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Editors’ Note

After 12 issues spanning close to a decade, we bid a fond farewell to usher in new leadership (including a managing editor) who will steer Asia Pacific: Perspectives to the next stage of its scholarly evolution.

We have tried to publish articles that span thematic and disciplinary topics related to the entire Pacific Rim region and beyond. Even after 12 issues, the number of academic journals taking a “big tent” approach to the Pacific Rim is very limited. We have promoted scholarship that provides fresh perspectives on familiar topics, or which updates long-standing debates in surprisingly contemporary and useful ways. Special issues devoted to certain themes—from corporate social responsibility to the Mumbai attacks—have been a particular strong point of the journal during our time as editors. We also tried to be inclusive in terms of regional breadth, covering not just the traditional East Asian countries but boldly venturing into Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and South Asia. It is also a point of pride that we have regularly included the work of graduate and occasionally undergraduate students in the journal, in part because we value the scholarship of these emerging scholars and the analysis and insight demonstrated in their papers.

We are pleased to highlight in this issue papers which once again cover a range of topics typical for Asia Pacific: Perspectives. The politics of policy and climate change in Australia by Lawrence Niewójt, China’s use of ‘soft power’ by Hyun-Binn Cho, and the development of democracy in Hong Kong by Jordin Montgomery all indicate themes and issues of vital importance to Pacific Rim regions.

This APP issue also includes two student submissions that made it through the required peer-review process. The first is Katherine J. Bowen-Williams’ article on “Tensions Over Hydroelectric Developments in Central Asia: Regional Interdependence and Energy Security” which discusses the important role of hydroelectric resources to the emerging geopolitical architecture of Central Asia. Bowen-Williams is a product of USF’s B.A. in International Studies program and is currently a graduate student at George Mason University. The second is Jake Nagasawa’s “Sitting in Silence: A Comparative Analysis of Two Sōtō Zen Institutions in San Francisco” which delves into the independent co-existence of Asian and Western Buddhism in a liberal, multi-cultural city—where anything and everything is possible. Nagasawa graduated from USF in May 2011 with double majors in Theology and Religious Studies as well as Asian Studies.

Thank you for your support!

Sincerely,

Joaquin Jay Gonzalez III, 2002-2011
John Nelson, 2003-2011
Beyond the Hot Debate: Social and Policy Implications of Climate Change in Australia

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Adam Hughes Henry, Australian National University

ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the social and policy implications of climate change on the world’s most arid populated continent. Warmer average temperatures will have real, identifiable impacts on human health, marginalized sectors of the population, and the sustainability of rural and coastal communities in Australia. By analysing indicators of environmental health and social welfare we can identify emerging threats posed by a warmer climate. Policy-makers will need to devise a suite of social policy and technologically-driven mitigation programmes in order to safeguard citizens against the most complex and far-reaching environmental and policy problem of the 21st century. Furthermore, the Australian federal government has a valuable opportunity to effect positive change in the Asia-Pacific region through its leadership in this policy area and funding programmes that promote the establishment of low-emission economies in developing nations.

Introduction: The Need for Innovative Policy

For the past two years, the Australian public has been subjected to a great deal of discussion regarding global climate change and legislation regarding a trading scheme for carbon emissions that might change Australian society’s intensive use of energy. For all the contentious debate regarding the pricing of carbon credits, the potential impact on the nation’s extractive industries, and the Liberal-National party coalition schism that emerged during negotiations surrounding this legislation, remarkably little progress has been made toward enacting public policies that prepare the nation for the effects of a warmer, drier climate. Some commentators have also suggested that the Labor government’s failure to pass the carbon emissions trading scheme through the Senate was a crucial policy failure that damaged Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s reputation and precipitated the events that led to his replacement by Julia Gillard in June 2010.

Little has been done to fill the policy vacuum and mitigate the effects of global warming on Australian society. While technological advances in the energy production, transportation and agricultural sectors of the economy are essential if the nation is to curb its carbon output, there is also a pressing need for a suite of innovative social policy initiatives that would safeguard the most vulnerable components of the population from the spectre of climate change. This paper will discuss the effects of climate change that have been identified and witnessed by Australia’s scientific community, and highlight key areas where forward-thinking policies could effectively mitigate the harmful effects of a changing climate on people and the economy. The most vulnerable groups stand to suffer disproportionate hardship in a warming world, and there is a need for policymakers to take action. Alongside the structural and technological advancements envisioned for a low-carbon economy, such public policy measures would work toward the long-term sustainability of Australian society.
Global Discord and the Looming Threat

The disheartening outcome of the Copenhagen Climate Change conference in December 2009 seems to have diminished the positive effect of earlier global initiatives such as the Bali Action Plan (2007) and quashed hopes of a concerted global effort to curb carbon emissions. The Bali agreement attempted to lay the groundwork for increasing international engagement and voiced the hope that the global community would begin to implement policies that arrested the growth of carbon dioxide emissions and addressed some of the social implications of a warmer global climate (Mittelstaedt 2007). It was hoped that at the end of 2009, the Bali Action Plan would be superseded by a new, stronger climate change agreement where nations would pledge to reduce carbon emissions to levels between 25-45% of the 1990 levels by 2020 (Anderson 2008). This type of solid agreement never emerged in Copenhagen, in part because the concerted efforts of ‘climate change sceptics’ derailed any serious discussions that could produce a comprehensive agreement on emission reductions (Climate Group 2010).

In Australia, such sceptics have mounted continuous attacks on the scholarly community, the professional integrity of scientific investigators, and challenged the validity of climate science. Comments made by Senator Nick Minchin, an esteemed member of the Australian Liberal Party, are indicative of the unsubstantiated, blanket statements favoured by these individuals. On the ABC’s Four Corners programme titled ‘Malcolm and the Malcontents’ televised on 9 November 2009, he struck out at all those concerned by the threat of climate change and blamed them for indoctrinating a whole generation of young Australians. He argued that ‘For the extreme left it provides the opportunity to do what they’ve always wanted to do, to sort of de-industrialise the western world. You know the collapse of communism was a disaster for the left, and ... really they embraced environmentalism as their new religion’ (ABC 2009). Minchin’s vocal leadership of a group of senators hostile to new environmental regulations proved sufficient to stifle debate and the advancement of climate change mitigation policies through the Australian Senate.

These ‘climate change sceptics’ choose to ignore the scientific data pointing to threats to land, life and economy posed by global warming. Rising sea level is one such threat. Sea levels are rising due to increased in-flow of freshwater from melting glaciers and polar icecaps, while the thermal expansion of the oceans during an era of higher temperatures will add to the problem. Australia’s coastline stretches for 36,735 kilometers and all of the nation’s major centers of population and economic activity are found in the coastal zone. While south-eastern Australia’s alpine skiing industry – and the 12,000 full-time jobs associated with this sector – is expected to suffer in an era of warmer temperatures, the threat to coastal communities will be exponentially higher (Viner and Agnew 1999). For example, as one of the leading tourism destinations in the Asia-Pacific region, the city of Cairns on the north Queensland coast is particularly vulnerable to the expected outcomes of a warming climate. Its economic dependence on nature-based tourism related to the nearby Great Barrier Reef and rainforest habitats of the Daintree will suffer greatly when coral reefs are inundated faster than their natural growth rate and shifting precipitation belts affect forest species and heighten the bushfire threat. Furthermore, its coastal setting leaves Cairns ‘threatened by the ravages of tropical cyclone storm surges’, a problem magnified by the projected rise in sea level (Viner
and Agnew 1999). While additional studies using regional climate modelling techniques reiterated that global warming would increase tropical cyclone intensity near Australia (Walsh and Ryan 2000), this theory was confirmed when Cyclone Larry struck the Innisfail area of northern Queensland in March 2006 and caused AU$1.5 billion in damages, and subsequently Cyclone Yasi devastated the Cairns region in February 2011 (Reuters 2011).

Policymakers at the local, state and federal level of government need to be prepared for the new set of problems faced by coastal communities. Foremost, it will be imperative that communities adjust their approach to the lucrative business of beachfront residential and commercial development. While in most cases beach reserves and foreshore parklands may be able to accommodate the 0.20 meter (8 inches) sea level rise expected by 2050, it is the magnified effect of extreme weather events – such as cyclones, storm surges and king tides – that have a greater potential to inflict real damage on coastal environments (IPCC 2001). One study that modelled the effect of sea level rise on the beach suburbs of northern Sydney expressed serious concern that ‘more than two-thirds of the world’s sandy coastlines have retreated during the past few decades’ (Hennecke et al 2004). This is a clear sign that storm events have increased in strength, frequency and destructive capacity. More importantly, their investigation found that the accepted 50-year sea level rise scenario, combined with a significant storm event, could cost AU$245 million in lost land and property value along Collaroy-Narrabeen Beach (Hennecke et al 2004). Policymakers at all levels of government need to take notice of these looming threats to seaside property. At the very least, urban planning regulations and their modes of implementation will need to be reassessed by the state and shire levels of government to ensure that homes and businesses are not flooded or swept away as the shoreline retreats inland.

As early as 1995, the Environmental Protection Agency in the United States weighed potential policy responses to sea-level rise and concluded that “Where the coastal processes and land development are on a collision course, the preferable option will be for the land development to move back from the shoreline” (US EPA 1995). Having initiated a full review of the State Coastal Planning Policy in 2010, the state of Western Australia adopted planning regulations that acknowledged an expected increase in sea level of 0.9 meters (35 inches) by 2110 (WA Department of Planning 2010). For new development on the sandy coast, the total setback was increased from 100 meters (328 feet) to 150 meters (492 feet). In the announcement of the new policy, Planning Minister John Day noted that the “key objective of the policy is to create a coastal foreshore reserve that can accommodate coastal processes – such as sea level change, erosion, accretion and severe storms across a 100-year planning time frame” (Urbanalyst 2010).

This change signals a trend toward a more conservative approach to development approval in Australia. There is increasing awareness that irresponsible patterns of development and the absence of precautionary building regulations could leave local councils, and even state governments, open to future negligence claims if property damage is incurred.
Climate Change and Population Health

The efforts of ‘climate change sceptics’ to block mitigation programmes may also harm the long-term well-being of Australians. A hotter, drier climate will be detrimental to the health of many people. In their latest update on climate change in 2007, the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) declared that warmer temperatures will visibly change the geographical patterns of disease, increase the potential harm stemming from water-borne contagions such as diarrhoeal disease, dengue fever, and raise the number of heat-related deaths around the globe (IPCC 2007). Malaria is already responsible for an estimated 25% of deaths worldwide in children aged 0-4 years old, and while the intensity of malarial infection may decline in some areas due to drier conditions, it is expected to broaden its geographical range overall (Patz et al 2007). The world’s poor, already subject to greater health risks, will bear the brunt of these negative impacts and suffer additional hardships as more frequent extreme weather events force marginal communities to migrate in distress. Lack of access to quality medical care and vital medicines exacerbates the vulnerability of this group. A study conducted by Sachs and Malaney in 2002 confirmed that disadvantaged populations can expect a heightened risk of contracting tropical disease in high-risk areas of the world. In examining the connection between poverty and the prevalence of malaria infection in sub-Saharan Africa, their study also showed that malaria-infected areas suffered from lower economic output as indicated through lower GDP figures (Sachs and Malaney 2002). In late 2010, a renewed effort to tackle seventeen neglected tropical diseases was launched by the World Health Organization (WHO). To address the lack of resources that has been an ever-present problem for health initiatives attempting to reach large numbers of very poor people, the WHO has partnered with pharmaceutical industry companies such as Novartis, Sanofi-Aventis, Bayer and Novartis to secure the long-term drug donations needed for disease eradication programmes (WHO 2010).

In Australia, a warmer climate will heighten the risk posed by the transport of airborne microbes, and enhance the geographical range of dengue fever, Ross River fever and Murray Valley encephalitis. The population centers of the tropical north and coastal Queensland are most vulnerable to this process and it is essential that local health services be prepared to handle new cases of infection. The mosquito-borne diseases are strongly influenced by variations in climatic conditions, with warmer waters encouraging the southward expansion of transmitting insects. A 2003 risk assessment undertaken by the federal government examined the potential spread of dengue fever under medium and high greenhouse gas emission scenarios in order to identify areas with new disease risks by the target date of 2050. While the range of the disease was limited to areas north of Cairns in Queensland, Darwin and Arnhem Land in the Northern Territory, and southwest toward Broome in Western Australia, the future climate scenario generated a much expanded range of disease risk. Under a high emissions scenario, it was expected that dengue fever cases could appear in Queensland’s coastal cities of Cairns, Townsville, Mackay and Rockhampton, push inland in the Northern Territory to the town of Katherine, and stretch along the coast of Western Australia as far south as Carnarvon (McMichael and Woodruff 2003). This does not bode well for the future health of residents in northern Australia. For while the treatments avail-
able for malaria are effective, fast-acting and can kill the infectious parasite, there are not yet any treatments available that would reduce the much longer period of dengue infection. A further difficulty is posed by the nature of the mosquitoes that transport these diseases. The malaria mosquito does not breed in an urban environment and is predominantly active at night. In contrast, the dengue mosquito is able to breed in the urban environment and will be active in mornings and evenings. Hence, the threat posed by an expansion in the range of dengue fever ought to be a primary concern for the health services operating in Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory.

Sadly, it appears that the disease range has spread more quickly than models had predicted. On 5 January 2009, an ABC news report confirmed fears that the dengue fever mosquito had shifted southward along the Queensland coast. During the preceding month, public health authorities had been trying to contain a dengue outbreak with more than fifty cases in Cairns, when two additional cases were reported further south in Townsville. By the end of March 2009, a dengue fever epidemic had been declared in northern Australia after it was discovered that four serotypes of the virus were circulating simultaneously in the tourist town of Cairns and one person had died from dengue haemorrhagic fever (McCredie 2009). In response to this incident, the Tropical Population Health Unit urged residents to tip out all stagnant water on their properties, use insect repellent and be mindful that it is ‘an indoor day biting mosquito’ that propagates haemorrhagic dengue (ABC 2009b). Medical experts working to control this disease expect dengue to become a more serious problem in Queensland over the coming years as rainfall patterns begin to show significant change. Counter-intuitively, less rainfall in Queensland was expected to create a greater threat from the mosquito population. In their words: ‘As rainfall drops, more people tend to store water more around their houses and it’s those containers where the mosquitoes that transmit dengue really like to live and breed’ (ABC 2009a). Since the major outbreak of dengue fever in the Cairns area over the summer of 2008-2009, a concerted effort at the local shire and town council levels has made great strides in addressing this public health issue. In the years 2010-2011, the number of reported dengue fever cases in Queensland hovered below 10% of that reported during the Cairns outbreak (Queensland Health 2011).

Remote indigenous communities in northern Australia are especially vulnerable to health impacts because their small scale and the vast distances between locales often mean that public health services are more limited than those found in cities. As part of the 2008 Garnaut Climate Change Review, a report by Donna Green examined this issue and found that ‘the inadequate and often culturally inappropriate health facilities and education infrastructure’ hampers efforts to promote good health and education in this region. Her study concluded that indigenous communities ‘are likely to be disproportionately disadvantaged by climate change’, a situation exacerbated by the poor state of existing infrastructure and high birth rates in some communities (Green 2008). Scientific projections that ‘the central and western deserts will have the greatest average warming in Australia’, with temperatures raised by up to 6OC (10.8OF) by the year 2070 and an increase in the number of hot spells, paints a dire scenario for these regions. The 0.50 meter (19.6 inch) rise in sea level expected over the next century will affect the reliability
of traditional food harvesting activities, add to worries about potential flooding on low-lying coasts, accelerate salt inundation of freshwater aquifers, and increase exposure to infectious enteric diseases and melioidosis. Regions like Arnhem Land, home to a number of communities that are currently experiencing high population growth, will be particularly hard hit by climate change if no anticipatory adaptation programmes are implemented (Green 2006, Green 2008).

The psychological impact of the climate change phenomenon will be an additional concern in Australia’s affected regions, as new environmental patterns and processes replace dependable natural rhythms. Communities with a strong spiritual attachment and economic dependence on land-based production will experience sustained mental stress and disruption of livelihoods. Indigenous communities may experience heightened emotional anxiety as traditional lands begin to alter in character or are inundated under a rising sea, and rural communities based on agricultural production may face complete ruin as the temperature rises and precipitation belts shift. The powerful traditions and sense of connection Australian Aborigines have to their ancestral territories will magnify the mental anxiety and may potentially lead to further problems within these communities. Donna Green has argued that ‘If community-owned country becomes ‘sick’ through environmental degradation, impacts of climate extremes, or inability of the traditional owners to fulfill cultural obligations through ongoing management and habitation; the people of that land will feel this ‘sickness’ themselves’ (Green 2008). Observed shifts in weather and wildlife migration patterns have already caused some consternation and distress. In the Snowy Mountains of south-eastern Australia, long-term observations of bird migrations showed that migratory birds were arriving several weeks earlier in the 1980s and 1990s than they had been in the 1970s (IPCC 2007a, Green and Pickering 2002). It is believed that higher minimum temperatures enable birds to migrate earlier in their annual cycle.

The warming and drying of Australia’s most productive farmlands will cause a great deal of stress in rural areas as crops fail and conditions dictate that some will need to be retired from agricultural production. Less rain, more evaporation, greater heat stress on plants and less water available for irrigation will hurt agricultural yields. And while farming is already a stressful occupation, droughts and extreme weather events will be the sort of adversities that farmers can expect more of in the coming decades. Droughts cause financial stress through the loss of crop income, the depreciation of capital stock when capital is idle, while underemployment often results in the loss of psychological well-being. Springtime droughts are particularly damaging to both crops and communities, and researchers have found that they are ‘associated with a large decline in life satisfaction for rural communities’ (Carroll et al 2009). While rural Australians often pride themselves on their resilience, regions hit with adversity often witness as rise in mental health problems and a concomitant rise in the number of farm suicides (Anderson 2008a).

A study examining statistical data from the 2001 census found a clear link between stresses associated with farming and suicide rates. Examining data from South Australia, researchers found that the rate of suicides on farms in that state was ‘significantly higher than the overall rate of suicide’ (Miller and Burns 2008). In another case study, data collected during the New South Wales drought of 2006 showed that a ‘decrease in precipitation of about 300mm has been associated with
an approximately eight percent increase in the long-term mean suicide rate (Berry et al 2008). In a drying and warming climate, access to mental health assessment and treatment services in rural areas will need to improve if lives are to be saved and the enormous burden placed on sufferers and their carers is to be managed. A warmer and drier climate will require that some districts need to cease agricultural production and close down the lucrative businesses that support the farm sector. Similarly, in the aftermath of the 2009 Victorian bushfires there appears little doubt that the fire hazard has been ‘exacerbated by climate change’ (Griffiths 2009). In this case, governments are now revising their approach to the bushfire threat and new fire evacuation protocols, but a broader reassessment of rural settlement patterns may be required as climate change alters the productivity of the land and character of fire-prone, eucalyptus forests.

Beyond the urban-rural dichotomy in the distribution of negative impacts from global warming, the adverse effects of climate change will also be felt more strongly by those living on the wrong side of the Australian class divide. Major reports commissioned by the Australian Conservation Foundation and the Friends of the Earth have highlighted serious concerns about how lower income groups will fare in an era of global warming (ACF 2007; Friends of the Earth International 2007). With higher ambient temperatures, more frequent hot spells and anticipated higher costs of living (due to increased food, energy and housing costs), is it clear that lower income Australians are in the worst position to face the economic repercussions of climate change. This represents a gross inequity given that low income groups have historically contributed the least to carbon dioxide emissions. Furthermore, they are least able to pay for the housing modifications and heightened energy expenses that will face most citizens over the next generation, and the rural poor may face the additional stress of employment loss as agricultural production suffers in some districts. In 2009, the Labor government’s home insulation rebate scheme was one attempt to address these issues in the midst of the global financial crisis. However, this programme’s lack of oversight and failure to achieve major policy targets showed that future initiatives in this area need to include clear quality assurance mechanisms and a strong monitoring regime.

