ARTICLES

Editor’s Introduction
>>...................................................John Nelson  1

The Contemporary Global Political and Economic Context for Interreligious Dialogue including China and India
>>...................................................Eric Hanson  3

>>...................................................Don Baker  24

Gender and Moral Visions in Indonesia
>>...................................................Rachel Rinaldo  44

Globalization and The Chinese Muslim Community in Southwest China
>>...................................................Michael Brose  61

Maintaining Patterns: Community Ritual and Pilgrimage in a Diasporic Taiwanese American Religious Community
>>...................................................Jonathan Lee  81
Religion and Globalization in Asia: Prospects, Patterns, and Problems for the Coming Decade

John K. Nelson, Ph.D., University of San Francisco

Welcome to a special issue of *Asia Pacific: Perspectives* devoted to the intersection of religion and globalization in Asia. The articles that follow made their debut as presentations at a symposium held at the University of San Francisco in March 2009. Sponsored by the USF Center for the Pacific Rim, the genesis for this event came from Dr. Barbara Bundy, former executive director of the Center. Dr. Bundy was soon to retire but wanted to promote one more academic gathering to address a topic of critical importance. Thanks to her insight and support, the symposium invited ten presenters (five of whom have contributed to this special issue) and three keynote speakers: Mark Juergensmeyer (author of *Terror in the Mind of God* and *Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State*), Saskia Sassen (author of *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*), and Nayan Chanda (author of *Bound Together: How Traders, Preachers, Adventurers and Warriors Shaped Globalization*).

While the keynote lectures were fascinating for their breadth and expertise, it was the work and research of individual scholars that gave the symposium its heart, soul, and considerable ‘brains’. The five papers presented here demonstrate a range of interests and methods that help to illuminate some of the most vital issues within contemporary Asian societies.

Few scholars or policy makers thirty years ago could have imagined that the first decades of the 21st century would be a time of explosive and wide-spread religiosity. As modernity progressed and societies became more secular and democratic, religion was supposed to loosen its hold on the ways men and women envisioned their place in the world. To the contrary, the dynamics of globalization—such as communication technologies, immigration and migration, capital flows, transnationalism, and identity politics—have contributed to social conditions in which religious belief and practice not only survive but, in many cases, also prosper and proliferate. A growing body of scholarship and reportage has documented the phenomenon of globalization upon religious traditions in the western hemisphere, but the symposium wanted to explore its applicability within Asia. No longer can the study of religion in Asia (or the west) be considered a “side show” to the three-ring circus of politics, economics, and class. With an estimated 300 million religious adherents in China (home also to the world’s fastest growing Christian population), the world’s largest and most diverse concentration of Muslims in Indonesia, and the rise of a more assertive and nationalistic Hinduism among India’s 1.3 billion people, the role of religion in globalizing processes in Asia requires sustained analysis and elucidation rather than a passing mention.

One of the key goals of the symposium was to better understand the dialectical tension of codependence and codeterminism between religion and globalization. With a focus on the populations of South and East Asia—densely concentrated, increasingly well-informed and technologically-sophisticated—the five papers here are positioned against a background of the following questions and themes:
What is the relationship between a healthy democracy and religious pluralism in Asian contexts?

Is religion in the context of globalization ultimately destined to become a symbolic marker of one’s identity, rather than an institution promoting claims to divinely-revealed truths?

In what ways is religion in Asia appropriated and exploited by politicians and activists intent on furthering their agendas and bolstering political capital?

Does religious fundamentalism, especially the extreme kind that resorts to violence, indicate a stimulus/response “blowback” for secular societies and their democratizing policies?

If the key to peaceful globalization is not secularization but pluralism and tolerance (as argued by Peter Berger), can the forces of globalization encourage diverse yet peaceful ways of being religious?

What global trends and dynamics increase (or restrict) the range of choices for individuals to determine their own identities (religious, cultural, gender, ethnic, and so on) and communities?

Can religious significance be imposed on the political trend towards multipolarity and the decline of American influence in Asia, or on creating solutions and policies that address environmental crises?

Does the globalizing character of religion help to promote or impede human rights in Asia?

Are there destabilizing forces at work in rural and urban communities of poverty and marginalization in Asia which, when interpreted via religious perspectives, pose a threat to economic development, democratization, and political stability?

How can religious conservatism in Asia compromise the more positive characteristics of globalization that are egalitarian, diverse, hybrid, and potentially cosmopolitan?

Is it intellectually and politically possible to articulate an alternative to fundamentalist and relativist positions concerning the role of religion in a globalizing Asia? (The Chinese politburo has stated, “We must take full advantage of the positive role that religious figures and believers among the masses can play in promoting economic and social development.” Jan. 20, 2008).

We hope the following papers advance understanding about religion and globalization in Asia, not simply as subjects for investigation but as dynamic processes that actively involve several billion people. To ignore or neglect the importance of these influences on the contemporary world is not only shortsighted but also indicates a profound misreading of significant trends and currents that affect international relations, economic activity, and knowledge about the global community. Thanks to our contributing authors, the participants of the symposium, and to Dr. Bundy’s initial vision, we are pleased to present these five papers as guides to topics that are fascinating and in many ways unique to the global moment we share.
The recent political and economic advances of China and India, and their changing relationships to each other and to the rest of the world, constitute the most crucial long term national adjustments necessary in the current international system. The differences among religions of the book, religions of meditative experience, and religions of public life make it extremely difficult to use any understanding of religion in itself as the focal piece for such dialogue. Religion and Politics in the International System (2006) identified the following five interreligious dialogues as particularly significant for global integration: 1. Among religions of the book, focusing on the developing world and its relationship to the developed world; 2-3. The multi-religious dialogues centered geographically and culturally on China and the Indian subcontinent; and 4-5. Multi-religious North American and European dialogues between the religious traditions long held in these regions and those of new immigrants. This paper recommends three additional issue dialogues among religious leaders as particularly promising prospects for integrating the international system: [1] On human rights and shared sovereignty; [2] On structuring webs of global understanding and cooperation; and [3] On restructuring the world economy, including global business ethics.

In linking these political and economic changes to interreligious dialogue, this paper employs the theoretical framework of Religion and Politics in the International System Today. That book proposed an international paradigm of the political, economic, military, and communication interlinked global systems interacting with religious-political events at the individual, local, national, regional, and global levels. Religion, however, does not constitute a global system like the above four because of the uniqueness of the various faith traditions. Indeed, the collective noun “religion” tells us very little politically, economically, or even religiously, so we have to pay close attention to the special characteristics of each religious tradition in its various local, national, and regional manifestations. The four global systems,
on the other hand, are each tied together by common realities, e.g., international bureaucracy and law; the global exchange of currency, products, and workers; offensive and defensive capabilities; and media penetration, for example, by satellite and Internet.

This theoretical approach is presupposed, but it is not the topic of this paper. Rather, the paper seeks to pursue contemporary policy analysis in focusing on the current political and economic roles of China and India in international affairs, hoping to generate recommendations for interreligious dialogue that reflect the specific characteristics of each religion at the global level and in its Chinese and Indian contexts. Religion does not exist to serve politics and economics, but it does exist within specific political and economic contexts. In the Catholic tradition, then, this paper is an attempt to understand what Vatican Council II called “the Signs of the Times.” As such, the paper is divided into five sections: 1. Global Affairs; 2. China; 3. India; 4. Sino-Indian Relations within the International System; and 5. Recommendations for Interreligious Dialogue. In each section the paper will first discuss the contemporary political, economic, military, and communication systems and their interaction. Then it will describe the major characteristics of religion in these contexts. Recommendations will be saved for the last section of the paper. Each recommendation, of course, carries its own opportunity costs. Each time a religious person or institution decides to undertake some task, it decides not to do something else. Listeners who point out theoretical and/or factual considerations that would have been more helpful in deciding which dialogues to pursue will be very much appreciated. The basic orientation of the paper remains: How would interreligious dialogue be best organized to achieve the optimal mutual cooperation to pursue human rights in the political system; growth, social equity, and environmental sustainability in the economic system; order and peace in the military system, and healthy personal and social identities in the communication system? This paper attempts to present contemporary global analysis in a balanced way so that certain issues become more significant. The author believes that in the twenty-first century the most significant issues can only be solved by multilateral cooperation in the international system. Beijing, New Delhi, Brussels, and Washington are all in the same boat.

I. GLOBAL AFFAIRS

A. Political

The first challenge in global political analysis is to describe the global system itself with its various types of organizations. Certainly, the Westphalian sovereign nation state remains the principal actor. However, the twentieth century witnessed the progressive rise of international, intergovernmental, non-governmental and transnational organizations, all of which interact with that nation state. Sassen described these changes in her prescient lectures Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization which employed immigration as their primary case. As Sassen points out, renationalization of politics and state control of borders has run straight into transnationalization of economic spaces and human rights regimes. Both territoriality and sovereignty have thus lost some of their former underpinnings. This paper will follow Sassen’s analysis in employing economic relations and human rights as two focal issues. In both International Business Law and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Western approaches have so far received the most emphasis, but this is changing as a result of recent U.S. and E.U. comparative economic decline and the successes of China and India.

From the perspective of nation states, the post-Cold War world combines a reduced singular leadership role for the United States with the rise of previously middle-level powers like China, India, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, Iran, Turkey, Mexico, and the Republic of Korea. The European Union, Japan, and Russia continue to play the major roles that they had achieved by the end of the 1960s. At the United Nations, the Big Five maintain their veto power in the Security Council, thus strengthening their national interests, with both the Secretary General and the General Assembly more important in “soft” public opinion that in “hard” power politics. The West continues to control international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Zakaria described the current global system as “The Rise of the Rest.”

The election of Barack Obama gave the U.S. “a new start” in repairing its leadership role, but it is doubtful that the world will ever again be such a small pond that it has only one big superpower frog as in the immediate post-World War II period and in the immediate post-Cold War period. Decreased national state power through increased international regulation on issues like human rights, the global economy, the environment, and nuclear proliferation remains a more likely long term scenario, but mature regulatory systems will probably not evolve until from fifty to one hundred years from now after some, hopefully not definitively destructive, crisis. The current downturn opens the way for both chaos and significant progress in the global economic system. As the Chinese character for “crisis” expresses, all crises remain both dangers and opportunities.

B. Economic

Zakaria was writing before the recent global financial meltdown. Especially since this event, the role of world economic leadership is passing from the Group of Eight to the broader-based Group of Twenty. There are just too many crucial economic interests to be covered by the G8 and the debacle happened on their watch. The major issues to be solved involve restructuring the global economic system for both growth and environmental sustainability while increasing the welfare of the poorest, especially in those countries termed “the Bottom Billion.”

C. Military

The contemporary military system exhibits the biggest changes since the structured tension of the Cold War. With less political-military control from Moscow and Washington, nuclear proliferation has developed into a bigger concern, conventional and civil wars abound, and non-state terrorism has become a significant challenge for all. Military crises proliferate across the system with few organizing principles other than the projection of force. Only the United States can project force worldwide, but even Washington cannot afford two full-scale conflicts at the same time. The world economic crisis means that much less money will be available for both military buildups and peace initiatives, for example, on the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. The economic downturn also adds significant stress in most developing countries. It is not a pleasant view, except that the economic system may
starve some military initiatives, even as it adds to the temptation to initiate them.

Recommendations come from organizations as diverse as the United Nations Security Council and the Stockholm Peace Institute. All religious traditions have certainly added to such conflicts, as demonstrated by Juergensmeyer. Why not aim to keep interreligious dialogue separate from military and peace issues? Wouldn’t the Israeli-Palestinian conflict be easier to solve without religion? This paper treats John Lennon’s “and no religion too” future as impossible, and unwise since attempting it would leave religion and conflict to just those forces that would be most negative. The paper thus follows conflict resolution specialist Marc Gopin, who shows that a lack of grassroots understanding between Israeli and Palestinian leaders did not give them the necessary political space to make the hard compromises during the Oslo Process. On the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the lack of inclusion of the North-West Frontier Province’s religious coalition, the MMA, between 2002 and 2007 hurt U.S. policy and the prospects for peace in the region. Elsewhere I have written of the positive impact of the United States Catholic Bishops letter, The Challenge of Peace, during the early 1980s Reagan military buildup. Indeed, most global conflict situations could be positively influenced by the expanding webs of trust advocated in the political section of this paper.

D. Communication

The “new media” of satellite television and the Internet offer both political advantages and disadvantages. Control of these new media remains problematic for national states, thus increasing public access to heretical political ideas and organizational support for human rights. But governments can also use the new media to control their publics and foster extreme nationalism, thus strengthening the state. The new world of instantaneous communication makes possible the new global economic system with millions of programmed trades happening across the world at the same time. However, the same system challenges national state control of this system, a point made strongly by Sassen.

The global communication system, like religion, can contribute to greater understanding and/or to greater conflict. Nationalism seeks to demonize the other, whether that other is defined by nationality, religion, class, or caste. Times of economic stress like the current economic crisis remain particularly dangerous in this regard. The unemployed always look for scapegoats to explain their suffering. When their political legitimacy is questioned, national governments are sorely tempted to shift blame to “the stranger.” The European Union, especially countries like Italy and Russia, currently face major challenges in this regard. Grassroots Christian-Islamic relations, as in those fostered by Rome’s Sant’Egidio NGO, can play a vital role in limiting the damage.

E. Religion

The global population in 2010 will be divided into approximately 86.5% religious adherents and 13.5% agnostics and atheists. The four largest religions will be Christianity (33.5%), Islam (21.5%), Hinduism (13.4%), and Buddhism (5.8%). Christianity (Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Protestantism) and Islam (Shia, Sufi, Sunni) exhibit significant religious and political divisions. In terms of the global system, religion remains important at the international, regional, national, local, and indi-
individual levels. Examples of such influence at these respective levels would be the global Christian-Muslim dialogue,\textsuperscript{13} the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Tibetan autonomy, public security in Baghdad, and the political roles of Ali al-Sistani, Desmond Tutu, Jimmy Carter, the Dalai Lama, and Benedict XVI. From the foregoing examples it is obvious that the various levels affect each other.

\textbf{II. CHINA}

The first thing to notice about any global analysis of China is that its East Asian context, especially Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, remains much more globally influential than India’s deteriorating South Asian context of Afghanistan, Pakistan,\textsuperscript{14} Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. So we must pay close attention to East Asia as a whole as we analyze China. In many ways the Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen is tied more closely to Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul, and even the gigantic port of Long Beach, California, than to the villages of rural Gansu. Despite historical connections, however, religion has played a different role in Japan than it has in China. Reischauer has described how Japanese society has been influenced by neo-Confucianism, Buddhism, the postwar new religions, and Christianity, but only in a limited manner.\textsuperscript{15} Only one-fourth of today’s Japanese consider themselves religious, and only four percent regularly visit a shrine, temple, or church.\textsuperscript{16} Japan remains a global economic pillar, but it still has not found the recipe for a return to sustained growth. The greatest danger to global peace in the case of Japan would be the resurgence of Japanese nationalism tied to a military crisis on the Korean peninsula. The Japanese Catholic bishops and many others have opposed prime ministers visiting Yasukuni Shrine. Those visits anger people and governments throughout Asia. Japan’s degree of nationalism makes a potential difference militarily, of course, because Japan could “go nuclear” with the technologies already present in its civilian power and space programs. North Korean nuclear and missile testing worries Japan more than any other country.

South Korea (ROK) constitutes one of the postwar world’s great political and economic success stories, along with the European Union. The ROK and Taiwan democratized peacefully at the end of the 1980s, and both have become economic powerhouses. Both Buddhists and Christians have played a significant role in democratization in both countries and in the partial reconciliation of the South with North Korea. Seoul’s Cardinal Stephen Kim Sou Hwan\textsuperscript{17} was the most prominent expressive leader of the decade’s democracy campaign and Catholic President Kim Dae Jong won the Nobel Peace Prize for his opening to the North. Korean Christianity continues to flourish, and the country is the world’s second largest source of Christian missionaries. Korea has always perceived itself politically and culturally between its more powerful Chinese and Japanese neighbors, and thus can continue to serve as the mediator between Beijing and Tokyo. The ROK also continues its discussions and joint projects with North Korea. The East Asian context is important globally, and China is the major rising power.

\textbf{A. Political}

From the political perspective, how will the Chinese Communist Party manage its transition to the next stage of political development, finding a new source for a stable political legitimacy? Hu Jintao and the Politburo Standing Committee are
correct in judging that such legitimacy depends first and foremost on implementing a “scientific development concept,” which includes a “harmonious socialism” that will narrow the significant socio-economic gap between the urban and rural sectors of the country. This urban-rural gap reinforces the increasing social stratification between those middle-class citizens who have benefited from Deng Xiaoping’s modernization and those who have been left behind in areas like rural Henan, which are poor in all ways. Since the demise of Maoist ideology, roughly from the death of Lin Biao in a plane crash in September 1971, the country has modernized despite a spiritual vacuum which no party-sponsored ideological campaign has been able to address. China has thus recently witnessed a great expansion of all types of religious activity that has attempted to fill the ideological void. But the success of the government’s approach will paradoxically and simultaneously demand greater central control of the regions and more local acceptance of individual sacrifice in terms of some overarching ideology, especially with the recent economic downturn. Those who follow the often passionate arguments in cyberspace know that elite Chinese students still feel their national responsibility, but there is certainly no consensus about the nature of that responsibility.

B. Economic

The great economic challenge for China is to continue economic growth while narrowing social stratification and improving the environment. The circumstances of the “floating population” of the cities remain dire, especially with recent layoffs and particularly in rust belt areas like Manchuria and Sichuan. At the global level, economic expansion requires that the country ensure its resource bases in countries and regions like Australia and the Middle East. As the PRC becomes more and more active in international economic affairs, NGOs can be helpful in assisting the Chinese to find their equilibrium in the global economic system and in international civil society. In this, a strong Chinese presence in economic supranational and non-governmental organizations would be a good start. Chinese business interests already exhibit concerns about whether or not a global consensus on right economic behavior and business ethics might allow Chinese multinationals to take “their rightful place” in the international political and economic systems.

C. Military

The PLA remains a basically regional army, with the focal issue being Taiwan. However, the resources for global military projection could be available in future years if the global situation turns ugly or China is threatened in its above economic resource bases. Whether or not China embraces a strong military posture also depends on the degree to which the country adopts a strong nationalism as its state-sponsored ideology. To keep its options open for force projection, it has continued its naval buildup, even considering constructing its first aircraft carrier. Force projection will also become more important for protest supply lines for raw materials and access to markets across the globe.

D. Communication

For the Chinese, the modern communication system facilitates economic growth and political control. It can also be an instrument of foreign policy, so Chi-
na is considering new global network initiatives, a la the Al-Jazeera 24-hour news channel, from state and party owned or sponsored outlets like CCTV, Xinhua, the People’s Daily, and the Shanghai Media Group. However, international outlets would have to be less heavy-handed to gain viewership, and domestic ones can enable entrepreneurs and activists to evade government scrutiny, e.g., the circulation of Charter ’08 on the Internet. Dissident groups like the Falun Gong also used these media to transmit their messages.

E. Religion

Accurate numbers on Chinese believers are notoriously hard to ascertain, both because of traditional government regulation and because Chinese have traditionally viewed as natural combining aspects of various religions in their practice. There is a consensus, however, that since the above demise of ideological support for Maoist Marxism, many religious traditions have spread into the vacuum. The government maintains its traditional system of penetrating, regulating, and controlling all religious institutions. Believers must belong to the government-approved organization or face pressure, even persecution. Han Buddhism fits this general dynamic, but both Tibetan Buddhism and Islam in Xinjiang Province remain nationality issues for the Chinese government. The party has responded to protests in both cases by toughening its policy.

The Chinese state has always only tolerated those religious organizations which allow their institutions to be penetrated, regulated, and controlled by the state. So Chinese State-Catholic Church negotiations over the naming of bishops or other leaders generates religious-political tensions analogous to the investiture controversies of the Middle Ages. And prior persecutions, for example, during the Cultural Revolution, have caused splits in some areas between those Catholics allied with Rome and those allied with Beijing, leading to great local variation. The Vatican has urged reconciliation among all Catholics, and hopes eventually to reach an understanding with the government. But the traditional Confucian state suspicion of independent religions remains strong.

III. INDIA

A. Political

The primary political challenge in India is nation-building, constructing state legitimacy among the world’s most culturally diverse nation with its twenty-two official languages. Following independence from Britain, the victorious Congress Party, led by Jawaharlal Nehru (“secularism, socialism, and democracy”) and his family, served that role. Since 1989, India has been led by coalition governments in which the spoils of rule have been more important than ideological orientation. The parliamentary system of the world’s largest democracy remains the world’s most culturally diverse, with the same voter possibly casting her vote on the basis of Congress’s dynastic secularism, religion, caste, class, or region. Analysis of the role of Hinduism in Indian identity, and its relation to minority traditions, thus takes political precedence. In the 2009 national election the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) came within ten seats of a majority. Congress itself won 205 seats, with the BJP dropping from 138 to 116 seats. But the election was even a more dismal failure for the leftist Third Front, which had set itself up to be a “king-
maker” between the two major coalitions.\textsuperscript{28} Even with the victory of Congress and the return of Singh as Prime Minister, the result will continue to be a coalition of many parties.\textsuperscript{29}

B. Economic

In 1991, Prime Minister N. Rao, supported by his then finance minister and now prime minister, the Sikh economist Manmohan Singh, responded to the country’s grave economic crisis by opening the national economy to the world market. Thus began the Indian economic miracle just over ten years after China’s opening. The results have been similar. India, like China, must figure out how to maintain economic growth while taking care of its grievous social stratification, particularly between the urban and rural areas, and environmental damage. India’s partial “fiscal shield” against the global economy has proved an advantage in the recent downturn.\textsuperscript{30} Instead of the growing independent protests throughout the Chinese countryside, India faces a significant Naxalite Marxist revolt which has affected as many as 172 of the nation’s 600 districts.

