ongoing transition has also caused a shift of interest, with farmers now increasingly lobbying for policies that allow them to maintain their current welfare levels, instead of seeking traditional prize subsidies or higher tariffs to protect their businesses. The introduction of an individual farm household income-support system through direct payments in order to stabilize farmers’ income, reflects this shift of farmer’s interests.

**DPJ’s Policy towards the TPP**

In order to better understand why Abe was able to make a decision in the TPP debate, the following section will compare his trade policy approach with the previous DPJ governments. The subsequent paragraph will then focus on the trade policy of the second Abe government.

The landslide victory of the DPJ in the 2009 parliamentary elections raised expectations for a profound policy transformation in Japan. The DPJ, however, disappointed most such hopes for policy change, prompting Kenji Kushida and Phillip Lipsy to make a crushing assessment: “not only did the DPJ implement few of its promised reforms, but it implemented very little of anything.”42 Did the DPJ perform any better in the area of trade policy?

Since its formation in 1998, the DPJ has followed a pro-free trade and pro-liberalization agenda. With a majority of its voters and supporters coming from urban areas, this approach reflected the political and economic interests of most of its constituency.43 Its election victory in 2009 accordingly raised expectations that the new DPJ government would be able to break free from the “iron triangle,” which had dominated trade policy under the conservative LDP and follow a determined free trade approach instead. In fact, however, the opposite occurred. Although the DPJ campaigned on a policy platform, which was very different to the LDP’s platform in 2009, the increase of DPJ voters in rural areas led to a rising influence of the farming industry on the party’s policymaking once they were in power.44 And although the DPJ had started out with the promise to strengthen the power of politicians while restricting the influence of bureaucrats, the agricultural lobby was still too strong to allow the DPJ governments to go ahead with its plan of joining the TPP.

The trade policy of the three DPJ administrations between 2009 and 2012 did not deliver many tangible outcomes. Its three Prime Ministers, Yukio Hatoyama, Naoto Kan and Yoshihiko Noda, concluded only two EPAs during their time in power and were not able to initiate new trade agreements. One major reason
for this was certainly the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, which prompted the government to sideline discussions on the TPP and postpone the decision on Japan’s membership. Although the DPJ successfully placed the topic on the political agenda in a prominent 2010 speech, the TPP debate soon became overshadowed by the immediate crisis response in the disaster-hit zone. These efforts were followed by large-scale cleanup and reconstruction projects in the Tohoku region, which demanded the full attention of the central, regional and local governments. In addition, with the nuclear catastrophe unfolding, the formulation of a new energy policy became the top priority for the national government.

Another reason for DPJ’s unsuccessful trade policy was the lack of consensus on trade policy within the party. All three DPJ prime ministers faced strong opposition from their own party members, who were organized in several informal groupings. TPP-critics within the DPJ also teamed up with politicians from other parties to form the “National Council to Study the TPP,” which held workshops and lectures on the TPP. According to Mulgan, this group comprised around 180 members and acted as a counter movement to the pro-TPP camp in the government.

**LDP’s Trade Policy Approach**

When the LDP under Abe returned to power in December 2012, it was widely believed that the agricultural lobby would further strengthen its influential position on Japan’s trade policy. But contrary to these expectations, Abe was able to achieve where the DPJ had struggled. He declared Japan’s intention to join the ongoing TPP negotiations.

Abe certainly profited from his predecessors’ efforts to establish the TPP issue on the political agenda and convince opposed policy makers and citizens. However, the main reason for the surprising turn in Japan’s TPP policy has its roots elsewhere. Abe’s strong leadership skills and his high approval ratings at the beginning of his second term as prime minister made it possible for him to unilaterally decide the controversial TPP issue. In contrast to the previous DPJ governments, he succeeded in integrating the decision on the TPP into his overall policy approach. Portraying the TPP as an integral part of his “abenomics” policy approach made it increasingly difficult for his opponents to openly criticize his pro-TPP stance. Abe further successfully presented the TPP as an indispensable precondition for overall structural and agricultural reform. A Japanese government official, summarizing Abe’s approach, was quoted as follows in an article by Mitsuru Obe in the Wall Street Journal: “The TPP is an important tool for Mr. Abe, but it’s still just a tool. He won’t let it dictate his policy, which is to produce positive outcomes that would strengthen his political power.”

Abe’s prowess was not the only reason for the sudden breakthrough in the TPP debate. JA-Zenchu also shifted its position on the subject and understood that its leverage and influence is decreasing as a result of Japan’s shrinking
Against this background, it might have seemed more promising for JA-Zenchu to negotiate a compromise that satisfied farmers to a certain degree, instead of finding itself in a less powerful situation later on. The organization therefore adapted its strategy on the TPP, so that it was at least able to negotiate substantial carve-outs for some agricultural commodities. That way, JA-Zenchu still fulfilled its political goal of protecting Japanese agriculture, despite joining the TPP.

Abe’s handling of the TPP issue demonstrates how overarching political and economic interests prevailed over local protests. Ultimately Japan’s local protest movement, although well organized and powerful, was not able to hold sway against the national pro-TPP coalition. And although the anti-TPP protest movement was also partly inspired by the anti-nuclear demonstrations, which gained momentum after the Fukushima disaster, it failed to establish a permanent coalition between these two social movements to challenge the government’s position on the TPP. From the perspective of the Japanese civil society engaged in anti-TPP protests and anti-nuclear demonstrations, this has to be seen as a missed opportunity. Japanese farmers, who were among the most affected group of the nuclear catastrophe, took their anger to the streets and protested against how the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) handled the situation. JA-Zenchu also criticized the government for their role in the Fukushima accident and even promoted the “denuclearization” of Japan. However, they ultimately did not develop a comprehensive strategy of protest that would combine trade issues with energy policy.