The health of elderly Australians will also be directly threatened by the higher temperatures foreseen in the future. Given that the expansion of this demographic group is following the pattern experienced in other advanced economies, we can expect that the well-being of elderly Australians will gain greater prominence as a major issue over the next few years. According to projections released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 13.1 percent of Australians were aged 65 years and over in 2005, and this figure is expected to rise to 25.7 percent by the year 2050 (ABS 2006). A growing body of literature on this subject suggests that there will be increased mortality due to severe heat waves. In Australia, it is estimated that around 1,100 people aged over 65 years die each year due to physical stress from high temperatures (Woodruff et al 2006). A 2006 report jointly commissioned by the Australian Conservation Foundation and the Australian Medical Association has used a comparative model to estimate the health impacts of increased temperatures on the elderly. The first modelling scenario assumed that the Australian population in 2100 would have experienced zero growth. Secondly, it compares two climate policies that could be adopted by the Government throughout the
21st century. If a regime of low emissions is pursued, ‘...the heat-related mortality [in the 65+ age group] could be between 1,700 and 1,900 deaths each year... under [high emissions] heat related deaths could be between 2,600 and 3,200 per year.’ A second model used the same comparative methods, but assumed that the Australian population has increased by 2100. Depending on the size of Australia’s population increase, it is entirely possible that the number of citizens aged 65 and over could be two or five times greater in 2100 than it is today. If a regime of low emissions were pursued, heat-related mortality in the elderly could be between 4,200 and 8,000 deaths each year, under high emissions this could be between 8,000-15,000 deaths each year (Woodruff et al 2006).

We are already beginning to witness the devastating effect of extreme heat on elderly citizens. Sudden, heat-related deaths reached a crisis level in South Australia during the heat wave of January 2009. In Adelaide, ambulance officers reported as many as 24 deaths in a single day, as temperature rose so high that the suburban railroads warped and buckled in the searing heat (ABC 2009d). What is most saddening about the deaths precipitated by the Adelaide heat wave was that they were largely preventable. Given that the nation’s population is highly centralized within a handful of major cities, it is incumbent on state and city officials to respond rapidly to the health threat posed by extreme heat. Rather than implementing expensive technological and infrastructural building programmes to heat-proof the housing stock, better co-ordination of social work and community outreach programmes, alongside the designation of temporary cooling centres could prove to be a simple and effective response to these crises. As many elderly people often live alone, it is crucial that social welfare programmes maintain regular communication with them during extreme weather events and provide free transport to centres where people could seek respite from the incessant heat. It is vital that governments provide safe options for city residents living in dwelling that are not equipped to handle extreme heat episodes. Without strong measures to mitigate the effects of climate change in Australia it is almost certain there will be an increased heat-related mortality trend amongst the elderly population throughout the 21st century.

**Signs of Movement in Australia and Abroad**

Before the demise of the carbon emissions trading scheme, there were many encouraging signs that Australia was on the cusp of a transformative era in which economic production and the lifestyles of citizens would begin to reflect a much-needed shift toward a low-carbon emissions economy. Climate change experts such as Professor Warwick McKibbin called for drastic cuts in carbon emissions and urged that all revenue from the sale of carbon credits ‘be focused on emissions reduction’ (ABC 2009c). Such a position was echoed by the Senate-based Green Party. Globally, business leaders have begun to voice strong support for a variety of ‘green’ initiatives. This move responds to sentiments expressed by their clientele and, more importantly, recognises the significant savings on operational costs that could be won by adopting more sustainable practices. Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retailer, has pushed its 200 largest Chinese suppliers to become 20 percent more energy efficient by 2012 and trimmed product packaging that in turn saved the company US$3.5 million in transportation costs over a single year (Kirby 2008).
Conscientious, less wasteful production often yields greater profits, and so for the private sector the meeting of social and environmental standards has proven to be a worthwhile endeavour. Given this trend, we might do better to think of the defeat of the emissions trading scheme as a minor delay on the road to sustainable change in the Australian economic and society.

While Australian politicians struggle with the issue of climate change and how to mitigate its damaging effects on society, other nations around the world are moving forward to fill this policy vacuum. The European Union continues to display leadership in the global drive toward lessening the carbon intensity of wealth creation, and its efforts in the area of fuel and energy efficiency have set a high standard for the rest of the world to follow. Following in their footsteps, the United States recently announced fuel efficiency regulations that bring that nation a step closer to the European norm, and President Obama’s commitment to controlling carbon emissions at the Copenhagen conference in December 2009 could be seen a small, tentative step forward in the global discussion. In June 2009, the US House of Representative passed the Clean Energy and Security Act that would put the US economy under a ‘cap and trade’ system, reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 17 percent (from 2005 levels) by 2020, and weaken the American economy off oil imports (ABC 2009e). And although China remains reluctant to commit to absolute cuts in carbon dioxide emissions for fear of hampering the meteoric rise of its economy, rising energy and fuel costs for its manufacturing sector have generated incentives for reducing the carbon intensity of its economy.

In the world’s advanced economies, policy units are beginning to incorporate the social implications of climate change into their analyses. The United Kingdom was one of the first global powers to realise that social policy measures must play an important role in its national response to climate change. A 2007 national assessment identified that the development of future social policies related to climate change will require greater research into the vulnerability of individuals and groups, assessments of public education and adaptation schemes, and better estimates of the impact of global warming on human health (Owen 2007). Also in 2007, a report by the US Congressional Research Service flagged the need to develop appropriate administrative linkages and communication channels that would enable researchers to reach decision-makers and facilitate action to mitigate the impact of global warming. In reassessing research priorities and encouraging the development of cooperative mechanisms for sharing insights, the US government appears more receptive than ever to calls for constructive change (Leggett 2007, 45).

Meanwhile, in Canada the Pembina Institute – a policy research center focused on environmental issues – has presented the federal government with a set of well-articulated greenhouse gas emission reduction policies which includes policy evaluation criteria that distribute fairly the burden of cost for structural adjustment to major polluters. Important principles, such as ‘ability to pay and historical responsibility for pollution’ underpin their proposals and ensure that the poor and marginalised sectors of society do not bear the cost for societal transformation (Demerse and Bramley 2008, 6). The Pembina Institute has argued that social responsibility can be assured within a distinctly free-market system. Given that ‘approximately 50% of Canadian emissions come from heavy industry, a portion
of the economy that has shown itself responsive to price signals, carbon pricing appears to be a crucial piece of the puzzle in cutting Canada’s emissions’ (Demerse and Bramley 2008, 1). In the absence of real leadership on this issue from Canada’s ruling Conservative party, more progressive provinces such as British Columbia have taken it upon themselves to enforce emissions cuts. Accordingly, in 2007 British Columbia’s Liberal government embarked on a programme that would see the province’s carbon dioxide emissions cut 33% by the year 2020 (Bailie and Horne 2007, 1). This action proves that, in the absence of agreement at the global level or even within a federated political system, there is no need for positive action to be delayed.

Despite the poor legislative record to date, the Australian public service appears to now have the capacity to act on this issue in a concerted manner. Established shortly after Labor’s November 2007 election victory, the Department of Climate Change has acknowledged that ‘As one of the hottest and driest continents on earth, Australia will be one of the nations hardest and fastest hit by climate change if we don’t act now’ and begun to establish programmes that place the cost of change on the wealthier component of society (AG 2008a). For example, the Labor government’s investment in the solar and renewable energy sectors, and in particular the AU$7500 rebate available to homeowners for the installation of solar panels, included a means testing mechanism that was intended to make this basic energy infrastructure accessible to less wealthy households (ABC 2008a). Furthermore, as a subsidy for installing a solar energy system, homeowners selling power back into the grid would receive ‘credit worth five times the value of the energy produced’(ABC 2008b). In this way, the Australian federal government ensured that a sector of society that would have been unlikely to participate in the promotion of renewable energy was now a central proponent and beneficiary of the technology.

Australia’s Department of Climate Change has also supported joint initiatives with developing nations in the Asia-Pacific region. Having declared its readiness to play a ‘full and fair part’ in an effective global solution to climate change, the government funded an AU$200 million International Forest Carbon Initiative aimed at reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (AG 2008b). The collaborative Forest Carbon Partnerships with Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Indonesia has safeguarded the future of forests in Kalimantan (Indonesia) and the Papuan Highlands, and funded joint research and training programmes with the Centre for International Forestry Research in Indonesia. The Australians have also pumped over AU$15 million into programmes that ‘assist countries in the Asia-Pacific region increase their capacity to manage forests sustainably to reduce deforestation and forest degradation’(AG 2008c). In a November 2008 speech to the Lowy Institute in Sydney, PNG Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare applauded Australia’s efforts in promoting sustainable forest management in the Asia-Pacific region. Somare also expressed grave concerns that in PNG ‘our very way of life is being destroyed’ by global warming and that its disastrous effects could already be seen. He declared that climate change was responsible for ‘bleached coral reefs that are starving our fisheries; atoll-based communities that are disappearing under the rising waves; mosquitoes that are moving up mountain ridges and killing children; we find beaches eroded away and suffocated by the
swelling seas; and mighty trees, once high up on the beach, now drowned, felled and sinking under the surface’ (Somare 2008). Clearly, Australia’s co-operative programmes with the developing nations of the Asia-Pacific region serve a major need for expertise and enhance the well-being of citizens in these societies. In the coming years, as island nations such as Kiribati and Tuvalu find their populations threatened by a rising ocean it will be incumbent on the Australian government to provide direct assistance to these vulnerable Pacific ethnic groups and develop appropriate work permit and residency visa arrangements that could enable a staged withdrawal from low-lying islands (McAdam and Loughry 2009).

**Conclusion: Addressing Climate Change and Persistent Inequalities**

The so-called ‘climate change debate’ that has dominated media reports in Australia for the past three years has yet to generate any concrete programmes for dealing with the disproportionate impact of global warming on the most vulnerable sectors of its population and the residents of its northern and rural areas. Following many months of political manoeuvring, public debate and parliamentary committee work, on 22 August 2011, Australia’s Labor government (with key support from the Green Party in the Senate), passed Carbon Farming Initiative legislation that would allow farmers and investors to trade carbon offset credits from farmland and forestry projects (Reuters 2011b). This scheme is intended to be a precursor to a carbon tax scheme that is expected to be passed by parliament in the coming months and take effect in July 2012. Additional legislation for renewable energy production and energy efficiency programmes are expected to follow in short order. However, with a fragile, Labor-led coalition in the House of Representatives and growing public dissatisfaction with a poorly-communicated legislative agenda, it is not clear whether all legislation will be tabled in parliament. Indeed, focusing political discourse on business impacts and carbon price figures has caused many Australians to reconsider the full-scale transformation of their economy and hidden from view the vulnerable components of society that will bear the brunt of climate change impacts in Australia. Furthermore, in delaying the implementation of mitigation programmes Australia has missed a valuable opportunity to show consistent, constructive policy leadership in the Asia-Pacific region.

Developing nations, those that have historically contributed least to global carbon emissions, are also least able to mitigate the harmful impacts of climate change. As the mounting evidence from Papua New Guinea and south Pacific island nations has shown, the rising sea levels that accompany warmer ambient temperatures are already forcing the relocation of fragile coastal communities and will likely result in the full-scale evacuation of inundated islands. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has estimated that failure to act quickly will consign the poorest 40 percent of the world population —some 2.6 billion people—to severe environmental disruption, economic instability, and a future of diminished opportunity. It will exacerbate deep inequalities within countries, reinforce disparities in the Asia-Pacific region and ultimately impact on regional security (UNDP 2008). In these countries, gains in welfare satisfaction and family planning programmes could be easily funded through development programmes that redis-
tribute wealth within the region and would contribute greatly to emissions reductions (Pan 2008). Beyond the hot debate surrounding carbon tax schemes and the trading of offset credits, it is imperative that Australian policy-makers implement a range of policies that protect the nation’s most marginalised groups, the economic sustainability of its distant regions, and lessen existing social inequalities.

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ENDNOTES

1. Woodbridge (2004) argued that the key to preserving the natural environment (including addressing the issues of climate change) is to devote the same energy to this purpose that is currently devoted to military expenditures and strategy.

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Public Perceptions and Democratic Development in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

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ABSTRACT

Beijing’s slow progress in implementing a more robust democracy in Hong Kong continues to sow citizen unrest. Considering the Basic Law, what prospects exist for reform given the outcome of governance disputes? By analyzing public polling data following significant political events, citizen expectations are used to project future patterns in government behavior. While popular organizing has yielded success in civil liberties, electoral change has consistently stalled until recent negotiations. Democracy remains a primary aim of Hong Kong political groups, who will continue to pressure leadership to close this deficit. The outcomes of past confrontations offer useful blueprints for reading political change in the future.

The acquisition and subsequent maintenance of democracy is often studied in the field of political science because of its potentially far-reaching implications. By knowing what variables affect different levels and practices of democracy, interested and affected groups can potentially affect efforts to achieve their goals. Scholars have posited a wide range of explanations for what factors may be responsible for influencing a society’s trending toward greater levels of democratic institutions. These include, inter alia, civic participation, trade, economic growth, and collective identity. This paper centers largely on the role collective and individual civic variables play in the advancement or retarding of democracy as they relate to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Henceforth referred to simply as Hong Kong) and its quest for increased levels of suffrage. Promised eventual universal suffrage from Beijing, the people of Hong Kong have instead been met with a string of ambiguous and temporizing gestures from the Mainland, generating significant frustration. By channeling this increasing frustration with repeated delays for reform into civic action, Hong Kong protest movements have achieved notable success in defending civil liberties but not universal suffrage. Barring the unforeseen influence of political or social variables and based on collected data and an attention to history, these trends will continue to ensure the high level of political autonomy currently enjoyed by Hong Kong.

To demonstrate this bifurcation of achieved liberties into civil and democratic, the main theoretical framework used in this analysis is Gabriel Almond’s landmark study on the role civic and political participation play in sustaining a democratic society. In addition, though written in response to declining trends in the United States, Robert Putnam’s influential study on civic society translates well to other locales because it also offers insight into what can motivate political participation. After laying a foundation in political theory, I then give a summary of the history of Hong Kong’s democratic efforts, beginning with the British return of sovereignty to China. This history is also punctuated by key events that have galvanized the local populace to strongly assert its dissatisfaction. Furthermore, these mobilizations are instrumental in understanding the impact of civic involvement.
on a larger scale of Hong Kong’s quest for greater levels of democracy and may also provide clues to the SAR’s future. To demonstrate this, I will utilize Almond and Putnam’s frameworks while applying related civic data to show empirically how efforts of the engaged populace are affecting the democratic environment. Finally, I conclude with policy implications based upon my analysis of history, the data, and what the future may hold for the movement itself—noting any practical applications they may have for Hong Kong’s organized citizenry.

Before discussing the situation in Hong Kong, Almond’s theory of popular participation and its connections with democracy provides a broad context for understanding. The relationship between the people and a state’s democratic tendencies has been the subject of debate for thousands of years. Looking back in Western history, the Greek statesman Pericles saw an educated and active populace as a critical attribute—indeed responsible for the greatness of Athens itself. Those not informed were deemed useless. In the modern era, political scientists continue to study the phenomenon of political participation in many societies around the world. While many studies relate to more prominent nascent democracies around the world, those employing theoretical models offer much that can inform the evolution of Hong Kong’s own democratic aspirations. Almond provides a general framework that states “the political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation.” He goes on to describe the “political objects” as comprised of three main parts: first, the “specific roles or structures, such as legislative bodies, executives, or bureaucracies; second, incumbents of roles, such as particular […] legislators and administrators; and third, particular policies, decisions, or enforcements of decisions.” In the case of Hong Kong, these three components are shaped by its history as well as by how the people are socialized politically. This socialization can occur because of multiple factors, including influence of the media, globalization, irredentism from the Mainland, and even the extent of exposure to authority figures in early family life. In more industrialized nations however, this familial influence seems to be offset by greater levels of educational attainment.

Because Hong Kong’s educational system is largely British in form and execution, consistently high worldwide educational rankings among OECD nations have resulted in a large percentage of educated citizenry. It can reasonably be assumed that similar educational standards and civic characteristics present in the West are also passed on in Hong Kong and may result in similar levels of political participation and empowerment as found elsewhere in parts of the world with a strong legacy of Western educational and administrative influence. Furthermore, while some scholars like Samuel Huntington and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew have argued Confucianism in Asian culture is incompatible with democracy, Francis Fukuyama feels that in fact democracy and Asian cultural characteristics in fact complement one another. As evidence he points to the Confucian emphasis on education as a key similarity that contributes to compatibility. More specifically he notes the effect literacy and education have on nurturing an increased concern for noneconomic issues like political participation. This pairing of Confucian influence and the heavy presence of Western systems of politics, thought, and education offer further reason to expect the development of a healthy degree of political participation and awareness in Hong Kong.
In contrast with the previous theory, it is also important to briefly consider what may cause a decline in civic participation among people in societies based on the rule of law. While noting the strong connections between the quality of life, institutions, and the influence of norms and civic engagement, Putnam also notes the precipitous drop in American political involvement. This he ascribes to several factors: the movement of women into the labor force, mobility, demographics, and what he deems the “technological transformation of leisure.” While formulated for the United States in the 1990s, I believe these four reasons also have the potential to affect Hong Kong. In order to give context to the two theories, it is constructive to review important events that helped shape its history prior to the 1997 transition.

**Hong Kong’s Seeds of Democracy**

Prior to 1997, the people of Hong Kong began to agitate for greater political participation. While not widespread, rallies were held during the 1980s and the United Kingdom agreed to discuss the implementation of democratic measures in a limited form, giving rise to Hong Kong’s nascent democracy movement. The events of Tiananmen in 1989 also stoked local feelings of independence and solidarity with the emerging forces of freedom at home and abroad. Upon transfer of sovereignty on July 1, 1997, prior negotiations between China, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom resulted in the creation of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy. This compromise allowed Hong Kong to keep its extensive civil liberties as well as civil and political infrastructure intact while ceding responsibility for military affairs and ultimate sovereignty to China. Key to the governance of Hong Kong is the constitutional document entitled the “Basic Law” that codifies these differences. One of the primary issues on Hong Kong’s political landscape that stems from the Basic Law’s content and wording is universal suffrage and Beijing’s strenuous opposition to its full implementation. Pro-democracy activists seek the direct election of both the Chief Executive and Legislative Council. The electoral procedure for both entities is addressed directly in the Basic Law under Articles 45 and 68, respectively. Both articles state that “[the Chief Executive and Legislative Council] shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of [the Chief Executive or Legislative Council] by universal suffrage […]” As one might expect, the exact meaning of “gradual and orderly progress” is disputed. Opinions in society are generally divided between parties united in their desire for immediate democracy, known as the “Pan-Democracy” or “Pan-Democrat” camp, and that of the “Pro-Beijing” segment, named for those in favor of closer ties with the Mainland and a slower route to suffrage. In the years following 1997, issues of political reform and Beijing’s heavy-handed role in Hong Kong affairs have cropped up on numerous occasions, generating much friction. One example is the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in Beijing which functions as a voluntary final arbiter over disputes in the Basic Law that the Final Court of Appeals is unable to resolve on its own.