C. Military

In 1998 both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons, setting off increased bilateral tension which nearly resulted in a major war during the Kargil conflict of 1999. Pakistan remains the major focus of the Indian military buildup, and vice-versa. The November 2008 attack on Mumbai has also added to Indo-Pakistani tensions. India, like China, is beginning to acquire the hardware and software to project its military muscle, at least far enough to protect their lines of resource supply, and to fight Pakistan if necessary. India, of course, has a long history of political and military ties to Russia and Iran in addition to a recent rapprochement with the United States.

D. Communication

Cell phones and satellite television are necessary for India’s integration into the world economic system, especially as India leads the world global service sector, but these media are also being used for beneficent social goals like attacking rural poverty and the spread of AIDS. The Indian communication system uses many more languages than China, and the parliamentary system of government means that the central authorities do not have authoritarian China’s option of tightly controlling their use.

E. Religion

The last 2001 Census reported the country as 80.5% Hindu, 13.4% Muslim, 2.3% Christian, 1.9% Sikh, and 1.8% Other. Hinduism, however, remains extraordinarily diffuse,\textsuperscript{31} so the battle for the interpretation of the Hindu tradition makes the major political and economic differences.\textsuperscript{32} A linked issue is Hindu-Muslim relations, especially the definition of the role of Hinduism in the national culture, and the role of Islamic shari’a in the legal framework for Muslims. Since partition in 1947, religious riots have been staples of political and social conflicts.\textsuperscript{33}
IV. SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

A. Political

From the political perspective, both Beijing and New Delhi face enormous strains in fostering state political legitimacy while solving basic economic issues of growth, equity, and the environment. In both countries, increasing economic stratification has placed enormous political pressures on the unity of the national states as expressed by their respective parties and governments. Both civic-political and socio-economic rights remain at risk, whether from government security forces in China, or from rampaging religious mobs in India. From the bilateral Sino-Indian perspective, both governments will increasingly compete for scarce global resources, but they desperately need good relations with each other and their other neighbors to attain the domestic stability necessary for the above political-economic progress. The global economic debacle has demonstrated the importance of the United States market for both Chinese consumer goods and Indian business services. The difficult geographical conflicts of Tibet and Kashmir might get ameliorated under more creative national and global approaches to the issue of sovereignty. Strong religious traditions, present in both cases, predispose the populations to accept such shared sovereignty. If a people have already adjusted to different types of authority, it is easier to accept the division of any one type of authority.

B. Economic

At the global economic level, both countries will rightly play expanded roles in the new regulatory fiscal architecture. In fact, both countries have done better than others in the current downturn. While their GDPs per capita may remain modest, the overall size of the two economies will demand major seats at the table for world decision making. There is plenty of work to be done in this area. The United States, Chinese, and Indian business communities have all suffered major corruption scandals recently, from U.S. real estate loans and investment banking to Chinese tainted milk and pollution damage to accounting fraud from one of India’s largest outsourcing firms. Solving global and national economic problems is the most serious challenge, and this is the global ethical dialogue with the greatest untapped interest in all three countries.

C. Military

Here is the sphere most influenced by regional events and global alliances, like the recently improved Indo-American ties. Absent national political victories of hard line nationalism, Chinese and Indian military buildups should reflect rational calculations about global threats and opportunities. A more successful amelioration of global political and economic threats from nuclear proliferation, conventional wars, and terrorism will allow the two countries to save significant resources for their economic agendas which remain more crucial to state political legitimacy. Each country has its own regional military obsessions along its border, but a rational calculation would only demand that their army be strong enough to prevent change, not impose their will. For example, as long as Taiwan does not declare its independence and Kashmir or terrorism like the Mumbai attack does not explode Indo-Pakistani relations, the military system should not preempt national political and economic affairs.
D. Communication

While the technology is very similar, the political, economic, and religious aspects of the communication revolution are unique to each country. Media remain important to both political and economic issues, but the characteristics of their significance are different in China and India. At the global level, the principal communication threats come from the economic-communication issues out of the developed world and military-communication issues out of the developing world.

E. Religion

Religion:

The respective most politically powerful religious traditions, state Confucian Marxism and Hinduism, constitute very different forms of religion, in China a religion of public life (Confucianism, Maoism) and in India a religion of meditative experience (Hinduism, Buddhism). If we think about interreligious dialogue among China, India, the European Union, and the United States, we must add a third type, religions of the book (Christianity, Islam, Judaism). The differences in the three religious types means that it will be extremely difficult to use any understanding of religion in itself as the focal piece for such dialogue. Such discussions are possible, e.g. in the Parliament of World Religions, but they tend to be diffuse because of the very different nature of different types of religions. In terms of this general international interfaith dialogue, German ecumenical theologian Hans Küng has sketched out a worthwhile approach based on four common ethical principles of respect for life, honest and fair dealing, speaking truthfully, and respecting and loving one another.

But not all interreligious dialogue should be global and/or include all the various religious traditions. In terms of the political importance of more limited geographically interreligious dialogue, Religion and Politics identified the following five in this order: 1. among religions of the book, focusing on the relationship between the developed and the developing worlds; 2-3. the multi-religious dialogues centered geographically and culturally on China and the Indian subcontinent; and 4-5. multi-religious North American and European dialogues between the religious traditions long held in these regions and those of new immigrants.

In between the general world interreligious dialogue and the five above more limited ones, the fifth section of this paper will propose an additional two global political and one global economic dialogue based on Chinese and Indian expansions in the global systems. These latter dialogues would interact with the five more localized ones and the one international one (see accompanying chart). Interreligious dialogue works much better if the participants are focused on a common problem, not just the commonalities and differences among their religious traditions in themselves. Religious groups can contribute four special types of expertise on political and economic issues: in relating rights and responsibilities; in limiting extreme nationalism and war; in maintaining dialogue in both favorable and unfavorable circumstances; and in building grassroots support at the local level. Common problems also foster full participation by the non-religious 13.5% of the world’s population.
5. **Recommendations for Three Global Interreligious Dialogues**

Based on the above analysis of China and India and their current role in the global political and economic systems, this paper recommends three additional issue dialogues among religious leaders as particularly promising prospects: 1. on human rights and shared sovereignty; 2. on structuring webs of global understanding and cooperation; and 3. on restructuring the world economic architecture, including global business ethics. Successes and failures at all three levels of interreligious dialogues (global, global issue, and regional) affect each other. For example, the amelioration of immigration issues in North America fosters confidence-building in the global economic dialogue and even partial successes in any of these regional and global issue dialogues make it possible for the leaders of very different traditions to see each others as brothers and sisters at the most general international conference.

**A. Shared Sovereignty and Human Rights**

If we start with the current global crises points like Kashmir, Taiwan, Tibet, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and ameliorated ones like Northern Ireland and German-French relations in the twentieth century, it is obvious that no even moderately peaceful solutions to such crises are possible without developing some common notions of shared sovereignty and human rights. The extreme nationalism of Westphalia no longer works. Such discussions of shared sovereignty and human rights also have the advantage of quickly relating to religious questions of “ultimate concern,” (what types of rights adhere in what levels of political sovereignty? Which rights and responsibilities belong to individuals?), thus introducing the very essence of the various religious traditions.

What contributions would Chinese and Indian religious thought have to such a discussion?

On human rights, Chinese credibility would be strengthened by progress on Tibet and some internal democratization. Henry Rosemont suggests that China can approach such issues without using Western human rights language. Rather, a Confucian perspective might start with the criterion that groups should be evaluated by their record on enabling personal growth and by focusing on societal relationships, not individual moral judgments. The right of petition, which began in the Ming dynasty, still exists, but a whole apparatus has grown up around blunting its use. In the case of India, Nehru’s secular socialism proved insufficient. The crux lies in the strengthening of Gandhi’s pluralistic approach to ethics and religion in general rather than focus on the Hindutva tradition. Hindu-Muslim, Hindu-Christian, and Hindu-Sikh relations will always serve as special human rights markers in Indian society. The world’s largest democracy also constitutes its most challenging multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and multilingual context. This first politically-based global issue dialogue would draw on the specifically Chinese and Indian cultural and societal ones above, and on the immigration relationships in the United States and the European Union.

The Chinese and Indian dialogues will depend on progress toward an international climate that enables Beijing and New Delhi to strengthen national legitimacies while recognizing the just demands of other societal levels, from individual rights and responsibilities to global concerns like immigration and the environment. No common progress on questions of shared sovereignty means...
little progress on global human rights. Given positive international changes, both the Chinese and the Indians could then provide expanded leadership in religious dialogue from the Chinese and Indian perspectives. Both nations offer pluralistic religious backgrounds and a long history of developing religious thought.

There are multiple human rights issues that could receive global attention. Recommendations for short term (one year), middle term (three-five years) and long term (ten years) global emphases should be sought from Human Rights NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Then a council of twelve personages (six religious leaders with extensive political experience, e.g., Bishop Tutu, and six political leaders with extensive ethical experience, e.g., Mary Robinson) could meet at least every six months to articulate short, medium, and long term goals according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Part of this global dialogue will be recommendations about the gradual restructuring of postwar international institutions like the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund to reflect current realities.

**B. Structuring Global Understanding and Cooperation**

At the regional level, the world needs new pathways for alliance linkage, both within and among regions, to replace the Cold War bipolar system. It is useless to call for international action in world politics if there are not the “grassroots” inter-country alliances and confidence-building measures to support global cooperation. Without such bi-national and multi-national “webs of trust,” the global political dynamic ends up as the shifting relationships of the nearly two hundred disparate nations in the U.N. General Assembly, each pursuing its own independent national agenda by fleeting alliances of convenience. Even if only some nations constitute the most significant military and economic influences, such a “pan of sand” (Sun Yat-sen on Chinese society) continues to send us back to the period preceding World War I, only with twenty-first-century weapons and economies. The United Nations, while it has a special world legitimating function, remains too large and too diffuse to structure global political cooperation. My proposal is to bring together an Asian dialogue as a counterpoint to the Atlantic alliance, the cooperative relationship of the United States and Europe. Southeast Asia would serve as the indispensable locus of dialogue for both the creation of the Asian pole and for its interreligious dialogue with the West. This paper will first discuss the Atlantic alliance and then the Asian dialogue.

Despite recent Euro-zone economic difficulties, the great political-economic success story of the last fifty years in regard to trust and cooperation among nations is the formation of the European Union. The current global situation, however, requires “deeper” and “broader” E.U. links with North America and with the “Big Three” E.U. outsiders, Turkey, Russia, and the Ukraine. That’s what made Benedict XVI’s trips to Turkey (November 2006) and to Cyprus (June 2010), both focused on dialogue with Orthodoxy and Islam, so important. Europe faces extraordinary internal and external linked challenges in bringing together tradition-ally secular [laïcité], Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Muslim political cultures, and keeping the resulting relationships linked to the United States. Ironically and maybe helpfully for Turkish accession, laïcité is both a French and a Turkish state value. To appreciate the internal challenges of these cultural dialogues in an
extreme case, one can read the Dutch reporter Ian Buruma’s book on the murder of provocative movie maker Theo van Gogh, which explores the Dutch social dynamic and asks whether orthodox Muslims can integrate into this very secular culture. Buruma adopts an affirmative response, identified with Amsterdam Jewish mayor Job Cohen, in stating that the mayor “should be given the benefit of the doubt.” In addition, Buruma states, “it is hard to see how an official attack on the Muslim faith would help to solve this problem.”

The only possible solution to the European Union’s major political issues, however long it takes because of the current downturn, also involves Ankara, Moscow, Kiev, and Washington. And would not such a comprehensive vision help inspire the next generation of European youth to make their contribution to global peace and justice? Communities can only build internal strength with visions that include external vocations.

There is no substitute, therefore, for this first Atlantic pole of influence in restructuring global dialogue. And any successful coming together within this geographical area will necessitate religious dialogue among the above secularists, Christians, Jews, and Muslims. Such dialogue can be categorized at four levels: the dialogue of life, the dialogue of action, the dialogue of religious experience, and the dialogue of theological and philosophical exchange. All four types of dialogue, those of the people, of the activists, of the religious adepts, and of the theologians and the philosophers, build upon each other.

As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, Asia constitutes the principal expanding power center in global politics. China, Japan, and India should all have their seats on the Security Council, and the Republic of Korea constitutes a most important country for global mediation. It is no accident that the ex-ROK foreign minister has been chosen as U.N. Secretary General. The rising economic, military, and political power of Asia, however, does not automatically explain how such a diverse continent could come together to form a second pole for global political dialogue. Japan, for example, tried to build its Co-Prosperity Sphere on military might and still suffers from regional suspicion on that account. Certainly, the antagonistic Asian regional history of the first half of the twentieth century has proven more difficult to overcome than the European one. But as iron and steel helped to bind the European Union, economic interchange has increased in East Asia, and with the ASEAN countries. One aspect missing is some greater ideological approach like that of Christian Democracy in postwar Europe. A multi-layered dialogue among the region’s religious traditions might help to fill that need.

When looking at East Asia as a whole, the principal interfaith dialogue would focus on the dynamic between Confucian-Marxist state ideologies and Buddhist-Taoist-Christian local practice. The minority East Asian Catholic Church can employ the comparative advantages of its minority, less powerful status to engage both groups. Korean Christianity remains central to this dialogue, with Taiwan’s engaged Buddhist and longtime Presbyterian traditions extremely important. With such a pursuit of common values in the service of humanity, East Asia can take a spiritual and ethical role in the global system that begins to match its political and economic one.

For the Indian subcontinent, Christianity, like Buddhism, plays a minority broker’s role in the predominant Hindu-Muslim dialogue. Within India, as in Japan, the Catholic Church has been active in opposing religious cultural nationalism.
and working for social justice. In India this religious nationalism is concentrated in the more conservative sectors of the Indian political party Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), which occupied the prime minister’s position from 1998 to 2004. The Japanese Yasukuni Shrine is matched as a national flashpoint by the Ayodhya mosque which was demolished in 1992 and remains a stumbling block today. Although a tiny minority, Catholics have served at high levels of government, for example, the first dalit president, K.R. Narayanan.

ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, unites ten countries, but six are especially suitable for interfaith dialogue: Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The Human Development Index lists them as one high and five medium human development countries, with the lowest, Indonesia, twenty-five places above the low human development category. Medium human development constitutes an advantage for dialogue, as do more than two religions. ASEAN nations include significant religious representation from Buddhism, both Theravada and Mahayana; Christianity, both Catholic and Protestant; Confucianism; Hinduism; Islam, Sunni, Shia, and Sufi; and Marxism. Just three of these countries, Indonesia (Muslim majority, Christian minority), the Philippines (Catholic majority, Muslim minority), and Vietnam (Marxism, Buddhism, Catholicism) are projected to have 440 million population between them in less than ten years. ASEAN nations thus remain extraordinarily significant globally in terms of themselves politically and economically and in terms of their potential contribution to interfaith dialogue and world peace. Finally, East Asian and South Asian economic development means that both Atlantic and Asian poles will affect the rest of the world, Latin America, Africa, and West and Central Asia. The Federation of Asian Bishops Conferences covers this entire Asian area, so it is a very fine location for Catholic initiatives within the region and toward the Atlantic pole. Australia and New Zealand are also natural cultural bridges between the two poles. Mutual understanding is helped by recent Chinese moves to improve their relations with both India and Russia.

Religious dialogue is already a shared project of both Muslims and Catholics in Indonesia and the Philippines. For example, in August 2003 more than one hundred ulama, bishops, and Protestant ministers met in Pasay City under the sponsorship of the Bishops-Ulama Conference of the Philippines. The final declaration stated that “our faiths, Islam and Christianity, are religions of peace which worship the One Merciful and Almighty God.” Peace building was the focus of a similar meeting in the southern Philippines in 2006. Cardinal Julius Darmaatmadja of Jakarta has praised the anti-corruption campaign of the two giant Indonesian Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.

Focusing on the Atlantic and Asian poles to structure global society does not mean devaluing Latin America, Africa, and West and Central Asia. The three areas include vibrant concentrations of Christians (Central and Southern Africa, Latin America) and Muslims (North Africa, West and Central Asia), underlining the significance of interfaith dialogue and North-South connections between both religions. Success in the linking of the Atlantic and Asian poles will naturally strengthen these areas in global society as they link them more tightly to the two poles and to their own regional organizations like the Organization of American States and the African Union. Furthermore, any reform of the U.N. Security Council should
C. Restructuring the Global Economic System and Business Ethics

Recent economic events have convinced many that a new world economic architecture is needed, both in terms of a new regulatory structure and in terms of a global business code. The current global economic system exhibits a great deficit of credit and trust, growing socio-economic stratification, and increasing environmental damage. From the religious perspective, economic dialogue should foster the triple goals of growth, social justice, and environmental preservation.

Focusing on a new and fairer regulatory structure and a global business ethical code would also have the advantage of bringing together all the relevant global stakeholders: national states, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and transnational organizations like multinationals and churches. The religious and ethical dialogue on these issues, however, could start with a working group of American, European, Chinese, and Indian church leaders, business association leaders, religious ethicists, and academics with connections parallel to the above developing political dialogue between the Atlantic and Asian poles and the above discussions at the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and other international and intergovernmental organizations on restructuring their institutions.

The most crucial bilateral tie in the world economic system is between China and the United States, called “Chimerica” by Niall Ferguson. The long term co-dependency of Beijing and Washington led to massive imbalances in the global system, but no one wanted to question the arrangement when it seemed to benefit both parties. China attained strong export growth and financial stability. The United States received cheap imports, thus keeping down inflation, and low-cost loans to stoke its economic expansion. Those critics who questioned the relationship were told that the huge trade imbalances would naturally even out over time. The economic situation was made even worse by the contrasting ideological proclivities on each side. The Chinese dedicated their authoritarian party control to focus single-mindedly on export growth which seemed the principal guarantee of political stability. United States economic administrators professed a nearly blind faith in the market which would somehow correct all mistakes. Beijing and Washington remain joined at the hip, but adjustments will have to be made slowly or greater damage will befall both countries. The U.S. will continue to need Chinese financing for its deficits and stimulus packages and the Chinese economy has already been hurt by the U.S. downturn, but it would be hurt more grievously by an American economic collapse. If Chinese and American leaders ever were in a situation of mutual dependence, it is now. These two countries have to lead the re-
structuring of the global economy, with strong representation from India, Europe, Japan, and the other members of the Group of Twenty.

This is not just a question of aggregate GDP growth, but also of social equity and of environmental sustainability. None of the three questions get solved without progress on all three. On the growth issue, nations tend to be important in relation to their aggregate domestic output. On the question of social equity, China, India, and Brazil, especially under Lula, all have special perspectives that need to be factored into any solution. The United Nations has already given us a general framework in the Millennium Development Goals. On sustainability, Europe has taken the global lead, but U.S. business in areas like Silicon Valley has started to gear up. And no proposals will be possible without strong participation from developing countries like China, India, and Brazil. While Europe, the United States, and Japan may be able to provide entrepreneurial and technological leadership, success and failure depends on implementation in the developing world. Finally, the cultural challenges to mutual cooperation on the global economy are staggering. It is here that India, the most diverse of all nations, may be able to make its biggest contribution. The success of India in integrating its many peoples, linguistic groups, and religious traditions could be the great demonstration case for the global communication system.

**CONCLUSION**

Unlike the twenty-four-hour news cycle in the global communication system, interreligious dialogue can maintain stability in the face of constant and instantaneous change. Traditional spirituality and liturgy focus people on things of lasting value which supersede the anger and turmoil of current crises. Interreligious dialogue, therefore, provides a backdrop of stability and personal and societal identity, uniting us with our sisters and brothers in other traditions. If religious leaders, insulated from the 24-hour news cycle and periodic elections, cannot hold constant in their vision of a better world, few other leaders will. Ironically, however, religious leaders serve best precisely by subordinating all political, economic, military, and communication goals to their personal unity with “the Other” and their societal unity with all humankind. What it most striking about the current international order is how closely connected are the successes and the failures in the global political, economic, military, and communication systems and among the various geographic regions. Religious traditions can play a vital role in bridging these divides. Wisdom constitutes making the best possible choices from a multitude of problems and relationships to move the entire world in a positive direction. It is the long term work of all of us and of many generations of our descendents.

**ENDNOTES**

3. *Religion and Politics* is dedicated to late close family friend Padre Pascual Ramirez who left his small village in Michoacán, joined the Mexican Highway Patrol, and eventually became a saintly pastor in California’s Oakland Diocese.
4. For religion and UN Secretary Generals, see Kent J. Kille, ed., *The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007). There are separate chapters on Secretary Generals from Trygve Lie to Kofi Annan.


12. World Christian Database. (Brill, 2007), cited in Todd M. Johnson, “Global Religious Trends: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy,” *The Review of Faith and International Affairs* (Fall 2008): 43-45. The challenges to adequate data on such religious affiliation, of course, are significant, from the religious desire to hide from unfriendly governments to the simultaneous practice of various religions among single adherents to very different levels of practice. These figures, then, provide only a general approximation. See also the website www.adherents.com for extended discussions of such points.


17. When the beloved Cardinal Kim passed away on February 16, 2009, more than 400,000 people came to pay their last respects. The two Kims, president and cardinal, represented fine national moral leadership.