Recent Developments and Outlook

In May 2014, the Regulatory Reform Council, an advisory panel to Prime Minister Abe, suggested a sweeping reform of the semi-public JA-Zenchu. Aiming to reduce the power of JA-Zenchu and to make local and regional agricultural cooperatives more independent from the centralist organization, along with proposed tie-ups with the private sector to increase competitiveness, were among the main points of the reform proposal. With these policy recommendations, a reform process of the Japanese agricultural system has been initiated. Although some far-reaching recommendations, such as the abolishment of JA-Zenchu, were scrapped after consultations with LDP politicians and MAFF officials, this proposal is still highly significant. It marks the first time that an official government document called for systematic changes of the mighty JA-Zenchu.

After lengthy deliberations between JA-Zenchu and the government, February 2015 marked a major turning point in the role of JA-Zenchu in Japanese agricultural and trade policy. The organization under its president, Akira Banzai, accepted the government’s reform proposal: “We intend to embrace
reform with a view to increasing the income of farming households." The Abe administration revoked JA's political influence by abolishing the so-called gentan system and by stipulating a reform schedule for the organization itself. In fact, the conflict of interest between LDP and JA-Zenchu had already been looming for some time. JA Hokkaido, for example, refrained from endorsing political candidates for the general elections in July 2013, lamenting that none of the parties reflected the anti-TPP interests of local farmers. However, in the parliamentary elections in December 2014 neither the TPP nor trade policy in general have played major roles.

The reorganization of JA-Zenchu seems drastic, but ultimately it is the result of a compromise, which becomes apparent when considering the timeline of the proposed reforms. The organizational reform of JA-Zenchu and the abolishment of the gentan system are scheduled for 2019, and will therefore not directly influence the ongoing TPP negotiations. However, the reform highlights Abe's determination to press ahead with restructuring Japan's agricultural sector and therefore has at least an important symbolic meaning for Japan's current negotiation partners.

Considering these recent developments, in hindsight it might have been a smart move for JA-Zenchu to more fully exercise its power and influence before being restricted by any reform. On the other hand, this reform should not be overestimated regarding its direct impact on trade policy-making. The JA-Zenchu is still the most powerful and best organized interest group in Japanese politics and will continue to be highly influential.
Notes


Mulgan, “Politics of Trade Policy,” 27.


Ibid., 645.


Refer to the website of the Network to Protect Japan’s Food, Livelihood and Lives against the TPP (日本の食と暮らし・いのちを守るネットワーク), “about this Website (当HPについて),” accessed February 26, 2015, http://www.think-tpp.jp/about.html.


Ibid., 336.


Ibid.

Okinawa also experienced large protests. Similar to other prefectures, the anti-TPP protests there have been driven by a group of organizations, such as the Okinawa Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, the Okinawa Medical Association, the Okinawa Medical Cooperatives and Okinawa Federation of Democratic Medical Institutions. See Maki Miyatake, “Who Has Sovereign Power in Japan? For Whom is TPP Being Promoted?,” article on the Symposium for Regeneration of Health Care, Food, Security, Housing and Environment from Local Communities: Looking Toward Future of Okinawa, Haebaru Town, Okinawa (April 14, 2013), accessed March 13, 2015, http://www.min-iren.gr.jp/?p=11802.

The TPP Debate in Japan / Jamitzky 91
33 Kuno and Naoi, “Framing Business Interests,” 12.
35 Another example of JA’s localized anti-TPP campaign can be seen in their TV advertisements starring a local TV celebrity from Kumamoto. See “An Agricultural Cooperative in Kumamoto to Air a TV Commercial in a Kumamoto Dialect Opposing TPP,” Japan Agricultural News (July 27, 2013), accessed February 24, 2015, http://english.agrinews.co.jp/?p=819.
38 For more information on Abe’s handling of Japan’s five “sacred” agricultural products, see Jonathan Sobler and Shawn Donnan, “Japan Politicians Criticize Shinzo Abe’s Trade Pact Push,” Financial Times (October 14, 2013), accessed September 26, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/47e6bfc6-34a8-11e3-8148-00144fceb7de.html#axzz3EO1NnNB.
41 Mulgan, Politics of Agriculture in Japan, 649.
44 Ibid.
46 Kim, “Japan and the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” 199.
55 The rice acreage reduction program was originally set up in the 1970s.
References


Ulli Jamitzky is a PhD Candidate at the Institute for Political Science, University of Münster (Germany). From 2011 until 2013, he was a MEXT Scholar at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and the International Christian University. Currently he is working as a Coordinator for International Relations for the City of Sapporo in Japan while completing his dissertation thesis.
Pablo Figueroa, Waseda University

All nations assert cultural difference through contrast with other countries, and Japan is no exception. However, the country believes it is extraordinarily unique, and has built pervasive cultural myths that claim uniqueness to anything Japanese. Could “uniqueness” in Japanese art photography be one of those myths?

In his excellent article “Distinctiveness versus Universality: Reconsidering New Japanese Photography,” art historian Yoshiaki Kai critically examines a 1974 exhibition held at the Museum of Modern Art in New York that introduced the works of fifteen Japanese photographers to an international audience. The event, named “New Japanese Photography,” was groundbreaking. According to Kai, Japanese photographers had been quite apathetic about trying to obtain recognition abroad and they seemed comfortable with the status acquired within the local photography community.

Kai explains that “New Japanese Photography” generated mixed reviews from critics; some of them found the images imitative of American photography. Others could not help but notice how the exhibition closely resembled the photographs that had been shown at MOMA during the previous decade. In addition, the organizers John Szarkowski—at the time director of MOMA’s Department of Photography—and Shoji Yamagishi, then editor of the photography magazine Camera Mainichi, appear to have had differing views. Szarkowski referred to the emergence of a “distinctively Japanese photography” in postwar Japan, a style that departed from the former tradition of pictorialism. Yamagishi felt differently. He wrote,

I did not intend to propose the idiosyncrasy of the Japanese style of photography, based on the contrast between the West and Japan. Rather, for me, it was a part of habitual work that seeks out the common significance of today’s photography, based on contemporary concerns and unrestricted ideas.

These contrasting views raise the question of whether there is, or has ever been, a distinctive style of Japanese photography. Is there something unique in the photographs produced in Japan before or after WWII? Have Japanese photographers constructed images of the world around them in a novel way?