In 1999, the Right of Abode conflict saw the Hong Kong Final Court of Appeals ruling on matters of residency within the region, sparking worry over the effect migrations of large numbers of Chinese from the Mainland might have on the local economy and quality of life. In response, the government sought the judgment of
the Standing Committee, which led to a reinterpretation of the original ruling, and thus a reversal. This judicial decision caused widespread dissatisfaction among concerned Hong Kong citizens and many within the SAR worried about the survival of a judicial system independent from Beijing’s influence.

July 2003 saw the largest protests in Hong Kong since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, prompting 500,000 people to demonstrate against a controversial anti-subversion law based on Basic Law Article 23. This proposed legislation aimed to address the need for Hong Kong to enact a series of laws to safeguard its national security following the exit of the British, separate from those of the Mainland. It contains provisions for search and seizure as well as more theoretical definitions such as what defines a threat to the security of the state. This legislation was seen by most in Hong Kong as a potential avenue for a rollback of Hong Kong’s civil liberties and a roadblock in the quest for democracy. Facing intense and focused domestic opposition, the law was tabled indefinitely and the democracy movement in Hong Kong gained a large measure of momentum.

Emboldened by this victory, the push for suffrage continued to gain speed with proposed constitutional reform meetings scheduled for early 2005. Many hoped these meetings would lead to universal suffrage in time for the 2007-2008 election cycle. However, in late 2004, Chief Secretary for Administration Donald Tsang quelled hopes when he stated categorically that anyone pushing for universal suffrage by these dates would be simply “wasting their time.” This view on the election process was buttressed further in the same year when the Standing Committee weighed in on the matter and reinforced Tsang by specifically barring direct elections in 2007-2008. A significant blow to democratic hopefuls, the intervening of the Standing Committee into Hong Kong’s internal affairs caused many to worry that Beijing was becoming increasingly intolerant of moves toward democracy.

Following the controversy over Basic Law Article 23 and amidst a sagging economy and plummeting approval ratings, Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa resigned in 2005. In a bold move, democratic elements on the election committee nominated a candidate for Chief Executive, thus introducing a measure of competition to the electoral process for the first time. In 2007, the dream of democracy came and went as Standing Committee deputy secretary general Qiao Xiaoyang declared his committee’s view that, “dual universal suffrage” for the selection of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council “shall not be implemented in 2012.” However, “2012 may serve as a midway station en route to universal suffrage, which will be conducive to a stable transition,” he stated. This was joined by the news that no suffrage reforms would come before 2017 for electing the Chief Executive and before 2020 for the Legislative Council. While disappointing, hopeful pan-democrats who warned of potential false promises and who continue to agitate for a 2012 date, this marks the first time concrete dates have been spoken of favorably by Beijing.

Finally, events unfolding in the summer of 2010 offer several notable occurrences that give a glimpse into the process of political maneuvering by the Mainland government and the continued strength of the political freedoms enjoyed in the special administrative region. In a case bringing Hong Kong’s free press under pressure, the controversial biography of deceased Communist Party Premier Li Peng and his role in the Tiananmen Square incident was set for publication—only to be halted for stated reasons of copyright uncertainties.
same publisher announced the publication and release of an excoriation of current Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during the month of August. This eminently more contemporary and politically sensitive book, “Wen Jiabao: China’s Best Actor,” is has nonetheless sold steadily in Hong Kong despite threats to the author by Mainland authorities.19

In the most striking development, previous assertions by the Chinese authorities that Hong Kong democratic aspirations would remain the status quo were altered for a number of reasons. With the Hong Kong government’s credibility increasingly in crisis over increased pressure from economic and domestic concerns, the Chinese government took the remarkable step of negotiating directly with the elements of the Pro-democracy camp in search of a compromise to the deadlock resulting from attempted constitutional reform. While the Pro-democracy camp fractured into decidedly moderate and radical factions in response to Beijing’s overtures, what resulted were several concessions from both sides, and a sense of a constructive— although minor—move forward in electoral demands. While not securing an agreement for the outright direct election of representatives or the abolition of the functional constituencies, Beijing did allow for the alteration of the composition of the Legislative Council. Ten seats were added, five via direct election and five chosen by popularly elected District Council members, resulting in a full forty of seventy Legislative Council seats chosen by popular vote and up from the previous thirty of sixty.20 While not exhaustive, this rough timeline of history and important events gives one an impression of the climate in which Hong Kong democracy advocates are working through both victories and setbacks. Having dealt with the background issues, I will now synthesize the theoretical frameworks previously introduced with evidence that I believe casts doubt on the prospect of full democracy in Hong Kong in the foreseeable future.

**Theoretical Roadblocks**

In Almond’s theory of civic culture mentioned previously, democracy is said to relate to a society’s orientation toward selected groups of what are termed “political objects.” In the case of Hong Kong, attitudes toward democracy are significantly affected by these groups because of the former colony’s unique history and experience. The first group of “pol. objects”, specific roles or structures, are made up of legislative bodies, executives, [and] or bureaucracies.21 The second group, particular legislators or administrators, might be specific people that are associated with prominent grassroots movements.22 And finally, the third group, particular policies, decisions, or enforcements, may include influential decisions and rulings —such as two examples— that have shaped Hong Kong’s history. In turn, these three categories are classified as either in the political “input” process or the administrative “output” process. This terminology refers to whether demands from the public are converted into policy or how these policies are enforced.23 According to Almond it is the combinations of these categories and their classification as either input or output that influence levels of political involvement. Political parties, NGOs, and the media are “input” processes and the bureaucracy and courts are “output” processes. When a country has actors within each of these categories it is said to have a “participant” culture.24 Hong Kong clearly retains considerable elements of each in its strong, unfettered media, many active political parties and outspoken legislators,
an independent judiciary, and its efficient bureaucracy. They provide evidence through their unity in many protests, marches, and challenges to legislation they see as detrimental to the spirit of the Basic Law. The process by which these different entities became structured as they are is a function of both his history and the political socialization of Hong Kong’s citizens.

As previously discussed, this socialization is affected by many factors, including levels of higher education, which in turn contributes to higher levels of political participation. 25% of Hong Kong’s total population is educated beyond the secondary level—16.5 percent of which are degree holders. This statistic translates to an educated class at least somewhere between 1.1 and 1.7 million strong—a number that has continued to increase since the 2003 figures of 13.6 percent. For comparative purposes, as of 2003 those in the United States with similar levels of educational attainment were around 27 percent.

While this data seem encouraging, it is also important to briefly consider whether Hong Kong is susceptible to a decline in popular participation and what this could mean. In his analysis of the decline in American political participation since the 1950s, Putnam lays out several possible explanations that may be adaptable to Hong Kong: women entering the workforce, mobility, demographics, and leisure transformation. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to detail each one, it is constructive to list them in passing. First, women are entering into the workforce in significantly increasing numbers. With women in Hong Kong enjoying the same de jure equality status as women in the West, it is possible that the increase in gross hours worked may reduce their involvement in civic organizations. Second, increased mobility can reduce acclimatization to one’s surrounding community. Though this feature may not apply to Hong Kong because of its compact geographical area, the high population density may engender the paradoxical phenomenon of one feeling socially isolated in a housing estate of several thousand people. Third, changing demographics may affect a decline in participation through multiple scenarios. For example, demographics in the West reflect decreased marriage and birth-rates. These trends are very likely to take root in Hong Kong if they have not already because of their known occurrence in developed societies. It is unknown whether these trends decrease civic involvement because of longer work hours or less community engagement that may or may not be concurrent with lower birth rates. It is sufficient to say that the accelerated pace of social demographic changes could easily influence civic involvement rates. Finally, Putnam describes a “technological transformation of leisure,” which translates to large increases in television programming consumption that can direct individual focus inward, away from the community at large.

To determine the presence of any meaningful trends first entails finding out whether political participation has fluctuated in any significant way. Below are graphs of Hong Kong’s total voter registrations and subsequent turnout rates for Legislative Council elections since the 1997 transfer:
In Figure 1, we see that after an initial large decline in 2002 and a minimal drop in 2006, the total number of registered voters has increased markedly on an annual basis. Noteworthy is the jump of almost 300,000 registrations in the year 2004—the first election cycle following the controversial proposed Article 23 legislation. This also offers a sign that in terms of raw voter registrations, Hong Kong is not suffering a decline in political participation.

Referring to Figure 2, turnout has fluctuated approximately every other election cycle. Mirroring Figure 1’s increase in aggregate registrations, Figure 2 saw a significant increase in the 2004 turnout—most likely due to discontent over Article 23 legislation. Following a decline in 2008, frustration by a lack of progress toward de-
mocracy and the boycotting of the election by major pro-Beijing parties is expected to result in high levels of voter apathy—reflected in Figure 2. Thus it is difficult to say whether or not Putnam’s theory of declining civic participation alone is at work here. Hong Kong voters seem to turn out when much is at stake or in response to an incident or set of political circumstances present in the local climate. We will now look at two key events that highlight the mentioned mass turnouts: the 1999 Right of Abode issue and the controversial 2003 Article 23 legislation that sparked further activism.

In January 1999, Concerns over the Right of Abode and its potential to grant citizenship to the children of non-permanent residents were voiced by the government of Hong Kong and many citizens who felt that a large influx of Chinese from the Mainland would place undue strain on the economic and social systems of the city. As noted earlier, after the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal ruled in favor of a broader definition of citizenship, the Hong Kong government then appealed to the Standing Committee to interpret Article 24 of the Basic Law, which led to a June 1999 ruling that found their appeal to be in line with the government’s demands. The ruling was subsequently appealed to the Court of Final Appeal but denied on grounds of the constitutionality of the Standing Committee decision. This outcome led to mixed responses, as fears over the influx of Mainland Chinese were assuaged when the Standing Committee sided with popular opinion. This apparent reversal negated the need for widespread demonstrations, though the subsequent questions of judicial independence raised even further suspicions, creating an entirely separate controversy over Beijing’s superseding of the Final Court of Appeals.

However, popular frustration over the proposed anti-subversion law under Basic Law Article 23 offers strong evidence of the ability of Hong Kong citizens to take matters of politics into their own hands—which was, in this case, preserving the fragility of the status quo in the face of a powerful and determined central government in Beijing. Fearing the use of the law as a tool to undermine civil liberties, 500,000 citizens came out on July 1, 2003 to protest the proposed security legislation. The middle of July saw not only the indefinite shelving of the controversial law, but also the resignation of two high-ranking officials within the Tung Chee Hwa administration in response to the protests and perceived need for public accountability. In the months that followed, pan-democratic elements achieved victory in Legislative Council elections, and hundreds of thousands again pressed for democracy and the direct election of the Chief Executive. It is apparent that July 1 led to an awakening that emboldened Hong Kong citizens to understand that if enough of the citizenry mobilized, their grievances would be addressed. And yet, while many officials also favored passage of the security legislation, one should not take as coincidence that such a concession by the government was made over an issue unrelated to suffrage, a trend that Hong Kong protests have reflected over time. Along with the robust provisions of the Basic Law for protecting basic civil liberties, political activism has established both a precedent and a legacy in Hong Kong. Public opinion polls on areas of civil liberties falling under the protection of Article(s) 27-38 reflect, with some fluctuation, increasing levels of confidence in the rights of those surveyed.

For example, in the year following the shelving of the anti-subversion law, perceived freedom of speech levels first decreased before increasing significantly.
By contrast, opinion polls gauging the government’s efforts toward democratic development are much more varied:

Figure 3: **Hong Kong Freedom Speech Longitudinal Status Poll (8/1997-1/2010)**; rating of appraisal of freedom of speech (per poll).

(Data from "Rating of Appraisal of Freedom of Speech," University of Hong Kong, 2010.)

Figure 4: **Hong Kong Democratic Development Status Poll (7/1997-3/2010)**; people’s dissatisfaction with the Hong Kong SAR Government’s pace of democratic development (per poll).

(Data from "People’s Satisfaction," University of Hong Kong, 2010)
Varying wildly over the years, the graph above offers several interesting data to consider. First, public dissatisfaction with democratic development increased almost 15% during 1999 and the judicial conflict over the Right of Abode. Second, pessimism continued to increase and rose markedly at the time of the 1 July Article 23 controversy. On the other hand, the public apparently became more heartened at the time of the 2005 poll, possibly in response to the resignation of Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa. Finally, public discontent with the pace of democratic reforms has been increasing since 2008, despite Beijing’s indication that it is willing to consider suffrage. This frustration may be linked to societal doubt over the achievement of suffrage and associated skepticism over potential reform.

By using significant events in the course of Hong Kong’s post-1997 history, we have been able to chart the impact of Beijing and the Hong Kong government’s attempts to alter the status quo. When the rights enshrined in the Basic Law that cover protected freedoms are perceived to be under threat, protest exists as a viable and proven medium for popular participation to voice one’s discontent. By contrast, this vehicle does not translate successfully when issues of democracy arise—specifically vis-à-vis universal suffrage and the right of Hong Kong to choose its own leader(s) and representatives. While this corollary may cast popular organizing efforts as somewhat futile, the implications of potentially having a predictable outcome offer a wealth of information that may prove fruitful for future civic and political leaders. Along these lines I offer several potential policy implications—practical and strategic—as well as where the movement may be heading as a result of new political opportunities.

Almond’s theory describing the formation of a political culture details how Hong Kong’s spirit of participation is rooted in its institutions. Subsequently, popular organization has tended to emerge in the wake of specific issues, most notably perceived affronts to civil liberties and the process of democratic reform and suffrage. The opinion polls provided show the creation of an expectation within the public at large: namely, the ability to preserve the status quo and the ineffectiveness of movements toward democracy. When the government attempts legislation that represents a potential threat to basic freedoms, the citizenry marshals its efforts and widespread protest ensues. The success of popular efforts during the anti-subversion bill controversy created a confidence reflected in the opinion polls and sent a message that any attempt at altering the status quo would entail significant resistance. On the other hand, the poll that surveyed progress made by the government toward greater levels of democracy reflected increased pessimism and an expectation that specific events may bring a setback in efforts—eventually leading to a consistently climbing rate of negative outlook on the matter. It also is worth considering any potential decline in political participation as noted earlier. Particularly noteworthy is the possibility of what Putnam calls “intercohort” shift in opinion that sees growing numbers of individuals less interested in democracy and civic involvement than the preceding generations.

However, this reality does not mean that pan-democrat groups in the Legislative Council and grassroots organizations have not attempted to effect change. On the contrary, Hong Kong has a well-documented history of efforts to bring about constitutional and electoral reform. These efforts entailed repeated marches with protestors numbering in excess of 100,000, extensive debate among
lawmakers and even the resignation of prominent Legislative Council members in symbolic gesture. These actions, while historically ineffective and when paired with an inflexible Hong Kong central government and regime in Beijing, create little cause for hope. The 2007 declaration by Standing Committee Deputy Secretary Qiao Xiaoyang that Beijing is open to eventual suffrage at some point in the future imbued much cynicism among Hong Kong people. With the current timetable for democratic reforms set at 2017 for Chief Executive and 2020 for the Legislative Council at the earliest, it is little wonder that many are skeptical. In response, prominent Democratic-party founder Martin Lee remarked, “If you throw a frog into boiling water, it will jump out right away. But if you put the frog in warm water and cook it slowly, it doesn’t jump. We are being slowly cooked in Hong Kong, but hardly anyone is noticing.”

This pessimism is echoed in Pepper’s assessment of Hong Kong’s democratic future. She sees the structural changes dating to Beijing’s 2004 intervention as inimical to progress on the electoral front for Hong Kong. By arrogating themselves the right to nullify any reform that upsets the existing balance of direct and indirect representative elections, Beijing effectively keeps the parameters for democracy susceptible to their caprice. This intervention of course is said to be in defense of any contravention of the Basic Law’s design and intent.

It is amidst this climate of discontent and uncertainty that the events of the summer of 2010 unfolded, creating a much more ambiguous view of the future of Hong Kong’s democratic aspirations. While the publication of a controversial book harshly criticizing Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao went ahead as scheduled, the outcome in the quest for democracy was not as readily apparent. As noted earlier, following the resignation of Pan-democracy legislators and a stalled reform package that stood to be rejected by much of the Legislative Council, Beijing stepped in directly with an offer to negotiate with Pan-democrats. With negotiation rejected by the hard-line democracy advocates, moderate elements agreed and the talks began. This circumvention of the Hong Kong government as an intermediary signaled the seriousness with which the Mainland government viewed the matter.

With the talks completed, a tentative agreement was reached, as discussed earlier. The composition of the Legislative Council is set to undergo alterations, yielding ten more seats, five of which are subject to popular election, the other five nominally so via directly elected District Council members. In regard No promises were made regarding elections of the Chief Executive and abolition (and thus full direct election) of the Beijing-friendly functional constituencies. These concessions should not be disregarded, no matter how insignificant they may seem, should not be disregarded. This direct negotiation marks the first time Beijing has met with democracy advocates since the 1997 handover, and signals the presence of circumstances the Mainland government has not faced previously. The exact reasoning behind Beijing’s willingness to come to the table is unknown, though the following reasons could be considered as impetus to renegotiate. First, as Ma Ngok notes, Beijing is acutely aware of the crisis in credibility faced by the Hong Kong government and its inability to effectively address the matter of reform. In addition, the volume of protest led by the more ardent democracy advocates threatens to siphon support from the more mainstream moderates. Unemployment, concerns over the economy, and growing disparities between rich and poor offer further
noteworthy factors to consider. When taken together, the common thread among these variables is the potential for political and social instability—a condition which is anathema to Beijing. So while matters of democracy are typically not open for negotiation, Beijing has managed to grant moderate change to the electoral machinery while sidestepping the looming demand of direct election of the chief executive and abolition of the functional constituencies. Furthermore, by reaching out to the moderate Pan-democrats—overtures rejected by the hardliners—the Mainland government’s main source of opposition in Hong Kong is now divided over how to proceed, relieving political pressure for the time being. The moderates see small concessions as progress Nonetheless, while full democracy advocates see the negotiations as a betrayal of their core cause. More simply put, there is a split between pragmatism and principle.

Outside of Hong Kong, changes in the political zeitgeist within Mainland China may offer democratic activists even more potential political opportunities in the future. Disgraced former Communist Party Chief Hu Yaobang has long been seen as a pariah by the Chinese government because of disagreements stemming from his views on reform. Many within the government blamed Hu’s leniency toward calls for change and flexibility as a catalyst for the subsequent Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. In the decades that followed, little was said about Hu and overt discussion was largely proscribed from the media. However, on the 2010 anniversary of his death, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao penned an essay in the People’s Daily praising Hu’s life and reminiscing over a trip taken together in 1986. No mention was made of Hu’s political career and legacy. While this may seem innocuous because of the circumvention of any material that could be deemed controversial, it should not be ignored as mere coincidence. Reviving the image and life of Hu may in fact serve some political end that Western observers are as of yet unaware. For example, it could presage a coming change in leadership or of an interest in discussing reform. On the other hand, Hu’s image was revived briefly in 2005, but amounted to little in the way of change—much to the disappointment of those wishing for an official re-examination of the Tiananmen Square incident.

Taking note of any sign of potential movement within the upper-levels of the Chinese Communist Party may bear fruit by serving as a rare bellwether for activists in Hong Kong. This is not to say that change is immediately possible, but historically futile agitation for democracy may gain traction when the political situation in Mainland China offers careful observers a signal that the parameters are moving on what is deemed acceptable. The practical implications for the democracy movement are clear: by choosing to act when the political climate is expedient, they maximize their use of political and social capital. Indiscriminate actions, resignations, marches, and emasculated Legislative Council bills risk increasing both formal and informal citizen and voter apathy.