26. For the religious policies of Confucian and Marxist states, see Eric O. Hanson, Catholic Politics in China and Korea (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1980).
28. After the Mumbai attacks, Congress still won in Rajasthan (coalition), Mizoram, and the city-state of Delhi. The BJP won in Gujarat, with the hard line N. Modi returning as Chief Minister, and Chhattisgarh. In India, as in Tip O’Neill’s America, all state politics are local. For the April-May 2010 national election, see Shalendra Sharma, “India in 2009: Global Financial Crisis and Congress Revival,” Asian Survey Vol. 50, No. 1 (January-February 2010): 139-56.
32. See the Epilogue in Maria Misna, Vishnu’s Crowded Temple: India since the Great Rebellion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 435-49.
34. See, for example, Hans Küng, Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1991).
37. For my discussion of the definition of religion and of politics, see Hanson, Religion and Politics, pp. 70-76.
40. Nayan Chanda, Bound Together begins his Chapter Four on “Preachers’ World” by narrating the Human Rights Watch’s intervention on Darfur. His classification as these NGO operatives as “the new missionaries” points to the close relationship between religious and human rights activities. See also his article in this volume.
41. For the discussion of such an international “primary ethical broker,” see Hanson, Religion and Politics, pp. 321-22.
42. See, for example, analysis by James Traub, author of The Best of Intensions, in January 4, 2009 New York Times.


44. British diplomat Michael Emerson has stated that the European Union must include Turkey, Russia, and the Ukraine to attain stability. Michael Emerson, Redrawing the Map of Europe (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin’s, 1998). For the role of the United Kingdom, see Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West (New York: Random House, 2004).

45. Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance (New York: Penguin, 2006), 246. The Netherlands serves as an excellent test case because of the extreme secularization of the country during the 1960s, an influential Jewish community, and the presence of very different Moroccan and Turkish immigration patterns.

46. For the characterizations of these types of dialogue, see “Our Mission and Interreligious Dialogue,” Decree Five of the 34th General Congregation of the Society of Jesus, www.jesuit.org/sections.

47. ASEAN, of course, does not have the economic structure of the EU or NAFTA. The Beijing-Tokyo rivalry, the prevalence of bilateral trade agreements, and the regional significance of the United States and European markets weaken larger regional structures. For this paper, however, it should be noted that there do exist at least intermittent negotiations on ASEAN plus Three (China, Japan, Korea) and ASEAN plus Six (add India, Australia, New Zealand) agreements, plus other regional arrangements.

48. With the exception of the Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam, the size of Catholic populations in this area does not rival Church interests in Africa or Latin America. However, East and South Asian Catholics remain more influential than their numbers in interfaith dialogue and in international politics.


53. See, for example, “India and China Become Friendlier Rivals,” New York Times, November 21, 2006. China and Russia have been cooperating on Central Asia in the Shanghai Cooperative Organization.

54. For the spread of Islam into Asia, see Chandra, Bound Together, pp. 128-36.

55. Asian Focus, August 29, 2003, for the entire text.

56. Asian Focus, September 1, 2006.

57. Asian Focus, November 21, 2003. For global corruption ratings, see www.transparency.org. For the latest Chinese variant, Beijing has recently tightened visa restrictions from South
China to Macao since so many cadres have been caught embezzling funds to gamble in the ex-Portuguese colony. *New York Times*, January 15, 2009.


59. Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time* (New York: Penguin, 2005). If I could recommend three books on social equity in the world economy, they would be Collier (above), Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002). All three authors, plus Thomas Friedman and Paul Krugman, are always worth a reader’s time, whether or not they are right on a particular issue, e.g., Friedman’s *The World Is Flat* focuses too much on economics and remains too optimistic in places.


**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Eric Hanson has taught comparative politics (China, Religion and Politics) at Santa Clara University since 1976. He is Patrick A. Donohoe, S.J. Professor of Political Science and authors the Markkula Ethics Center website Religion, Ethics, and Politics in World Affairs. He is also author of Catholic Politics in China and Korea (Orbis, 1980), The Catholic Church in World Politics (Princeton, 1987), and Religion and Politics in the International System Today (Cambridge, 2006).

Don Baker, Ph.D., University of British Columbia

Korea is an ancient civilization. There were independent states on the Korean peninsula at least 1,700 years ago. Moreover, for much of its history Korea has been caught up in globalization, if by globalization we mean significantly influencing and being influenced by other countries. It has also been religious for millennia, in that Koreans have interacted with spiritual entities with the help of shamans for at least a couple of millennia and of Buddhist temples for almost that long. However, both globalization and religion have taken on different meanings in modern Korea. Whereas in past centuries globalization for Korea usually meant interaction only with immediate neighbors such as China and Korea, starting in the late 18th century Korea has found itself a member of a much larger international community. Suddenly politics and cultures as far away as North America and Europe are able to influence events on the Korean peninsula and the beliefs and values of the Korean people themselves. Moreover, thanks to the intrusion of Western civilization, religion has emerged as a separate and distinct category of social and cultural life in Korea, making Koreans much more self-conscious about their religious identity.

Nationalism, on the other hand, has appeared in Korea fairly recently. Though Koreans have been aware for millennia that they are a distinct people with their own language, food, clothing, history, and government, before the last quarter of the 19th century they did not express that distinctiveness in the language of the nation-state. It was only when Japanese imperialism threatened the political entity we today call Korea that Koreans began to define Korea as a nation rather than as a dynasty or a cultural sphere.

The emergence of nationalism at the same time that Korea was encountering a new form of globalization and was becoming more self-conscious about its religious identity has led to the birth of religious nationalism in Korea. Korea’s religious nationalism appeared in two stages. At first, it was defensive religious nationalism. Korea resisted modern religious proselytizing from abroad by clinging more firmly to what it saw as distinctively Korean religious beliefs and values. However, in the second half of the 20th century, some Koreans went on the offensive and began claiming that Korea not only did not have to look to others for religious guidance, it could teach the rest of the world about true religion. In recent decades, various religious organizations in Korea have proclaimed that Korea is now the spiritual capital of the earth. Whether Buddhist, Christian, or affiliated with one of Korea’s many new religions, these Korean religious nationalists agree that, just as Korean automobiles and consumer electronics are winning over consumers in markets around the globe and Korean singers and actors are gaining adoring fans in various non-Korean communities, so too will Korean religious leaders soon be recognized as among the world’s leading spiritual figures. These nationalistic Koreans believe that non-Koreans will soon be as comfortable listening to the sermons of a Korean missionary, becoming a disciple of a Korean meditation master, or even affirming that a Korean is the messiah as non-Koreans today are buying a Hyundai sedan or a Samsung cellphone.
When Korea first became active on the global religious stage, Koreans were not so determined to establish the Korean approach to things supernatural as the best approach. The first organized religion in Korea was Buddhism, brought from China and central Asia by missionary monks around 1600 or 1700 years ago. Not long after Buddhism established itself on the Korean peninsula, Korean monks crossed the Japan straits to share their new religion with the Japanese. However, they were not trying to establish Korea as the world center for Buddhism. In fact, they probably did not see themselves as Korean missionaries as much as they saw themselves as Buddhist missionaries. As Robert Buswell pointed out in his introduction to *Currents and Countercurrents: Korean Influences on East Asia Buddhist Traditions*, “such monks saw themselves not so much as “Korean”...but instead as joint collaborators in a religious tradition that transcended contemporary notions of nation and time.”

For several centuries during this formative period of Korean civilization, Korean monks moved freely between Korea and Japan and between Korea and China, contributing significantly to developments within the pan-East Asian Mahayana Buddhist cultural sphere. Though of course they were aware that they spoke different languages than the Chinese and Japanese monks they interacted with did, and came from kingdoms on the Korean peninsula rather than from kingdoms in what is now China or Japan, their primary self-identification was religious rather than ethnic or nationalistic. They were Buddhists, first of all, and “Koreans” second.

In fact, during the first centuries of Buddhism on the Korean peninsula, there was no “Korea” per se. Until the second half of the seventh century, three different kingdoms fought for control of the Korean peninsula and there was no single country called “Korea.” Rather than seeing themselves as Koreans, at that time the peoples of the peninsula saw themselves as subjects of Koguryŏ, Paekche, or Silla. However, even those pre-Korean identifies were less important to them when they were discussing Buddhism with their neighbors than was their broader religious orientation. They were interested in promoting Buddhism in general, not a specific Koguryŏ, Paekche, or Silla approach to Buddhism.

Some of the early kings in those kingdoms on the Korean peninsula used Buddhism to strengthen their own claims to legitimacy and in some cases even claimed that their throne would soon be occupied by a *chakravartin*, a Buddhist term for a universal ruler whose superior virtue and power would be recognized by the entire world. However, they made such grandiose claims only when dealing with their own subjects or with rivals for control of the Korean peninsula. They did not try to convince their neighbors in China, Japan or elsewhere that their kingdom or their peninsula would soon assume a position of leadership in the Buddhist world. Even after most of the peninsula was under the control of one kingdom, Later Silla (668-935), that kingdom made no claims that Buddhism in Later Silla was superior to, or even significantly different from, the Buddhism of neighboring countries. Instead, it was simply Buddhism, free of an particular political identity.

For most of the long Koryŏ dynasty (918-1392) that followed Later Silla, Korea was not as active on the international religious stage as it had been in preceding centuries. Korean monks no longer traveled to Japan, and and travel to China was often hindered by non-Chinese dynasties that seized control over the land route.
from Korea to China proper. However, when Korea was conquered by the Mongols in the 13th century, it became part of the great Pan-Asian Mongol empire and, as such, could have participated in the trans-regional religious interactions that Mongol rule allowed. There is no evidence that Korea did so. Though there were Christian missionaries in Mongol China in the 13th and 14th centuries, none of them appear to have traveled on to Korea, nor do any Koreans appear to have had any significant contact with Christians or the Muslims when they visited China. There is evidence that some Central Asian Muslims settled in Korea during the century Korea was part of the Mongol empire, but there is no evidence that those Muslims had any impact of the religious culture of Korea.

Korea was even less involved with the wider world in the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910), which followed the Koryŏ dynasty. In fact, the Chosŏn dynasty came to be known as the “hermit kingdom” for its self-imposed isolation, though that term is a misnomer since Korea continued regular tributary relations with the governments in Beijing for most of the five centuries that dynasty governed the peninsula and it also maintained some limited trade relations with the Japanese. However, for almost four centuries there was little religious interaction with the outside world, apart from the Chosŏn dynasty’s acceptance of Neo-Confucianism from China at the beginning of the dynasty and its export of Neo-Confucianism to Japan at the end of the 16th century.

That changed dramatically in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, when Korea encountered a new foreign religion for the first time since Buddhism had entered Korea 1,500 years earlier. A few Koreans visiting Beijing had picked up some books on Christianity written in Classical Chinese by Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) and other Jesuit missionaries to China and had brought them back to Korea. Some of those who read those books found their religious message intriguing. In 1784 one curious young Korean man in Beijing on a diplomatic mission visited a Catholic church there and, after a couple of months, convinced the resident missionary to baptize him. Now known as Peter Lee, he returned to Korea and began baptizing many of his fellow Confucian-scholar friends. Thus the Korean Catholic Church was born even before there were any Catholic missionaries proselytizing to Koreans on Korean soil.

The reaction of the “hermit kingdom” was not positive. In 1791, when two of those Catholics, in obedience to directives from Rome, refused to perform ancestral memorial rituals in the manner prescribed by Korea’s Confucian government, they were executed. In 1795, when Korean Catholics smuggled in a Chinese priest to minister to their small community, a few more of them were executed. Then, in 1801, when one young Korean Catholic tried to send a letter to the French bishop of Beijing requesting that the French government dispatch a fleet to Korea to force Korea to allow religious freedom, persecution exploded in a scale never before seen in Korean history. Thousands of Korean Catholics were killed by the Korean government in intermittent persecutions over the next 70 years.

This was not an auspicious beginning to Korea’s re-entry into religious globalization. However, it would be anachronistic to portray the Chosŏn dynasty’s bloody persecution of Roman Catholicism as an early example of religious nationalism. The initial violent rejection of Catholicism was more on cultural and religious grounds than for nationalist reasons. The first Catholics were killed, not for
following a non-Korean religion but violating the ritual requirements of Korea’s Confucian culture and state. The persecution of Catholics intensified in the 19th century because Catholics attempted to bring French military pressure to bear on the Korean government, but that violent reaction by the government was a defensive measure to protect the dynasty, not a nationalist measure to protect the Korean nation. As such, it resembles the persecution of Catholics by Japan’s Tokugawa Shogunate in the 17th century more than it does modern manifestations of religious nationalism such as Japan’s promotion of State Shinto after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 or China’s insistence after 1949 that Catholics allow Beijing rather than Rome to select their bishops.

Confirmation that nationalism was not the driving force behind the anti-Catholic persecutions, can be found in the Chosŏn government’s persecution of Korea’s first indigenous organized religion, Tonghak, which emerged in 1860. Though Tonghak gave itself that name (which means “Eastern Learning,”) as a way to distinguish itself from the foreign religion of Catholicism, it was persecuted just as savagely as Catholicism was because it, too, was seen as a threat to the dynasty. Dynastic survival, not nationalism, lay behind the Chosŏn dynasty’s resistance to religious change in the 19th century.

It was more than a century after Catholicism first arrived in Korea before we see the first signs of modern Korean nationalism. Moreover, that nationalism did not emerge from the Catholic community. Most of Korea’s Catholics were so scarred by the century of persecution that they avoided the political arena until the second half of the 20th century. Instead, nationalism sprouted soon after Protestant Christianity arrived in Korea.

In 1884 the first Protestant missionaries landed in Korea. They were fortunate in that the Korean government had come to the realization by then that persecution of followers of the Western religion of Christianity would bring more trouble than it was worth. Moreover, those missionaries, primarily Presbyterians and Methodists from the US, brought with them some of the benefits of modern civilization, such as modern medicine and education, so they were not entirely unwelcome. Of course, they did not come to Korea to teach Koreans about nationalism. Nor can they be said to be the primary force stimulating nationalism in the Korean people. It was a combination of Protestant Christian missionaries and Japanese political, economic, and cultural intrusion into the former “hermit kingdom” that started some Koreans thinking about Korea as a nation rather than as a dynasty or as primarily a cultural community.

However, because it was Buddhist Japan rather than a Christian nation that robbed Korea of its independence in 1910 and kept it under harsh colonial rule until 1945, early Korean nationalism was directed primarily at Japanese colonizers rather than Christian missionaries. Though the Japanese tried to modernize Korea, many Koreans in first half of the twentieth-century resented the Japanese imposition of modernity on Japanese terms. They began to look to the West for an alternative to the Japanese approach to modernization. And the West they knew best, thanks to the presence of Christian missionaries in Korea, was the West of Christianity. As a result, Korean Christians were disproportionally represented among the first nationalists.
Christians were not the only nationalists. When Koreans rose up in nation-wide non-violent protests against Japanese rule in the spring of 1919, there were almost as many protestors from the Ch’ŏndogyo religion (a successor to Tonghak) as there were Protestant Christians. However, few Buddhists, Catholics, or Confucians took an active part in those protests, creating a split among the Korean people with nationalists concentrated in just a couple of religious communities and largely absent in others.8

This does not mean that Korea’s first Christian nationalists were religious nationalists. Though Ch’ŏndogyo might arguably be described as a religious assertion of the vitality of traditional Korean beliefs and values, those Koreans who became Christians did not do so out of a desire to defend Korean domestic religious traditions against foreign threats. Not did they become Christians to help Korea spread its religious beliefs and values around the world. In fact, by becoming Christians, they signaled their rejection of Korea’s ancient traditions of shamanism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Their nationalism was political nationalism, a desire for Korea to regain its political autonomy, not for Korea to assume a leadership role in the global Christian community. Nevertheless, the early association of Christians with nationalism in Korea can be seen as the first stage of what evolved into true Korean Christian religious nationalism.

The association of Christianity with nationalism was reinforced in South Korea after 1945. Liberation from Japan left Korea a divided country, since the United States and the Soviet Union had decided to share in the administration of that former Japanese colony. When both the US and the USSR granted Koreans self-rule in 1948, they left in their wake two hostile states, a communist state in the north and an anti-Communist state in the south. Unfortunately for the Christian community, before 1945 over 60% of all Korean Protestants lived in what became North Korea. So did 30% of Korean Catholics.9 Most of them fled south to escape “Godless Communism.” Moreover, they found South Korea, under the presidency of the Methodist Syngman Rhee, a safe haven. They therefore became the most ardent supporters of Rhee’s Republic of Korea.10 While we can not call their South Korea nationalism “religious nationalism,” it definitely was a nationalism with religious overtones. Moreover, when the separation of the Korean peninsula into two hostile regimes left most of the followers of Ch’ŏndogyo in the north, Christians became the only major religious community in the south strongly identified with nationalism.11

The close relationship between Christianity in Korea and Western missionaries could have proved a obstacle to the association of Christianity with nationalism after the Japanese were forced out in 1945. However, Korean Christianity, particularly in its Protestant form, began to become more independent of foreign missionaries by the middle of the 20th century. Foreign missionaries, with the exception of French and German Catholic missionaries, were forced out of Korea by the Japanese after Japan went on a war-footing in the late 1930s, allowing Koreans a larger role in shaping the way they expressed their religious beliefs.

The local Catholic church remained under largely non-Korean control until the 1960s, when the number of Korean priests finally began to greatly outnumber the number of Catholic missionary priests. In addition, the 1969 naming of Kim Suhwan as Korea’s first cardinal, and therefore the head of the Korean branch of the Roman Catholic Church, was a clear sign that Catholicism in Korea had been Koreanized.12 Nevertheless, the Catholic Church, operating as it does within an
hierarchical transnational institution with headquarters in Rome, has never been able to express a nationalistic orientation to the same degree Protestants, who were not under the same sort of centralized direction, could.

Protestants began breaking free of foreign missionary control much earlier than Catholics did. An early sign was the replacement, on orders of the Japanese, of the American head of a Christian university, Ewha Womans University, by a Korean Christian in 1939. A year earlier Japanese authorities had already begun forcing various local Christian organizations, including the YMCA and the YWCA, to break their ties with their counterparts in the US and also began forcing various Christian governing bodies, such as the Korean National Christian Council, to bar foreigners from membership. In addition, colleges and universities founded and funded by Westerners were taken out of missionary hands and placed under the control of Koreans. Though those decisions were forced on Korean Christians rather than taking place at Korean initiative, Koreans discovered they liked being in charge. When missionaries returned after 1945, they found that their converts were not as willing to take direction from them, or to give them leading roles in Korean Christian organizations, as they once had been. In another sign that Koreans were becoming more confident of their credentials as Christian leaders, in the late 1930s they had already established a Korean-run seminary to replace seminaries run by missionaries and, after 1945, opened many more such seminars, ending missionary control over the education of future leaders of Christianity in Korea.

Local Christians seizing control of their own church institutions can be seen as a manifestation of religious nationalism, since it resembles political nationalism in its demand that local decision-making bodies be led by local people. However, that beginning of localized control is more important for what it made possible later: the creation and promotion of distinctive Korean theologies and the emergence of a Korean conviction that Korea has become the center of world Christianity. Korea also changed from being the object of missionary endeavors to being the world’s second largest supplier of missionaries to other countries.

Full-scale Korean Christian nationalism, the conviction that God has chosen the Korean people to show the rest of the world what true Christianity is, arose in Korea as a result of the dramatic expansion in the size of Korea’s own Protestant community between 1960 and the 1990s. In 1960, Korea’s various Protestant churches reported a total membership of 623,072. Only ten years later, they reported their numbers had gone up over five times. There were, they claimed, now almost 3.2 million Protestants in Korea. A decade later, that impressive figure had more than doubled, to almost 7.2 million. These are self-reported figures, so we would be justified in being somewhat skeptical of such claims to incredibly rapid growth. However, we shouldn’t be too skeptical because, when the Korean government began asking about religious affiliation for its census, it found almost 6.5 million Koreans in 1985, 16% of a total population of almost 40.5 million, who wrote on their census questionnaire that they were Protestants. In the next census, in 1995, that figure had risen to over 8.8 million, almost 20% of the 44.6 million living in South Korea that year. Gallup Korea confirmed such rapid growth by identifying over 20% of Koreans as Protestants when they conducted their own survey of religious affiliation in 1997.
This rapid growth, and the conviction (dampened by the latest census figures which show Korea’s Protestant community in 2005 to be slightly smaller than it was in 1995) that South Korea would soon be a majority Christian nation, convinced Koreans that not only was their particular form of Christianity the most dynamic in the world in the second half of the twentieth century, that rapid growth and that dynamism was a sign that God had passed the torch of evangelization from Western nations to Korea. In other words, Korea had become a second Israel, and Koreans were the new chosen people. Many Korean Christians believe that they have been given the task of leading the rest of the world to salvation.

It is not difficult for find evidence for such Christian nationalism in Korea. One particularly fruitful place to look is the 1995 publication *Korean Church Growth Explosion.* The opening chapter in that volume is Bong Rin Ro’s “The Korean Church: God’s Chosen People for evangelism.” The title says it all. In the second chapter in that volume, Ki Joon-Gon writes, “God has chosen the nation of Korea to be a holy nation to serve other nations and to evangelize them with the love and gospel of Jesus Christ.” Han Chul-Ha, in the third chapter, writes, “Korean people are often called a “Second Israel” or a “Chosen people of God.” In 1975, Korean Christians were already acting on the assumption that Koreans had a special responsibility toward the rest of the world. They established in Seoul a training center called the “Asian Center for Theological Studies and Mission” and proudly proclaim that ACTS “has opened a new chapter in Christian mission history by building a foundation for sending missionaries from Asia to the rest of the world.”

This assumption that Korean Christians are superior Christians is not limited to Christian leaders in Seoul. Two recent studies of Korean Americans have shown that such religious nationalism is shared on this side of the Pacific Ocean. Soo-Young Lee, in her recent doctoral dissertation, wrote that, “From Korean Americans’ point of view, God chose America in the seventeenth century and enormously blessed it as His second Chosen People after the Jews. However, they [the Americans] lost their favor because of their increasing atheistic attitudes. Then Korean Christians are here to help America to regain God’s favor.” Kelly Chong, another Korean-American scholar, recently cited a pastor of a Korean Church in the United States saying, “The responsibility of Koreans Americans is to renew the Kingdom of God in America, to help better its morality and value system.” Chong adds, “a sense of strong ethnic group unity and exclusivity is achieved by portraying Koreans as a ‘special’ group of Christians, in particular as a ‘better’ and more ‘true’ type of Christian than those found in society at large.”