Since its arrival in Japan in the 1840s, the camera as a tool in the production of meaning has been embedded in the traumatic processes that have characterized Japanese history: rapid modernization and industrialization, internal social exploitation, imperialist enterprises, atomic bombings, and natural and man-made disasters. Photography was introduced to the Japanese archipelago by the Dutch in Nagasaki, before the country was forced in 1853-1854 by Commodore Perry’s expeditions to enter into trade with the United States. After an uncertain start, the production of photographs in Japan sped up from the late 1850s, thanks to advances in technology and the establishment of the

"Uniqueness” in Japanese Art Photography / Figueroa
first two professional photo studios in 1862. This combination of circumstances allowed the camera to play a role in the representation of a feudal society in transition right before the 1868 Meiji Restoration.

Art photography in Japan emerged slightly late compared to Europe, during the first few years of the 20th century, and it was indebted both technically and aesthetically to Western influences. Given that photography in Japan was initially part of a larger scientific and aesthetic movement in the West, it is worth considering whether photography was affected by a “native” Japanese way of seeing. Photo historian and curator Kaneko Ryuichi argues that from the 1890s Japanese art photography took its own course, making it essentially different from art photography in the West. Japanese art photographers concentrated on a few key themes: calm images of nature, misty landscapes that conveyed lyricism and the romantic beauty of the mountains and the countryside. This trend, palpable by the 1920s, led some Japanese photographers to feel there was something “essentially” Japanese in their way of seeing. However, the photographers who tried to convey a sense of Japaneseness were often educated abroad and had distinctive European aesthetic influences.

I argue that attributing uniqueness to Japanese photography, whether from a research or a spectator point of view, is problematic. Although Japanese photographers did not just passively reproduce foreign themes, their ways of seeing developed vis-à-vis scientific and aesthetic modes of seeing in the West. This happened in a dialogic manner: Japanese photographs both informed and were informed by non-Japanese texts. Historian John Dower, for instance, is distrustful of the idea that native art traditions affected Japanese ways of seeing in prewar photography. He argues,

One might have expected the photographer’s eye to be influenced by the dynamic sense of composition and line that distinguished woodblock prints— and even more, by the disciplined use of form and emptiness in the great tradition of sumi-e, or ink painting. (...) The earliest Japanese photographers appear to have been uninfluenced by these traditional ways of seeing. (...) It was not until the vogue of “art photography” began around the turn of the century that Japanese photographers found inspiration in paintings, an even then such inspiration often come from contemporary Western painting rather than from traditional Japanese art.

In this line of thought, art historian Eric Shiner places contemporary Japanese photography in a broader context, and he sees it as the product of multiple influences taking place in a global network:

Simply stated, for the past one hundred years, Japan has been infiltrated with images and essays from around the world, something that has helped alter the way things are seen and understood. In other words, Japanese artists work within a truly global network of ideas and images, and are just as likely to look abroad for ideas as they are to reference Japan’s own unique history.

The global network of connections influencing Japanese photography appears most clear today. In an era of globalization, photographic narratives are the complex product of multiple national and transnational influences. The widespread circulation and consumption of digital images add to this complexity. Photographers are continually exposed to these images through
the internet and social media. This affects the way artists understand their own images, and further blurs the thin line separating “Japanese” (art) photography from other genres. To provide an example from my fieldwork research on art photography of the Fukushima nuclear disaster: a young Japanese art photographer may consider him or herself part of the domestic photography community simply because he/she is connected to dozens of other Japanese photographers through Facebook. This virtual community may be aware of the members’ exhibitions and projects, and validation comes not only from showing their works at art galleries in Japan but also from recognition abroad. Often, these photographers make a living from commercial photography, advertising, and various photographic assignments for newspapers and magazines. Thus, photographic genres frequently mix, and photographic discourses converse with a multiplicity of global influences.

That is not to say that there is no authenticity in Japanese photography. Certainly one can find personal style in the photos of Daido Moriyama or Nobuyoshi Araki as well as many photographers in Japan today. However, that authenticity is not related to a supposedly “Japanese” way of seeing but rather to the creativity of individual artists and their mannerisms, as Kai points out in “Distinctiveness versus Universality.”

It is well-known that Japan has a history of producing and reproducing state narratives which emphasize the uniqueness of Japan’s culture, its land, and its people—the so-called theories of Japaneseness or Nihonjinron. This explains why arguments for the uniqueness of anything Japanese resonate in Japan. But when analyzed in detail, theories of Nihonjinron do not account for more than myths, since traits supposedly unique to Japan—such as national character—can be found elsewhere.

We need to abandon the filter of uniqueness when looking at Japanese photographs if we are to gain a deeper understanding of the images. By paying attention to the social dimension of photography as well as the influence of individual artists, we are able to go beyond essentializing dichotomies that only reproduce cultural myths.

More than thirty years ago, Allan Sekula wrote, “The meaning of a photograph, like that of any other identity, is inevitably subject to cultural definition. The task here is to define and engage critically something we might call the ‘photographic discourse.’” It is in this realm of social exchange of information where photographs make sense and are made sense. Pressing the shutter button may be an individual action but photography is primarily a social activity, one that is inevitably tendentious (as all communication is). Photographs function as texts that converse with a multiplicity of other texts.

There is no “uniqueness” in Japanese photography. There are unique photographic acts—each photographic act is unique because it can only take place once. To be interpreted, Japanese photographs need to be placed in the larger sociopolitical and historical context. Only then we can get a sense of the tension and conflict that characterizes photographic discourses.
Notes


2 Ibid., 7.


Pablo Figueroa is an Assistant Professor at Waseda University in Tokyo. A cultural anthropologist specialized in Japanese Studies, his research interests include nuclear politics, cultural representations of disasters, and the communication of risk during catastrophic accidents.
The Question of Japanese-ness: Repatriation and Guilt in Postwar Japan

Kilby Hammond, University of San Francisco

Abstract
After World War II, the millions Japanese soldiers and civilians living abroad in Japan’s former empire were sent home by Allied forces. This article explores the impact of that repatriation on the Japanese homeland, and the social phenomena of scapegoating, alienation, and cultural prejudices that met many returnees. Using memoirs and cultural works, this article considers the experience of repatriation from 1945 to 1958. In so doing, it highlights the connection between repatriation, national identity, and Japan’s struggle with war guilt and responsibility as a defeated and occupied nation.