Pro-Beijing groups are largely subject to the the political and social climate in Mainland China and thus can use similar signals to plan their strategies for increasing their influence as well. Repeated appeals to the “orderly and gradual progress” clauses of the Basic Law have provided a sustainable measure of ambiguity that has thus far effectively deferred the need to grant significant concessions. Keeping a keen eye on Mainland politics and Hong Kong public opinion will allow Pro-Beijing groups to effectively maintain a narrative that favors “order-
ly and gradual progress.” With the negotiations between moderate democrats and Beijing in the summer of 2010, the Pro-Beijing elements may now have unlikely bedfellows in the wake of the pan-democratic divide, giving groups like the DAB more credibility and enhancing their image among voters.

I have shown in this paper what elements comprise the participant political culture that Hong Kong has, including an educated class similar in size to that the United States and the presence of key domestic institutions. I have also demonstrated that Hong Kong possesses a vibrant and active citizenry that is able to mobilize when issues of civil liberties and the desire for substantive democratic reform arise. Repeated mobilizations and success in response to civil liberties issues and relative failures in response to democratic issues have set a precedent for citizen expectations reflected in voter opinion polls and participation. These results lead to the conclusion that success in defending civil liberties is more likely than progress toward democratic reform, which for the most part have met with negligible success. This apparent mutually exclusive relationship between civil liberty and democracy should not be taken as a foregone conclusion however. Events of summer of 2010 and the recent media nod to Hu Yaobang by the CCP should serve as a reminder to activists seeking to advance their democratic agenda that political windows of opportunities may arise at any moment. While the potential for progress exists, it is unclear whether historical precedents for success and failure in Hong Kong will help forecast future events. Even so, barring countervailing forces that may contribute to the decline of society, this paper presents several examples supported by evidence that shows the likelihood that Hong Kong’s citizens will remain engaged is strong. As always, the future is never certain, and the impending leadership shuffle in Beijing is a question mark with regard to the central government’s orientation toward its restive SAR.

REFERENCES


ENDNOTES

1. Of course at this time in history, the “populace” excluded those not falling under the category of elite, propertied males.


5. Ibid., 349-350


9. Ibid., 75.

10. Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (Hong Kong, 2006), 31, 41-42.

11. Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, henceforth referred to simply as the “Standing Committee”.


17. These events (Right of Abode and Article 23) are discussed in further detail later in the paper.
21. An example of a legislative body is the Legislative Council; Executives, the chief executive position; and bureaucracy, the British-inherited and modeled civil government in Hong Kong.
22. E.g. the accepted de facto spokesman of democracy and the leader of efforts to increase ties to Beijing: Martin Lee and Ma Lik, respectively.
24. Or in this instance, a city-state.
25. Guaranteed in Basic Law Article 27 which states, “Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to strike.”
26. Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 349-350. Familial life and participatory school experience are notable as well, though when higher education is present it seems to supersede and render these variables less significant.
27. Hong Kong 2008 Estimated total population: 7,026,000.
30. A greater influx of workers and residents from Mainland China may also affect participation rates if political socialization differs significantly in one’s country of origin—as Mainland China clearly does from Hong Kong.
31. While written in the mid-1990s, this possibility remains just as salient with the advent of the internet, video games, and the greater breadth of media options.
35. Article 23 states, “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies” (Basic Law, 2006).


37. Article(s) 27-38 include civil liberties such as, inter alia, freedom of the press, religious practice, and speech.

38. Specific events like the Right of Abode or Article 23 legislation.

39. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 34. For example, as time progresses past significant events such as the 1989 protests over Tiananmen, 1997 transfer of sovereignty, and 2003 Article 23 security legislation, it is possible that it becomes more difficult for those making up the bulk of the protesters to personally identify with any given cause. We see this starkly evident in Beijing now with few if any youth having any recollection or knowledge of the 1989 protest movement. While no doubt a combination of concerted government censorship and the pervasive effects globalization, in the case of Hong Kong it is almost certainly an exclusive function of the latter.


42. Suzanne Pepper, Keeping Democracy at Bay: Hong Kong and the Challenge of Chinese Political Reform (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 390.

43. Reinforcing the significant press freedoms enjoyed by the SAR, especially when dealing with matters as sensitive as the image and perceived competence of the present leadership.

44. The only other instance of direct negotiation occurred in 1989 with the former colonial government in response to the Tiananmen Square incident.


48. Philip P. Pan, “China Gives Political Outcast Rare Revival; Tiananmen Figure Recognized, Raising Hopes for Official About-Face on Incident,” Washington Post, November 19, 2005.

49. Formal in the sense of participation in the electoral process, informal in the sense of popular cohesive efforts such as protests and marches.

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Tensions Over Hydroelectric Developments in Central Asia: Regional Interdependence and Energy Security

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ABSTRACT

Hydroelectric advancements in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have led to increased tension in Central Asia over the allocation of water resources. The use of Kyrgyz Toktogul Reservoir for hydroelectricity and the construction of Tajik Rogun Dam challenge the Soviet era water quota system, which affords Uzbekistan the greatest geopolitical power. As the two upstream states explore possible ways to expand electricity markets outside Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may permanently alter the geopolitical balance of power.

Central Asia is an understudied region of the world (see Appendix A) that will become increasingly important because of historical shifts, emerging energy potential, geographical proximity to South Asia, strategic location and battling spheres of influence. Historically, the Central Asian States (CAS) were contained within the Soviet Union as Socialist Soviet Republics (SSR). The shift from a closed domestic system of governance to competing international interests has led to post-independence political and economic upheaval, which could lead to violence in a region prone to ethnic tensions. With the proximity to South Asia, namely Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the current war in Afghanistan already spilling over the border into Tajikistan, stability in Central Asia is of great importance, and the biggest destabilizing factor is natural resource allocation and energy security. Should there fail to be cooperation in concern to resources and energy production between the CAS, the entire region could slide into violence and further destabilize Central and South Asia.

The CAS have an arid climate, which leads to a small amount of arable land. In order to support the agricultural enterprise of the Soviet Union and now the downstream states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, there were large irrigation projects to create arable land, which resulted in the depletion of local water sources, environmental degradation and ecological disasters, most notably the desertification of the Aral Sea. Water is seen as such a national treasure in the CAS because the downstream states are reliant upon water for agriculture.

List of Abbreviations

| ADB: Asian Development Bank | EIA: Energy Information Administration |
| CAS: Central Asian States | IFI: International Financial Institution |
| CASA 1000: North-south transmission grid | kW-h: Kilowatt-hours |
| between Central Asia-South Asia | RFE/RL: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty |
| CASAREM: Central Asia-South Asia | SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization |
| Regional Electricity Market | SSR: Soviet Socialist Republic |
| CAPS: Central Asian Power System | WB: World Bank |
| CSTO: Collective Security Treaty | Organization |
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and cotton production, which feature heavily in their economic earnings, and the upstream states need water to produce hydroelectricity to provide energy for their citizens and for export. The importance of water for hydroelectricity is a post-independence occurrence accompanying the breakdown of Soviet resource allocation. The original role of upstream states Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was to regulate water flows for downstream irrigation. Under this Soviet system, the downstream states would send natural gas to the upstream countries to help with heating during the winter because they were rich in gas. It is most helpful to view the CAS in terms of location, resources and energy because the country lines are the legacy of Joseph Stalin to divide the region such that ethnic allegiances were unclear so that the CAS could not unite and challenge Soviet rule (Tolipov, 2001). Now that water is becoming even scarcer due to drought and the upstream states do not have the same access to natural gas as during the Soviet Union, tensions regarding resources and energy are on the rise as each country attempts to maintain their current level of consumption.

Although the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989, two Soviet era leaders are still in power: Uzbek President Islam Karimov and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Following independence, there was a period of political turmoil in which the former Soviet Tajik president was forced to resign, and President Imomali Rakhmon (Emomali Rakhmon) was elected and subsequently led Tajikistan through a civil war. Turkmen President Kurbanguly Berdymukhamedov took over in 2006 following the death of the former Soviet President Saparmyrat Niyazov. Niyazov was an eccentric president with a personality cult that led the country into isolationism post-independence and spent large sums on personal projects. The new President Berdymukhamedov has taken several steps to ease back the isolation and find new markets for its natural gas (BBC, 2010). Kyrgyz Interim President Roza Otunbayeva was placed in office after the popular uprising that removed President Kurmanbek Bakiyev from power. Interim President Otunbayeva was charged with dealing with ethnic violence outbreaks in Jalalabad in July 2010. Even though three of five presidents are not from the Soviet time period, this does not mean there has been movement away from Soviet policy. In fact, energy policy – including the regulation of water resources – is a direct result of a Soviet infrastructure that is not easily changed. This entrenched Soviet policy for resource allocation has left upstream states with limited options for energy advances and an uneven balance of power favoring those states with the biggest water quota.

Even though the CAS gained their independence in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union and have their own national interests, they are still heavily influenced by Russia due to its regional power and diplomatic reach. The CAS are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States that was created in December 1991 with political and economic functions, a regional body comprised of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and formerly Georgia. The CAS, excluding Turkmenistan, are also members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Russian dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), although little cooperation between the CAS has stemmed from these organizations.

Due to limited cooperation between the CAS coupled with political instability and recent ethnic violence, there is the potential for more violence if energy...
and resource issues are not resolved. These issues must be resolved because the CAS don’t have the option of isolationism when it comes to resources like water, which is a transnational resource. The destabilization of the CAS could cause a ripple effect throughout the already unstable region of South Asia, which is not in international interests. The focus of this paper will be on Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan will be the only downstream state discussed in detail because of their its majority water quota and perceived regional power over the other four states. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as the only upstream states in the CAS, are quintessential in illustrating the complex issues surrounding the breakdown of Soviet policies, the continuation of water quotas, downstream and upstream economic needs relating to water, and interdependence. CAS regional interdependence is directly influenced by a nation’s access to energy security, as illustrated by Uzbekistan’s negative response to Kyrgyzstan’s hydroelectric advances and the unfolding tensions between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over the construction of a hydroelectric dam which could alter the Central Asian balance of power. While specific national developments in energy capabilities can be seen as a positive economic development, national developments can lead to regional political tensions which may be more harmful than the benefits of expanded economic and energy capacity.

**Literature Review: Interdependence**

The theory of interdependence focuses on the consequences of one state’s actions upon another. Richard Rosecrance argued “that interdependence is a state of affairs where what one nation does impinges directly upon other nations” (as cited by Ferguson & Mansbach, 2003, p. 167). Interdependence can also be measured through “sensitivity”, which measures the domestic susceptibility to international events (Ferguson et al., 2003, p.168). Rosecrance, Keohane and Nye Jr. all agree that interdependence rests upon nation-to-nation interactions. This state-centric view is also found in the realist perspective of interdependence, which concentrates on “dominance-dependence, with the dependent party particularly vulnerable to the choices of the dominant party” (Kauppi & Viotti, 1993, p. 55-56). Dominance-dependence can easily be seen in the power play between Uzbekistan and the two upstream states of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. For example, the Central Asian Power System (CAPS), or a regional electricity grid, has its main location in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. This makes the upstream states dependent on Uzbekistan’s political goodwill to allow Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to use CAPS to sell their electricity surplus. Uzbekistan may also use access to CAPS as leverage over the two upstream states.

To realists, there is an additional idea of vulnerability, or the presumed disproportionate power of states. To offset a state’s vulnerability caused by interdependence, a state must reduce outside dependency. In the case of international resources, it would be beneficial to have domestic alternatives so as not to be as reliant on imports (Kauppi et al., 1993, p. 56). Keohane and Nye Jr. define vulnerability as “the ability of an actor to insulate itself from events occurring elsewhere” (Ferguson et al., 2003, p. 168). In the case of Central Asia, the upstream states are attempting to minimize vulnerability by being able to provide their own energy for their citizens. Increased energy security would allow Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan

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to provide heat during the winter months without relying on imports of natural gas. At the same time, increased energy security for the upstream states results in heightened vulnerability in Uzbekistan because of their dependency on water in the summer for agriculture, which is curtailed by upstream advances. Competing national interests within a once domestic system of allocation makes it clear that interdependence is not based on inherent equality nor does it automatically connote peaceful collaboration; it has never been proven that interdependence leads to cooperation (Ferguson et al., 2003, p. 170). Interdependence in Central Asia should be seen as a necessary byproduct of shared transnational resources and a high reactivity to supranational decisions, as well as a historical Soviet legacy.

The Soviet system was specifically designed to promote resources, most importantly water and natural gas. Under Soviet rule, agriculture in the downstream riparian states was increased, which led to a complex irrigation system regulated by the upstream states through reservoirs and dams along the two main rivers (MacKay, 2009, p.18; Kemelova & Zhalkubaev, 2003, p.480), the Syr Darya, which runs through Kyrgyzstan, and the Amu Darya, which runs through Tajikistan (see Appendix B). The agricultural practices, mostly the production of cotton, necessitated summer releases of water to irrigate crops. Kyrgyz SSR and Tajik SSR were responsible for these summer releases to fill Soviet-inspired water quotas, and in return, since the two upstream riparians were not rich in natural resources, the downstream states would send shipments of natural gas during the winter months to help defray the costs of maintaining the water allocation system. Regionally, Uzbek SSR had the most power because it was given the biggest water quota. During the Soviet Union, this was left unchallenged because energy security was a domestic concern comprising all five SSR, and as such the balance of power was preserved.

However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the irrigation and water allocation systems, which used to be contained within domestic Soviet borders became a complex coordination between five new states, and transitioned into an international issue. The introduction of resource allocation into the international sphere drew attention to the region’s vulnerability to resources that directly opposed new national interests. Without supranational guidance, the CAS allowed national interests to interfere with the allocation of resources that have led to increasing regional tensions. The current degradation of the Aral Sea serves as an additional example of the CAS’ inability to cooperate to solve the depletion and desertification of the sea, which is a tragic outcome of Soviet irrigation policies implemented for agricultural purposes. The Aral Sea is fed by the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers which flow through Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, respectively, and would eventually join at the sea in the northern region of Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan and southwestern Kazakhstan after the Amu Darya went through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and the Syr Darya went through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (see Appendix B). Now domestic irrigation practices in the downstream states have drained the rivers such that they never meet in the sea, and the Aral Sea has become two separate lakes (MacKay, 2009, p.18; Sievers, 2002, p.365).

The environmental disaster surrounding the Aral Sea is exacerbated by the unwillingness of downstream governments to change agricultural practices even after independence (MacKay, 2009, p.18) despite evidence of environmental deg-
radation. Due to the emphasis placed on water by Soviet policy, in the upstream states for summer water releases and in downstream states for agriculture, there is resistance to reform post-independence, which in turn makes the CAS even more interdependent on water resources. After independence there was hope that the CAS would reform Soviet policy and make appropriate changes, yet many of the same policies are in use; because of this, it is believed by some that “reference to the previous ‘guilt’ of Moscow…no longer can explain events” (Sievers, 2002, p.365-367). The two main differences from Soviet policy are, one, that the upstream states have begun to use their dams and reservoirs for hydroelectricity and, two, that there is no compensation in the form of natural gas given to the upstream states by downstream states (Kemelova et al., 2003, p.480-481; Sievers, 2002, p.372). There is a great possibility of conflict and destabilization within Central Asia as a result of water allocation policies in the post-Soviet era (Sievers, 2002, p.357), especially with no governing body to regulate water allocation to account for both hydroelectric and agricultural needs.

**International Water Law**

Post-independence, the international community expected the CAS to draw on international law to regulate transnational water sources, yet to a large extent this expectation has been unfulfilled. It is important to keep in mind the historical impact of Soviet water and fuel interdependence on post-independence national interests to foster agriculture, for the downstream states, and for the upstream states to place such importance on hydroelectricity due to the existing infrastructure of dams and reservoirs. These factors have often prevented the implication of international water law because the two divisions of states have opposing national interests. Even so, directly following independence the CAS instituted the “five-State Agreement on Cooperation in the Joint Use and Protection of Water Resources of Interstate Significance” or the “1992 Agreement” that maintained Soviet water quotas to riparian states, yet the compensation with energy halted (Kemelova et al., 2003, p. 480-481; Sievers, 2002, p. 372) because the downstream states deemed the exchange unnecessary. The halt in compensation from the downstream states led to severe energy shortages in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan during the winter months, when energy would have been delivered, since they continued to operate their reservoirs and dams in accordance with the Soviet system of summer water releases to support agriculture.

In response to the downstream states’ expectation of summer releases and refusal to help contribute to the cost of maintenance, Kyrgyzstan unilaterally switched the primary focus of the reservoirs and dams along the Syr Darya from serving downstream agriculture to hydroelectric capabilities to provide for its own citizens. The main reservoir in question is the Toktogul Reservoir (see Appendix B), located in Kyrgyzstan on the Syr Darya River (see Appendix C). The reservoir’s original purpose was to control water releases during the summer months to aid with agriculture; in return, “Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan supplied Kyrgyzstan with a billion cubic meters of natural gas, a million tons of coal, and 400,000 tons of heating oil annually” (Kemelova et al., 2003, p.480), in addition to funds from the USSR. Without these resources, Kyrgyzstan was forced to use Toktogul Reservoir to generate heat during the winter to compensate for the natural gas, coal
and heating oil. The change in seasonal water releases has led to tensions between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan over summer irrigation issues and damages from released water in the winter (Kemelova et al., 2003, p.480-481).

To compound issues, in 2001 the Kyrgyz government came out with a controversial law called the 2001 Kyrgyzstan Law on Interstate Water Use that “states that Kyrgyzstan’s state policy with regard to transboundary waters is that water in Kyrgyzstan is the property of Kyrgyzstan, that water is a good with a market price, that sales of this water should consider world prices, and that Kyrgyzstan has a right to be compensated by the other states of the region for the expenses and losses suffered by Kyrgyzstan in operating its water facilities” (MacKay, 2009, p.24; Sievers, 2002, p.389-390). According to Kemelova et al. (2003, p.491), Kyrgyzstan cannot be seen as acting contrary to international law because operating Toktogul Reservoir in the winter is “the product of necessity” as evidenced by the failure to adhere to the 1992 Agreement, which upholds Soviet-era quotas and compensation, but through which Kyrgyzstan has not received recompense. This 2001 Law on Interstate Water Use “compensates for a post-Soviet dilemma” (MacKay, 2009, p.24), yet has been met with significant resistance.

There are three main opposition points to the 2001 Kyrgyzstan Law on Interstate Water Use. First, the sale of water is illegal because the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes doesn’t permit water to be sold (Sievers, 2002, p.390). Kyrgyzstan responded that the new law only demands payment for water services, not the actual water (Sievers, 2002, ibid.). However, because of the scarcity of water in the region, the use of water as leverage to achieve desired results – even maintenance – can be seen as harmful to surrounding states (MacKay, 2009, p. 24). Customary international water law such as the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment attempts to make states recognize that their “actions must not damage the environments of other states or of areas outside their boundaries” (MacKay, 2009, ibid.), which could be interpreted to mean Uzbekistan’s agricultural enterprises.