Korean Christians have also begun to display religious nationalism with attempts to claim that Christian theology has Korean roots, and to export Korean Christian theology to the rest of the world. Two examples of the first tendency can be found in the writings of two Korean Methodist theologians, Sung Bum Yun and Dong Shik Yu. Yun claimed that an ancient Korean foundation myth, in which the lord of heaven above dispatched his son to earth and that son, in turn, sired Tan’gun, the legendary first king of the Korean people over 4,300 years ago, is actually evidence that early Koreans recognized the existence of a Supreme Being (the Lord of Heaven) and that that Supreme Being was actually three persons in one God. In other words, those three divine beings mentioned in this ancient
Korean tale are actually a reference to the Trinity of Christianity. Dong Shik Yu, though he doesn’t go as far as Yun in claiming that Koreans were aware from the beginning of their history of the trinitarian nature of God, writes that Koreans in ancient times believed in the incarnation, that the Supreme God above had sent his divine Son to dwell among men, and ever since Koreans have worshipped that Son of God as the mountain god. Though few Koreans go as far as Yun and Yu, almost all Korean Christians today, and many non-Christians as well, have come to believe that Korea had an ancient monotheistic tradition in which the One God above was worshipped under the name Korean Christians use for God today, Hanŭnim, even though that name was actually coined by a Canadian missionary in the late 19th century and there is no documentary evidence for an indigenous Korean monotheism.

These attempts by Korean theologians to find Korean counterparts for Christian concepts are directed at Koreans, not outsiders. They represent a desire to overcome the implied rejection of Korean cultural identity and of the beliefs of ancestors that becoming a Christian in a non-Christian society entails by arguing that adopting the religion from the West is not really the adoption of foreign values but is rather the rediscovery of the true meaning of core Korean religious beliefs. As such, they may be described as manifestations of “inward-directed nationalism,” an effort to resolve the cognitive dissonance that can arise when a firm belief in a religion that is both new and foreign to one’s native culture is combined with a pride in one’s traditions and in the accomplishments of one’s ancestors.

Other Korean theologians have adopted a posture that can be labeled “outward-directed nationalism,” in that they drew on Korean tradition to create a theology they strive to convince non-Koreans to accept. The best example of such an attempt to create a Korean theology for the world outside Korea is minjung theology. Minjung is a Korean term that is difficult to translate, since it means different things to different people. It can simply mean “the masses” or the general public. However, in minjung theology, it is used to refer to those people who have been oppressed by the political, economic, and social elite. It usually refers to farmers, factory workers, women and the like, including underpaid professors!

It is a core assumption of minjung theology that the suffering of the minjung somehow has ennobled them. This is a Korean concept that pre-dates the emergence of minjung theology. A clear statement of that concept can be found in Ham Sok Hon’s Queen of Suffering: A Spiritual History of Korea. Ham, a leading Christian thinker in Korea in the the 20th century, states that “suffering makes life greater,” because it turns us toward God. Since Korea, in his view, has suffered at the hands of others more than any other nation, Koreans have to take that history of suffering as an indication that they have been given a global mission: “to bear our load of iniquity without grumbling, without evading and with determination and in seriousness. By bearing the load we can deliver ourselves and the world as well.” In other words, as the “queen of suffering,” Korea can serve as the messiah for the entire world.

Ham, however, did not promote an explicit minjung theology. That was for a younger generation of Korean theologians, among them David Kwang-sun Suh and Changwon Suh. Both theologians wrote theology in an historical vein. As a vocal advocate of democracy at a time Korea was under dictatorial rule, David Suh...
suffered at the hands of the state. He draws on that personal experience to narrate a history of political oppression in Korea, and resistance to it, which he then interprets theologically. As he writes, “the theology of the minjung was therefore born out of active participation in the struggle of the Korean people for a more humane and just society. But it is more than a political theology. It is rooted deeply in the consciousness of Korean history, its religion and its culture.” It is important to note that David Suh often wrote in English. He was preaching minjung theology to both Koreans and non-Koreans, believing that non-Koreans would recognize that the suffering of the Korean people for a just cause had made them spiritually qualified to lead the world toward a better understanding of God.

David Suh’s minjung theology can be said to represent religious nationalism in that he claims for the Korean nation and the Korean people a special role in both the struggle for political liberation and the struggle for religious salvation. The religious nationalism of minjung theology is even more apparent in the writings of his fellow Minjung theologian Changwon Suh. Changwon Suh writes as an Asian historian, not a Korean historian, when he claims that “Asian theologians emphasized the religio-cultural dimension in order to fight against domination by Western metaphysical-oriented theological imperialism.” However, he privileges Korean theologians because of what he considers their special experience with the struggle of the minjung for justice. He describes minjung theology as “Korean theologians’ efforts to provide an interpretative frame of Third World Liberation from their socio-political and religio-cultural history, that is, from the socio-historical biography of the minjung koinonia in Korea.” In other words, Koreans, because of their ennobling experience of suffering for a righteous cause, are more qualified than others, in Asia or elsewhere, to interpret the Bible for the modern age.

The most dramatic evidence of the rise of religious nationalism among Korea’s Protestant community is not minjung theology (which has faded into irrelevance in democratized Korea) or the attempts to create an indigenous foundation for Christian beliefs, which had little impact outside of more liberal seminaries in Korea. Rather, it is the sharp rise over the last couple of decades in the number of missionaries Korea had been dispatching overseas. Since so many Koreans have come to believe that they are a chosen people, that God has selected them to revive the sagging fortunes of global Christianity, they have decided that they should engage in active proselytizing all over the world.

There is also another explanation for the upsurge in the number of Korean overseas missionaries: there are more Koreans available for the missionary enterprise. As the Korean economy grew wealthier, starting in the 1970s, more funds became available for the construction of seminaries. More seminaries means more preachers, but not necessarily an equal increase in the number of churches. Those new preachers had to find someplace to preach. Fortunately for them, at the same time those seminaries began producing a surplus of graduates, economic globalization led to a relaxation of government regulations governing travel overseas (Korean businessmen had to be able to travel abroad to compete in the international marketplace). Since the 1980s, Koreans have found it easier to travel abroad. That relaxation of travel restrictions was not limited to businessmen. It included religious entrepreneurs as well. Preachers in search of a place to preach could now seek a pulpit overseas.
Before the missionary upsurge began, there were few Koreans preaching overseas. In 1979, there were only 93 Korean Protestant missionaries reaching out to non-Koreans outside of Korea. They were greatly outnumbered by Korean pastors ministering to Korean expatriate communities.34 (Korean Christian religious nationalism first manifest itself overseas in the drive by Korean churches to ensure that Koreans outside of Korea attended Korean churches rather than the non-Korean churches in their communities.) A decade later, that number had increased over 12 times, to 1,178. Then the real surge began. By 2000, there were 8,103 Korean missionaries abroad. By 2006, that number had almost doubled, reaching 14, 905.35 The latest report I have seen counts almost 18,000 Korean missionaries in the field in 2008.36 That is an increase of around 190x in less than three decades. Korea can now claim to have more missionaries overseas than any other nation except the United States.

Those Korean missionaries are spread out all over the world, including the Islamic world. In fact, almost a quarter of them are trawling for conversion in Muslim countries.37 Including those Muslim countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, Koreans are now preaching Korean Christianity in 169 countries.38 And the number of missionaries is expected to increase. Almost half of those running missionary organizations in Korea today expect the number of Korean missionaries to expand to at least 50,000 or so by 2030. Many predict that in a few decades there will be 100,000 Korean missionaries.39

The more Koreans leave Korea to preach Korean Christianity abroad, the more chances there are for inter-religious and cross-cultural conflicts. Most Korean Christians are strong believers in the doctrine that there is no salvation outside the church, and they define that church quite narrowly. For example, there is an active Korean missionary presence in the Philippines, since many Korean Christians don’t consider Catholics to be real Christians and therefore want to save the Filipinos from the eternity in hell that awaits those who die outside the true church.40 Also, conflicts with Muslim communities are inevitable, giving the fundamentalism and the religious fervor of both sides. Evidence for how dangerous such proselytizing can be came in the summer of 2007, when 22 young Korean missionaries along with their pastor were kidnapped in Iraq by Muslim extremists. Two of those missionaries were murdered before the rest were freed. That tragic incident does not seem to have dampened the determination of Korean Christians to convert the entire world to Christianity and, especially, to the Korean brand of Christianity, though it has made some of them reconsider where they engage in proselytizing.41 That incident also provoked some of the harshest criticism Christianity has faced in Korea in decades, with even many Christians questioning why young people were sent by their church to such a dangerous country and some non-Christians voicing loud criticism of what they labeled “Christian arrogance.”42

Korean Protestants may be the most visible, or at least the most numerous, examples of Korean religious nationalism on the world stage, but they are not the only ones. Korea’s Buddhists, as well, have begun to promote the notion that their approach to their world religion is superior, though they have not been as strident in that claim as Korean Christians have been. I don’t know of any Korean Buddhists who claim that Koreans are Buddha’s chosen people, or that Korea has become the global center for Buddhist proselytizing! Nevertheless, Korean Buddhists
have been quite active in recent decades in trying to attract non-Koreans to not just Buddhism in general but to the Korean approach to Buddhism in particular.

However, Korean Buddhist nationalism, if we may call it that, emerged later than Korean Christian nationalism did. First of all, Buddhists in general (there were a few conspicuous exceptions) were not as anti-Japanese as the Christians were. The Japanese were much more pro-Buddhist than the Confucian government that had ruled Korea for five centuries previously and many Buddhists appreciated the greater respect Japanese showed them. That Buddhist comfort with Japanese rule dampened the identification of Buddhism with nationalism in Korea. Secondly, Buddhists didn’t tend to be as involved with the world beyond Asia as Christians were (Korean students in North America, for example, were more likely to be Christians than Buddhists), so they were not exposed to the modern ideology of nationalism as early. Also, after 1945, Korean Buddhists were caught up in an internal squabble between married and celibate monks that kept them from focusing much attention on the world beyond the peninsula. They also had to focus on gaining respect at home. \(^43\) (Christmas was a national holiday long before Buddha’s birthday was, and there were Christian chaplains in the Korean military long before there were Buddhist chaplains.) \(^44\)

That began to change in the 1960s. As Korea began to gain more respect on the world stage for its economic accomplishments, Koreans began to recover pride in their cultural heritage. Buddhism was an important part of that heritage. Slowly, Korean monks began to feel that not only was their Buddhism distinctively Korean, because of its distinctiveness it had much to offer the outside world. Soon Korean Buddhists began to move toward globalization in two ways: trying to attract non-Koreans to Korea to learn Buddhism and establishing temples overseas to convert non-Koreans to Korean Buddhism.

Like the Christians, Korea’s Buddhists have also dispatched clerics overseas to minister to expatriate communities to ensure that the religion they practice is Korean. In other words, they want to ensure that Korean Buddhists practice Korean, not Chinese, Japanese, or Tibetan, Buddhism. \(^45\) In fact, the main denomination in Korea, the Jogye Order, says that it has 174 temples overseas, including 128 in North America, five in South America, seven in Europe, seven in Oceania, and 27 throughout Asia. \(^46\) However, the most dynamic expression of Korean Buddhist nationalism is found in the drive to attract non-Koreans to the Korean Buddhist fold.

The monk Kusan was the first in modern Korea to reach out to foreigners and encourage them to be ordained in his Korean order. Kusan already held an important position in the Jogye Order when he visited California in 1973 and brought a Westerner back with him to Songgwangsa Temple, where he was in charge of the monastic compound. Soon, under his leadership, Songgwangsa became the Korean center for foreigners wanting to become part of the Korean Buddhist community. Over the decade he had left in this world (he passed away in 1983), Kusan trained a number of foreign monks. He, and the rest of the Korean Buddhist community, is particularly proud that they recruited into their community non-Koreans who had tried other approaches to Buddhism first but decided that Korean Buddhism was the approach they felt most comfortable with.

Among those success stories is Robert E. Buswell, Jr., currently the director of the Center for Buddhist Studies at UCLA. Buswell had spent some time in a Thai
monastery and a hermitage in Hong Kong before he finally arrived at Songgwang-sa, where he spent 1974 to 1979 under Kusan’s guidance.\(^{47}\) Another success story is Martine Batchelor, who, as Martine Fages, traveled from France through Bangkok before she ended up in Korea in 1975, where she also studied under Kusan for ten years.\(^{48}\) In Korea, she met another European Buddhist, Stephen Batchelor, who had been ordained in the Tibetan tradition in India but then came to Korea to practice Korean-style Buddhism and learn from Kusan for three years. The Batchelors married in 1985 and returned to Europe, where they played important roles in promoting Buddhism in Europe.\(^{49}\) As for their teacher Kusan, he later went on to found a temple in Los Angeles, one in Geneva, as well as one near Carmel, California, but his primary interaction with foreigners was with foreigners who had come to his temple in Korea.\(^{50}\)

After Kusan’s death, the primary center for training foreign monks in Korea moved from Songgwansa to Hwagyesa Temple, which is closer to the cosmopolitan city of Seoul. Hwagye-sa hosts the Seoul International Zen Center (notice that, when Koreans want to reach out to non-Koreans, they use the better-known Japanese pronunciation of what in Korea is pronounced “sŏn.”)\(^{51}\) As of 2006, the last year for which I could find data, there were 28 foreign monks at Hwagye. That is the largest concentration in Korea, but there were another 59 scattered around at various sites, including the Lotus Lantern International Meditation Center on Kanghwa Island, to the west of Seoul.\(^{52}\) The foreign monks in Korea come from all over the world. In 2006, there were 13 from Sri Lanka, 11 from Bangladesh, 10 each from Nepal and the United States, four each from Poland, Israel and Taiwan, three from Russia and India, two each from Cambodia, China, Hungary, Lithuania, Malaysia and Canada, and one each from Argentina, Austria, Mongolia, France, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Switzerland, Australia, Serbia, Singapore, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom.\(^{53}\) Korean Buddhism has truly become globalized in Korea.

The most famous Western monk in Korea today is an American who, unlike Buswell and the Batchelors, has stayed in Korea and continues to wear his clerical robes. As Paul Muenzen, he was a American Catholic who earned an undergraduate degree at Yale and then went on to earn a degree at Harvard Divinity School. While he was at Harvard, he heard a lecture by the Korean monk Seung Sahn and that convinced him to continue his religious education in Korea. He was ordained as Hyun Gak in 1992 and for a while was the head monk at the the Seoul International Zen Center.\(^{54}\) Hyun Gak Sunim (sunim is the Korean title for a monk) became famous in Korean when he published a two-volume work in Korean called *Manhaeng : Habŏdŭ esŏ Hwagyesa kkaji* [From Harvard to Hwagyesa].\(^{55}\) Many Korean Buddhists swelled with nationalist pride when they learned that an American from Harvard who had no Korean ancestry has decided that he wanted to be a Buddhist, and the type of Buddhist he wanted to be was a Korean Buddhist.

The monk who introduced Paul Muenzen to Korean Buddhism, Seung Sahn, is the monk who can claim most of the credit for establishing a Korean Buddhist presence among non-Koreans in Korea and around the world, for that matter. When Seung Sahn first left Korea, in 1962, he first went to Japan and established a Korean temple there for Japanese-Koreans. He also established a temple in Hong Kong. Then, in 1972, he moved to the United States and began teaching the Ko-
rean approach to Zen. Soon he had enough disciples to open the Providence Zen Center in Rhode Island, and to form an organization for Western Buddhists he called the Kwan Um Zen School. By the time Seung Sahn passed away in 2004, that center in Rhode Island had become a full-fledged Buddhist monastary for Westerners, and it had Zen centers affiliated with it in New York, Boston, Los Angeles, Berkeley, Cambridge, and New Haven. In addition, there were groups Seung Sahn had a role in organizing in 32 countries. All told, he is credited with opening over 120 Buddhist meditation centers outside of Korea. It is therefore no exaggeration when one of his Western disciples wrote that Seung Sahn, “has always seen his role as an evangelist in the service of Korean Buddhism, and of his own interpretation of it.”

So far, the Korean Buddhist drive to recruit Western converts has not stirred up the type of controversies Korean Protestant missions have. That may be because there are not nearly as many Korean Buddhist missionaries yet, so they can’t get in as much trouble. Or it may be because the Buddhist approach is different. Korea’s monks are more interested in teaching about their beliefs and practices than they are in criticizing the beliefs and practices of others. The nationalism of Korean Buddhism is a self-affirming nationalism, not an aggressive nationalism.

Buddhists and Protestant Christians are Korea’s two largest religious communities. According to the 2005 census, 22.8% of South Koreans are Buddhists, and 18.3% are Protestant Christians. (Another 10.9% are Roman Catholics.) Less than 1% said they are a believer in one of Korea’s many new religions. Yet no study of religious nationalism and globalization in Korea should ignore new religions, since they are manifestations of one important Korean response to the intrusion of the modern world: the construction of modern religious organizations designed to provide shelter for traditional beliefs and values while nonetheless allowing their adherents to claim to be modern.

The best-known Korean new religious organization outside of Korea, and the most controversial, is Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church. Now known primarily as the Family Federation for World Peace and Unity, its original name was The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity. The Unification Church aspires to be a universal church, but, even though Moon moved to the United States in 1972, Korea is still considered the sacred homeland of the Unification Church. The Divine Principle, the fundamental scripture of the Unification Church, declares the King of Righteousness would appear in Korea, the Third Israel, and would “receive tribute from all the countries in the world.” Moreover, the founder of the Unification Church, the Korean-born Rev. Moon himself, has been proclaimed by its members as “True Father, ...the savior, messiah, and Lord of the Second Coming.” Sun Myung Moon is a personal embodiment of Korean religious nationalism, of the claim that Korea is the spiritual leader of the world today. Korea’s claim to a special place in the religious history of the modern world is reinforced in the autobiography of Pak Bo Hi, one of Moon’s top lieutenants. That autobiography, entitled “Messiah: My Testimony to Rev. Sun Myung Moon,” has an entire chapter called “Korea as the Chosen Nation.”

The Unification Church has garnered much negative publicity over the last few decades not such much because of its promotion of Korea as the new Israel but because Moon and many of the organizations he has founded have become
involved in a number of controversial political issues, beginning with a campaign to support Richard Nixon when President Nixon was facing impeachment because of the Watergate scandal. However, there is another Korean new religion with a global presence that has not attracted nearly as much attention as the Unification Church has. Won Buddhism, despite its name, is a new religious organization that has its origins in the enlightenment of its founder, Pak Chung-bin, in 1916. Won Buddhism does not claim that Korea is the homeland of Buddhism. It does claim, however, that it provides a Buddhism more appropriate for the modern world than traditional Buddhism. Moreover, Won Buddhists believe that eventually the rest of the world will recognize that not only does Won Buddhist offer a more up-to-date version of Buddhism, but it offers a religious philosophy that is second to none. As the Scriptures of Won Buddhism say, “From a spiritual perspective, our nation will become the leader of the many nations of this world.”

In another sign of Won Buddhist nationalism, those scriptures quote the founder bragging about Korea’s Diamond Mountains, saying “they are peerless under heaven so, in the near future, they will be designated as an international park and be tended resplendently by various nations. Subsequently, people in the world will vie with each other to find the host of this mountain.... With inseparable affinities connecting this nation, the Diamond Mountains, and its hosts, we will together be the light of the world.”

Despite their conviction that non-Koreans will eventually turn to Korea, and to Won Buddhism, for spiritual guidance, Won Buddhists are not aggressive religious nationalists. Rather than criticizing other religions, they have taken the lead in Korea in ecumenical projects. Moreover, though they have dispatched missionaries overseas, those missionaries try to convert by example rather than argumentation. They provide medical care and other forms for aid for the needy around the globe in the belief that such selfless action will eventually convince others that Won Buddhism is the religion the world needs today. As part of their long-range plan to become a major world religion, they established a graduate school of Won Buddhist studies near Philadelphia in 2001 and also have some 37 temples overseas, including in New York, Los Angeles, and ten other places in North America. There is also a Won Buddhist presence in various countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa. However, so far the Won Buddhist presence has been rather low-key. They have not attracted nearly the attention the Unification Church has.

The somewhat muted religious nationalism of Won Buddhism is not matched by a couple of other Korean new religions that are trying to reach beyond Korea. Dahn World is a group that emerged out of Taejonggyo, a new religion founded in the first decade of the 20th century that teaches that Koreans don’t need to worship a foreign god like Jesus or Buddha since they have a god of their own, Tan’gun. Dahn World claims it is not a religion, but it proclaims that the longevity exercises it promotes (breathing exercises and physical movements similar to those of the inner alchemy practices of Chinese Daoism) originated with Tan’gun. Moreover, it cites as a basis for that claim three texts that comprise the scriptures of Taejonggyo. Dahn World has also erected an outdoor statue of Tan’gun at its US headquarters in Sedona, Arizona. As further evidence that Dahn World, if it is not a religious organization, closely resembles one is the claim that its founder, Seung Heun Lee has been recognized as “one of the fifty preeminent spiritual leaders of the
According to Dahn World, two Koreans, one legendary (Tan’gun) and one alive today (Seung Heun Lee), are leading the world into a new era of peace, health, and happiness.

Though Dahn World has been quite vigorous in its promotion of its Korea-centric philosophy, it differs from the Unification Church in that it has not become involved in politics. Also, unlike Korean Christian missionaries, Dahn World advocates do not tell their followers to abandon their original religious orientation. Although there are now Dahn World centers all over the globe, Dahn World has avoided religious or political controversy. The only controversy involving Dahn World has come from complaints by disgruntled former members who claim that they did not receive all the health benefits Dahn World promised.