Keywords: Japan, identity, postwar period, World War II

Introduction
At the end of World War II, millions of Japanese soldiers and civilians who had been spread across East Asia came home to Japan. The interaction between home island Japanese and these repatriates provides a useful lens to view the collective Japanese struggle to come to terms with the lost war. Japanese leaders called for collective repentance for the actions of the country, but guilt and responsibility were difficult burdens to bear in the ruins of a Japan that had suffered under Allied airpower.

Although the issue of repatriation has received attention in most comprehensive works about the occupation of Japan, historian Andrew Gordon writes that repatriation, “was a complex undertaking which left a legacy that has not yet been fully studied or understood.” Occupation historian John Dower recognizes the need for additional work on repatriation in his expansive work, Embracing Defeat, calling it “a neglected chapter among the countless epic tragedies of World War II.”

This paper examines the impact of repatriation and the difficulties that many returnees encountered through the memoirs of two repatriates from Manchuria, Kazoku Kuramoto and Yasuo Kazuki. While the small sample set of only two memoirs does have limitations, Kuramoto and Kazuki represent diverse colonial experiences that were unified through the act of repatriation. Kuramoto was a third generation female colonial settler and Kazuki was a late draftee soldier who would spend years in a Soviet gulag before his eventual return. The use of memoir and repatriation-focused secondary sources reveals an internal struggle as the nation attempted to assign guilt and responsibility in the chaos of defeat. The goal of this research is to connect personal experiences to a broader picture of the mainland Japanese reaction to Japanese repatriates.

While Japanese at home and abroad were all Japanese citizens, Lori Watt distinguishes between naichi (literally, “inner territory”), those who lived in Japan as of August 15, 1945, and hikiagesha (“repatriates”), who lived abroad. The legal definition of hikiagesha in Japan is:
The paper will consider how all Japanese, both in the naichi and hikiagesha, understood what it meant to be Japanese in Imperial Japan and also what prompted so many Japanese to leave their homes for the colonies. From there it will look at how the divergent experiences and rhetoric in the colonies and Japan began a separation of understanding between these two groups. By examining the accounts of Kuramoto and Kazuki, as well as later analysis from other scholars, this paper will show that the interactions between the repatriates and other Japanese was less than welcoming and in some cases even hostile. The final section will show how language created the backlash against the repatriates as the Japanese people attempted to come to terms with guilt, scapegoating, and responsibility in postwar Japan.

The Construction of the Japanese Empire and Imperial Identity

The 1868 Meiji Restoration began the process that would turn into a massive military and empire-building project for Japan. During the Meiji Era (1868-1912) a modern nation-state was created out of a feudal country. As part of that change under the Meiji Emperor, Japanese leaders, both public and private, began to work on a discourse for the new national identity. Before this time many Japanese had identified with their local region rather than the nation.

During this period, Japan built an empire from the spoils of war. Japan acquired its first colony, Taiwan, after the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Five years after the victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910. The League of Nations gave Japan special rights in China and mandate over Pacific islands following its participation in World War I. The 1930s saw an aggressive expansion into Manchuria, where Japan would set up the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932, and further expansion into China and Southeast Asia between 1937 and 1945. Through these conquests, Japan’s military cleared the way for the colonial growth that would place millions of Japanese throughout East Asia.

By the end of World War II, entire generations of Japanese civilians had lived and died abroad in Japan’s colonies. There were facts at home that “pushed,” or perceived factors abroad that “pulled” people to a different land with the hope of a better life. The Japanese government made several moves through propaganda, new policies, and monetary incentives to artificially create these factors in Japan and its colonies, such as Manchuria. Similar to Horace Greeley’s advice to Americans to “Go West, young man,” the Manchurian Emigration Council called on Japanese youth to “Go to the continent young man,” for “a new land awaits the village youth.” The largest programs that took many Japanese to the continent were village migration policies. These put civilians on the frontlines and, later, into the hands of Japan’s enemies.
The massive mobilization of Japanese civilians to the colonies fell under quasi-public development companies that helped organize the Japanese in the new lands. While private companies, these massive bureaucratic organisms used public funds to help facilitate the transfer of people. The Oriental Development Company in Korea and Manchuria Colonization Corporation in Manchuria helped negotiate land acquisition for the future Japanese settlers from the native Koreans or Chinese, usually by forced relocation of the latter. These companies created a buffer between the Japanese settlers and colonial natives. Not only did they acquire the land, these companies helped provide each new settlement with farming experts, police and defensive apparatuses, hospitals, factories, and schools. The companies were helped by government propaganda urging the Japanese people to become “soldiers of the Hoe” for “the development of the Yamato race, to build a new order in Asia.” Just as with earlier immigration projects, the Japanese government put more than just words in the minds of the average Japanese farmer in order to encourage immigration, they offered to put money in his pocket. These large scale policies needed help from grassroots counterparts in the form of local elites in each prefecture, and in the smaller villages in Japan. It was these elites who in the 1930s began to sell their villagers on the “glorious” idea of immigration to the continent. With the help of Prefecture bureaucrats, villages in Japan would recruit up to 300 households, sending up to a third of the total village population or recruiting from surrounding villages to meet a preordained quota. Most villages would take up these recruitment drives for economic reasons. Immigration to Manchuria promised to ease the economic stress of the 1930s global depression. With the promise of more land to farm and money in their pocket, these recruitment programs could cut away the households that were a drain on the village’s resources and space. With government propaganda painting a pretty picture of the riches to be had in the colonies, and the push from local prefectures and villages, many Japanese jumped at the chance for a better life in a colony.