Second, that the law departs from conventional understandings of international law, since the 2001 law de-stresses impact on other states and emphasizes water as Kyrgyzstan’s national resource (MacKay, 2009, p.24; Sievers, 2002, p.391). The same principles gleaned from the Stockholm Declaration declaring a state must not make decisions regarding water resources that negatively impact downstream states are challenged. There is a general agreement among Central Asian water experts that upstream riparians do not, or should not, have the power to unilaterally take actions that might cause harm to downstream states, but there is little condemnation because the Soviet-style system of water allocation was seen as inequitable and the termination of such practices post-independence is seen as equitable (Sievers, 2002, p.392).

Third, Bishkek (capital of Kyrgyzstan) can stop water flows to the downstream states in the event they do not receive payment, which to most would be considered extortion and outright illegal (MacKay, 2009, p.24; Sievers, 2002, p.391-392). This is why the case of the CAS must be viewed through the historical lens of the Soviet water allocation system and water-for-fuel exchange between downstream and upstream riparians. Kyrgyzstan was compensated for Toktogul’s summer usage with natural gas and other resources during the winter to be able to maintain
the facility. And while Kyrgyzstan has been criticized for its unilateral decision to institute the 2001 Kyrgyzstan Law on Interstate Water Use because of the disregard for human rights, not seeking a legal remedy, and the violation of previously existing agreements stating that water will not be sold, Kyrgyzstan can be seen as acting to correct post-Soviet shortfalls (MacKay, 2009, p.24). Taken as a whole, Kyrgyzstan’s actions must be viewed in relation to the failure to successfully implement international law to effectively regulate resource allocation in Central Asia after independence (MacKay, 2009, ibid.).

It can be seen through the case of Toktogul Reservoir that the collapse of the Soviet Union has not ameliorated the transnational distribution of resources despite shared regional dependency, and the induction into international law has not taken control of the situation either. Kyrgyzstan viewed the 2001 Law on Interstate Water Use as the strongest response to the lack of compensation under the 1992 Agreement, and the use of Toktogul Reservoir as the best way to achieve greater energy security through increased hydroelectricity production. Uzbekistan stands to lose the most if Kyrgyzstan truly begins to enforce their 2001 law because of reliance on cotton production during the summer. Since independence, tensions have been on the rise between the two states over water use due to scarcity and vulnerability. Furthermore, there is a lethargic take on water policy because the general sentiment in the CAS is that the Soviet Union is to blame for the current problems. This has led to an intrinsic support of current irrigation policies (MacKay, 2009, ibid.), which in turn attributes to the reluctance to join binding treaties on the issue and outrage at the 2001 Kyrgyzstan Law on Interstate Water Use. Kyrgyzstan is challenging the traditional system of water allocation, which automatically challenges the balance of power and creates a regional paranoia over any attempted reform or further developments on part of the upstream riparians.

**Emergent Hydro-Hegemony**

Post-independence, regional power appeared to be allocated based on the concept of hydro-hegemony in absence of an effective governing body or binding international law. Wegerich (2008) explores hydro-hegemony, the prevailing idea in Central Asia that whichever state controls the biggest water quota is the hegemon and wields the most regional influence. It is possible to argue that Uzbekistan, with the highest Soviet-era water quota, largest population and most irrigated land, would be the clear hydro-hegemon (Wegerich, 2008, p.80). This would explain Uzbekistan’s critical response to Kyrgyzstan’s shift in use of Toktogul Reservoir from water allocation to hydroelectricity because it challenges Uzbekistan’s perceived hydro-hegemony. In addition to receiving the largest water quota, the Central Asian electricity grid, CAPS, has its center in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, and the majority of natural gas pipelines must pass through Uzbekistan to reach other states (Wegerich, 2008, p. 82-83). With the amount of control Uzbekistan has on the distribution of natural resources, any switch in facility function or addition of new facilities for greater water control in upstream states directly impacts Uzbekistan’s ability to control the most regional influence, which is evidenced in Uzbekistan’s negative political response to Kyrgyzstan’s use of Toktogul Reservoir and the similar unfolding response to the construction of Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam.
Methodology

In order to assess the ongoing tensions over water allocation and energy security between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, historical writings, government publications, U.S. data analysis, and international and local news sources were reviewed to compile information. International financial agencies are also useful sources for water project information, data and joint ventures as well as proposed projects. Sources with historical aspects were used to inform the Soviet-era Central Asian policies so that post-independence shifts in policy could be recognized and compared, as well as lasting influences. These resources clearly illustrated emerging trends in escalating tensions over resource allocation in Central Asia and potential political ramifications. News sources were especially useful because it was possible to see new developments emerging between countries in Central Asia but also South Asia, which led to international investments and the relation to construction of a hydroelectric dam in Tajikistan. Some drawbacks to conducting research were the inability to find a source in English, or local news sources in Russian or a local language, which could have provided more in-depth information than the English counterpart. Inability to travel to the region and conduct additional research led to a dependency on local news sites.

Research Findings

Tajikistan shares many of the same characteristics as Kyrgyzstan in relation to their dependency on water for hydroelectricity. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (U.S. EIA), right after independence Uzbekistan was producing 4,533 billion cubic feet of natural gas, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were both producing 12 billion cubic feet (see Appendix D). This large disparity is the reason during the Soviet Union the upstream states needed shipments of natural gas during the winter to be able to survive. In the year 2008, this disparity has grown to where Uzbekistan now produces 7,161 billion cubic feet, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s production fell to 3 billion cubic feet (see Appendix E). This means that during the Soviet Union, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had higher levels of natural gas production in addition to the natural gas received from downstream states. Post-independence, their natural gas production fell 9 billion cubic feet while the resource allocation system disintegrated after the 1992 Agreement. The upstream state’s dependency on natural gas heightened and forced them to find another way to generate the heat and energy needed for the winter months: hydroelectricity. Of Tajikistan’s total electricity net generation of 15.971 billion kilowatt-hours (kW-h) (see Appendix F), 15.688 billion kW-h are generated by hydroelectricity (see Appendix G), which is 98% of all electricity generation. Kyrgyzstan also has a high electricity dependency rate of 90% (see Appendix F, Appendix G). While Kyrgyzstan turned to Toktogul Reservoir to meet their hydroelectricity needs, Tajikistan turned to an old Soviet project called Rogun Dam.

Rogun Dam

The construction of Rogun (Roghun) Dam in Tajikistan (see Appendix H) is another catalyst behind the dispute over water resource allocation and challenge to regional hydro-hegemony. Rogun Dam is the product of the Soviet Union, just like Toktogul Reservoir. The main difference is that Rogun Dam was not completed...
under Soviet rule, so Rogun Dam is an implicit continuation of Soviet policy and an example of Soviet plans being enacted post-independence. It could be argued that if Rogun Dam had been completed under Soviet rule with the water-for-fuel system in place, the downstream states would have no quarrel with its construction because it would not have disturbed regional power. However, since it is being constructed post-independence, Rogun Dam has warranted the same harsh criticism and resistance from Uzbekistan that it had towards the switch in utilization of Toktogul Reservoir, especially because Rogun Dam will be used specifically for hydroelectric purposes.

As mentioned earlier, during Soviet rule, water allocation was decided by Moscow as a domestic issue, heavily favoring downstream Turkmen SSR and Uzbek SSR (Wegerich, 2008, p.72-73). Tajik SSR was utilized in controlling the River Vakhsh, and Rogun was another initiative to harness hydropower, although it was never realized, while its downstream counterpart, Nurek Dam, was finished before independence (Wegerich, 2008, ibid.) (see Appendix I). After independence, the original purpose of Rogun – to aid in downstream agriculture by further control of the Vakhsh – warped into a national Tajik project for energy and electricity because Tajikistan could no longer expect energy shipments during the winter from downstream states (Wegerich, 2008, ibid.). When Rogun Dam is complete, it will be the first in a system of hydroelectric facilities on the River Vakhsh in Tajikistan (see Appendix I), which will give the upstream riparian enormous influence over the downstream states of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Wegerich, 2008); influence that, the two downstream states believe, will lead to detrimental impact on their agricultural practices.

Rogun Dam’s construction and completion hold several implications for regional interdependence and energy security in Central Asia. From the construction of the dam, it is possible to assume that the infrastructure put into place by the Soviet Union created tight regional interdependence based on resource allocation that has hindered energy development in the upstream states post-independence, which in turn creates negative political interactions when national interests are at stake, and mounting tensions. As the dam is an extension of old Soviet plans, the Soviet infrastructure is still growing within Central Asia. It can already be seen with Kyrgyzstan’s hydroelectric use of Toktogul Reservoir that the infrastructure can allow for energy development but is heavily hampered by downstream interests concerning water. Rogun Dam is an extension of the same issues relating to water.

While Uzbekistan had national interests opposed to Toktogul Reservoir’s winter hydroelectric usage, the facility was already built and therefore Uzbekistan could only deal with the Kyrgyz government. Since Rogun Dam is under construction, Uzbekistan has reportedly taken other steps to make its disapproval known, namely impounding trains delivering supplies to Rogun through Uzbekistan and calling for environmental safety investigations about the dam. In February 2010, Tashkent (capital of Uzbekistan) began to impound trains bound for Rogun Dam, but news agencies reported on October 15th 2010 that the impound was lifted and trains could once again cross the Uzbek-Tajik border (Rogers, 2010). This was a day after the RFE/RL reported that the Tajik ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe formally requested assistance dealing with Uz-
beksistan; according to Tajik authorities, “Uzbekistan has held up the transit of rail freight bound for Tajikistan in retaliation for Dushanbe’s determination to proceed with construction of the Roghun hydropower system” (RFE/RL, 2010).

Additionally, Tajikistan’s desire for energy security through Rogun Dam was hampered by their removal from the CAPS (World Bank 2010; Demytrie, 2010). CAPS is centered in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and as such contributes to Uzbekistan’s ability to leverage its political will and remain the supposed hydro-hegemon. The exclusion from CAPS forced Tajikistan to rely on a faulty, expiring electrical system and resulted in severe hardship on top of already existing problems with the lack of fuel from downstream states. These direct interferences with Rogun Dam’s construction and the removal of Tajikistan from CAPS demonstrates Uzbekistan’s trepidation to the dam’s completion because Tajikistan will have more power over regional water that will diminish Uzbekistan’s hydro-hegemony and shift the balance of power. The fight over national interests and transnational resources could push Tajikistan into closer ties with upstream Kyrgyzstan and towards a policy similar to the 2001 Kyrgyz water law.

Tajikistan would consider a similar law because of the parallels between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in regards to the legal right to water for the development of energy security. If Tajikistan did institute a law claiming the water on their territory as a national resource, it would be after Rogun Dam was completed because they would have more leverage over water sources and therefore more regional clout in dealing with Uzbekistan and downstream riparians. The same three arguments against Kyrgyzstan’s 2001 water law can be raised if Tajikistan ever institutes a similar law. First, the sale of water is illegal and could draw negative international attention should both states begin to demand monetary compensation (Sievers, 2002, p.390) and, second, that water is a national resource rather than transnational (MacKay, 2009, p.24; Sievers, 2002, p.391). What was once seen as a perfectly acceptable domestic solution to defraying costs through fuel and financial obligations is now an unacceptable international solution, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are attempting to continue to support their side of Soviet infrastructure. Through the upkeep of the dams and reservoirs and the construction of a Soviet designed improvement to the water system on the river Vakhsh, Tajikistan is Ironically attempting to increase their individual energy security with a system meant to promote regional interdependence. By demanding money of downstream states in an international dispute, potential human rights violations and environmental implications can be used against Tajikistan’s bid for greater independence.

Third, Kyrgyzstan reserved the right to stop the flow of water to downstream states in the event of nonpayment (MacKay, 2009, p.24; Sievers, 2002, p.391-392); it remains unclear if Kyrgyzstan would actually do so. Uzbekistan’s concern over Kyrgyzstan’s threat to withhold water would be heightened in the event that Tajikistan followed suit. If both upstream riparian states had the ability – or perceived ability – to withhold water, tensions would spike and there could be the potential for violence. With a destabilized region in South Asia and some of the conflict in Afghanistan spilling over the border into Tajikistan, tensions over water will exacerbate the situation and could lead to the Central Asian balance of power crumbling.
There is another concern that as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan move further away from the widely accepted notions of international law, for example, that states do not have the ability to unilaterally disrupt water flows, their actions could have a detrimental impact on international law. The violation of perceived international regulations could lead to a permanent lack of global conventions in Central Asian water law. In turn, this could lead to a separation between Central Asian policies and international law, which would make the situation harder to resolve if the current tensions escalate.

**Tehran and Dushanbe**

As Toktogul Reservoir was already constructed before the start of political tensions with Uzbekistan over the use of water, many international actors were not involved in the beginning. There is the potential, however, to see the influence of outside regional actors in Tajikistan, especially that of Iran and International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Iran shares a border with Turkmenistan (see Appendix A), and is considered part of South Asia along with Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the eighth meeting of the Joint Commission on Trade, Economic, Technical and Cultural Cooperation in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, Tajikistan and Iran entered into a Memorandum of Understanding concerning cooperation in “energy, water, industry, mining engineering and technical services...” (Fars News, 2010). According to Tajik President Imomali Rakhmon, “Tehran and Dushanbe have had a growing trend of cooperation over the past five years” (as cited by Press TV, 2010a), which would explain the Iranian funding of Tajikistan’s Sangtoudeh II (Sang-Tuda 2) Power Plant, also located on the River Vakhsh, although it will be twelve years before Tajikistan can take over control of Sangtoudeh II from Iran (Press TV, 2010b).

This means that Tajikistan is being heavily influenced by Iran’s investment in its energy sector. As tensions grow between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Tajikistan must find other ways to satisfy their need for energy security and increased economic capabilities, and moving outside the region of Central Asian may be one possibility. Iran represents the opportunity to break the Central Asian balance of power in that Uzbekistan has no control over the amount of money entering Tajikistan from Iran, unlike supplies that went through Central Asia. Also, Iran’s support of Tajikistan in areas such as the aforementioned energy, water and industry could discourage any harsh action on Uzbekistan’s part. While Iran’s involvement could serve as a deterrent to extreme responses, deepening ties with a country outside Central Asia will only hinder regional relations in the future because of the interests of countries outside the region still invested in Soviet energy infrastructure.

**Central to South Asia**

Afghanistan and Pakistan are two such countries that could have a stake in the future of Tajikistan’s hydroelectric sector if the Central Asia – South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM) project is implemented. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, the Islamic Development Bank, and the World Bank (WB) should be involved in the funding of CASAREM if the project is approved (World Bank, 2009). The main goal of CASAREM is to allow the four borrowing countries...
– Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan and Pakistan – to enter into electricity trade. Tajikistan expects Rogun Dam to be the powerhouse behind their electricity supply to generate enough electricity to potentially sell through CASAREM. Without the completion of Rogun Dam, there is concern that the WB might not invest in CASA 1000 (U.S. Department of State, 2010), which would pejoratively affect Tajikistan’s bid for greater regional power through energy self-sufficiency.

As there is no existing electricity grid for selling electricity to South Asia from Central Asia, and Tajikistan was removed from CAPS, there are plans to create a north-south transmission grid,

“which would run ‘through Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan and through Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan, then Tajikistan would be able to export electrical energy directly north to Kazakhstan, Russia and possibly China. In addition, the construction of transmission lines south from Tajikistan would enable Tajikistan, and eventually Kyrgyzstan, to sell hydropower to Afghanistan and further south’ ” (as cited by Wegerich, 2008, p.83).

This energy grid would completely bypass Uzbekistan, further weakening Uzbekistan’s regional power, as well as increase the two upstream states’ energy self-sufficiency and decrease vulnerability due to existing energy structures. The operation of Toktogul Reservoir, and eventually Rogun Dam, as primarily hydroelectric facilities is only the first step towards energy sustainability – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan must find a way to sell surplus electricity, unfortunately in a way that bypasses Central Asia systems due to high levels of tension and hostility from downstream states.

CASAREM seeks to construct CASA 1000, a north-south transmission grid between Central and South Asia. CASA 1000 must be completed for the entire CASAREM project to be viable. There are acknowledged risks because of destabilization in the region and war in Afghanistan, yet there are huge potential benefits, such as the possibility of increased regional cooperation and “the linking of the Kyrgyz Republic with Tajik system through high voltage lines could help break the ‘Water-Energy Nexus’ that exists in the Syr Darya basin” (World Bank, 2009). That is, allowing Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to have separate modes of selling electricity than the CAPS centered in Tashkent would give them more opportunities for development. According to the World Bank (2009), Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have not been able to “realize their potential, in part because of (a) significant resources needed to develop the hydropower plants and associated transmission lines; (b) limited regional cooperation; and (c) the lack of clarity about the main electricity export market”, which CASAREM and CASA 1000 seek to address. CASA 1000 is also hoped to ameliorate the tension in Central Asia because South Asia will import electricity during the summer months, letting the upstream states release water while the downstream riparians need it for agriculture (Asian Pulse Data Source, 2010).

Even though the project sounds beneficial for all involved, whether directly or simply by geographical proximity, the ADB released a statement making it explicit that there was a feasibility study in progress before the ADB would earmark funds for CASA 1000 (Hasanova, 2010). An interim report for the CASA 1000 feasibility study came out on September 25, 2010 assessing Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s potential supply alongside Afghanistan and Pakistan’s potential demand. The interim report by SNC Lavalin (2010) assumes CASA 1000 functionality by 2016.
According to the report, Pakistan’s demand is set to increase significantly due to ambitious long-term development plans, and while Afghanistan will not have as much demand as Pakistan, there will still be an increase in electricity demand but the main need will be to rehabilitate the current system. Another key assumption for CASA 1000 is that Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will not be exchanging power (SNC Lavalin, 2010, slide 17), which upholds the exclusion of Tajikistan from the CAPS with the center in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

The exclusion from the CAPS creates greater opportunities for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to expand into new markets, whether or not it was a voluntary choice. Regrettably, the north-south market must be created before it can be utilized, leaving Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan vulnerable to current hydro-hegemony. Movement towards CASA 1000 by the upstream states will mean even more reliance on hydroelectric power in Kyrgyzstan, and even more money being poured into the construction of Rogun Dam in Tajikistan. Rogun Dam’s importance as a national honor will skyrocket if the WB does in fact want Rogun to be completed for CASA 1000 (U.S. Department of State, 2010). CASA 1000 and by extension CASAREM would mean more development for the upstream states but would still entrench the reliance on hydropower because the new market is built on selling electricity. Toktogul Reservoir and Rogun Dam’s original purposes would never return to agricultural releases, as Uzbekistan and other downstream states have realized. However, since CASA 1000 will allow Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to produce hydroelectricity for sale during the summer months, summer agricultural needs of the downstream states would also be met. This could help assuage the tensions over water allocation and could allow the upstream states to purchase the natural gas needed during the winter months so that winter releases of water are not necessary. In this way, some of the tensions could be released, but the balance of power would shift so that the upstream states would have more leverage over downstream states through the control of the rivers. So the real tensions might not be over the downstream states receiving their fair share of water for agriculture. The real issue might be the possible shift in balance of power.