There is one more Korean new religion with global pretensions that should be mentioned in any discussion of modern Korean religious nationalism. Jeung San Do teaches that the Supreme Lord of Heaven descended to earth near the end of the 19th-century and lived as a Korean among Koreans as Kang Ch’ung-san (They prefer to romanize his name as “Jeung San”). In other words, God is a Korean. (That is one step up from the Unification Church claim that the messiah is Korean. Unificationists do not view Moon as God.) Jeung San Do also teaches that soon there will be a great cosmic transformation and, afterwards, Korea will be the center of the world, since Korea is where the earthly paradise will emerge from that cataclysm. Moreover, in this coming age, everyone in the world will speak the same language, which believers assume will be Korean. Despite the extremely Korea-centric nature of Jeung San Do teachings, and the Jeung San Do assertion that those who do not become members of Jeung San Do will all suffer horribly and then perish in the coming Great Transformation, Jeung San Do has begun to establish a global presence. It has worship halls in 10 foreign countries, including 7 in the US. Among the countries in which it has a presence, besides the US, the UK, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, and Japan are Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Religious nationalism in Korea, whether Christian, Buddhist, or manifest in one of Korea’s new religions, is different from religious nationalism as it appears in many other countries. Korea’s religious nationalism is a nationalism that has taken on religious overtones more than it is an expression of religious identity in nationalistic terms. In other words, Korean religious nationalism originated from pride in the Korean nation. Religion simply became a vehicle for expressing that pride in the nation. That may be because, since no one religion can claim a majority of the population of South Korea, Koreans don’t identify any one religion with their national, ethnic, or cultural identity.

There is one significant exception to that statement. Shamanism is considered by Koreans to be their one major indigenous religious tradition, since shamanism apparently predates Buddhism and Confucianism on the peninsula and, moreover, Korean shamanism is quite different from the shamanism of neighboring countries. However, shamanism is not officially considered a religion—the government leaves shamanism off the census questionnaires when it asks Koreans about their religious affiliation. The government sometimes dispatches shamans overseas (something it does not do with Christian pastors, Buddhist monks, or other religious ritual specialists) but as dancers, not as religious figures. The shaman ritual
is presented on stages overseas as a secular form of entertainment, stripped of the
gods that are normally an essential part of a shaman ritual.

Korean religious nationalism is more often than not (with the exception of the
relatively small new religions) a nationalism expressed through the Koreanization
of world religions, in which Koreans claim to have developed a superior version of
a religious tradition they share with peoples in many other countries. Such a link
with a broader world religion can mute the danger that Korean religious national-
ism will lead to religious clashes with other peoples, since many of the debates
Koreans hold with other peoples are debates within rather than between religious
traditions. However, that danger is not completely eliminated. When Koreans
engage in too enthusiastic proselytizing, when they try to tell other peoples that,
unless they accept their Korean approach to religion, they are condemned to
damnation, they risk provoking anger in those they are trying to convert. That is
especially a high risk when Korean missionaries try to convert people away from
a religion that has become part of the national and cultural identity of the people
they are trying to convert. (Korean missions to Muslim countries and to the Philip-
pines are examples of such risky proselytizing.)

Religion should draw people together and encourage people to live and work
together harmoniously. Similarly, globalization should also draw us closer to-
gether, since it shrinks the communication and transportation networks that cover
the globe. However, as we can see in the Korean case, both religion and globaliza-
tion can also stimulate further fragmentation of the human community. Global-
ization, by threatening homogenization of culture, stimulates some to try to cling
much more tightly to those cultural elements which distinguish them as a people.
Religion is very often one of those cultural elements wielded as an assertion of
ethnic and national distinctiveness. As we’ve seen in the case of Korean Buddhism
and Korean Christianity, that can even been the case with local versions of world
religions.

I live in a country, Canada, which prides itself on its respect for cultural diversi-
ty. The city I teach in, Vancouver, is a particularly striking example of such divers-
y. We have both Chinese, Japanese, and Korean churches and temples. We have
Sikh temples, Hindu temples, and mosques. Usually, we all get along. That is be-
cause there is a mutual respect for our religious differences. However, we are also
aware in Canada that mutual recognition of differences can easily move beyond
mutual respect to competing claims of superiority. And therein lies the danger of
nationalism arising from the globalization of religion. As globalization has opened
the eyes of Koreans to religious differences around the world, and as that same
globalization has stimulated nationalism in the Korean people, some Koreans have
responded to this changed world by asserting not just Korean distinctiveness but
Korean superiority.

Both religion and nationalism can serve as forces for good and for evil in this
world. They both stimulate the formation of communities in which people are
inspired to help each other overcome the difficulties life brings. They both help us
overcome the innate human tendency to think of ourselves first and encourage us
to work with others to achieve common goals. However, both religion and na-
tionalism can also lead to the erection of barriers separating one community from
another.
Religion can define and reinforce differences between people. Therein lies the potential for problems. Pride in one’s heritage and culture is a good thing, since it can enhance self-esteem. But such pride can slide into arrogance or even contempt for those who don’t share our religious beliefs. Nationalism also contains the potential to cause trouble. Nationalism can easily slide into racism. When religion and nationalism are combined, as they increasingly are in Korea today, the good they each can bring is multiplied, but so is their potential for evil. Religious nationalists can become arrogant and rigid out of a conviction that they embody both truth (the assumption that their country is right) and righteousness (they are moral but those who don’t share their views are not.) Praying to God to take your nation’s side in a military, political, or even sport competition is relatively innocuous. Attacking others because God has chosen your nation to lead the world is not. Fortunately, Korea, despite the growing use of the rhetoric of religious nationalism by non-governmental organizations, has not yet crossed over from a relatively mild chauvinism into dangerous jingoism. Let us hope it stays that way and Korea remains on the safe side of the line dividing national and religious pride from militancy.

ENDNOTES

9. Chōsen no shōkyō oyobi kyōshi yōran (Survey of religions and shrines in Korea) (Keijō: Government-General of Chōsen, Gakumukyoku, Shakai Kyōikuka, 1941), p. 75
12. “From Pottery to Politics, pp. 147-49.
15. Ibid., pp. 299-300.


21. Han, Chul-Ha, “Involvement of the Korean Church in the Evangelization of Asia,” *Korean Church Growth Explosion*, p. 87.


32. Ibid., p. 230.


35. Steve Moon, p. 59.


37. Steve Moon, p. 60

38. Steve Moon, p. 59.

40. For a negative assessment of the Korean missionary drive in the Philippines, see two articles by Michael Gibb that appeared in Asia Sentinel, “Korea’s Filipino Missionary Mania” (December 23, 2008), and “Korea’s Missionaries Charge Ahead” (December 24, 2008). Accessed March 8, 2009, at http://www.asiasentinel.com


55. Hyŏn’gak, Manhaeng: Habŏdŭ esŏ Hwagyesa kkaji (Seoul: Yŏllimwŏn, 1999)


Globalization, Nationalism, and Korean Religion / Baker • 43

Don Baker studies the cultural and religious history of Korea. He received his Ph.D. in Korean history from the University of Washington and has taught at UBC since 1987. He teaches the department’s introduction to Asian civilizations for first-year students as well as undergraduate and graduate courses on Korean history and thought (religion, philosophy, and pre-modern science). In addition, he teaches a graduate seminar on the reproduction of historical trauma in Asia, in which he leads graduate students in an examination of how traumatic events in Asia in the 20th century, such as the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the bombing of Hiroshima, partition of India, China’s Cultural Revolution, and the killing fields of Cambodia have been reproduced in eyewitness accounts, historiography, fiction, and film. He was a co-editor of the Sourcebook of Korean Civilization and is also the author of Joseon huig yugyo wa chonjugyo eui taerip (The Confucian confrontation with Catholicism in the latter half of the Joseon dynasty). His most recent book is Korean Spirituality (University of Hawaii Press, 2008). In 2008, he was awarded the Tasan prize for his research on Tasan Chŏng Yagyong, a writer and philosopher in Korea in the 18th and 19th centuries.
Gender and Moral Visions in Indonesia

Rachel Rinaldo, Ph.D., University of Virginia

“I think the ideal Indonesian woman is intelligent, moral, and on the religious side she is pious. With her goodness and morality she can influence future generations, because from her womb will be born the next generation of the nation.”

Woman cadre from the Prosperous Justice Party, 2005 interview

It has been more than a decade since the collapse of Indonesia’s authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998. The ensuing years have brought democratization, as well as divisive debates to Indonesia’s emerging public sphere. In particular, Indonesians have been preoccupied by controversies over issues such as pornography, polygamy, veiling, Shariah law, abortion, and homosexuality. These debates play out in the mass media, on the internet, in parliament, and even on the streets of major cities. Democratization by its very nature produces political contestations and struggles. But why have these particular kinds of debates have arisen? Why does gender play such a key role in these public debates? And what does examining them tell us about processes of globalization, religion, and politics?

What is striking about the Indonesian debates is that they entail competing ideas about how religion should be incorporated in the nation-state. Political positions on pornography, for example, revolve around whether the state should regulate the media to prevent it from disseminating images that offend Islamic norms of modesty. Debates such as these are moral debates, in that they involve notions of what constitutes the common good, and engage different conceptions of ethics, rights, and freedoms. An intriguing aspect of these debates is that they resemble controversies elsewhere. Debates over abortion and homosexuality are prominent features of American politics, while veiling and polygamy have become subjects of intense discussion in European countries with Muslim immigrant populations (Luker 1985, Göle 2002, Bowen 2006).

Yet another connection between these debates is their gendered character. In the U.S. and Indonesia, debates over issues like pornography are often framed as struggles over values, but such framings overlook the ways ideas about gender are profoundly implicated in these controversies (Stein 2002). Ideas about proper moral behavior entail bodily practices and dispositions, to which gender is central. For sociologists who have taken up the lens of practice theory, religion is understood in terms of actions rather than just beliefs. Turner, for example, argues that acts of religious piety involve bodily practices that may involve changes of habits and which create new forms of religious practice that challenge existing social arrangements, including secular forms of citizenship (Turner 2008). As I discuss in this paper, the Indonesian debates about polygamy and pornography render problematic women’s bodies and behavior, but also instantiate notions of ethics, rights, and freedoms.

Discourses and practices of gender are therefore fundamental to moral debates. But increasingly in Indonesia, women activists from all sides of the political spectrum raise their voices in these controversies. In this paper, I examine
how women from two Muslim organizations, Fatayat Nahdlatul Ulama and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) engage in these public debates and express different moral visions of politics and gender. Investigating the public interventions of Indonesian women activists helps illuminate the complex ways in which these important debates are gendered.1

In the following discussion, I argue that global processes, especially the intersection of transnational Islam and feminism with democratization and the rise of religious civil society, are driving moral debates in the Indonesian public sphere. Feminist scholarship on gender and nation-states helps to explain why gender is a site of attempts in Indonesia to define or redefine the boundaries between religion and the state. Gender’s centrality as an arena of broader social and political struggle therefore makes it critical for understanding the global Islamic revival. The moral debates discussed in this article are attempts to define norms of citizenship, to influence the relationship between religion and public life, and to secure the gender structure of public and private life.

I also propose that these moral debates provide insight into patterns of globalization more generally. Many scholars have focused on the question of how global discourses intersect with local subjectivities (Boellstorff 2005, Blackwood 2008, Davis 2007). Building on Sassen’s (2008) work on assemblages of authority and rights, I suggest that moral debates can no longer be understood only within a national framework, but must be seen as related to normative orders that are not confined to the territory of the nation-state. Yet these normative frameworks such as Islam and feminism exist in the abstract – their meaning emerges as they manifest in public spheres such as that of Indonesia. It is precisely through national debates that many Indonesians adapt and negotiate global discourses. Yet while these global processes render women’s bodies objects of debate, they also enable women to become participants in discussions about morality. As I show later in this article, the Indonesian women activists draw on and enact different global discourses to express their distinctive moral visions for Indonesia’s future. Sassen suggests that the state is no longer the central source of moral authority, and these debates in Indonesia indeed demonstrate this point. Nevertheless, the debates also show that state power is very much a subject of contestation in Indonesia, and that gender is one of the main arenas where this struggle takes place.

**INDONESIAN CONTEXT AND RESEARCH METHODS**

Indonesia’s 237 million inhabitants, about 90% of whom are Muslim, make it the country with the world’s largest Muslim population. Indonesia was ruled by an authoritarian and secular military regime, led by General Suharto, from 1965-1998. The Asian economic crisis helped to spur a popular democratic opposition movement, and Suharto stepped down in May 1998. Indonesia held democratic elections in 1999 and 2004. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Indonesia experienced outbreaks of religious and ethnic violence, as well as terrorist attacks linked to Muslim extremists. However, in the last few years stability and economic growth have returned, though some analysts argue that democratic reforms have stalled. While Islam arrived in Indonesia in the 1400s, Islamic practice in Indonesia has been diverse and often localized. In the 1970s, transnational flows of Islam helped spur an Islamic revival. These flows came via students who studied in the Middle
East, where they were influenced by the ideas of organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The returnees helped to establish student groups and institutions dedicated to cultivating piety and infusing all aspects of life with Islam. Another related flow was news of the 1979 Iranian revolution, which some scholars argue was influential in Indonesia. By the 1980s, translated books and pamphlets by Middle Eastern Muslim thinkers were being circulated in Indonesia, as religious publications could sometimes circumvent the government’s media censorship. The Islamic revival seems to have deepened with democratization, as increasing numbers of Indonesians are practicing Islam in a more visibly pious manner (Brenner 2005 and 1996, Doorn-Harder 2006).

This article draws on ethnographic research with women activists in Indonesia between 2002 and 2008. I compare women from the Jakarta headquarters of two organizations, Fatayat NU and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The women in these organizations are demographically similar but express different views on gender, religion, and politics.

Fatayat is the young women’s division of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama which is estimated to have 45 million members. NU is considered to be one of the mainstays of Indonesian Islam, and Fatayat is characterized by an interpretive and often revisionist approach to Islamic texts. Most of the Fatayat staff and volunteers I met were university educated, and worked as teachers or lecturers. Fatayat originally functioned as something of a women’s auxiliary within the NU, doing community service and charity work. But in the early 1990s, Fatayat leaders were influenced by international discourses of gender equality through participation in trainings and other events organized by international donors like the Ford Foundation as well as local NGOs inspired by discourses of Islamic liberalism that were circulating globally. Fatayat leaders now see women’s rights and empowerment as a key part of their mission and consider themselves to be part of a broader women’s movement.

The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) was founded in 1998, and is one of Indonesia’s most successful new political parties. While the party does not call for an Islamic state, it advocates making Islam the source of law and policy in a more general sense. PKS received about 7% of the national vote in the 2004 and close to 8% in the 2009 elections, with stronger showings in urban areas like Jakarta. The PKS women I interviewed were university educated, married with children, and many worked as teachers or lecturers. However, most PKS women I met came from families who were not affiliated with the NU organization.

While the women of Fatayat and PKS emerged from somewhat different kinds of Islamic backgrounds, they share a location in the urbanizing middle classes and they have all been deeply influenced by the Islamic revival in Indonesia. They have in common a commitment to religious piety and practicing Islam in all aspects of their lives. Yet as we shall see, for these two groups of women, the notion of a more Islamic society holds different meanings and is associated with diverse political projects.

**Culture Wars, Moral Panics, and Public Controversies**

Scholars of Indonesian politics first drew attention to increasing public debates over gender and religion in the 1990s. Brenner (1999) and Sen (1998) analyzed how
the media coverage of “career women” and discussions of veiling reflected widespread tensions over economic changes that were drawing women into universities and the formal workforce. In these debates, women were often accused of neglecting their responsibilities and thereby risking the nation’s future.

Rather than dying down after the regime transition in 1998, these kinds of moral debates became an entrenched feature of Indonesia’s increasingly open public sphere. Pornography and polygamy, which I examine in this paper, have been two of the most contentious. The main participants in these public sphere activities are, as might be expected, mostly members of the urban middle classes. Nevertheless, these debates do arouse widespread interest and discussions, particularly in popular media, and women activists have been quite vocal about expressing their opinions.

The current moral debates in Indonesia should be understood as a manifestation of a broader cultural phenomenon – sometimes referred to as “culture wars” in the American context. Hunter’s (1991) original argument that differences of ideology or “values” increasingly trump social class or ethnic/racial status as a source of polarization has been much debated in American sociology. Nevertheless, the core of Hunter’s thesis, that differences around conceptions of morality are becoming sources of polarization, is worth considering in the Indonesian context.

A subset of culture wars is the phenomenon of moral panics, which also resonates with recent events in Indonesia. David Garland (2008) argues that, increasingly, moral panics are expressed in the form of culture wars, in which “specific social groups engage in moral politics in order to redistribute social status and declare one form of life superior to its rivals” (Garland, 17). Garland also suggests that an essential aspect of moral panics, and by extension culture wars, is the perception of the risks that modernity brings. Garland’s work reminds us that the debates and controversies in Indonesia are profoundly normative. The debates over polygamy, for example, reveal that family forms are an important way of defining group identity, and are closely connected with ideas about proper womanhood as well as the relationship between piety and the public sphere.

**Gender and the Nation-State**

Although moral panics and culture wars often revolve around gender and sexuality, the literature on culture wars often fails to make these elements explicit, emphasizing the broader rubric of “values” instead. But feminist scholars have made significant contributions to the study of nationalism and nation-states. They argue that not only do state policies constrain gender relations, but “ideas about the differences between men and women shape the ways in which states are imagined, constituted, and legitimated” (Gal & Kligman 2000: 4). Because of their reproductive capacities, women in many societies are seen as the embodiment of the community’s tradition and history. Their behavior and roles help to construct the symbolic boundaries of the community, whether that community is an ethnic group or a nation. In times of social change, as the boundaries of the community are threatened or identities are shifting, women’s bodies and behavior often become a focus of attention (Moghadam 1994, Yuval-Davis 1997).

Since 1998, the Indonesian nation-state has been engaged in a process of redefinition. Control over state resources and power came up for grabs, new social actors
like pious Muslims have moved into the public sphere, religious organizations and figures have become fixtures of politics, processes like rural to urban migration have speeded up, gender roles and family forms continue to evolve, and Indonesia’s national identity remains in flux. It is not surprising that in an era of great flux, many of the moral debates in Indonesia revolve around women’s bodies and roles in the nation.

Gender, then, is a critical dimension of culture wars and moral debates. But what is also intriguing about gender in Indonesian public debates is how women activists are able to intervene in them. While feminist scholars who study gender and the nation-state often see women as symbols or victims of these processes, I suggest here that it is this very gendered nature of moral debates, somewhat surprisingly, which can facilitate women’s participation in those debates. To understand how this happens, I turn to a discussion of how moral debates are shaped by globalization.

**GLOBALIZATION**

In thinking about why gender is so central to moral debates in the public sphere, it is crucial to consider how these debates are shaped by structural forces, especially globalization. The Indonesian nation-state’s process of redefinition has been driven in large part by the same global processes that are reshaping and transforming nation-states more generally. Democratization, transnational flows of culture and religion, as well as funding from international donors and NGOs, have helped to promote the rise of religious civil society in Indonesia since the late 1980s (Brenner 1996, Hefner 2000, Van Doorn-Harder 2006). At the same time, democratization, neo-liberal economic policies, and political decentralization have resulted in a situation in which the state, if not necessarily weakened, does not exert the same ideological control that it once did (Hadiz & Robison 2004, Sidel 2006). These developments have helped to foster a more open public sphere, which is constituted by a variety of publics. As these processes took off in the early 1990s, and as religious civil society emerged as the main avenue of opposition to the government, the door was opened for increasing moral debates.

Against this background, I argue that two global flows are crucial for understanding the Indonesian context: the Islamic revival and transnational feminism. Other scholars have also examined how these two flows have influenced Indonesian women activists (Brenner 2005). My argument furthers this work by proposing that these processes help to fuel gendered moral debates, as well as provide opportunities for women to engage in those debates.

Transnational feminism has been studied at great length, and many scholars have examined the ways feminist discourses are adapted, negotiated, or contested in local contexts (Desai & Naples 2002, Davis 2007). Feminism has certainly been important for women’s activism in Indonesia. Though Indonesian women activists rarely use the term to describe themselves, they have a long history of engagement with ideas of gender equality and some organizations view themselves as nodes in a transnational women’s movement. This development has been facilitated by the emergence since the early 1990s of international NGOs who fund programs targeted toward women’s empowerment and equality. Some women activists in Indonesia have used Islamic frameworks to argue for equality and rights (Rinaldo
Feminism has also produced contestations in Indonesia, with opponents accusing it of being destructive to religious values and family structures. Whether or not activists espouse feminism, it is clear that this global framework is a reference point for discussions about women’s rights, as well as for debates about religion’s place in public life.

The global Islamic revival has also been the subject of intense scholarly scrutiny (Juergensmeyer 2000, Roy 2005, Mahmood 2005), though it is not often conceptualized as a global process in and of itself. As scholars have chronicled, the first major wave of the Islamic revival in Indonesia, beginning in the 1980s, was influenced by a new generation of Indonesians who had received scholarships to study in the Middle East. Many of these students brought back the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, which emphasized Islam as a way of life (Hefner 2000, Sidel 2006). Although many of these students were most interested in personal spiritual renewal, an important subset of this generation disavowed any separation between religion and politics. Increased funding from Middle Eastern sources helped bring Indonesians to study in the Middle East throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and also funded new Muslim schools within Indonesia. By the early 1990s, growing numbers of Indonesians were involved in religious study groups at school or in their neighborhoods, and young women were adopting the veil in large numbers. The early 1990s demonstrations demanding the right to wear the veil in schools and opposing the national lottery were among the first large-scale public displays of resistance to the Suharto regime since the mid-1970s.