As citizens of a newly modern nation-state and empire, the Japanese needed a new identity for themselves and understanding of the world at large. Several scholars such as Tessa Morris-Suzuki and Michael Weiner have looked at the development of language and ideas during this time of empire expansion to understand how Japan created this new Imperial discourse on identity. As their empire grew into Korea and China, the Japanese had to find a way to fit new groups into their understanding of the Japanese Empire. Weiner and Morris-Suzuki have taken different approaches to show how this understanding of Japanese culture and terminology was used during the Imperial era. In his article entitled “Discourses of Race, Nation and Empire in Pre-1945 Japan,” Weiner discusses the rise of culture (minzoku) and race (jinshu) within the Japanese identity after the Meiji Restoration. Weiner begins his analysis by distinguishing between the two terms. Minzoku is used in reference to Japanese language, culture and society. Jinshu is translated as race, meaning the biological characteristics of skin tone, hair, and other physical traits. These two terms have distinct meanings when translated to English, but Weiner points
out how they became blurred in the decades leading up to 1945. During the 1920s and 1930s, newspapers, magazines and scholarly journals argued the superiority of the Japanese on a biological and cultural basis.\textsuperscript{15} State Shinto and devotion to the Emperor also played an important role in creating the idea of Japanese uniqueness and superiority over the peoples of Asia.\textsuperscript{16}

Historian Tessa Morris-Suzuki looks at the development of different words in Japanese understandings of themselves and their identity on the world stage. Morris-Suzuki observes how the Japanese understanding of culture changed over the early years of the Meiji period from a symbol of westernization into a concept of Japanese uniqueness.\textsuperscript{17} Morris-Suzuki focuses on the famous Japanese ethnographer Yanagita Kunio (1875-1962) as an example of how Japanese intellectuals in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century struggled to create a framework to understand “Japanese-ness.”\textsuperscript{18} In his early writing, Yanagita focused on the distinctions between small villages around Japan, noting differences between people of the plains versus people of the mountains and those that lived in more urban environments. However just as Weiner points to the intellectual shift in the 1930s and 1940s, Morris-Suzuki notes a shift in Yanagita’s work towards a more encompassing “Japanese culture” rather than distinction between various prefectures.\textsuperscript{19} This one author’s shift represents a trend in Japanese society that began building upon the larger idea of Japanese distinctiveness. A sense of cultural uniqueness was a driving force in segregation within the colonies and Japan’s perceived duty to protect other Asians from the West.

Weiner and Morris-Suzuki point to statesmen, bureaucrats, and unofficial spokesmen who constructed ideas of what it meant to be Japanese from the Meiji through the 1930s.\textsuperscript{20} Through language in newspapers, movies, and other mass media avenues, these leaders used “Japanese-ness” to encompass more than just ethnicity, but also cultural markers. While academic circles continued to use \textit{minzoku} and \textit{jinshu} according to the proper definition, common usage of the words began to merge as early as World War I.\textsuperscript{21} Just as \textit{minzoku} created this unified understanding of what it meant to be Japanese, the focus on the term culture also helped build this unity through creating a national sense of culture that was meant to foster national harmony among Japanese.\textsuperscript{22}

The blending of blood and culture as two parts of the same identity is an important aspect of the Japanese understanding of “Japanese-ness.” This construction of an all-or-nothing Japanese identity through the language of culture imposed a utopian vision of a harmonious and united Japanese society.\textsuperscript{23} This vision fell apart after the war. When the \textit{hikiagesha} returned to Japan, the seemingly small differences between \textit{naichi} and \textit{hikiagesha} would provide enough ground to isolate the group for scapegoating and shifting of blame.

\textit{Divergent Experience between Homeland and Colonies}

Japanese citizens, both at home and abroad, had long endured the propaganda of Imperial Japan, which nurtured an intense love for the Emperor and the state of Japan; yet when Kazuko Kuramoto was repatriated, she wondered, “why, then, do I feel a stranger?”\textsuperscript{24} Children who had grown up in the colonies had
been taught that they were the symbols of Japan’s Imperial might in Asia. The Japanese soldiers, too, had been held in the highest esteem, receiving gifts from villages back in Japan during the war. Soldiers like Yasuo Kazuki had “thousand-stitch belts” made for them by school children and families as a way to connect common civilians in Japan with the soldiers overseas. These soldiers and settlers were the forefront of representing the Japanese culture to the world, symbols for Japan and Japanese minzoku.

This time abroad and the experiences of the colonies would slowly change the future hikiagesha into a unique group of Japanese that differed from the naichi on the home islands. In the colonies of the Japanese empire, strict segregation laws had created a multi-tiered caste system with the privileged Japanese above the native populations. The colonial Japanese lived in privileged worlds separated from the norms of Japan and even from the countries they inhabited. Colonists in places like Korea and Manchukuo rarely experienced the bombings and fear that the home island Japanese knew. However, being an isolated minority in a hostile population produces its own kind of fear. Kuramoto describes an incident before the end of the war in Manchuria when she met naichi girls recently arrived from Japan in a Red Cross training program in Manchuria, writing that it seemed they, “had come from different backgrounds—Japanese as we all were.” The fact that she had grown up in the colonies created a separation between Kuramoto and these naichi, which she noticed even as a young girl. While this could be explained as a response to schoolgirl teasing, Kuramoto’s reaction to the naichi girls had deeper meaning. Kuramoto’s memoir describes the way the naichi girls critiqued Kuramoto’s manners, attire, and her interactions in social situations, calling Kuramoto disrespectful because she failed to follow the strict social protocol that came second nature to them. This is an instance of cultural differences such as manners and speech patterns having an effect on one’s perceived “Japanese-ness” and, yet, this occurred prior to repatriation.

The desire for separation was not only initiated by the naichi. Kuramoto made a conscious effort to separate herself from naichi girls who were teasing a Korean house maid’s Japanese language skills. If that is the way people act in Japan, she thought, then that’s not the place she had been taught about through government propaganda. The Japanese colonial settlers were not radically different from naichi; colonial Japanese did not reject their heritage. But the colonial environment allowed for enough change over time for the naichi and hikiagesha to possess slight, yet significant, differences in identity. The variation and differences between settlers of different colonies was probably equally noticeable, but the act of repatriation would be the unifying force that would create the single group of hikiagesha out of all the settlers and former soldiers.