Upstream Hydro-Hegemony

The basis of regional power among access to and control of transnational resources such as water has created the term hydro-hegemony (Wegerich, 2008). During the Soviet Union, there was no hydro-hegemon because the entire region was controlled by Moscow. Following post-independence there has been a period of time where Uzbekistan emerged as the hydro-hegemon because of Soviet water quotas, which were preserved in the 1992 Agreement. Now that period of Uzbekistan’s hydro-hegemony is being challenged and, based off of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s emphasis and devotion to hydroelectric developments, will be replaced with upstream hydro-hegemony. Kyrgyzstan appeared to threaten Uzbekistan first by changing Toktogul Reservoir’s purpose from agricultural water releases to winter hydroelectric releases and by passing the 2001 Kyrgyzstan Law on Interstate Water Use. Now Tajikistan is constructing Rogun Dam and courting international investments for the developing energy sector, which would give Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan more control over Central Asia’s transnational water resources.
Since hydro-hegemony is based on control of water, and more hydroelectric advances mean more control of the rivers, it is fair to conclude that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will emerge as the new geopolitical hydro-hegemons if CASAREM is implemented. Rogun Dam is the Tajik key to entrance into a new electricity market that CASAREM would create through the electricity grid of CASA 1000. With Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s collaboration in regard to CASAREM and potential energy exports, the two countries’ national interests indicate that they could form a powerful alliance against Uzbekistan if Uzbekistan attempted to wrest back political power. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also have international actors from outside of the region that are investing in what is essentially the hydro-hegemony of the upstream states. At the core of the issue, energy developments are creating political upheaval in a region known for volatile relations post-independence, which will lead to a destabilization of the Central Asian balance of power. For this reason, Uzbekistan has tried to preserve their political stronghold by objecting to Kyrgyzstan’s 2001 water law on the basis of human rights and environmental grounds, impounding freights bound to Rogun Dam, removing Tajikistan from the CAPS and drawing international criticism to the dam’s construction. However, Uzbekistan’s efforts will only exacerbate the situation and will further geopolitical instability instead of reinforcing their its dominance.

**Conclusion**

Destabilization of Central Asia due to water allocation is not in the interest of the international community. Resource allocation may seem to be a small matter, but because of the scarcity between the CAS, the country with the largest water quota controls more regional power. In this case, Uzbekistan’s perceived hydro-hegemony, in addition to controlling the CAPS and a vast amount of natural gas pipelines, is being challenged by hydroelectric advances in the upstream states. The upstream states seek to improve their geopolitical standing through increased hydroelectric capabilities, which will lend greater control of the water in their territory, which will lead to further water scarcity, and by seeking outside investments for their energy infrastructure. By engaging Iran and IFIs in their energy sector, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are finding ways outside of Central Asian interdependence to develop. While positive for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the ramifications of their advances are upsetting the balance of power.

CASAREM and CASA 1000’s affect on Central Asia has yet to be seen, and the feasibility report for the IFIs has not been completed, but the decision to fund or not to fund CASAREM will have a huge impact on geopolitical structures. Should the IFIs fund CASAREM, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would have a new market to sell their hydroelectricity, and there is the potential for the two upstream states to emerge as the hydro-hegemons. Should the IFIs chose not to fund CASAREM, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s current hydroelectric advancements could have been for naught. Without a new market to sell hydroelectricity, or an electricity grid aside from the CAPS, Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam could have little uses. The further development of CASAREM and CASA 1000 should be watched to help determine the future stability of the region.

If the balance of power, based on resources, is upset, then the region has the potential for violence. Mounting tensions could ignite into violence because of
past political turmoil, recent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan against ethnic Uzbeks, and the fact that Stalin drew the state borders of Central Asia through tribal zones. Political sparring over hydroelectric advances could lead to violence if Kyrgyzstan ever decided to withhold water from the downstream states, as their 2001 water law threatens. With the entire region of Central Asia on edge about water distribution, it doesn’t help that Tajikistan shares a border with Afghanistan and Central Asia is an important strategic point for both the U.S. and Russian military forces. If violence erupted in Central Asia, it could worsen the situation in South Asia and prevent CASAREM and CASA 1000 from being implemented.

In addition to the potential for violence, there is also a definite ripple effect from perceived harmful management of the water facilities along the Amu Darya and Syr Darya to continue the damage to the Aral Sea. This holds devastating implications for the entirety of Central Asia, as it is thought that the depletion of the Aral Sea is changing the region’s climate. There is the possibility for citizen marginalization among the Karakalpak population in Uzbekistan, economic crisis as fishing communities become deserts, health risks, and disempowerment not only in Uzbekistan but also in northern Kazakhstan. If the five states do not negotiate concerning hydroelectric advancements, Soviet water quotas, agricultural practices and the Aral Sea, it could be ecologically, economically and politically disastrous for future generations.

With resource allocation at the forefront of geopolitical tensions, efforts should be made to explore alternative sources of energy in Central Asia, specifically in the upstream states. Not only to take some pressure off of the use of water, and therefore alleviate some of the tensions surrounding its use, but also because Central Asia has been experiencing problems with drought, so putting a lot of effort into a hydropower system that might not have enough water to function in the future would be a horrible turn of events. Wind power could be explored due to the mountainous regions in Tajikistan, or crop diversification methods could be suggested because cotton is a very water-intensive, salt-sensitive crop. Rising salinization levels in the water also create a worrisome atmosphere downstream because of the economic reliance on cotton for subsistence. Environmental factors may force the CAS to make decisions they are not prepared to make in regards to shrinking cotton production and sufficient water levels for hydroelectricity.

There are larger implications that can be gathered from the Central Asian experience. First, a region once under the control of a supranational power is very vulnerable to the policies once implemented under that rule. The CAS are not able to move away from Soviet policy because of the infrastructure that effectively tied them together in resource dependence even after they gained their independence. Even with the introduction of national interests, the countries are not able to agree upon a new and efficient way to allocate water aside from water quotas. Second, the application of international law – in this case international water law – is ineffectiv because there is no body to enforce it, and because international water law fails to take into account the experiences of developing countries that may be heavily reliant on that resource to a point where it impinges upon another state’s sovereignty.

Third, resource allocation in an area experiencing scarcity will lead to political strife and could lead to destabilization to the point of violence. And fourth, be-
cause resource scarcity can put a strain on national interests, energy sustainability and diversification need to be addressed. If energy sustainability is possible in the region, then IFIs should attempt to fund responsible, sustainable programs while being culturally sensitive to the needs of the people. Tajikistan may want Rogun Dam for hydroelectric purposes, but is an old Soviet plan really the answer? Are there any other options to more efficient water control capacity? Diversification could also lead to energy security, for example, because Tajikistan would not be vulnerable to outside actors if they had wind-generated electricity or power during a drought that prevented hydroelectricity. Obviously wind power in not as powerful as hydropower, but it would be a beginning to exploring possible outcomes away from Soviet era planning.

In the case of Central Asia, a supranational body to regulate water could be a possible solution, with a couple noticeable problems. First, that there are regional bodies to regulate water resources that are not having any actual impact in Central Asia other than to confuse the situation. Second, that political tensions are such that the mere creation of a governing body would mean negotiations, which have the potential to aggravate the situation. The recommendation for a supranational governing body to regulate water resources does not refer to current bodies in relation to the disaster of the Aral Sea. Rather, the recommendation would be to create an entirely new body, whose purpose is to represent each of the five countries’ national interests related to water, but in terms of economics. Each country wants their water quota for agriculture, cotton production or hydroelectricity, widely speaking. If the issue was approached from an economic standpoint, efficiency and equity could put the allocation of resources into a different light and encourage maximum cooperation for the greater good of the region.

Energy security is quintessential in understanding both the upstream states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s interest in hydroelectricity and on a broader scale regional geopolitical interdependence. While energy security has become focused on utilizing water resources, energy sustainability and diversification possibilities should be explored in the upstream states to take some stress off of water dependency, such as aforementioned wind turbine possibilities in Tajikistan. There is regional vulnerability to water. It is in the national interests of all actors involved to acknowledge this vulnerability because destabilization and war are not in any country’s national interests. The geographical reality of Central Asia is such that the interdependence of the region has to be negotiated for greater stability and progress to occur.

REFERENCES


Appendix A
A political map of Central Asia, as well as Russia, China, and South Asia: Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Appendix B

A map of the region. The red box (added) indicates the location of Toktogul Reservoir.

Retrieved 25 September 2010 from: http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/water_issues_in_the_ferghana_valley
Appendix C

A map of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers in Central Asia, from the Earth Institute, Columbia University.

Appendix D

The data below is gathered from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis (http://www.eia.doe.gov/). They gather information on international energy statistics, and it is possible to create data sets based on certain parameters. The parameters for the following data are: Natural Gas, Product: All Products (single year), Year: 1992. 1992 because it is the year following Central Asian independence and the first year the U.S. EIA has a separate breakdown for individual countries. Before 1992, all information is together under the Former USSR. This table and graph illustrate the disparities in natural gas production, and the fact that the downstream states are rich in natural gas and as such were able to supply the upstream states during the winter months during the Soviet era.

Natural Gas Production by Type, 1992 (in Billion Cubic Feet)

![Graph of Natural Gas Production by Type, 1992](http://tonto.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=3&pid=alltypes&aid=1&cid=regions&syid=1991&eyid=1992&unit=BCF)
Appendix E

The data below is gathered from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis (http://www.eia.doe.gov/). They gather information on international energy statistics, and it is possible to create data sets based on certain parameters. The parameters for the following data are: Natural Gas, Product: All Products (single year), Year: 2008. It is possible to see from the data that production in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan fell in the years after independence, increasing vulnerability to energy shortages during the winter and reliance on outside sources of natural gas.

**TABLE: Natural Gas Production By Type, 2008 (in Billion Cubic Feet)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF GAS</th>
<th>KAZAKHSTAN</th>
<th>KYRGYZSTAN</th>
<th>TAJIKISTAN</th>
<th>TURKMENISTAN</th>
<th>UZBEKISTAN</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross Natural Gas</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2490</td>
<td>2387</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Rejected Natural Gas</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2490</td>
<td>2387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketed Natural Gas</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2490</td>
<td>2387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry Natural Gas</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2490</td>
<td>2387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GRAPH: Natural Gas Production By Type, 2008 (in Billion Cubic Feet)**

Appendix F

The data below is gathered from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis (http://www.eia.doe.gov/). They gather information on international energy statistics, and it is possible to create data sets based on certain parameters. The parameters for the following data are: Electricity: generation, all countries: Eurasia. From the Eurasian data set, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s data was selected. Start year: 1991 (independence), end year: 2008. 2009 data is either n/a or incomplete for all five countries.

From this data, it is possible to see the total amount of electricity generated in Central Asia from several sources: Total Renewables: Hydroelectricity, Total Non-Hydroelectric Renewables (geothermal; wind; solar, tide and wave; biomass and waste), Total Conventional Thermal, and Hydroelectric Pumped Storage. This data, in conjunction with the data in Appendix F, illustrates hydroelectric dependency based on how much of total electricity net generation is hydroelectric generation.

TABLE: Total Electricity Net Generation (Billion Kilowatthours)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KAZAKHSTAN</th>
<th>KYRGYZSTAN</th>
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<th>TURKMENISTAN</th>
<th>UZBEKISTAN</th>
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<td>14.612</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>12.426</td>
<td>13.85</td>
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<td>15.621</td>
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<td>15.971</td>
<td>14.138</td>
<td>47.004</td>
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</table>
GRAPH: Total Electricity Net Generation (Billion Kilowatthours)

Appendix G

The data below is gathered from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis (http://www.eia.doe.gov/). They gather information on international energy statistics, and it is possible to create data sets based on certain parameters (http://tonto.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=2&pid=2&aid=12). The parameters for the following data are: Electricity: generation, product: Total Renewables > Hydroelectric, all countries: Eurasia. From the Eurasian data set, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s data was selected. Start year: 1991 (independence), end year: 2008. 2009 data is either n/a or incomplete for all five countries.

From this data, it is possible to see how much of the total electricity net generation is generated by hydroelectricity. For Kyrgyzstan, Total Electricity Net Generation is 11.702 billion kW-h. Hydroelectricity Net Generation for Kyrgyzstan is 10.633 billion kW-h. 10.633 billion kW-h divided by 11.702 billion kW-h = .908, or 90% of total electricity net generation is hydroelectric. Tajikistan is 15.688 billion kW-h divided by 15.971 billion kW-h = .982, or 98% of total electricity net generation is hydroelectric. These are the numerical reasons why Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are so dependent on hydroelectricity in their resource policies. Due to their lack of natural gas, abundance of water and the existing infrastructure to create hydropower plants to generate enough electricity to supply the country.

TABLE: Hydroelectricity Net Generation (Billon Kilowatthours)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
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<th>Turkmenistan</th>
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<td>10.633</td>
<td>15.688</td>
<td>.003</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GRAPH: Hydroelectricity Net Generation (Billon Kilowatthours)


Appendix H

This map shows Rogun Dam in relation to its sister dam Nurek inside Tajikistan on the River Vakhsh.

Appendix I

This is the layout of hydroelectric infrastructure along the River Vakhsh. Rogun Dam (red arrow, added) will be at the beginning, followed by its sister dam, Nurek Dam (blue arrow, added), which was built during the Soviet era. (Wegerich, 2008).
Katherine J. Bowen-Williams focuses her studies on water rights and regional interdependence as a graduate student at George Mason’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. She is a member of the Central Asian Working Group and involved in a project to create teaching materials about the region and make non-Western style mediation techniques available to undergraduates. Summer 2012 she plans to enter the Peace Corps as part of her Master’s International degree, and hopes that her time in the Peace Corps will help shed further light on conflict resolution, interdependence, and communities.
The ‘China Alternative’? Chinese Counter-Norms and China’s Offensive and Defensive Soft Power

Hyun-Binn Cho, University of Pennsylvania

ABSTRACT

To assuage fears of a ‘China threat,’ analysts have suggested that China now increasingly supports and adheres to international norms and institutions. Yet the possibility that China can promote counter-norms through the international system has rarely been considered. Similarly, as Chinese influence has grown particularly in regions such as Africa and Latin America, it has not been clear what characteristics this increased influence has taken. Together, these two pictures present a case for a ‘China alternative.’ The question is how to best conceptualize and evaluate this. This essay does so by differentiating between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ soft power. The former refers to China’s policy to attract others through reassurance, such as the idea of ‘peaceful development.’ The latter refers to China’s policy to attract others to a ‘China alternative,’ such as through ‘no strings attached’ aid or counter-norms such as the ‘Beijing Consensus.’ The effects of these policies have not only been non-trivial: this essay importantly argues that the use of defensive soft power by China to reassure others has masked the extent to which China has simultaneously used its offensive soft power to quietly promote a ‘China alternative.’

Introduction

Central to the increasing attention on China has been debate over the ‘China threat.’ It is by now a familiar story that China’s unprecedented economic growth has led to an increase in Chinese influence that could pose a threat to the international system. But consider two logical extensions. On the one hand, with its economic growth, China has re-orientated its foreign policy to become increasingly cooperative, and even supportive, of the multilateral institutions and norms of the international system. For instance, China not only entered the WTO in 2001, it increased its membership in international governmental organizations from just over 30 in 1986 to 53 in 2009, more than doubled the number of international arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation treaties that it has joined between 1990 and 2008, and increased its UN Peacekeeping forces from 5 to over 2,000 between 1990 and 2010. As a result, some analysts have suggested that China is not a revisionist power, and the about face in its foreign policy has been accorded to the socialization affects of international institutions and US engagement policy. But is this the end of the story? The possibility that a ‘successfully engaged’ China may promote Chinese counter-norms through the system and come to change international norms and institutions via an opposite causal arrow has rarely been considered.

On the other hand, an extension of China’s increase in economic size has been an increase in opportunities to flex its new-found influence. As economic size and political power has grown, Chinese economic interests around the globe have grown too, and this has lead to an increase in cases where China’s influence can come at the expense of the U.S. or other major powers. Such concerns have arisen particularly as regards the Latin American and African continent. The question is: what is the actual content of this increased Chinese influence? What characteristics does it have?
These two stories of China potentially promoting counter-norms and the characteristics of China’s increased influence in developing countries, pose two perspectives of a ‘China alternative’ that need reconciling. This essay first aims to provide a clearer conceptual framework to analyze these issues with reference to the popular ‘soft-power’ discourse surrounding China. Second, upon this framework, this essay aims to create a more coherent picture of China’s soft power and counter-norms in China’s foreign policy. Lastly, it aims to evaluate the viability of a ‘China alternative.’

**China’s Offensive and Defensive Soft Power**

Joseph Nye’s concept of ‘soft power’ can most readily be understood in terms of the power to attract. In his own words, he defines it as follows: “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” For instance, if we think about US soft power, we can think of McDonalds, baseball, or freedom of speech. Similarly, when we think about Chinese soft power, we may think of Beijing Duck, pandas, or Confucianism.

But the concept becomes less clear when it comes to explicating the relationship with foreign policy. When doing a cross-database search on the China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database - the largest and most comprehensive database for Chinese journals and periodicals – there are no academic articles containing the English word ‘soft power’ in their title before 2000, 15 between 2000 and 2005, and 467 between 2006 and 2011. The ‘Chinese soft power’ discourse has met no less success outside of China, most notably through works such as Joshua Kurkutchick’s book *Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World*. Yet as more authors have used the term, it has come to include everything from ‘Neo-Confucianism,’ to ‘peaceful rise,’ to ‘no strings attached’ foreign aid. This makes it analytically blunt. For instance, if part of China’s peaceful rise is due to its cooperation in multilateral institutions, has it enhanced its soft power? If it aims to use international institutions to socialize others to its values, is it also enhancing its soft power? And if it gives out aid to African states with ‘no strings attached,’ is it promoting its soft power too?

An important first distinction can be made between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ soft power. If, as we saw earlier, Nye can define soft power broadly as ‘the power to attract,’ then China’s policy of ‘reassurance’ can be located as a form of promoting ‘defensive soft power.’ For instance, in 2003, it promulgated the idea of ‘peaceful rise’ to let it be known that its rise would not threaten others; in 2004, the government quickly retracted this concept and renamed it to an even less threatening term ‘peaceful development’ because ‘rise’ was too distressing for some; and in recent years, it has come to promote the concept of ‘win-win’ to characterize joint-cooperative efforts with other countries. As Avery Goldstein has argued, a central objective of China’s current grand strategy has been to reassure other countries of its benign intentions and this has been in large part a reaction to the ‘China threat’ debate. Since the ideas of ‘peaceful development’ and ‘win-win’ aim to promote an attractive image of a benign and friendly China, they can be seen as defensive soft power resources. They attract through defense. Similarly, the promotion of such resources can be seen as defensive soft power policies.
In contrast, ‘offensive soft power’ can be seen in terms of China’s policy to promote a ‘China alternative.’ Here we can classify China’s promulgation of the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,’ ‘New Security Concept’ and ‘Beijing Consensus’ as examples of China’s efforts to promote ‘offensive soft power.’ These political ideas not only convey key Chinese understandings of their own foreign policy, they challenge existing political ideas abroad and provide potential alternatives to them. For instance, the ‘Five Principles’ promulgated in 1953 advocated a hard-line interpretation of the idea of non-interference, which provided a justification for China to later reject calls by other states to improve its human rights record. The ‘New Security Concept,’ espoused since the mid-1990s, calls for a departure from ‘Cold War mentality’ and hence US bilateral alliances, and has been pivotal in China’s cooperation with ASEAN as it resonates with their idea of ‘cooperative security’\(^9\). And the ‘Beijing Consensus,’ coined in 2004, symbolizes the benefits of limited economic liberalization, thus providing African and Latin American countries with a tempting alternative to the ‘Washington Consensus.’\(^10\) The idea of the ‘New Security Concept’ or ‘Beijing Consensus’ are thus offensive soft power resources that attract others by providing an alternative. The promotion of such resources can be seen as offensive soft power policies.