The Islamic revival produced a series of debates in which women’s behavior was often the central issue. There was resistance to veiling, both from the state and from older generations who saw it as foreign and fanatical. But the veil was as much of a symbol of renewed piety as it was a token of resistance to a government seen as authoritarian, secular, and overly Western (Brenner 1996). Nearly 20 years later, the success of the call to modesty is visible in the large numbers of women wearing Muslim clothing, particularly in urban areas. On many university campuses, for example, most female students are now veiled (Smith-Hefner 2007).

By facilitating moral debates in the public sphere, global processes have helped to shift the relationship between religion and state in Indonesia. The state is no longer able to fully manage religion, as it did during the Suharto era (Sidel 2005). Moreover, as Sassen (2008) argues, a vital aspect of global processes is the emergence of normative orders that are often specialized. While assemblages of territory, rights, and authority have up till now been congruent with the nation-state, Sassen contends that we are now seeing the rise of normative orders that do not line up neatly with the nation-state. This development results in growing challenges to the moral authority of the nation-state.

I build on Sassen’s work to think about Islam and feminism as non-national normative frameworks. This concept is more useful analytically than the more nebulous ‘global flows,’ as it highlights the moral features of these discourses. Religion could probably be said to be one of the original globalizing forces, and Islam, with its vision of a global Muslim community, has often been in tension with the nation-state (Asad 2003). That is not to say that Islam cannot be harnessed to the nation-state, as religious nationalism attempts to do. But Islam does have a significant non-national aspect in Indonesia in the sense that Islamic ideas and practices
have increasingly flowed across borders, in ways the state has recently been unable or unwilling to control. For example, as in other majority Muslim countries, since the early 1990s, Saudi donors have helped to build educational institutions that promote more conservative interpretations of Islam. Similarly, feminism has long had a global imagination. In fact, feminism was one of the first social movements to mobilize in this global manner (Jayawardena 1986). But it was not until more recently that feminist institutions began to have the ability to fund local organizations, and that feminist ideas began to be incorporated in the development strategies of international donors. While the ideas that constitute feminism are variable and dependent on context, over the past thirty years we have seen the development of a global network of feminist institutions and organizations that seek to empower women (Davis 2007). So while neither Islam or feminism is new, it is only more recently that these discourses have been attached to global networks of institutions, a development that coincided with the opening of Indonesia’s public sphere.

Gender is rather obviously implicated in both of these normative frameworks. While feminism is often studied as a social movement, it is also, as Davis (2007) writes, an epistemological project; that is, “a project that generates knowledge and knowledge practices” (Davis, 8) related to gender and bodies. In this way, Islam and feminism are both ethical orientations that may demand changes to social arrangements, especially those related to family and gender. While Islam and feminism are not at all monolithic, and like all normative frameworks are manifest through interpretation and practice, as guides for how to live and understand the world, they include prescriptions for how men and women should relate to each other, organize households, and reproduce. Their transnational circulation thereby often fuels moral debates over women’s behavior and rights. Yet it is precisely in such public sphere debates that Indonesians adapt and negotiate global discourses. As we shall see in the next section, Indonesian Muslim women use Islam and feminism to participate in public debates and advocate their own moral visions for Indonesia’s future.

WOMEN ACTIVISTS AND MORAL DEBATES: PORNOGRAPHY AND POLYGAMY

I now turn to the multifaceted interventions of women activists in public controversies over pornography and polygamy. The Anti-Pornography bill, passed in 2008, spurred angry demonstrations, myriad newspaper and magazine articles and op-eds, not to mention heated debates in parliament.

Concern about pornography became more widely expressed in Indonesia following the rise of a freewheeling popular media after 1998. While older laws providing some forms of censorship remained on the books, many television shows and magazines began to feature subject matter or images that some Indonesians considered indecent, such as women in very revealing clothing. The furor that erupted over the popular singer Inul Daratista’s dance style in 2002 and 2003 was an indication of a backlash from increasingly pious Muslims. Some Indonesians felt that Inul was merely the tip of the iceberg of a progressively more sexualized culture, one in which kids were watching pornography at internet cafes and buying counterfeit “blue” movies on the street. In an article published in the popular
newsweekly Tempo, for example, Syamsul Muarif, the Minister for Communications and Information, said that 60% of Indonesians were accessing porn on the internet and beyond. “So, because that’s what they like, the shows are also being allowed on television,” he warned (Tempo, May 14, 2003).

The momentum for new legislation on pornography seems to have come from the ranks of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). PKS cadres adhere to more textual approach to Islam, often arguing that Islamic values should be the source of national and local law. In 2003, I attended a seminar and demonstration against pornography held by the PKS women’s division – the speakers included a representative from the Indonesian Council of Ulemas, a quasi-governmental body that rules on matters of Islamic law.

At the seminar, pornography was consistently depicted as a threat to the nation. The head of the party’s women’s division introduced the event with the statement, “We face the challenge of building an Indonesia which is moral.” Later, a PKS legislator argued that Indonesia was under threat from “American cultural exports,” including pornography. “We should not be afraid to express the desire of the majority,” she said. “We have a responsibility to the next generation to make a better Indonesia.”

Several of the speakers defined pornography very broadly, as showing a woman without covering her aurat (a term from Arabic meaning the parts of a woman’s body that should be forbidden from public view – for many Indonesian Muslims, aurat stretches from a woman’s upper chest to her ankles). At this time, although it was not discussed in the seminar, a bill to outlaw pornography was already being written.

In February 2006, PKS members introduced into parliament draft legislation, written in collaboration with MUI and other religious authorities. As originally written, the bill was extremely broad, and would have outlawed kissing in public and bikinis on beaches. Public outcry forced its return to parliament for revision and it remained stalled there for over a year. In November 2008, a somewhat revised version was passed which made exceptions for “sexual materials” as part of traditional culture and fine arts.7

PKS’s interest in pornography reflects an agenda to reform Indonesia through a highly public form of morality. For many of the women in PKS, the organization is not merely a party, but a vehicle for instilling Islamic values in society. As one woman told me, “I hope that politics in Indonesia will be based on Islam, as the majority of the population is Muslim. Islam is believed to be rahmatan li al-`âlâmîn, bringing goodness to the whole world. So, if it is implemented, I am sure Indonesia will progress.”

Women activists in Indonesia’s public sphere found themselves on very different sides of the pornography debate. While those who see themselves as part of the women’s rights movement strongly opposed it,8 women in Muslim political parties like PKS supported it. Yet both thought that they had the broader interests of Indonesian women in mind. Interestingly, while pornography was a divisive issue for the American and Australian feminist movements in the 1980s, this was not the case for women’s rights proponents in Indonesia. Both religious and secular women’s rights activists in Indonesia opposed the bill because of concerns about censorship and effects on gender equality. While few Indonesian women have
advanced the kind of “pro-pornography” or “sex positive” positions that emerged in the U.S. and Australian context, support for freedom of expression within women’s rights organizations led even those who have expressed concern about pornography and public morality in the past to oppose the bill.

Demonstrations against the pornography bill were initiated by women’s rights organizations, but it was at first unclear whether Muslim women’s organizations would oppose or support the legislation. In March 2006, however, Fatayat leaders weighed in with a carefully worded statement opposing the bill because it failed to provide protections for women and children victimized by the sex industry, and arguing that pre-existing legislation could be more effectively implemented. This statement was widely reprinted in the national media and especially on the blogs that sprang up as part of the opposition to the bill. One Fatayat activist explained the group’s stance, reiterating the importance of empowering women:

“As for Fatayat, we agree that pornography shouldn’t be allowed, but we also don’t think these laws should be passed soon. It’s not that we agree with pornography, but there are many paragraphs that harm women… For example, women if they go out after midnight must have an escort or they can be arrested. Now what’s that for? Meanwhile, it’s OK for men, and I think that’s unfair. So I think there are a number of items that really harm women, so we rejected it… Yes, there are things that I agree with, but these laws don’t empower women, in fact, it’s the opposite.”

At demonstrations and other events, individual Fatayat leaders expressed more scathing views on the bill. One activist linked it to recent attempts to pass legislation inspired by Islamic law, noting: “The phenomena of the anti-pornography bill started with the appearance of by-laws in some of the regions. Although not explicitly packaged as anti-pornography, they have put in place of anti-prostitution laws, morality laws and even Islamic Shariah laws. All these laws attempt to force women back into their homes” (Koesoemawiria 2006).

For many women in Fatayat, the debate over pornography was a distraction from more serious problems. When I asked Fatayat members about what they considered to be the most important problems facing women and the country as a whole, unlike women in PKS, they rarely mentioned morality. Instead, they tended to cite need for political and economic reforms. As one Fatayat volunteer explained, “The rich are getting richer, the poor are staying poor, the poor don’t have a strong bargaining position. Civil society in Indonesia is still weak… up till now government programs are always top-down, not bottom-up, they don’t channel the aspirations of the society.”

For most of 2007, the bill was being revised in a parliamentary committee. In early 2008, I asked women from PKS about their support for the bill, and why they thought it has proved so controversial. They did not think the bill was too extreme, but blamed the difficulties on the power of media interests as well as on supporters of the bill who hadn’t explained it well enough so that people would understand it. One woman cadre, who was confident that it would soon pass, explained:

“I think it’s maybe because of the communication factor, which isn’t always easy. Sometimes there are obstacles, debates on various sides, which are not clearly communicated and so we don’t understand each other, are not open with each other. But the main thing is that we supported it because it protects society from the bad effects of pornography and porno activity…. In terms of our position, we have already been very clear
that our support for it is related to how the next generation of children can be protected. So that our society will be morally better, because morality is very important to improve ourselves.”

The pornography example shows how globalization drives gendered moral debates. A public furor arose over media images, especially of women’s bodies, that were popularly felt to be a negative result of Indonesia’s increasing openness to the rest of the world. The expansion of the Islamic revival and the growing power of Muslim civil society organizations produced a growing concern over moral behavior in public spaces. The new interest in modesty was visible in the growing numbers of women adopting Muslim clothing in the early 2000s (Smith-Hefner 2007). In the pornography debate Islamic discourses of virtue, especially for women, were linked to concerns for national progress. Women in PKS used these global discourses of Islamic piety to argue that certain kinds of depictions of female bodies were a threat to the moral order of the nation. Meanwhile opponents of the bill drew on transnational feminism to argue that the bill would contravene progress toward women’s empowerment. In particular, women in Fatayat wielded liberal discourses of freedom, civil society, and rights to contend that greater state regulation of expression is not the way to achieve gender equality.

**Polygamy**

While polygamy is not as closely attached to particular legislation as the pornography debate is, it has been a topic of increasing interest among Muslims in Indonesia since 2000 (Brenner 2006, Nurmila 2009). In fact, though the practice is not particularly common in Indonesia, polygamy was periodically a contentious moral issue throughout the 20th century. During the nationalist movement in the 1920s and 1930s, women activists were split along religious/secular lines, with Muslim women’s groups opposing restrictions on polygamy (Locher-Scholten 2000). According to Locher-Scholten, Muslim women’s groups did not embrace polygamous marriage, but rather, opposed the colonial state’s attempts to intervene in religious practice. In the 1970s, elite women’s organizations pushed for a ban on polygamy. The government responded to their concerns with the 1974 marriage law, which made it extremely difficult for civil servants to marry more than one wife. By the 1980s, Indonesia’s growing Muslim middle class generally saw polygamy as a sign of backwardness, although state attempts to ban it might have met with some resistance.

Yet in the wake of 1998, polygamy once again emerged as a moral debate. Much has already been written about the 2003 “polygamy contest” sponsored by the entrepreneur Puspo Wardoyo (Brenner 2006), which resulted in calls by women activists to boycott his restaurant chain.9 The political figure Hamzah Haz, Megawati’s vice president from 2001-2004, has promoted his polygamous marriage as an ideal for Muslims. In 2006, the debate became even more polarized with the well-liked Muslim preacher Aa Gym’s announcement that he had married a second wife. His popularity immediately plummeted (Hoesterey 2008) and his commercial empire has shrunk. The polygamy debates generated an entire sub-category of books and pamphlets extolling the values of polygamous families or conversely, arguing that polygamy has no place in contemporary Islam. Aa Gym’s revelations inspired competing street demonstrations by women, as one article describes:
“The debate moved into the street, with opposing groups marching and carrying signs. ‘Polygamy is halal (allowed in Islam). Extramarital affairs are haram (forbidden),’ said one of the pro-polygamy posters. Moments later, another group of women marched at the same location, shouting anti-polygamy slogans. ‘One, I love my mother. Two, I love my father. Three, I love my brothers and sisters. One, two, three, I reject polygamy,’ they chanted to the tune of a well-known children’s song.”

Polygamy has also become grist for Indonesia’s pop culture mill. In 2008, millions of young Indonesians made the film “Ayat-Ayat Cinta” (Verses of Love) a smash hit. “Ayat-Ayat Cinta,” which ends with the marriage of its romantic hero to a second wife, has apparently helped to spawn a new trend for Islamic romance stories and films. While the country’s president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and leaders of Muslim organizations praised the film for presenting the story of a pious youth getting married in an Islamic manner, women’s rights advocates were uncomfortable with what they saw as the film’s gentle treatment of polygamy. And indeed, “Ayat-Ayat Cinta” followed on the heels of an earlier work, “Love for Share,” by Nia Dinata, one of Indonesia’s leading independent filmmakers. Dinata drew on her own experiences growing up in a polygamous family to make “Love for Share,” which harshly condemned polygamy.

Since the 1970s, many Indonesian Muslim women’s groups have come to oppose polygamy, Fatayat included. Fatayat leaders don’t dispute the fact that the Quran allows men to marry four wives, but influenced by the work of Muslim reformists such as Fatima Mernissi, Ali Asghar Engineer, and others, they maintain that the verse about polygamy needs to be understood in its historical context (to be discussed below). Clearly this argument also derives from their hope to promote a more gender egalitarian way of practicing Islam. Fatayat leaders argue that the wording of the main verse on polygamy makes it clear that men are only permitted to marry more than one wife if they can support all the wives equally. To accomplish that is basically impossible in this day and age, they argue, especially when it comes to dealing with wives’ emotional needs. Fatayat has published books and articles as an attempt to disseminate this view more widely.

For example, in an article in the national newspaper Kompas, Maria Ulfah Ansor, the head of Fatayat, contends that the Prophet Muhammad’s practice of polygamy was a special circumstance because during his lifetime there were many widows due to tribal conflicts. She maintains that the “basic principle” of marriage in Islam is monogamy, and that the verses about polygamy should be seen in the context of a particular time and place. Nevertheless, Fatayat’s position as the women’s division of Nahdlatul Ulama makes advocacy for their views on polygamy rather complicated. Though many NU leaders discourage polygamy and reiterate the view that a husband must have the means to fully support his wives, they do not fully reject polygamy either. NU is a large and diverse organization, and there are some polygamous members. Fatayat activists must therefore be careful not to stray too deeply into the polygamy debates.

PKS women express a very different view of polygamy. In 2003, when I first met Nita, a founding member of the party, she told me that none of the leadership was polygamous. But when I returned for additional research in 2005, other party members mentioned that some leading PKS figures, including Anis Matta, the party’s secretary general, had more than one wife. More recently, in 2008, the former head of the party, Hidayat Nurwahid, also married a second wife.
The PKS women I met held quite diverse opinions on the practice of polygamy, but nearly all argued against what they saw as efforts to ban it. The sentiments of one PKS women cadre whom I interviewed in 2003 were widely shared. Nita argued that polygamy should be seen as a provision for special cases.

“Islam, I think, represents rules from Allah. This is what we call Shariah. Allah knows the weaknesses of humanity and makes rules for this. Therefore, for humans for whom one wife is not enough, Islam opens the opportunity for polygamy…If a man really wants to have children, but his wife has been told by a doctor that it is not possible for her to have children, then Islam permits polygamy. Also for a man who has high sexual needs, Islam permits polygamy. Because it is not possible for a woman to serve the man all day long, so a man may take another wife….In practice, we have to pay attention to the context of the polygamy. If it is only to satisfy desire, it is in contradiction to Islam. Unfortunately in Indonesia, many people don’t understand that.”

The concern about needing to make provisions for male sexual needs is a common feature of pro-polygamy discourse in Indonesia, as some proponents claim that it discourages adultery. Some PKS women acknowledged to me that they did not like the idea of polygamy, but felt that as Muslims they had to accept it (none of the women I interviewed admitted to being in polygamous relationships). And it is this view that is the key to understanding PKS women’s stance on polygamy – they adhere to a strict textual approach to the Quran, which does not accept the historicized approach of Fatayat and many Muslim reformists.

For example, when asked about her opinion of polygamy, Susanti told me that Muslims cannot simply pick and choose what they like from the Quran. “The problem is that we can only place our trust in Allah. Certainly for a husband who wants to be polygamous, there must be many considerations. He must ask permission from his wife and his children, whether they are ready for it. Individually, as a Muslim I accept it. This is because I want my Islam to be full, comprehensive and not choosing just what is nice and leaving behind what is not so great. I want to be like that.”

A few PKS women were more willing to defend the practice. Yet given that even within PKS circles the prevalence of polygamy is probably low, polygamy is more of a symbolic commitment for PKS women. Some studies of gender norms and the division of labor within evangelical families in the U.S. have found a gap between ideals of male household headship and actual practices. Gallagher (2004) proposes that the commitment to male authority is a way of symbolically defining community boundaries around conservative gender norms. Similarly, I suggest that PKS women’s espousal of polygamy represents a commitment to a particular approach to practicing Islam, one based on a rather literalist reading of the Quran, which defines the identity of PKS.

As with pornography, the debate over polygamy is driven by global processes. Global Islamic normative frameworks have helped to fuel an urge to return to what are seen as authentically Islamic practices, including polygamy, which embody particular conceptions of women’s roles and family forms. Moreover, the growing legitimacy of more textually conservative approaches to Islam has empowered those Indonesians, such as members of PKS, who argue that the verses of the Quran should be questioned. Additionally, the polygamy debate also seems to respond to a perception of a national crisis in marriage and morality.
Until recently in Indonesia, most Muslims saw polygamy as inappropriate for a modern society. While few PKS women can be categorized as proponents of polygamy, their opposition to limitations on polygamy is couched in terms of a commitment to practicing Islam as fully as possible, which means accepting the text of the Quran for what it is. PKS’s argument represents an emerging approach to practicing Islam “fully” that bears the marks of the global Islamic revival and the increasing emphasis on living an Islamic life. Yet other global Islamic discourses with a more liberal bent, as well as transnational feminist frameworks, have helped to produce stronger challenges to polygamy that are expressed in Islamic terms. While Fatayat women draw on Indonesia’s established traditions of interpretation in their approach to Islam, they use these traditions in support of explicitly egalitarian aims. Influenced by Middle Eastern Muslim feminists like Fatima Mernissi, the women of Fatayat interweave revisionist readings of Islamic texts with discourses of gender equality and women’s rights to argue against polygamy.

**GLOBALIZATION, MORAL DEBATES, AND GENDER IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE**

This paper has sought to understand the ways globalization intersects with local subjectivities through an examination of moral debates in Indonesia. Moral debates have become an entrenched feature of the Indonesian public sphere in recent years, and gender is central to these debates.

The debates over pornography and polygamy represent a kind of culture war in Indonesia, in which opposing sides argue for their own notion of the common good as superior to others. Supporters of the pornography bill argue that it is necessary to combat national moral degradation and promote more appropriately Islamic values, while opponents claim that it is detrimental to freedom of expression and does nothing to empower women. Proponents of polygamy, and those resistant to limitations on it, argue that polygamy is intrinsic to Islam and that the state cannot interfere in Islamic practice. Meanwhile, opponents of polygamy contest the view that it is inherent to Islam, and argue that it conflicts with equality and justice within the family.

The gendered aspects of these two debates are inescapable. The pornography bill allows the state to regulate the ways bodies are depicted in media, but also how they appear in public spaces. The concept of modesty inherent to this legislation is not gender-neutral, for it is nearly always the female body that is considered disruptive and must be covered. Similarly, polygamy, or more specifically, bigamy, enshrines a distinct hierarchy between the husband and his wives. Allowing or encouraging men to have multiple partners while women are forbidden to do so is predicated on the belief that gender difference is natural and inevitable, and that the role of a woman is to produce heirs.

Why are women such a subject of debate in contemporary Indonesia? Feminist scholarship provides a framework for understanding this issue. The events of 1998 and the decade since have been a period of tremendous social and political change in Indonesia. Islam has become a force in politics and public life, the state no longer provides many social programs, the ranks of the middle class continue to expand, and the country is rapidly urbanizing. Many of these shifts have direct consequences for gender relations. The rising age of marriage and growing numbers of women attending higher education and joining the formal workforce have
produced anxieties around family and reproduction, as well as resulted in some women seeking egalitarian marriages. And because of the way women symbolize tradition and community identity, it is no surprise that moral debates in the public sphere focus on them.

Yet examining these debates through the lens of globalization yields insights about patterns of globalization, as well as changing forms of power and domination in the contemporary world. Global processes have helped to shift the relationship between religion and state in many countries, including Indonesia. Democratization, neo-liberalism, and the rise of civil society mean that the state exerts less control over the moral order. In the early years of the New Order, from the late 1960s through the 1970s, there was a fairly clear division between religion and politics. The later years of the New Order, from the 1980s onwards, were characterized by the state’s increasing attempts to manage and control religion, especially Islam (Sidel 2005). But since 1998, many Muslim groups have sought to re-forge this relationship no comma in a variety of ways. Groups like PKS aim for the state to promote a more Islamic society, while Fatayat seeks a role for religion in the public sphere as a way to promote justice and equality.

Not only do national anxieties about social and political change occur on the terrain of gender, but moral debates about gender are also driven by global processes, especially the emergence of normative orders that are not contained within the nation-state. These normative orders, which may clash or intersect with the state, fuel debates about existing social arrangements, and especially, questions of what constitutes moral behavior and the public good.