After Japan’s surrender, life in the colonies took a sudden and dramatic shift. Hostile local populations, who for the most part had suffered under Japanese rule, surrounded Japanese colonists. Kuramoto’s home was quickly becoming a strange place for her and her fellow Japanese, but even so, she could not comprehend the need to return to Japan, because Manchuria had been her family’s home for three generations. In her mind, she was already home.
However, as the world around Kuramoto began to collapse she would feel differently. In her memoir, Kuramoto described Manchuria as a “living hell” of not knowing who in a crowd might attack over some past grievance against the Japanese. The experiences of this “living hell,” along with repatriation, would unite Kuramoto with other colonists, all the while furthering the separation from their naichi counterparts.

Similarly, Kazuki, who had been stationed in northern Manchukuo at the time of surrender, described the end of the war as a powder keg that exploded with the local Chinese finally able to express their enmity and hatred towards the Japanese. Without the colonial and military apparatus, the loss of the strict segregation brought about confusion on all sides in the colonies, leading to violence and misunderstandings. Kazuki made a point in his memoirs not to blame the local populations for their actions during those chaotic first months. While he had not witnessed any of the atrocities himself, he had heard and believed the confessions of other Japanese soldiers who committed such acts. Social structures were failing as the Japanese government dissolved and left, leaving space to be filled by Allied soldiers.

The relative safety of Manchukuo during the war came to an abrupt end when the Soviets broke their non-aggression pact and invaded in early August 1945. Life under Soviet control was a struggle for Japanese like Kuramoto and her family. Uncertainty paired with the threat of violence as the Japanese waited to return home. Kuramoto heard stories from her mother and others about the “ex-convicts” that the Soviets had used as their frontline forces for the Manchurian invasion—stories of violence, pillaging, and rape. To protect herself, Kuramoto dressed in her brothers’ old clothes and even had her hair cut short so as to look more like a boy. The reason for her decision was not lost on the barber, who told her she would not have to cut her beautiful hair if she just remained indoors and away from the soldiers. When her mother told her of the necessity for Japanese girls to have abortions before their repatriation, Kuramoto lamented, “Did I grow up, maybe ten years in ten weeks?”

Kazoku Kuramoto

Kuramoto’s family faced other trials while awaiting repatriation in occupied Manchuria. Chinese policemen stopped Kuramoto’s father while he was cutting firewood in their family’s front yard and informed him that he could not destroy the property of the Chinese government. The Japanese in the colonies lost all property rights, and even their sense of agency. When discussing the growing violence and disorder in various cities on the Liaodong Peninsula, Kuramoto’s father attempted to find solace in the fact that, “the Chinese and Soviets will sort things out.” Passivity seemed to have settled over Kuramoto’s father in the knowledge that he could do nothing but wait for the Allied Powers to decide things among themselves. Such experiences, shared by Kuramoto, her family, and other repatriates, created a divide between the hikiagesha and the national minzoku. Kuramoto would be detested for being a woman in Soviet occupied area. The fears of repatriated women tainted by rape and disease were all too real for the naichi, who insisted that hikiagesha be sprayed with DDT and tested for
diseases upon their return. Fear of disease went hand in hand with the fear of mental contamination from the soldiers who the naichi worried would bring back communism to Japan.

Yasuo Kazuki

The journey back to Japan for former soldiers captured by the Allied Powers such as Kazuki was as traumatic as Kuramoto’s experience as a female civilian repatriate. In addition to the changes that all colonists experienced, the soldiers were interned by the Allied Forces, further straining the soldiers’ “Japanese-ness.” Kazuki and his fellow soldiers would face confusion after the war, as he and his unit spent months travelling south towards Korea, and ultimately to Japan, until one day the Soviet forces loaded the Japanese on a northbound train. These soldiers could not have know the long road ahead of them that went through the Soviet gulag before they could return to Japan. Upon their repatriation, these soldiers and colonists, who had been the heroes of Imperial Japan, would find that they had lost not only the war, but their place in Japan’s minzoku as well.

The Return of the Hikiagesha

The repatriation of the hikiagesha was a massive undertaking for the Japanese government and the Allied Powers that controlled Japan. By the end of the war, over 6.5 million Japanese were still in the colonies and territories previously controlled by the Japanese empire, accounting for roughly nine percent of the Japanese population. On September 2, 1945, the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP), under General Douglas MacArthur, took control of Japan’s existing bureaucracy to ensure the repatriation of Japanese nationals. Under Article Nine of the Potsdam Declaration, the Allied agreement that outlined the goals and conditions for Japanese surrender, Japanese forces would be able to “return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.” When deconstructing the Japanese Empire, SCAP and the Allied governments approached repatriation through ethnic and racial lines. In SCAP’s view, it was as simple as sending Koreans to Korea, Chinese to China, and Japanese to the four main home islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Hokkaido, and Shikoku. All attempts by Japanese officials to negotiate the return of overseas Japanese had to go through SCAP, which now acted as the foreign relations arm for the Japanese government. As the shock of defeat settled upon the Japanese that remained overseas, they had to find ways to survive in foreign lands without the colonial apparatus that had provided them a privileged position among the native Chinese, Korean and other Asian ethnicities.

The length of the wait for repatriation was predicated on a number of factors. Where and when repatriation would take place depended on location, social status, which Allied Power controlled the region, and finally, bureaucratic red tape. While one of SCAP’s proclaimed priorities was to disarm and repatriate the remnants of the Japanese Imperial army as quickly as possible, this was not the case everywhere. The Allied Powers saw the defeated enemy soldiers as labor to
be used around Asia—the British retained 113,500 Japanese soldiers in Southeast Asia, the United States used 100,000 Japanese soldiers to help rebuild parts of Okinawa and the Philippines.47 When the Soviet forces raced across Manchuria in the final days of the war, they captured a large number of the Japanese forces stationed there and shipped around 700,000 Japanese to labor camps in the USSR.48 Kazuki was one such Japanese soldier shipped to a gulag in Siberia, an experience that would have a profound impact on his life as a painter after his return to Japan.49 These Japanese soldiers in Soviet custody would wait longer than most. One SCAP official accused the Soviets of repatriating no captured Japanese soldiers until June 1946, while other Allied Powers had repatriated at least over half by that time.50 These delays seem to be clear violations of the Potsdam Declaration. Repatriation would ultimately take place from all major areas, including the Soviet administered territories. However, the act of return would be just the beginning of the hikiagesha’s postwar struggle.