A second distinction, however, can be made within ‘offensive’ soft power: those which promote potential Chinese counter-norms and those which do not. For instance, as China’s increasing economic ties with Latin America and Africa has led to increasing Chinese interests and influence in these regions, China’s ‘no strings attached’ foreign aid and ‘red-carpet diplomacy’ has served to bolster public opinion in these regions and enhance China’s attractiveness at the potential expense of the ‘West.’ China’s ‘no strings attached’ foreign aid refers to China giving foreign aid to countries without requesting any political favors in return such as the improvement of democracy in the recipient country; ‘red-carpet diplomacy’ refers to China’s lush treatment of leaders of the developing world when they visit China. Although both policies include material incentives, because money is used to enhance the image and attractiveness of China rather than as direct payment for a transaction with another country, they can both be seen as soft power policies. But neither of them is aimed at promoting new or alternative sets of norms and ideas. Rather, it is the very absence of an imposing ideology that is the distinguishing character and poses a ‘China alternative.’ On the other hand, the promulgation of Confucian and Chinese culture in these regions through Confucian Institutes can be seen as a form of promoting Chinese counter-norms.\(^11\) According to the Hanban website, by the end of 2010, there were 691 Confucian Institutes and Confucian Classrooms in 96 countries, of which 23 Confucian Institutes were in 16 African countries.\(^12\) These Confucian Institutes not only aim to attract others to Chinese principles and values, adherence to such principles and values can provide an alternative way of life from what is regarded as the norm in the ‘West,’ such as the value of ‘harmony.’\(^13\) Therefore, we can see that offensive soft power has two faces: The first face does not speak of norms, such as ‘no strings attached’ foreign aid, Chinese cuisine, or Chinese martial arts, while the second face is very much concerned with and actively promotes alternative norms, such as the ‘Five Principles,’ ‘New Security Concept,’ and ‘Beijing Consensus.’ As some authors have recently claimed, ‘[t]he New Security Concept allows China to claim prestige as a norms entrepreneur.’\(^14\)
The Impact of China’s Counter-Norms

Having distinguished ‘offensive’ from ‘defensive’ soft power, and Chinese counter-norms as a form of offensive soft power, to what extent are counter-norms relevant? Have Chinese counter-norms been able to gain acceptance in a reverse process of engagement through international institutions, and even change them?

Ironically, the most successful case of Chinese counter-norms to pervade and change international institutions has been in the area that has traditionally been appraised by the pioneers of the study of international norms – human rights. As Andrew Nathan claims: ‘[i]nstead of being on the receiving end of human rights influence, the Chinese government is increasingly able to blunt the impact of human rights on its domestic rule and shape the international regime’s norms and institutions to its own preferences.’ For instance, China has not only been claiming that human rights is a matter of internal affairs, consistent with its Five Principles of 1953, but that human rights should be judged relative to the cultural context and level of development of the country. In the mid-1990’s this idea found resonance with the ‘Asian Values’ debate in Southeast Asia. More recently, China created a non-Western coalition of states in the UN Human Rights Commission that was able to block Western-sponsored resolutions, causing Secretary-General Kofi Annan to reorganize the commission into the new Human Rights Council in 2006. Although this was not the result of offensive soft power alone, it demonstrates that Chinese counter-norms can gain significant adherence among developing countries and that China can push for change in the international system to reflect its own norms. These examples not only counter the rosy picture of China being merely cooperative and supportive of multilateral institutions, it shows that China can also use the cooperation and support available through the system to promote its own ideas and interests that can in turn shape the system.

Chinese counter-norms have also been bolstered by new Chinese-led international organizations. A prime example is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO first began as a multilateral forum called the Shanghai Five in 1996, which included China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The main purpose of the forum was to cooperate on border control and military issues. With the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2001, the forum was upgraded to an official organization named the SCO, and the agenda expanded to included broader security, economic, and cultural issues. Importantly, the SCO was a result of China’s efforts to promote its ‘New Security Concept.’ China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept released by the foreign ministry in 2002 states that:

It is the common call of people to discard the old way of thinking and replace it with new concepts and means...The new security concept is, in essence, to rise above one-sided security and seek common security through mutually beneficial cooperation... To this end, China has placed great importance on and taken an active part in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)...

The SCO is a successful case of the new security concept.

China has therefore not only been able to promote counter-norms to change existing international institutions, it has been able to create new ones that can, in turn, further promote Chinese counter-norms. And while there are several international institutions that exclude western countries, as the SCO has been conducting joint-military exercises in 2005, 2007, and 2009 with China’s global influence growing, there has been increasing attention on the maneuvers and motives of
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Now the SCO interacts with the United Nations, European Union, and ASEAN and it has recently invited countries such as Iran as observers. The U.S. was rebuffed as an observer in 2005 and still stands as an outsider.19

Another example is the Boao Forum – the now largely successful Chinese take on the world-famous European economic forum, the Davos Forum. The forum gets its name from the location it is held – an island in Hainan Province in southern China – and was inaugurated in 2001 to promote regional economic cooperation and exchange of economic ideas among global government, business, and academic leaders. In 2003, China used the Forum to promote its defensive soft power by launching the idea of ‘peaceful rise’ through the Forum.20 With the subprime mortgage crisis and the ensuing global economic crisis, China increasingly used the Forum to argue that 1) economic liberalization should be gradual, 2) there should be a new global financial system, and 3) although the US pressures China to revaluate its currency, this is ‘a matter of national sovereignty.’21 These statements not only challenge the ‘Washington Consensus’ of open markets and transparency, by avoiding issues over democracy or human rights, the Boao Forum creates a picture of an economically successful China that did not have to fully liberalize its economy, thereby showcasing the success of the ‘Beijing Consensus.’ Finally, in 2011, President Hu gave a speech at the Boao Forum titled “Towards a Common Development and a Harmonious Asia” which emphasized the concept of harmony. Thus, the Boao Forum has been another platform for China to promote its counter-norms.22

China’s Foreign Policy and its use of Offensive and Defensive Soft Power

The motivations behind China’s counter-norms, defensive soft power, and offensive soft power can be understood as part of China’s larger foreign policy. First, a crucial motivation for Chinese counter-norms is China’s domestic security. From Beijing’s perspective, western norms of ‘liberty,’ ‘democracy,’ and ‘the freedom of opinion,’ pose critical challenges to China’s domestic political stability by triggering a process of ‘peaceful evolution.’23 This concern explains why China has been particularly forceful with the promulgation of counter-norms in the human rights regime. But China also needs to counter foreign norms through original and globally successful Chinese norms so that it can satisfy its increasingly proud domestic audience. This need relates to China’s global status. Not only can China use such counter-norms to gain adherence as a global ‘trend-setter,’ a more successful China will rear a more ambitious Chinese public, and a controlled promotion of global counter-norms will serve as a form of ‘pragmatic nationalism.’24 Therefore, if domestic security is the top priority for the ‘Fragile Superpower’ as Susan Shirk argues,25 the importance of counter-norms in China’s grand strategy can be seen in tandem.

A second point related to the first is China’s use of defensive soft power to create a stable regional and international environment. China’s soft power policy of reassurance aims to create an amicable regional and global environment to sustain its economic growth. This policy, in turn, also helps domestic stability. But importantly, China’s use of defensive soft power also masks the extent to which it is simultaneously promoting its offensive soft power. The simultaneous use of defensive
and offensive soft power has been central to China’s use of soft power in its foreign policy and this bifurcated strategy if often overlooked when observers analyze whether and to what extent China is a ‘revisionist’ or ‘status quo’ power.

Third, China’s use of offensive soft power in the form of ‘no-strings-attached’ aid and ‘red-carpet diplomacy’ is not only crucial in promoting a ‘China alternative’ to the West, but also in creating a ‘PRC alternative’ to Taiwan. China has used its foreign aid and investment to woo countries in Latin America and the South Pacific to sever ties with Taiwan and diplomatically recognize the People’s Republic of China.26 Thus, we can see that another defining characteristic of China’s offensive soft power policy is that the ‘no strings attached’ aid to developing countries often attaches the condition of diplomatic recognition.

In this light, we might want to take more seriously China’s ambitious proposals to promote the idea of ‘harmony’ as a new universal norm. As Mingjian Li notes:

“In modern history, Western civilization, epitomized by science, individualism and materialism, pushed for industrialization but caused many problems in the process… Traditional Chinese culture, which stresses ‘giving priority to human beings’ (yì rén wèi běn) and ‘harmony between nature and humankind’ (tiān rèn hé yī), could provide alternative approaches to these problems, thus putting Chinese culture in a more advantageous position in the post-industrialization, information era.”27

If Chinese counter-norms have thus far been mostly successful in ‘niche markets’ such as with specific groups of developing countries, these norms aim to provide an alternative to the ‘mainstream.’ As Kurlantzik points out, President Hu’s statement that ‘Chinese culture belongs not only to the Chinese but also to the whole world,’ reveals ‘a conviction that other countries desire his culture, just as the American leaders have always evinced.’28

**The Viability of a China Alternative**

But how viable is a ‘China alternative’? Some China observers such as Bates Gill and Joshua Kurlantzik are skeptical.29 First are the arguments that China has many problems at home, such as poor labor standards, environmental degradation, and corruption that pose a limit on China as an attractive alternative. In this way the argument is that sooner or later people will become more aware of China’s failures at home, which will lead to their disenchantment. Second is the argument that the China alternative has not been proven and is still a work in progress. For instance, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ model, although successful so far, still has to prove itself over the long-run. In this sense, success will bring success. Third is the argument that Chinese foreign policy lacks legitimacy. Here it is claimed that China’s candid relationship with tyrannical rulers of countries such as Sudan delegitimitizes China, as does its lack of democracy and human rights. Fourth is the argument that China simply lacks the resources to compete in the ‘soft power’ market. Despite hosting the largely successful 2008 Beijing Olympics and 2010 Shanghai Expo, little has come out of China that provides a competitive alternative to lasting household names such as Coca Cola, Nike, or Starbucks. This argument is all the more poignant when seen in terms of the influence that Japanese and Korean popular culture has in Asia; an area that China still lags far behind, despite its cultural heritage and economic and political weight. These arguments provide a belittling picture of China’s soft power and counter-norms.
Yet the above arguments can themselves be criticized. First, the argument that China’s domestic troubles debilitate China’s soft power seems to be holding onto the wrong end of the stick: to lessen such concerns will be a primary reason why China would be interested in increasing its soft power. For instance, those who follow Major League Baseball or the Billboard Charts of the US around the world may be more willing to overlook the shortcomings of the US government and its policies. It is said that many people in the former communist bloc who had access to American pop culture began to form more favorable opinions of the US. Second, that the lack of legitimacy in China’s foreign policy will lead to a decrease in China’s soft power fails to realize that a change in what is deemed ‘legitimate’ is precisely the objective behind promoting counter-norms. This limitation is therefore a result of a failure to distinguish between soft power and counter-norms. Third, the argument that China lacks soft power resources compared to soft power giants like the US fails to recognize that as large as the influence of the US is, its mistakes will have a much larger negative impact than that of China. This may in turn play into the hands of China’s soft power. For instance, in demonstrations around the world against the Iraq War broadcasted on TV, it was not uncommon to see people attack US-branded shops in the streets such as McDonalds or Starbucks. The metaphor that even a peacefully rising Chinese elephant will be able to trample the grass can be applied oppositely to US soft power. In this regard, since the US can also promote its soft power around the world to compete with China’s soft power, the viability of a ‘China alternative’ is not entirely decided by the Chinese.

**Conclusion**

The viability of a ‘China alternative’ is not a foregone conclusion. Neither is the prospect of a ‘China alternative’ entirely new: China has been promulgating counter-norms since at least the Mao era (1950s to 1970s). Yet how this has changed with the change in China’s foreign policy, how it functions in China’s foreign policy today, and what political motivations underpin them are poorly understood first-steps that are needed to understand the policy of a ‘China alternative’ from Beijing’s perspective.

By conceptualizing and distinguishing offensive and defensive soft power, we can see that the change from revolutionary Maoism to a much more cooperative posture of the ‘New Security Concept’ has made China’s offensive soft power more palatable to the average global citizen. Yet these offensive soft power policies now also coexist with defensive soft power policies such as the promotion of ‘peaceful development,’ which masks the extent to which China has continued and perhaps even stepped-up its efforts to promote its offensive soft power. Underpinning these policies is a strong political motivation to promote counter-norms for domestic stability, promote defensive soft power for external stability, and promote offensive soft power to woo countries to isolate Taiwan. Focusing exclusively on China’s improved cooperative posture in multilateral institutions and failing to recognize these offensive soft power aspects of China’s foreign policy can therefore give a misleading view of China’s intentions. China is neither a ‘revisionist’ state in the sense of being bent on taking-down the US; nor is it purely a ‘status quo’ state in adhering to the international system to maintain its position. Rather, China ap-
pears to be using the international system to quietly promote a ‘China alternative’ with its offensive soft power policies of ‘no strings attached aid’ and Confucianism on the one hand, while reassuring others with its defensive soft power policies on the other. The viability of this ‘China alternative’ is not a foregone conclusion, but it needs to be assessed by recognizing China’s strategies more clearly. This paper has sought to provide a framework for such an analysis.

Endnotes


7. Zheng Bijian, former vice-chair of the Central Party School, is often given credit as the first person to espouse ‘peaceful rise’ as a policy of China in a speech entitled ‘A New Path for China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia’ given on November 3, 2003 at the Baoa Forum. In the speech, he says that “China’s only choice is to strive to rise and, more importantly, to strive for a peaceful rise. That is to say, we have to work toward a peaceful international environment for the sake of our own development and at the same time, safeguard world peace through this process of development.” See China’s Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997-2004, The Brookings Institution, Luncheon Speech ‘China’s Peaceful Rise’ handout, 2005. pp. 15. Available at http://www.brookings.edu/events/2005/0616china.aspx (Accessed August 14, 2011).

8. For instance, see Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security, (California, Stanford University Press, 2005). pp. 203. Goldstein suggests that central to China’s current grand strategy has been its efforts to reassure others.


References


Hanban website: http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm


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ABSTRACT

In this age of globalization—of technological development, transnationalism, and multinational corporations—the truth of interdependence that Buddhism speaks of is evident at every turn. Were it not for international trade and political relations, world travel, modern printing technology, and developments in industrial production, Buddhism may have remained exclusively in Asia or as an immigrant’s religion. In this essay, Nagasawa examines the relationship between two Sōtō Zen institutions of San Francisco: the Sōtō Zen Mission of San Francisco, Sōkōji, founded in 1934 by Rev. Hosen Isobe and the San Francisco Zen Center, founded in 1962 by Shunryū Suzuki. Field research and participant-observation lead to the conclusion that, though these two temples are of the same lineage, there is little to suggest a robust relationship between them. Indeed, there is silence between Sōkōji and San Francisco Zen Center, because of differences that extend beyond ethnicity and into the cultural, linguistic, social, and economic.

In this age of globalization—of technological development, transnationalism, and multinational corporations—the truth of interdependence that Buddhism speaks of is evident at every turn. Were it not for international trade and political relations, world travel, modern printing technology, and developments in industrial production, Buddhism may have remained exclusively in Asia or as an immigrant’s religion. Buddhism’s interaction with the West has helped to shape it both in the West and in Asia. One might even say Buddhism in the West is an outcome of globalization.

Buddhism is a relatively new religion to North America. There was some knowledge of Buddhism in America in the late 19th and early 20th centuries through the World Parliament of Religions at the Chicago World Exposition in 1893, and much later through the writings of D.T. Suzuki and his contemporaries.1 However, the most important contributors to Buddhism’s introduction to America were the Buddhist groups and institutions founded by immigrant populations from Asia during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, particularly those hailing from Japan and China. White Americans did not begin adopting and practicing Buddhism on a large scale until the Beat and Hippie generations of the 1950’s and 1960’s respectively.2

The Buddhisms that have been introduced and adopted by predominantly white Americans of the 1950s and 1960s that have survived to the present day are markedly different from their Asian counterparts. In his work The Making of Buddhist Modernity, David McMahan articulates a view held by many Westerners (and especially Americans) that Buddhism does not require one to “follow any strict rules; you simply exercise compassion and maintain a peaceful state of mind through meditation. Buddhism values creativity and intuition and is basically compatible with a modern scientific worldview. It is democratic, encourages freedom of thought, and is more of a ‘spirituality’ than a religion.”3 For McMahan, these conceptions of Buddhism in the West, what he collectively refers to
as “Buddhist modernism,” have been shaped not only by Western scholars and practitioners, but also by “Asian reformers educated in both Western and Buddhist thought.” Teachers whose books and teachings have become popular in the West, such as Daisetz T. Suzuki, Sōen Shaku, and more recently Yongey Mingyur Rinpoche and the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, have adapted their message to mesh with Western philosophy and ideas about reason, empiricism, and science. According to McMahan, such a popular Western picture of Buddhism as described above is “neither unambiguously ‘there’ in ancient Buddhist texts and lived traditions nor merely a fantasy of an educated population in the West, an image with no corresponding object.” The result of such a movement is a Buddhist institution, perhaps run or founded by an ethnically Asian teacher but with white Americans as an overwhelming majority of its membership base that has shifted its focus from traditional ritual practices and beliefs to meditation and the pursuit of enlightenment.

Yet there remain Buddhist institutions founded by Asian immigrants who traveled to America, “in search of jobs, new opportunities and a better future for their family, simply bringing their religion[s] along” with them. Such institutions act not only as place where religious ideas and practices are transmitted to later generations, but also help to preserve a sense of cultural identity through providing death rituals and becoming gathering places for immigrant communities. Communities of this sort, as Jan Nattier points out in “Landscapes of Buddhist America”, are “almost always deliberately mono-ethnic at the outset.”

In this paper, I will examine the relationship between two Sōtō Zen institutions of San Francisco: the Sōtō Zen Mission of San Francisco, Sōkōji, founded in 1934 by Rev. Hosen Isobe and the San Francisco Zen Center, founded in 1962 by Shunryū Suzuki. My own field research and participant-observation have led me to conclude that, though these two temples are of the same lineage, there is little to suggest a robust relationship between them. Indeed, there is silence between Sōkōji and San Francisco Zen Center, because of differences that extend beyond ethnicity and into the cultural, linguistic, social, and economic. I intend to explore these differences in order to understand this lack of a relationship, and to contribute more generally to the understanding of Buddhism as it grows and takes shape in America. I will provide a brief history of Zen Buddhism’s intrepid history, show the historical relationship between each of these temples, and present my own observations of their respective practices and congregations. I will also provide my own suggestions to these institutions so that they can perhaps come to support one another.