In Indonesia, the Islamic revival has called into question norms of citizenship and the relationship between religion and state. Yet as we have seen, global discourses not only stimulate moral debates but also promote contestation in those debates. Gender, with its close relationship to sexuality and reproduction, is not surprisingly a key aspect of these globally driven moral debates. Islam and feminism present women activists with the means to engage in these debates, providing tools for arguments for a more Islamic society and a traditional gender order, or conversely, for gender equality and women’s rights. Thus, it is precisely in these kinds of debates that Indonesian women activists such as those in PKS and Fatayat adapt global discourses to express their own moral visions for the future of Indonesia.

The Indonesian case sheds light not only on how global processes produce moral debates in the public sphere, but also the complex ways gender is implicated in such struggles. While the emergence of global normative frameworks may mean that the state is no longer the central moral authority, state power is more than ever an object of contestation in Indonesia. Examining recent Indonesian moral controversies demonstrates that ideas about gender are very much tied to broader visions of religion and the nation-state. While these processes are driven by global structures, these same global structures and processes are also helping to produce new subjectivities whose public interventions target the nation-state. Muslim women activists in Indonesia have begun to take advantage of these developments. Nevertheless, we should be cautious about equating women’s agency with liberation, for Muslim women’s activism is not necessarily oriented towards equality. While some activists seek equality and rights, others pursue stronger moral regulation.
The question that remains is not merely the eventual outcomes of such debates for women in Indonesia, but the broader consequences of competing moral orders for social change and power relations in the contemporary world.

Acknowledgement

This paper, originally written while the author was a Kiriyama Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim, is an earlier version of a forthcoming (2011) article in Qualitative Sociology, entitled: “Muslim Women, Moral Visions: Globalization and Gendered Debates in Indonesia.” I am thankful to the organizers and participants of the 2009 Religion and Globalization in Asia conference for their helpful comments and suggestions on this paper.

ENDNOTES

1. I use a broad definition of women’s activism to refer to women organizing other women for purposes thought to benefit women more generally. This includes activism by women oriented towards equality or rights (which I call women’s rights activism), as well as activism by women more oriented toward the goal of building an Islamic society.

2. The organizations in this study have encouraged me to use their real names. However, all individual names have been changed.

3. For more information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_legislative_election,_2009.


5. In her influential work, Yuval-Davis provides case studies of how states and nationalist movements have sought to regulate women’s bodies. A classic example is Nazi Germany, where Hitler’s regime exhorted women to remain in the house and bear children to reproduce the nation. More recently, scholars have argued that Muslim groups’ demands for women to veil or to behave modestly represent attempts to reformulate the nation through control over women and reproduction (Ong 1996; Gole 1996). Similarly, scholars of South Asia have written about how Hindu nationalists seek to marginalize Muslims based on their alleged mistreatment of women. Here again, women are mobilized as a symbol of a community’s status (Jeffery and Basu 1998).

6. Feminism here is used descriptively, to refer to a set of transnational discourses of women’s equality in public and private spheres.

7. Allen (2007) writes that an early version of the bill was drawn up and shelved in the 1990s.

8. Pornography in the bill is defined as: coital acts, foreplay and sexual diversions pertaining to intercourse, sexual violence, masturbation or onanism, nudity or illusions/allusions to nudity, and genitalia. A further clarification in the bill’s text defines nudity as: appearance or reference to nude bodies (http://www.indonesiamatters.com/2474/porn-laws/).

9. The bill was most strongly opposed by artists and by the Balinese, who argued that erotic and sensual expression is intrinsic to their traditional culture. Balinese politicians have said that they will not enforce the legislation in Bali.

10. Wardoyo, owner of a chain of chicken restaurants, announced an award to promote ‘transparent polygamy,’ in which a husband would inform his wife of his new marriage. At 2003 gala, Wardoyo honored 37 men and distributed pro-polygamy books. Protesters marched outside holding placards with slogans such as: “Monogamy yes, polygamy no” and “Polygamy transgresses human rights” (Robinson 2009; Brenner 2006).

REFERENCES


---

Rachel Rinaldo is an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Virginia. Her interests include the sociology of gender, culture, religion, and social change. Rinaldo’s Ph.D. dissertation was a study of Muslim and secular women activists, based on 16 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Jakarta, the Indonesian capital. Her article, “Envisioning the Nation: Women Activists, Religion, and the Public Sphere in Indonesia” (*Social Forces*, 2008) explored how Muslim women activists are increasingly legitimate participants in the ongoing re-imagination of the Indonesian nation-state. She is currently working on a book about women activists, Islam, and the public sphere in Indonesia.
Globalization and The Chinese Muslim Community in Southwest China

Michael C. Brose, Ph.D., University of Wyoming

ABSTRACT
Is globalization a good thing when it comes to religion and religious practice generally in China? What contributions might globalization have on the practice of religion, or more broadly, on social transformation, in China? Focusing more specifically on Islam in China, is it also subject to forces of globalization? If so, will that encounter result in more or less social and political power to Muslims in China? Is Islam antithetical to or a part of modernization? These are just some of the questions that are raised in thinking about the role of Islam in China today as related to the theme of this special issue, “religion and globalization in Asia.” This paper uses two case studies, recent mosque construction projects and the development of a new Institute of Arabic Studies in Yunnan Province, China, to understand if and how global trends have affected the Islamic community and practice of Islam in one region of China.

Southwest China presents a unique context for the role of Islam in Chinese society because this area is largely free of the hot ethno-religious issues that plague other parts of China. Yunnan is also home to twenty-six official minority groups, but of these the Chinese Muslims have been largely ignored by scholars. It is clear, however, that Chinese Muslims are becoming important economic and political actors in Yunnan, judged by the kinds of mosques and educational activities they are sponsoring. They present an excellent opportunity to probe the impact of globalization on local forms of Islam, to understand how Islam might become a strategic social and political resource for the Yunnan Chinese Muslim community, how identity politics serves this group’s interests, and to demonstrate the importance of regional particularities in understanding “Islam in China.”

INTRODUCTION
When people discuss the impacts of globalization in and on China, they usually point to such phenomena as the ubiquitous Starbucks and Kentucky Fried Chicken stores and their local knockoffs that are springing up in every town. The implication of these observations is that this is essentially a “clash” between universal (read “western”) and national or local cultures, and one can only end up destroying the national or local culture. This same discourse has been applied unevenly to writing about the state of religion in contemporary China, focusing, for example, on the spread of Protestant Christianity and the so-called house church movement, and equating all Muslims in China with world terrorism. This paper focuses on the state of Islam in China today. It is a compelling case study through which to problematize the impact of globalization on China, and it is perhaps one of the least understood aspects of religion in China by the rest of the world.

While it is a commonplace to treat Islam as a monolithic entity in China, in fact, there are ten separate groups of Muslims in China. This paper focuses on a group of Muslims who are spread across all parts of China and are not identified with any one piece of territory or specific ethnic group. This ubiquitous group
is usually known by its state-assigned name, the “Chinese or Han Muslims” (C. Huizu, 回族). In an effort to avoid the usual trap of treating all of China as the same, we limit our discussion to the Chinese Muslims who live in the far southwestern province of Yunnan. This paper argues that globalization has affected the Hui of Yunnan in some specific ways, but that that has not been at the expense of local initiatives and identity. In fact, global and local trends reinforce each other, creating positive sites of engagement by and for these people in their local social and political worlds.

**Defining Globalization**

The topic of globalization has been the focus of an enormous body of scholarship, and several definitions have emerged. Much of that scholarship assumes that it is a totalizing experience that changes the local environment without question and largely without the assent or cooperation of locals. Some of this scholarship even seems to be a revived orientalism, substituting the national for local. Some recent studies, however, argue instead that particularized versions or aspects of globalization and habitus meet in unique mediation points that result either in a refined reaction to (accommodation) or outright rejection of the globalizing force by locals, depending on whether the globalizing force allows the local community to choose and realize their desires. One recent study on the effects of globalization on Chinese cities captures the renewed emphasis on the active agency of the local context especially well, arguing for a “bottom-up and trans-local process embedded in national territories” to understand globalization. Essentially, this is a call for a more nuanced understanding of the interaction of global and local forces, hinting that neither is all-powerful or monolithic.

Another helpful way to conceptualize how globalization works in order to keep the local in perspective is to use the metaphor of friction to describe the encounter between the global and local, where this friction creates tension that can be positive and productive as well as negative. There are a variety of value spheres (religion, economy, politics, etc.) and each of these needs to be analyzed in coming to terms with globalization. In other words, we are seeking to build a model of globalization as a contextualized experience where different aspects of globalizations interact with a number of locales. Each and every “global-local interaction is particular vis-à-vis (1) the elements of globalization and subjectivity, (2) the elective affinity or alienation [by the local community] of those elements, and (3) the community’s revaluation of the criteria of subjectivity given new possibilities… the greater the association between globalization and the absence of local political, economic, or cultural self-determination, the more militant and anti-humanist the response.” Enacting this kind of multi-faceted approach to studying globalizing forces and local agency, even limited to the Yunnan Hui community, is a task too large for this paper. I have thus chosen two specific sites where this global-local interaction is most evident, the architecture of new mosques and a new school for Islamic studies, as case studies to begin with.

**Definitions: Chinese Muslims**

One of the tasks of this paper is to question the typical monolithic readings of “China” and the “Chinese Muslims.” Muslims have been a part of China ever since
the seventh century, but definitions of that community have been fairly vague until quite recently in Chinese history. This question became critical after the demise of the imperial system when various people were casting about for a replacement. Well before the People’s Republic was established in 1949, Communist Party officials were thinking about which constituents were to be included in that new national project, and they included Muslims. One of the first campaigns rolled out by the new nation’s leaders to bring everyone into the project was the 1950 Nationalities Identification Project that eventually resulted in the identification of ten separate Muslim groups in China, and restricting the Hui minority group to Chinese-speaking non-Turkic peoples across China. The Hui thus became the only official national minority group who were identified solely on the basis of their practice of religion, and not on overt ethnic or racial criteria.

According to the 2000 national census, there are at least 20 million Muslims in the People’s Republic of China, and 48% of these, or 9.8 million, are Hui (the actual numbers may be far higher, possibly as many as 60 million total). While the Hui across China share many similarities and, in some respects, constitute a national group, they are also residents of specific regions and provinces, and these local contexts certainly shape their identity. For example, Yunnan is home to 26 separate official minority groups, and several of these, such as the Bai and Yi, also include their own Muslims (Bai Hui and Yi Hui). Yunnan has had a unique history and role within greater “China.” Nowhere is that local history and culture better seen than in the Muslims of the province. They played key political and economic roles for much of Yunnan’s imperial past, and have revived that position in the post-Mao era.

**YUNNAN**

The area now known as Yunnan Province was for centuries controlled by local states that spanned current national borders and peoples, a true “frontier zone” from the Chinese perspective that was only brought under the direct control of the Chinese court when the Mongols invaded the area in the 1250s and designated it one of eleven Branch Secretariats that included present-day Yunnan and eastern Sichuan. These administrative entities were only loosely controlled by the central court, and it was not really until the succeeding Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) that Yunnan became a true province, administered by Beijing. Even then, Yunnan’s orientation remained as much tied to that large highlands region that has been called zomia, and which was beyond the control of the various states whose main population bases were in lowland areas (China, northern Vietnam, Laos, and northern Myanmar). This regional orientation towards its near neighbors in Southeast Asia has reemerged recently when it designated three cities in Yunnan as “state-level open cities” to promote border trade and investment between Myanmar and Yunnan.

Yunnan’s unique history among the Chinese provinces also stems from the rather unique role that Islam has played there. While Central Asian Muslims played important roles in many parts of Mongol-controlled China, perhaps nowhere did they exercise as much direct authority over the area and people as in Yunnan. The first Muslim presence in Yunnan in any significant way came with the Mongol conquests and pacification of the region. Qubilai appointed a trusted Mus-
Asia Pacific: Perspectives - May 2011

Globalization and the Chinese Muslim Community / Brose • 64

lim from Central Asia named Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din governor of the region in 1274, and his rule proved beneficial for the consolidation of the various tribes under Mongol authority. Sayyid Ajall’s sons and grandsons continued to rule the area as long as the Mongols controlled China. In fact, Yunnan was the site of late Mongol loyalist resistance to the consolidation of control of China by Zhu Yuanzhang, who did not bring Yunnan into line until the 1380s.

In spite of the fact that Muslims had dominated Yunnan politics during the Mongol period (or perhaps because of that), the new emperor of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), Zhu Yuanzhang, also placed Muslims there as regional governors. It is not usually recognized as such by non-specialists, but the Ming Dynasty was really a turning point for Chinese Muslims, the first time when they shifted in their identity from “Muslims in China” to “Chinese Muslims.” It was during this period that Yunnan became associated with a center of Islamic learning in China; several notable Muslim writers and thinkers from Yunnan made specific attempts to reconcile Islam and Confucianism during this era, the Qu’ran was translated into Chinese, and Islam really for the first time became a part of the Chinese religious scene. Many of the leaders of this movement came from Yunnan.

Coming to the present, it cannot be denied that the Muslims of Yunnan share a great deal in common with their Hui brethren across China. This is due not least to the fact that all Muslims in China are subject to the same state-enforced educational curriculum and policies, and that prominent Muslim clerics and leaders travel frequently between the various regions of China in order to teach and preach to congregations across the country. But regional differences in China cannot be ignored, especially since regional differences in social and economic issues have long dominated local life, and have shaped all aspects of that life. For example, the Hui in Gansu and Ningxia (in northwest China) have far different social, environmental, economic and political issues to confront than do the Hui in Yunnan. Their specific context also undoubtedly has played a role in how and to what extent each community has accommodated to or rejected globalizing trends in Islam. We now turn to the two sites of interaction that demonstrate some of the prospects and patterns of globalization in the Yunnan Hui community, new mosque architecture and a new Institute of Arabic Studies.

“Global” and “Local” in Architecture: Global Forms

This paper does not engage the debate on global forms of Islamic architecture. I define “global” as those architectural and artistic styles that appear to be ubiquitous across the Islamic world and that reflect apparent Arab or Middle Eastern origins. I begin by assuming that there are certain core architectural features of the mosque that appear to be common across the entire Islamic world, including the dome over the qibla wall, the free-standing minaret, and pointed or rounded archways (discussed in more detail below). Beyond these, some stylistic elements, such as the use of geometrical patterning so that the interior of the mosque represents the vault of the heavens, absence of representational images, and abundance of highly-stylized calligraphy, may also be found in mosques across the Islamic world.

The chief aim of Islamic sacred space is to create a building that is a metaphor of Islamic cosmogony, which should elevate the mind of the worshipper or viewer
above the mundane world of corruption to an ideal realm where order and harmony reign. As Luo has pointed out, these elements can be found in older mosques in various parts of China.

Imperial architectural styles had a heavy influence on religious architecture across China, and this extended to mosques, which shared similar architectural features with Buddhist and Confucian temples. In modern architecture, however, it is problematic to argue that there are no distinctive regional styles. For example, we know that mosques in the arid northwest are quite distinct architecturally from mosques in other parts of China owing to the lack of timber building supplies and the large Turkic and Central Asian cultural heritage there. Yunnan is another area where regional differences show up easily in material culture and the built environment, not least because of its climate, abundance of wood, and the heavy influence of southeast Asian styles, as well as the fact it is home to 26 different ethnic groups (the most diverse province in China). Most people have undoubtedly seen photos of the traditional dwellings of the peoples in southern Yunnan, closer to Thai than Chinese culture. Muslims are also a part of this social landscape. As with all Muslims in China, there is no national or central religious authority that directs the Yunnanese Chinese Muslim affairs and appoints religious personnel. Rather, these decisions are all made at the local level (provincial, county, and even city or local area), and each Hui community reflects its own particular social and ecological landscape. We shall see some of these characteristics evident in mosques in Kunming (昆明), Dali (大理), Nagu (納古), and Yao’an (姚安) cities.

**Islamic or Chinese Architecture?**

The few mosques that we will examine here raise immediately the issues of defining exactly what is critically “Islamic,” “Chinese,” and “local” about these mosques. Since architecture must be understood as a text that reflects the values of the community in which a building is situated, then “reading” that “text” should then reveal those values to anyone who sees it. The mosque, in particular, may also be understood as a site of negotiation or articulation between Islam (as a world religion) and local or national culture and society. This is probably especially true in China, where monotheistic world religions stand in stark contrast to Chinese religions and social values. Examining these mosques should thus reveal the ways in which Islam interacts with Chinese and Yunnan values.

How should we read the architecture of these mosques? It seems clear that we must examine the building itself in its social, political, economic, and ecological context. Messages that buildings are meant to convey to the public can only be read correctly if we understand and take into account this context. Ismaïl Serageldin suggests that we examine buildings within a matrix that looks at both building types and architectural approaches. Serageldin identifies several major building types, three of which apply to the mosques we shall see in this paper; the mosque as a major landmark structure, the mosque as a community center complex, and the small local mosque. He also identifies five architectural approaches that should be considered in this kind of analysis, (1) a popular, vernacular approach that stresses traditional indigenous architectural language, and usually built by local craftsmen from the community rather than an architect, (2) a traditional approach, taken by an architect using vernacular or historically relevant forms, (3) a populist
approach, similar to the vernacular approach but using a wider spectrum of imagery, (4) an adaptive modern approach, assimilating traditional vocabulary into a modern approach, and finally (5) a modernist approach that emphasizes originality and modern forms and themes.

Mapping mosques within this matrix will then allow us to understand them at several different levels and to read the meaning inherent in them, the meaning that their planners, funders and builders surely intended to convey to worshippers and the general public: the mosque as a building, the mosque in its physical context, the mosque in its cultural context, the mosque in its local or regional intellectual milieu, and finally, the mosque in its international context. This brief paper cannot propose to do more than introduce some of these themes and methods of analysis to these few examples of mosques in Yunnan Province. But it is hoped that this will prove stimulating to further analysis of this kind on Islamic architecture in other provinces and regions of China.

**Basic Elements of the Mosque**

We must first remind ourselves of the defining elements of any mosque around the world. These elements transcend regional or national distinctions, and can rightly be said to constitute a global Islamic architecture. The most important elements in any mosque are the **mihrab** (C. *mihulabi* 米哈拉比) niche and **qibla** (C. *gebulai* 格卜来) plaque in that niche, both of which indicate the direction for prayer. The **qibla** is considered a sacred object itself, and in Chinese mosques always includes both stylized Arabic and Chinese inscriptions. All mosques include an ablution space for ritual washings before worship, a **minbar** (C. *minbaier* 敏拜尔) or pulpit, the **kursi**, a lectern on which the Qur’an is placed, a minaret (C. *bangke lou* 邦克楼) and the portal or gate in the wall that surrounds the mosque, dividing the outside from the tranquil inner space of the mosque compound. Finally, the main hall of the mosque is a space demarcated for prayer, usually in the form of a rectangular hall that allows all worshippers to be equidistant from the **mihrab**.19

**Globalization and the Traditional Chinese Mosque**

While most mosques constructed in imperial Chinese periods adopted imperial architectural styles, a few did combine Chinese and Central Asian motifs and styles in some unique ways, as seen in the old mosques in the port cities of Quanzhou and and Guangzhou.20 Mosques constructed in the imperial period in Yunnan used traditional Chinese imperial and temple architectural styles, especially in the layout and orientation of the buildings, the roof lines and kinds of materials used in construction. We see this in two examples, the oldest mosque in the provincial capital, Kunming and in Dali, which has the oldest surviving mosque in the region, dating to the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 CE)

**Kunming City**

The old mosque in Kunming (*Shunchengjie Qingzhensi* 顺城街清真寺) is situated behind high walls in the now-destroyed old Muslim quarter of the city (see Figure 1). When the rest of the neighborhood was still standing it was not apparent from outside the compound that a mosque was within the walls. Once inside the gate, it becomes clear that this is a place of refuge and serenity away from the
world. The old mosque has been refurbished recently with substantial donations by the local Hui community. The style of the original building has been maintained, but now rebuilt on a raised platform, underneath which are located rooms for teaching and modern ablution space. In front of the mosque is a traditional ablution pool which is now clearly decorative, but serves as the focal point of the walled courtyard. Surrounding the central prayer hall are multiple-storey buildings for other mosque activities, including school rooms and living quarters. The exterior of the main prayer hall of the old Kunming mosque has retained many stylistic elements of the traditional Chinese mosque, including faux wood beam construction (concrete painted to look like wood), a series of narrow carved panel front doors just inside the overhanging eaves of the building, and a tile roofline in typical Chinese style with arched eaves.

**Dali City**

The old mosque in Dali (Dali Nanmen Qingzhensi 大理南门清真寺) is a much better example of a traditional Chinese mosque that was built in the imperial period than the old mosque in Kunming (Figure 2). Like the Kunming mosque, it too is reached by a door in a wall that separates the mosque compound from the neighborhood. This mosque has been well maintained and not renovated to remove any of its traditional features. The main prayer hall inside the mosque compound is a wood building first built in the Ming Dynasty. Its style is very much that of traditional Chinese imperial and religious architecture; a set of intricately carved, painted and lacquered wood doors protect the interior of the prayer hall, under wide eaves with carved wood brackets that serve as both structural and decorative functions. This mosque has escaped all attempts at modernization, still located on its original raised stone platform.

The interior of this Dali mosque is where the striking blend of Chinese and Islamic styles is best seen (Figure 3). First, the wide mihrab niche contains a qibla...
set within a stone framework supporting a traditional Chinese roof system and
decorated with highly stylized quotations in Arabic script. On the right side of the
mihrab stand a set of carpeted steps that appear to be a simple minbar. Framing
the outside of the niche, not visible in the photo, are Chinese-style architectural
brackets supporting a horizontal beam painted in typical Chinese style with Arabic
inscriptions. Finally, just to be sure that the focus of the worshipper is correctly
oriented, above it all hangs a painting of Mecca and the Ka`ba.