Before the war, one of the reasons many small villages in Japan supported the colonial project and encouraged members to settle the colonies was to conserve resources back at home. By 1945, the war effort and Allied forces had destroyed Japan’s infrastructure. Many Japanese did not know where their next meal would come from. The scarcity of food, money, and fuel increased with the return of hikiagesha. Millions of Japanese faced starvation on the home islands during the occupation and thousands died from it.51 Civilians and soldiers returned to find family members long dead, or even that they themselves had been declared dead.52 Soldiers who returned were seen as failures to the Emperor’s cause or looked upon with suspicion about what possible unjust violence they had committed during the war.53 It was easier for the naichi to assign blame for atrocities to the soldiers as a group, rather than recognizing them as individuals who had been trying to survive death, either from enemy bullets or their commanders’ katana. The soldiers would provide a scapegoat that the naichi could point to when questions of war responsibility were laid at Japan’s feet.

The hikiagesha returned to a Japan that had suffered under Allied air power. Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been reduced to ash by atomic bombs and many more cities had been burned to the ground. Communications between the colonists and the home islands were cut during the closing weeks of the war, leaving the colonists and soldiers with little knowledge of the devastation to which they were about to return.54 The divergent experiences in the colonies before and after the war would create a vast separation between hikiagesha and their naichi brethren. This ignorance went both ways; the naichi knew just as little of the hardships that the colonists and soldiers were subjected to before returning.

Ignorance about the other group’s experiences might have been resolved through open communication and dialogue between the naichi and hikiagesha. Unfortunately this dialogue was prevented, perhaps unintentionally, by SCAP. The Allied occupation had strict censorship rules, along with all the other reforms SCAP had enacted, to help rebuild a democratic Japan. This censorship was far-reaching, and yet arbitrary and unpredictable in its application to
all Japanese media from 1945-1949. SCAP gave Japanese publishers and editors vague instructions on what would be censored, with phrases such as “adhere strictly to the truth,” and print nothing that would “disturb the public tranquility.” William Coughlin’s important contribution to the understanding of SCAP censorship has been the identification of the taboo subjects that limited the Japanese press, with such restrictions as “criticizing Russia, criticizing Korea (and Koreans), criticizing China, criticizing other Allies, criticizing Japanese activities in Manchuria, employing ‘Greater East Asia’ propaganda, describing black market activities, overplaying starvation, and inciting violence or unrest.” These taboos, coupled with the vague instructions to Japanese publishers described by Coughlin, would have prevented hikiagesha from sharing their story with a wider audience.

The initial years after the war would have been the perfect time to bridge the gap between the naichi and the hikiagesha. Those labeled as “red repatriates,” like Kazuki, could not speak out about the treatment and indoctrination they had experienced while interned in Siberia. Likewise, settlers like Kuramoto could not have written disparaging remarks about her and her family’s treatment in Manchuria. Of course, the censorship worked both ways; the hardships of the naichi experience would have likewise been censored from publication. Without the opportunity for genuine dialogue, rumors, fears, and hearsay created a barrier amongst the Japanese. This Allied censorship is a likely reason for the lack of early hikiagesha memoirs that scholars can use to study as primary sources of their experiences in early postwar Japan.

Return of the Settlers

Upon her return to Kyushu, Kuramoto and her family sought out her paternal family in Oita. The reactions of her relatives surprised Kuramoto. Her cousin repeatedly described Kuramoto’s family as “lucky” because they did not experience the firebombing and other tragedies that befell Japan in the closing months of the war. Kuramoto looked to her father to tell his family the horrors they had endured in Manchuria, but for reasons he never directly expressed, he did not. There was no sharing of experiences, only assumptions made. The hikiagesha and the naichi simply did not understand each other’s experiences.

Kuramoto described her first meeting with her naichi family: “Taro [Kuramoto’s cousin] always referred to us as ‘repatriates,’ as if we were of another race, not ‘real’ Japanese... The man who welcomed us had said, ‘Welcome home, my fellow repatriates.’ He had not said ‘welcome home, my fellow Japanese.’” Through subtle and nuanced language, the naichi separated themselves from the hikiagesha. Language is a powerful yet delicate tool. Language is how the idea of an all-or-nothing minzoku was created and enforced to attain a notion of national harmony. But language can be used to divide the naichi and hikiagesha. The insistence of both family and strangers on using the term “hikiagesha” reveals the conscious need to label Kuramoto as something other than a true Japanese because of her time in the colonies. This separation will provide fertile ground for placing the blame or attempting to shift responsibility for the lost war to the repatriates.

The Question of Japanese-ness / Hammond 110
Return of the Red Repatriates

The return of the Soviet internees in particular would have an impact on how all hikiagesha were viewed by the naichi. By 1948 Japanese POWs began to return in larger quantities as SCAP negotiated with the Soviets. However, during the years of their internment, the Japanese soldiers, including Kazuki, were subjected to communist indoctrination, which created distrust among the naichi. An infamous occurrence at the Maizuru Repatriation Center involved Japanese soldiers locking arms in the formation known as “landing in the face of the enemy” singing the Internationale, a communist and left-wing anthem. The incident caused widespread worry in Japan—fear of communist sympathizers grew among both the American occupiers as well as the Japanese. Then again, in his memoir, Kazuki recalled days of singing Internationale at the tops of his lungs in preparation to return to Japan, but only because of a rumor that those who were seen singing the anthem would be repatriated sooner.