1. Sōtō Zen in Japan and its Migration to San Francisco

Since the earliest centuries of its existence, Buddhism has been a religion on the move and is often thought of as one of the first world religions. It moved from a relatively small area in northern India, traveling along trade routes and transcending state borders. As it moved into different cultures in Asia, Buddhism adapted to each of the culture’s religious expectations, resulting in a multiplicity of Buddhisms, with only loosely related teachings. According to traditional Chan/Zen accounts, an eccentric Buddhist teacher by the name of Bodhidharma brought the teachings and practices of dhyāna meditation to China from India in the early 4th
century. \footnote{Chan, an adaptation of dhyāna, only began to emerge as an independent school of its own in the early eighth century, coming to prominence during the Song Dynasty as it adapted itself to its new context and gained the support of the state. By the Southern Song period (1127-1279 CE), virtually all of Chinese Buddhism was Chan.\footnote{It is for this reason that Japanese monks who traveled to China to study at this time found themselves frequently encountering Chan monks in important administrative positions of state sponsored temples.}} It was this type of prevalent and state-supported Buddhism that Eihei Dōgen, a Japanese Tendai monk at the time, found on his 1223 quest to China in search of a master with whom he felt more compatible. Dōgen found this in Rujing of Mount Tiantong, a Chan monk who emphasized strict discipline and mediation. Upon his return to Japan, Dōgen attracted few disciples and eventually moved out into the countryside to found Eiheiji, far from the reach and influence of the Tendai establishment in Kyōto. It would not be until after Dōgen’s death that the Sōtō sect became one of the largest sects of Buddhism in Japan. Dōgen’s disciples and Dharmaic descendants were successful in expanding the Sōtō school by adapting it to the needs of the lay people and accommodating other elements of Japanese culture. It managed to incorporate the veneration of popular bodhisattvas and Shinto deities, and opened Buddhist precept ceremonies to all classes of people. Sōtō priests also “attended to such needs as the building of roads and irrigation canals, the curing of diseases, and the extirpation of evil spirits.”\footnote{Following the politically and socially tumultuous years of the Kamakura period, and the establishment of the Rinzai school of Zen as the de facto state orthodoxy of the Ashikaga shogunate (1336–1573 CE), Sōtō Zen was confined to the countryside. The Sōtō school established itself in these areas and famously began the tradition of providing Buddhist funerals for the laity. These involved posthumous ordinations, in which the Buddhist precepts and ordination names were administered to the deceased so that they could be given a formal monk’s or nun’s funeral, complete with the chanting of sutras, burning of incense and a sermon. As William Bodiford points out, “the regional dissemination of Japanese Zen Buddhism, and of the Sōtō school in particular, advanced hand-in-hand with the popularization of Zen funeral services.” The popularization of Sōtō Zen in such a way had far-reaching implications, resulting in Japanese Zen’s becoming “strongly associated with funeral rites.”

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The first Japanese immigrants sailed to San Francisco in 1869 following the fall of the Tokugawa, and at the beginning of the Meiji period. Just a few years prior,
Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States sailed into Tokyo harbor with his fleet of gunships, forcibly opening the previously reclusive Japan to Western trade and influence. Many Japanese sought new opportunities for education and employment in the United States as Japan faced an economic depression. As more immigrants arrived in San Francisco, they began establishing their own social institutions to support their growing community, with many settling on the outskirts of Chinatown and in the South of Market district. By 1898 San Francisco has become “the headquarters for Buddhist churches and social organizations located throughout the West, including prefectoral organizations or kenjin-kai, benevolent associations, and newspapers.” After the devastating 1906 earthquake, the Japanese community relocated itself to the Western Addition establishing the first major Japantown of the United States. Because San Francisco was the main port of entry for Japanese immigrants, it had the largest population of Japanese in the US at the time.

By the dawn of the 20th century, the size of the Japanese community had significantly increased. The community then began to face increasingly racist and xenophobic policies of the then San Francisco mayor and future California Senator, James D. Phelan. Japanese American students were forced into their own segregated schools by the city’s Board of Education. As this issue caught the attention of the Japanese government and President Theodore Roosevelt, the city agreed to rescind its policy. However, President Roosevelt then negotiated a curtailment of Japanese immigration with Japan in 1908. This restriction did not include the so-called “picture brides”, many of whom traveled to San Francisco, facilitating the establishment of families and a new generation of native-born Japanese Americans. However, the community faced other new challenges in the form of California’s 1913 Heney-Webb Act which prohibited non-citizens from owning property and the 1927 Immigration Act, which ended immigration from Japan until the 1950’s. It was in this difficult social environment that the Sōtō Zen Mission of San Francisco, Sōkōji first opened its doors in 1934 at 1881 Bush Street in Japantown under the leadership of Rev. Hosen Isobe. In the next decade, Sōkōji managed to survive the World War II years, even though its priest, Daito Suzuki, and many of Sōkōji’s parishioners were sent to Japanese internment camps (a local Hindu group cared for the temple building in their absence). As Sōkōji attempted to stabilize itself in the years after the war, it would soon face a new set of challenging circumstances.

2. Sōkōji and San Francisco Zen Center: A Shared History

According to Buddhist studies scholars Senryō Asai and Duncan Ryūken Williams in their “Japanese Zen in America: Americanizing the Face in the Mirror,” temples like Sōkōji were “established for Japanese American immigrants who had belonged to the Sōtō Zen school in Japan” as “branch temples” of Eiheiji and Sōjiji. Often, these temples closely resemble the danka temples of Japan, which focused on providing funeral and memorial rituals to their parishioners and less so, if at all, on meditation. This is the sort of temple that the newly appointed and eager Suzuki Shunryū came to in May of 1959 as the new chief priest. Prior to this, Sōkōji was led by Kato Wako as its interim priest. Buddhism was in vogue because of the countercultural tide of the time and the writings of the aforementioned D.T. Suzuki and Beat poet Alan Watts. Many of Suzuki’s earliest students “came from
the loose subculture of artists, non-conformists, and beatniks in the Bay Area, where interest in Asian thought was high. Word had spread through San Francisco that a “Zen master” had arrived in San Francisco, attracting the attention of interested Westerners, like Lou and Bill McNeil, Joane Kyger, and Bill Kwong. Prompted by Kato Wako, Suzuki began giving lectures to the American Academy of Asian Studies at the San Francisco Art Institute, where Kato had once been a faculty member. At these gatherings, Suzuki began teaching zazen to Westerners and eventually invited them to Sōkōji to sit at the temple’s morning zazen sessions. Suzuki also began giving Dharma talks in English on Wednesday evenings, and began holding evening zazen sessions followed by dokusan, practice meetings with individual students. In Suzuki’s biography, David Chadwick implies that as Sōkōji started attracting more and more Western students, Suzuki began organizing much of his time around teaching them and hosting zazen sessions. “A lot of the older members of the congregation resented the growing presence of the non-Japanese in their temple,” as they were often disheveled, awkward and, to the Japanese mind, disrespectful. For these older members, zazen was a serious practice meant for monks and priests. Though some, like Suzuki’s middle-aged Western women students, got along with the ethnically Japanese members, “there would always be a gap.”

Suzuki’s group of mostly Caucasian practitioners eventually managed to incorporate under the State of California in 1962 as a non-profit organization with the name “Zen Center.” Zen Center also began publishing its own newsletter, Wind Bell, in December of 1961. During this period, Zen Center only continued to grow, attracting San Francisco’s future abbot Richard Baker. Suzuki provided lay ordination to veteran practitioners and sent several students to train in Japanese monasteries. In 1966, Zen Center, still housed in Sōkōji, purchased Tassajara Hot Springs, formally reopening it as Tassajara Zen Mountain Center in July of 1967. Suzuki’s time was more so split between his duties as the temple priest of Sōkōji and the needs of his devoted Zen Center students. Finally in 1969, a sudden change occurred:

Abruptly, a demand came from Sokoji’s board of directors in the spring of 1969: choose us or them….They no longer wanted a priest with divided loyalties. They wanted Suzuki to stay, but even more they wanted a priest that was theirs… The younger Japanese members were more understanding, but the elders ran Sokoji. He [Suzuki] said that the Issei, the first generation Japanese-Americans, has a Meiji Buddhist approach. They admired the progress of the West, yet clung to a type of Shinto nationalistic Buddhism focused on making offerings to the spirits of the ancestors.

Following this turn of events, Suzuki resigned from his position as chief priest of Sōkōji. The members of Zen Center had to search for a new building that could house their groups and act as a training monastery. This came in the form of the current building of the San Francisco Zen Center at 300 Page Street in the Lower Haight area of San Francisco. Despite the difficulties from being separated from the place in which they had thrived for nearly a decade, the Zen Center continued to expand, setting up satellite groups and zendos across the West Coast. The culmination of Suzuki’s mission to plant the seed of the Dharma in the West came with Richard Baker’s installation as abbot of the Zen Center on November 21, 1971. Thirteen days later, Suzuki succumbed to the cancer with which he had been diagnosed just one month before.
The connection between modern Sōtō Zen in America, San Francisco Zen Center, and Sōkō-ji is a very important one. Many of the most influential American Sōtō teachers today trace their lineage through Suzuki Shunryū, including Zentatsu Richard Baker, Jakusho Bill Kwong, Sojun Mel Weitsman, and Zenkei Blanche Hartman. Today, Sōkō-ji occupies a different building which was dedicated in 1984 at 1961 Laguna Street, located still in the Japantown neighborhood, quite near the old Sōkō-ji building. The old building on Bush Street is now owned by Kokoro Assisted Living. Though Sōkō-ji is an important part of the history of the San Francisco Zen Center, I have observed that the two institutions do not have any sort of working relationship, despite the fact that their split took place more than forty years ago. What is it that keeps these two institutions at arms length?

### 3. Enduring Dualities: Differing Peoples and Practices

The issues between these two institutions extend beyond ethnicity and into cultural, linguistic, social, and economic differences. In “Landscapes of Buddhist America,” Jan Nattier observes that, “some Buddhist organizations that would seem to fall within a single category—for example, the Sōtō Zen Mission in Honolulu and the Diamond Sangha... in the same city—have virtually no common features, and indeed many of the members of the two groups seem blissfully unaware of one another’s existence.” While Sōkō-ji and the San Francisco Zen Center (hereafter SFZC) indeed have an awareness of each other’s existence because of their close proximity and shared history, they nonetheless share few common features and have very little interaction. As Wendy Lewis, a resident practitioner at SFZC and graduate student in Theology at the University of San Francisco points out, “Sōkō-ji serves the Japanese/Japanese-American community; SFZC members and residents do not, to my knowledge, participate in activities at Sōkō-ji on any regular basis,” or vice versa.

There are significant observable differences between the constituencies of these two institutions. Sōkō-ji is for the most part ethnically homogeneous. All of the chief priests of Sōkō-ji have been Japanese, and the congregation itself is composed of first, second, and a few third generations Japanese-Americans, as well as a small number of recent immigrants from Japan. Interestingly, though the priests and temple members speak English, rituals and the sermons given by the priest afterward are completely in Japanese. Much of the social interaction at the meals provided after ceremonies are also conducted in Japanese. This differs quite significantly from Asai and Williams’ observation of services at Los Angeles’ Zenshū-ji, where since 1985, “ceremonies have been performed solely in English.” They do, however, conclude that Japanese language reigns over Japanese culture as “an organizing activity of Japanese American Zen temples.”

Sōkō-ji also hosts cultural activities with some loose connection to Buddhism. This includes the goeika group, which sings Zen-inspired hymns in Japanese at services, the monthly sutra transcription group, the bi-weekly tea ceremony class, and the Shorinji Kempo school that holds its practice sessions in Sōkō-ji’s gathering hall. Asai and Williams correctly assert that, “Japanese culture is so central to Japanese American Zen that even cultural activities with no relationship to Buddhism have become major activities” at temples, specifically citing Sōkō-ji’s annual food bazaar held in conjunction with the Cherry-Blossom festival every
April. Zazen plays a very minor role at Sōkōji, with tri-weekly Zazen sessions which attract few, usually non-Japanese practitioners, and one sesshin (meditation retreat) in December (this sesshin is quite unlike the extended sesshin retreats that other Zen institutions hold with meals and lodging provided; it is rather a drop-in sesshin, with set sitting periods in the morning and the evening). Sōkōji thus functions as a Japanese community center with its “major activities geared toward the maintenance of community and familial ties through death rites and ‘Japanese culture’ activities,” while also helping to preserve its congregation’s cultural identity.

By contrast, SFZC, while more racially diverse than Sōkōji, most members are “from white, middle class backgrounds” and are of varying age groups. This confirms Nattier’s categorization of such institution as “Elite Buddhist” organizations, wherein members are usually educated, white, and middle-class. Services (including the chanting of sutras) and Dharma talks at SFZC are mostly held in English. This has the double function of accommodating its membership and asserting its perceived independence from Japanese cultural influence. SFZC is primarily a training monastery and so has residences for lay and ordained members of the community. The focus on zazen practice is obvious—SFZC holds sittings in the morning and evening during the weekdays, while hosting Dharma talks and lunches on Saturdays. SFZC also sponsors various activities, such as yoga, cooking and calligraphy classes, and self-help and mediation workshops.

The membership structures and outreach of these institutions also differ. Sōkōji asks for a one-time membership fee of $100 per individual, and a $150 fee for couples and families. But, as Asai and Williams show in their study, the main source of income for Sōkōji and other temples like it are funeral and memorial service fees, much like their counterparts in Japan. SFZC has varying levels of membership, from $150 to $1200 per year, with corresponding levels of membership benefits, such as discounts at the bookstore, subscriptions to the Wind Bell, and discount for SFZC’s classes and events. While Sōkōji has a simple website with little basic information or background and no recent updates, SFZC has a sophisticated website that has the daily schedule, a running calendar of monthly events, profiles of prominent figures in the community, and links to other affiliated organizations.

These differences between Sōkōji and SFZC seem to be a prominent barrier in the development of amicable relations. Rick Fields argues that much of the split between Asian and white Buddhist groups no doubt stems “from the natural ethnic fellowship of an immigrant community in which Buddhist temples have functioned as cultural and community centers above all else.” Additionally, in temples where activities are conducted in an Asian language, “many white Buddhists are reminded of the empty and yet requited religious rituals of their childhood...” as might have been the case for those who grew up with the pre-Vatican II Council Catholic Church, during which time, liturgies were conducted in Latin.

Either group also usually approaches Buddhism in different ways. Most ethnically Asian Buddhists receive it as part of their own cultural and familial traditions, while many but not all white Buddhists choose to convert because of some disenchantment with the religion in which they were raised. Thus, “unlike the Euro-American Zen center, that focus on the study of Buddhism and the practice of
meditation, Japanese Zen temples revolve around death rights and cultural activities." Furthermore, because of the patronage of the relatively well-to-do, white, racial majority, an organization like SFZC has the economic and social means to support the rest of its membership as well as several affiliate centers, like Tassajara and Green Gulch. While acting as a regularly functioning Zen monastery, Tassajara is also open to the public during the summer months for its regular “Guest Session.” During these sessions Tassajara becomes something of a Zen “resort.” Guests pay a nightly fee for room and board (plus extra fees for retreats) and may also participate in various planned activities including sitting sessions, dharma talks, and various other classes. Other accommodations include use of Tassajara’s hot spring and swimming pool facilities as well as hiking trails on the monastery property.

SFZC also faced a number of financial and sexual scandals in the 1980s, stigmatizing SFZC in the general Buddhist community. Add to this the experiences of racism and isolation that many of the older generation Japanese Americans experienced between the 1920s and 1950s, and the already existing split between the Japanese Americans of Sōkōji and Zen Center over Suzuki, it becomes obvious that the subtle conflict between Sōkōji and SFZC is quite complex.

**Conclusion**

Despite the differences explored above, I think that it is imperative for the survival and development of Buddhism generally, and Sōtō Zen particularly, that institutions like Sōkōji and SFZC work together in this crucial period as Buddhism and religions struggle to remain relevant in a rapidly changing world. As human societies continue to become more interdependent through the power of ever improving technology, the infiltration of capitalist values in all spheres, and as new social and political situations arise, Buddhism can become a fresh voice in the public sphere. Before this can happen, however, Buddhists must come together and overcome their sectarian, ethnic, and cultural biases. Sōkōji, with its rapidly aging *nissei* parishioner base, should reach out to other areas and peoples in order to keep itself afloat as it faces current challenging economic times. It should attempt to accept its neighbors down the street, the San Francisco Zen Center, and look to their creative programs for inspiration, perhaps boosting Sōkōji’s membership base with newer, younger members and helping it to become more socially active. San Francisco Zen Center should reconcile itself with Sōkōji, embracing it as an important part of their history and of the history of Sōtō Zen Buddhism in America. Were it not for Sōkōji’s presence and the early support the institution itself and the congregation it provided, SFZC and all of its descendant organizations—Tassajara Zen Mountain Center, Green Gulch, Berkeley Zen Center, Sonoma Mountain Zen Center and many more—may never have come to fruition. SFZC can try to network with Sōkōji, aid it in developing more outreach programs, and encourage its members to attend Sōkōji’s services or zazen sessions as a show of support. Sōkōji and SFZC are inevitably related and should try to foster a new relationship, breaking their long-time silence, so that together, they can become more of a presence in the greater San Francisco community.

In light of the interesting dynamics between Sōkōji and SFZC, the way Buddhism in America is studied should also be reformed, or at least rethought. It is
important in the study of a Euro-American Sōtō Zen institution, to refer back to its Asian/Asian-American roots, and to always consider ethnic Buddhist temples as important contributors to the developing of an American Buddhism. Perhaps future studies of Buddhism in America could include inter-sect comparisons, showing the differing approaches of, for example, an American Vajrayana center and an American Zen center like SFZC. I also suggest the inclusion of inter-religious comparison, to show how, say, an ethnic Buddhist temple like Sōkōji functions in contrast to a Russian Orthodox Church run mostly by Russian immigrants.

Buddhism in Asia enjoyed the patronage of the aristocracy and the state, facilitating the politicization of Buddhism and aiding its propagation through the development of Buddhist social and educational institutions. As Buddhism moved and took root in America, its practitioners had to change and make adjustments in light of modernity, democracy and capitalism. Buddhism in America has been and continues to be shaped by globalizing forces and thus is also changing. The phenomenon of Buddhism in America, particularly Japanese Zen Buddhism in America, is still an emerging one with a hopeful but uncertain future.

Bibliography


Endnotes


4. Ibid. 6.

5. Ibid. 5.


8. Ibid, 190.

9. Chan is the original Chinese name for Zen, said to be a translation of the Sanskrit *dhyāna*, meaning meditation.


11. Ibid, 146.


13. Ibid.


17. Ibid.

18. Senator Phelan is in fact a graduate of the University of San Francisco, then known as St. Ignatius College. He lends his name to one of the dormitory halls on the University’s present day campus.


22. Ibid, 195.


24. Ibid, 326.

25. The connection between Sōtō Zen in San Francisco and the Jewish community is interesting. As mentioned before, the original Sōkōji building at 1881 Bush Street was formerly a Jewish Synagogue, while the San Francisco Zen Center’s City Center building used to be a Jewish women’s residence.


27. The Japantown Taskforce, 100.


31. As part of my field research, I have incorporated observations made over the last three years at Sōkōji with more recent interactions at various ceremonies and events, including the annual Hanamatsuri service honoring the Buddha’s birth on April 3, 2011. It began with a recitation of the Heart Sutra, followed by a goeika performance. There were other sutras chanted, including a chapter from the Lotus Sutra, and an excerpt from the writing of Eihei Dōgen. The main part of the ceremony was the ritual bathing of the baby Buddha in sweet tea. Each member of the community went to the front of the temple, where a small pavilion stood. In the pavilion, was a bowl, inside of which was a standing statue of the baby Buddha and sweet tea. Each parishioner would then pour tea three times over the baby Buddha, bow, and then offer incense. Following the service was a light potluck lunch provided by the congregation of assorted Japanese foods, and a small drink of the blessed sweet tea from the bathing.

32. Asai and Williams, 26.

33. Ibid, 27.

34. Ibid, 20.

35. Lewis, May 12, 2011.

36. I also attended and participated in San Francisco Zen Center’s version of the commemoration of Buddha’s birth on April 10, 2011. While SFZC’s ceremony preserved the pouring of sweet tea over a statue of the baby Buddha, it was held outdoors in Koshland Park, which is across the street from the SFZC. Only the presiding priest of SFZC burned incense before a makeshift altar, while the 50+ in attendance chanted the Heart Sutra several times in English. SFZC also provided a birthday cake for Buddha, which was placed in the aforementioned makeshift altar.

37. Asai and Williams, 25.

38. Fields, 203.

39. Ibid.

40. Asai and Williams, 28.


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