While the Japanese interned by the Soviets would not have been ignorant of the indoctrination process, one can assume that many did not think about possible repercussions back in Japan. The indoctrination, or simply the perceived threat of communist indoctrination, effected how the naichi would react to the soldiers. Communism had been suppressed, at times violently, during the decades leading up to the World War II. While Weiner does not reference political affiliations in his discussion of minzoku, it would not be a stretch to infer communism as an un-Japanese quality as understood by the common people in Japan. These soldiers returned tainted in the eyes of Japan.

The Language of Guilt and Responsibility

The division of experiences during and after the war between naichi and the repatriated Japanese created a unique opportunity to see how a society reacted when forced to break with, and reconcile, the past. Under the imperial machine that urged the Japanese people to join the army or to help settle the expanding territories, Japanese colonists had been held in high esteem by Japanese society at home. But with the end of the war, these repatriated soldiers and civilians had to come to terms with their new place in Japanese society, a place that was no longer held in high esteem.

The separation achieved through language and distinctions in experiences allowed the naichi to use the hikiagesha as an “other” to separate themselves from blame. Most Japanese would have heard the broadcast for the “repentance of the 100 million,” in which the government attempted to spread the guilt and responsibility of the war among all Japanese rather than directly upon the government or the Emperor. The Japanese had different reactions to this call for a dispersed culpability among every Japanese. Dower points out several ways that the Japanese dealt with their guilt, including remorse for failing the Emperor in his holy war, and for the intelligentsia, remorse in failing to stop the military clique from taking power in a democracy.

One Japanese reporter described a confrontation between a naichi and a hikiagesha, in which the naichi proclaimed, “if you hadn’t gone out to the colonies,
there wouldn’t have been a war.” While this inflammatory statement has some truth, it shows this particular man’s desire to place the blame elsewhere. Kuramoto’s older brother had a theory for the cold welcome they received from their family on Kyushu: guilt. In their naichi family’s mind, it would have been better for Kuramoto and her family to be strangers. Strangers are easier to distance oneself from, but when your own blood returns to remind you of your own complicity in the lost war, the truth can be harder to bear.

Kazuki explained the difference he saw between the postwar experiences of naichi and hikiagesha. On his trip north into Siberia, Kazuki noticed a “red corpse” of a Japanese man on the side of the road. The body had been stripped, beaten, and possibly skinned. Kazuki postulated that the red corpse had suffered the vengeance of the local population for the atrocities of the colonial government. He compared this “red corpse” to the “black corpses” left behind at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Kazuki explained, the “black corpse” would go on to symbolize the victim story of Japan in the postwar world, while the “red corpse” would remain silent on the side of the road. The “red corpse” is not that of a victim, but a victimizer who fell to the tragedy of war just like his victims. Kazuki did not make the distinction between civilian and military repatriates but instead perhaps viewed the repatriation process as a unifying experience all hikiagesha went through. The hikiagesha were living “red corpses” in Kazuki’s mind: husks of victimizers who have suffered for the sin of blindly following orders. Without attempting to excuse their actions or their guilt, Kazuki asserted that it is the “red corpses” that Japan must remember in the postwar era so as not to make the same mistakes again.

Conclusion

It would take years for Japan to come to terms with the lost war and the role citizens played in the conflict. While the hikiagesha were not the only marginalized subgroup of postwar Japan, their experience is little recognized in scholarly analysis. They were and remain Kazuki’s living “red corpses” that represent forgotten casualties of war. The hikiagesha encountered extreme hardship in the face of hostile local populations, both before and after the war. When they landed in Japan and came face-to-face with the naichi, repatriates soon learned that they had indeed lost more than the war. They had lost some part of what in meant to be Japanese, as it was understood in the Imperial era. Together, both naichi and hikiagesha had to incorporate all their wartime and Imperial experiences into a collective whole, so that they could begin to rebuild their nation and national identity.
Notes

1 I would like to acknowledge the people who have helped me with this research. I thank Andrew Barshay, who took the time to speak with me about repatriation and shared his personal translation of Yasuo Kazuki’s memoir. I would also like to thank the presenters and attendees of the East West Center 2015 Graduate Conference for their suggestions and comments. Thank you to John Nelson and Brian Dempster for their help on the early drafts of this work, and to Genevieve Leung and Cynthia Schultes, who helped me expand this paper and think about the topic of repatriation in a different way. I would like to thank Dayna Barnes, not only for her assistance with the final drafts but also for recommending John Dower’s *Embracing Defeat* to me during my first semester at USF.


7 Ibid., 356.

8 Ibid., 358.

9 Ibid., 354.

10 For an example of further governmental assistance, the Colonial Ministry provided a one-time payment of 4,750 yen, and another 14,733 yen per year, for the first three years to help pay for these settlers and set up expenses for the new settlement. Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*, 358.

11 Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*, 376.


14 Ibid., 438.

15 Ibid., 440.


18 Ibid., 765.

19 Ibid.


21 Ibid., 441.


23 Ibid., 772.


27 Kuramoto, Manchurian Legacy, 68.

28 Ibid., 9.

29 Ibid.


31 Kuramoto, Manchurian Legacy, 76.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid., 85.

34 Ibid.

35 Kazuki, Watashi no Shiberiya, 35.

36 Ibid.

37 Kuramoto, Manchurian Legacy, 86.

38 Ibid., 66.

39 Ibid., 90.

40 Ibid., 91.


42 Kazuki, Watashi no Shiberiya, 35.

43 Young, Japan's Total Empire, 407.


45 Takamae, The Allied Occupation of Japan, 112.


48 Ibid., 111.


51 Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, 228.

52 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 48.

53 Ibid.

54 Kuramoto, Manchurian Legacy, 118.

55 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 386–423.


57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., 117.

59 Ibid., 114.

61 Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 126.
62 Ibid., 128.
64 Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 256.
65 Hikiage minpo, October 10, 1946, as cited in Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 86.
68 Ibid.
References


Kilby Hammond is a recent graduate of the University of San Francisco’s Masters in Asia Pacific Studies (MAPS) Program. He was the Valedictorian speaker for May 2015 Arts and Sciences Commencement ceremony and is a recipient of the 2014-2015 Center for Asia Pacific Studies Fellowship.