The reader will notice some obvious differences in these two buildings. First,
as noted above, the Kunming mosque has undergone extensive renovation and
repair, including elevating the building on a foundation that has allowed for a
basement area for educational and other mosque activities. Much of the tradi-
tional wood architectural elements have been replaced with concrete painted
in traditional Chinese motifs and styles and to resemble wood. The traditional

Figure 2: Dali City South Gate Mosque.
roofline and materials have been retained here, and the overall appearance is one of a highly valued structure that has simply been restored and updated to retain the best of its original features but with modern amenities.

The mosque in Dali’s old town is noticeably different, if only from the fact that, while well cared for, it has not undergone any kind of modernization. This may be due to the fact that this mosque is located in the old section of Dali city, now a tourist destination. But that fact has not diminished the role of this mosque as the center of a lively Muslim community.
MODERN MOSQUES

Visitors to either Kunming or Dali who are interested in religious sites will already know that these two historic mosques are by no means the only ones. In fact, several new mosques have also been built in these cities, and they indicate a thriving Hui population. Equally noticeable, however, is the marked shift in style of architecture of these new mosques, most definitely going away from traditional Chinese-style buildings to more modern structures that appear to use a universal, global style of Islamic architecture that is indebted to Middle Eastern designs. Does this trend really represent a rejection of Chinese or local styles, possibly as part of a globalizing Islam? What, if anything, is “Chinese” about the modern mosque in China? And what do these new mosques tell us about globalization in these communities?

FIGURE 4: KUNMING NEW MOSQUE.
Observing practices in recent mosque construction in Yunnan, it seems that the “Chinese” or local cultural signs have been removed from the mosque in favor of buildings and spaces that look decidedly “classical Islamic.” However, a close reading of some Hui mosques across Yunnan Province reveals a more complex picture, one where local communities have incorporated some global Islamic elements into their new mosques while still retaining a sense of local culture and values. In fact, the architectural programs used in these mosques demonstrate that global Islam is still subservient to local culture, and that it is not necessarily a globalizing force that totally changes or overwhelms local culture. We might argue that this globalizing architectural trend presents a positive prospect for the local Chinese Muslim community to project to the wider world an identity of spiritual and financial health, something that their non-Muslim neighbors can look on with envy. The range of choices for expressing levels of social power have thus increased for this community when they invoke these new styles.

Compare the old Kunming mosque to the new mosque in Kunming (Nancheng Qingzhensi 南城清真寺). This large complex presents us immediately as something quite different from its nearby neighbor, the old mosque. Everything from the building skin and color to the use of the dome and freestanding minaret lets the casual observer know this is a modern Islamic building! To this western observer, moreover, the only feature that might distinguish it from any mosque in other parts of the Islamic world are the Chinese characters above the main portal and the use of the Chinese style screen in front of the door. But a more careful examination reveals a lot of “Chinese modern” features that have also been incorporated into this building, features that tie it as much to expressions or conceptualizations of Chinese “modernity” as to “Islamic” styles, including the extensive use of white and colored glazed tiles on the exterior of this concrete multi-storey building bro-

**FIGURE 5: DALI CITY NEW MOSQUE.**
ken into square lines enclosing tall, clear glass windows. This is typical of contemporary secular urban architecture in China. The building is also clearly marked as Islamic by incorporating the byzantine pointed arch and dome, styles that are much more reminiscent of Central Asian sacred buildings. Finally, unlike older mosques that are completely hidden behind high walls, this structure is obvious to the neighborhood because it is tall and it is protected by a wrought iron fence.

The new mosque in Dali City (Dali Nanwuliqiao Qingzhensi) is also strikingly modern in appearance (see figure 5). Its planners and builders almost completely rejected the traditional Chinese-style mosque style in favor of what appears an even more global Islamic style, complete with free-standing minarets, pointed green domes with stylized Arabic inscription, and the single-storey white building with blue trim. The only features of this building that might locate it to China are the carved plain wood panel doors on the front of the mosque.

What can we say in terms of comparisons between the Kunming and Dali mosques? First, we can certainly see that the old imperial-era mosques used the same Chinese imperial building styles and artistic motifs that were also used in other Chinese imperial and sacred buildings. In contrast, the new mosques in both cities emphatically rejected that old imperial style in favor of secular modernist styles that incorporate Islamic architectural vocabulary, especially the minaret, dome and arches. There is no mistaking these new mosques for anything other than Islamic buildings. The new mosque in Kunming is completely “modern” with Chinese elements, while the new mosque in Dali does not strike one as “modern” as much as totally “non-Chinese.” In fact, the new Dali mosque could be transplanted with ease to many other parts of the wider Islamic world and not be out of place!

It is clear that the old imperial-era mosques adopted an organic style that allowed for some Islamic elements in the otherwise-dominant imperial Chinese architectural and decorative program (what may be called an Imperial Sino-Islamic style). This is not surprising since the oldest mosques in Yunnan date to the Ming, when Yunnan was for the first time firmly a part of larger China. It is also not surprising to see new mosques depart from that tradition, but the departure may reflect a variety of reasons and motives. Kunming’s new mosque, which integrates Chinese modernist and Islamic programs, reflects that city’s position as the provincial capital that is also home to a thriving Chinese Muslim community. The fact that the new mosque in Dali eschewed Chinese modernist building styles and themes in favor of what appears to be a wholly un-Chinese, purely Islamic building may reflect the desire of that community’s residents to exhibit their Muslim piety or their possible ties to a wider transnational Islamic world?

The choice of architectural and decorative programs in new mosques in Yunnan seems to be open to some interpretation at the local level, and we see this even more dramatically in two other examples from communities in central Yunnan. These demonstrate, I believe, the growing vitality of local Chinese Muslim communities, and their increasing sense of confidence to express their identity to the rest of the world, at least in their vicinity. A new mosque in the city of Nagu in south-central Yunnan and one in the north-central town of Yao’an could not be more different on first glance. Both, however, are examples of vibrant Hui communities who have made decisive statements about their own identity and how they see themselves vis-à-vis their neighbors and the state.
If there is any example of a new mosque dominating its local setting and making a bold statement to the wider community it would have to be the impressive mosque in Nagu City (see figure 6). First, it is clear that this large building totally dominates the city, rising several storeys above any surrounding buildings and visible even several miles outside of the city. It is also a striking example of the fusion of Chinese modern and Islamic styles, with its white-tiled exterior encasing large, multi-storey windows of clear glass in pointed byzantine-style arches, and with the large green dome and four tall minarets, completed with inscriptions in both Chinese and Arabic. It also dwarfs the nearby old mosque, which, interestingly, was not demolished but instead completely restored in traditional style and now serves as the women’s mosque for the community.

As the photo makes clear, this is no austere building! The large amount of glass provides for an expansive, light main prayer hall replete with gold chandeliers and ornate fixtures and hardware. The height of the minarets also lends emphasis to the soaring nature of the building into space. It literally towers over every other building in the city, representing the socio-economic position of the Nagu Hui community, who are the economic elite of Nagu City because they dominate the traditional copper mining and manufacturing industries there. These same Hui industrialists who sponsored the construction of this mosque have also built new palatial estates for themselves, homes that are modern in every sense of the word and that would stand up to any mansion in the West. This new mosque is a bold statement of the modernity and the economic health of this Muslim community to nearby towns, if not the rest of the province.
At the time it was completed the Nagu new mosque was the largest in all of Yunnan. It seems to affirm the idea that the Hui of Yunnan are interested in new mosques that have deliberately rejected the traditional Sino-Islamic style in favor of more ostentatious, visible buildings that stand out above and apart from their architectural and cultural context and that appear to adopt some kind of global Islamic architectural style. But lest we think the picture is really this simple, we now turn to a final example of a contemporary mosque that throws this trend into question, a mosque in a much smaller community the north-central town of Yao’an.

Yao’an City

Yao’an City is smaller in population, and more remote and poorer overall than Nagu. The majority of businesses are small-scale merchants, and the Hui population is also much smaller than in Nagu. The new mosque in the center of town presents us with an interesting example of a deliberate mixing of traditional and modern styles that, according to leaders of the Hui community, reflect the religious pluralism of the wider Yao’an community. (see Figure 7). This mosque was under construction when I visited it in 2001, financed exclusively by local residents. It is a three storey structure, the bottom two storeys constructed in the latest tile and concrete technology integrating Islamic architectural features such as the byzantine-style pointed arch and lack of outside ornamentation in a typical modern Chinese building, all concrete with glazed tile skin and clear glass windows. The one nod to traditional Chinese architectural style here is the traditional tile roof with pointed eaves that separates the bottom storeys from the top.

The top storey of this building is where things become interesting; it has been constructed entirely in the fashion of the traditional Chinese religious building, with reproductions of lacquered carved panel doors, octagonal lattice windows, curving eaves and traditional brackets that support a tiled roof. Just like other traditional mosques, the only indication that this is a mosque is the Arabic inscription over the main entrance.
What does this mosque tell us about the Yao’an Hui community? I was told by the mosque superintendent that the Hui community built their mosque on the site of an old Daoist temple, and in exchange for permission to build their mosque they promised to reconstruct the temple as part of their new mosque. Thus, the top storey was built in that old style. Community interests and shared values thus appear to be more important than sectarian differences. Also of note, while it is a modern building, it was not meant to stand out from its near neighbors. In fact, the only visible portion of the mosque, which is surrounded by a wall, is the top storey. Thus, it would not be immediately identifiable as a mosque to people who did not live in or know the community. Just as important, while this mosque is obviously a building that has required large sums of capital to construct, it is not overly ostentatious. This undoubtedly expresses the socio-economic status of the Yao’an Hui community and their relations to other citizens of Yao’an. The building is entirely appropriate in its cultural context, both as a religious building and as a modern addition to this regional town. Situating it in the local-global discourse, this mosque shows us the continuing importance of local culture and society that mediates or integrates larger modern and Islamic styles and architectural techniques to serve the interests and needs of the Yao’an Hui community who are part of a larger community.

**Education, the Internet and the Yunnan Chinese Muslim Community**

A far clearer case that demonstrates the impact of globalization on the Yunnan Hui community than mosque architecture is the new Institute of Arabic Studies established a few years ago in the south-central provincial town of Kaiyuan. Kaiyuan is not too far from the town of Nagu, and has a long history as a center of Islam in the province that stretches back to the Mongol era. Its location on the major north-south trading routes between central Yunnan and Vietnam was one reason that Muslim traders settled there long ago. Kaiyuan was also a major transit point on the colonial French rail line that ran from northern Vietnam to Kunming. Kaiyuan City is home to three national minority groups, the Hani, Yi and Hui, which together make up almost half of the population. There has been a mosque in Kaiyuan City at least since the Qing period. In 1979 the provincial government authorized the mosque to open a school for Hui students. It grew over time, both in enrollments and purpose, and in 1999 the government approved the change of name of the school to the “Kaiyuan Institute of Arabic Studies.” The reasons for that change, and the current direction of this school all show the impact of globalization on this local institution.

**Kaiyuan Institute of Arabic Studies**

This institute evolved out of the former local mosque school in 1999 under the direction of Mr. Ma Ligu, a local Hui man who had studied at the Imam University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and had obtained his MA in Arabic Literature at Jinnah University in Pakistan before returning to Kaiyuan. This kind of international training would not have been possible before, and it is clear that Mr. Ma had grand ambitions for this school. Now-President Ma has recruited several teachers for this institute from the Islamic “heartland,” including a person with a BA from Saudi
Arabia and MA from Pakistan, another teacher who graduated from an educational institute in Pakistan, and three teachers with degrees from Syrian universities.

In 2002 the Institute added a large building of 2000 square meters that included eight classrooms, an assembly hall, gymnasium, and other facilities to accommodate their growing student body. A year later they boasted an enrollment of over 120 students from all around China. Their website, in Chinese and English, boasts a modern curriculum that enables students to “catch up with the rapid growth of the present information era.”

Their curriculum includes the following required and elective courses:

1. Compulsory courses:
   - Arabic: Basic Arabic (Volumes 1-4) compiled by the Arabic department of Beijing Foreign Studies University.
   - Arabic grammar, rhetoric, translation.
   - Practical spoken Arabic.
   - Newspaper and magazine reading.
   - Business Arabic, etc.
   - Religion: the Holy Koran, the Hadith, the Islamic creed, Islamic law, Islamic ethics
   - Chinese: Modern Chinese, literary selections from classical Chinese literature, etc.
   - History: Chinese history, Arabic history, Islamic history.
   - Social science: Politics, common knowledge of law, etc.

2. Elective / Additional courses:
   - English and Computer.

The Kaiyuan Arabic Institute also prides itself on its outreach activities. In addition to its website, they publish a regular newspaper called *Islamic Garden*, now over 27 issues and available, apparently, throughout China by regular post in hard copy with a reported readership of 13,500 (curiously, not available in electronic form from their website). Their website also boasts that theirs is the only campus website of any Islamic school in China, and they clearly take pride in attracting domestic and international students and scholars. The Institute's mission to explicitly dedicated to educating a new generation of Muslim leaders across China. They will allow any Muslim, male or female, to enroll who meet certain criteria: (1) they must be secondary school graduates or those with an equivalent educational level, (2) they must be in good health and exhibit good behavior, and (3) age between 18-25. Their website also situates this school within the framework of new nationalism in China.

"The aim of the institute is to cultivate talented people, for the national economic development and the improvement of the quality of the nations, for adapting to the needs of reform and opening up and the needs of exploring the great northwestern China, for promoting peace and unity and for building a civilized society; by further adapting itself to the needs of social development and insisting on the principle of that the education should serve the country for its construction and make benefits for Muslims.

With the help of Allah, with the generous support of the local Muslims, and with the continuing efforts of the institute, Kaiyuan institute of Arabic has made progress in all respects. Particularly, the system of post responsibility set up between the institute and the Mosque committee, has made things done and responsibilities taken accordingly, and has got all things running on the right tracks with a favorable circle.

Since the founding of the institute, nearly 4 years (sic) time, the institute has introduced and sent 17 students abroad: 3 to Saudi Arabia, 1 to Yemen, 5 to Syria, 5 to Pakistan, 2 to Iran and 1 to Thailand.
Kaiyuan institute of Arabic will commit and dedicate itself with sincerity to the educational undertakings of the Chinese Muslim community.  

It is clear that the Hui community of Kaiyuan City has realized the potential offered by the internet to establish their identity as normative citizens of the nation who are serving national interests by promoting this specific religious education. The Hui students that graduate from this institute will be harbingers of local, regional and national development, as well as productive Muslims who will build and strengthen that particular community. This is an especially important message to convey in China since Islam has, according to many Hui, been unfairly painted as an extremist religion by a few but active Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang. It is also noteworthy that this Institute has sent its students to several countries in the Muslim world to study! These students are presumably meant to return to China where they will take up teaching or religious positions in Chinese Muslim communities and mosques. This program of foreign study, and the successful recruitment of teachers from abroad, indicate that the Kaiyuan Hui community are thinking and acting in global terms, creating specific linkages to their brethren in other parts of the Islamic world! These actions, and the fact that the Institute maintains its website in English and Chinese, also probably indicate the interest of the Kaiyuan Hui to make sure that China is part of that same Islamic world. Finally, if we adopt a more cynical view, we might conclude that the Kaiyuan Institute’s ability to internationalize in these ways are allowed by the state because they accord with China’s growing interests to promote good relations with the various states in the wider Islamic world for national security and energy reasons.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that globalization has substantially increased the range of choices for the Chinese Muslims in Yunnan. There are undoubtedly specific architectural styles that represent modern Islam that have been adopted into new mosques here. Whether those styles are really part of a larger objective “global Islamic” style rather than how modern “Islamic” style is imagined by the Yunnan Hui is another question, one this paper cannot address. In any event, these new mosques are huge departures from the traditional Sino-Islamic mosque.

What is equally clear from the examples of the new mosques in Kunming, Dali, Nagu and Yao’an, is that the Hui in those communities are lively, well organized and upwardly mobile people who want to be seen as normative citizens of the modern nation and who have not rejected their own national and local identities in their quest to have their religious identity recognized. The old imperial-era mosques are well maintained and still provide a full range of services for their communities, from worship to education to housing. At the same time, they proclaim the historicity of the Hui as part of the Chinese imperial ecumene.

The new mosques that have been constructed in these same communities perform different, complementary functions to their imperial counterparts. These buildings are bold statements of the health and wealth of the Hui communities that do not diminish their historic continuity but symbolize their ongoing vitality or centrality to the “new” China that is emerging from the Mao era to become a regional and world power. That 21st Century identity has not, however, eliminated the Chinese stamp. In fact, local or national culture is resilient, and absorbs supposedly global forms into its own modern expression.
The Arabic Studies Institute website provides us with yet further evidence of the impact of globalization on the Yunnan Hui. The Kaiyuan Arabic Studies Institute has embraced the internet and global exchanges of people as a way to expand their teaching mission. It is interesting to note the resilience of the local community in this enterprise; the Institute is clearly an outgrowth of the mosque and religious community in this rather small provincial town which is not on any main route or tourist map. The website’s description of the program’s goals and curriculum and photos make it clear that this is a modern school intent on being part of a national agenda of development and opening to the rest of the world, but one that is clearly situated in central Yunnan Province. Students come there from other parts of China, and some go abroad to study in other centers of Islamic learning. Faculty come from local and international destinations, and the image imparted by the website is of a unique center of Islamic learning growing in this far southwestern province of China.

What world or worlds do these communities—with their old and new mosques and their energetic schools—envision inhabiting, and how has globalization affected the practice and status of Islam in Yunnan? These Hui clearly have a long history of existing in their local communities, a fact that is celebrated by the numerous restored and fully functioning old mosques around the province. But they are also not being left behind in the development frenzy that is currently consuming the Chinese landscape, and which is part of a wave of urban development going on around China. Their new mosques are nothing if not modern buildings that use an eclectic palate of Chinese modern and Islamic styles and building techniques. The Hui are no longer content to remain as just another part of the undifferentiated religious landscape of China, as they were in imperial times, when notable attempts to sinicize Islam were undertaken by Hui literati. In this post-Mao era they are free to assert their identity as Muslims who are also citizens of a strong state. The ideas, forces and technologies that we see as part of a homogenizing globalization are actually being used to reinvigorate these Hui as proud citizens of their local towns, province, and nation who are also simultaneously citizens of a world community of Muslims. As Fulong Wu has already argued, it is China’s new urbanism that makes possible the specific materializations of globalization that we see in these examples of mosque complexes in Yunnan. And ultimately, these manifestations of globalization are always due to and found in specific actions taken in specific locations.

ENDNOTES
4. Rudy, pp. 60-61.
5. See, for example, the 1941 study titled “The Question of the Huihui Nationality,” cited in Michael Dillon, China’s Muslim Hui Community: Migration, Settlement and Sects (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999): p. 2.

7. For maps of Mongol and Ming Dynasty Yunnan see Tan Qixiang, Zhongguo Lishi Ditu ji, vol. 7 (Beijing: Zhongguo Ditu chubanshe, 1982).


12. Research for this article took place during several visits to Yunnan between 2001 and 2007. I would like to thank the invaluable help of Professor Yao Jide and Mr. Zhao Weidong in making it possible to visit many of the mosques and communities discussed in this paper.

13. To claim that there is such a thing as a global or universal style of Islamic architecture is itself open to question. Suha Özkan, the secretary-general of the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, in particular, rejects a notion of a global or universal style of Islamic architecture. See his “Defining Architecture,” in Architectural Design 74.6 (2004): 24-31. His goal is to reawaken the reader to the diversity of architecture found in Islamic communities around the world. While this point of view is certainly valid and needs further discussion, I do not wish to enter into it here, and shall assume, for the sake of discussion, that there is something global or universal inherent in mosque architecture.


16. Jonathan Lipman has made this decentralized, local nature of the Hui “community” clear in his recent article “White Hats, Oil Cakes, and Common Blood: the Hui in the Contemporary Chinese State,” in Governing China’s Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi, Studies on Ethnic Groups in China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004): 19-52. I have not attempted a comprehensive study of Islamic architectural styles across the entire area of Yunnan Province, let alone all of China, and cannot make any definitive statements about local styles, or even at what level “local” may be defined.

17. Oleg Grabar raises this fascinating issue in several essays, including his “The Iconography of Islamic Architecture,” in Content and Context of Visual Arts in the Islamic World, ed. Priscilla P. Soucek, Monographs on the Fine Arts, 44 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University

Globalization and The Chinese Muslim Community / Brose • 79


20. The architectural styles of mosques in Xinjiang are a separate issue and will not be discussed in this paper. For striking photos of many important imperial-era mosques showing traditional Chinese imperial style architecture, see Chen Yuning 陈育宁 and Tang Xiaofang 汤晓芳, Zhongguo Huizu wenwu [Cultural Relics of China’s Hui People] (Yinchuan: Ningxia Renmin chubanshe, 2008).


22. It is important to note here that there are other modern mosques in Dali that look more like the modern Kunming mosque, with noticeable Chinese modern elements integrated into an Islamic aesthetic program.

23. All information on the Kaiyuan Arabic Institute is based on their website: www.kyaz.com/eg/kyaz.htm.

24. See the Institute’s website, cited above.

25. See the Kaiyuan Institute’s website for this material, cited above.


Michael Brose is Associate Professor and Department of History Chair at the University of Wyoming. His research interests include Non-Chinese in Mongol Yuan and Ming Dynasties, and the history of Islam and current status of Chinese Muslims in Southwestern China. He is the author of one book and several articles.
Maintaining Patterns: Community Ritual and Pilgrimage in a Diasporic Taiwanese American Religious Community

Jonathan H. X. Lee, Ph.D., San Francisco State University

INTRODUCTION

A local goddess religious community, popular among the recent Taiwanese American immigrants in San Francisco, has effectively linked together cultural, ethnic, and linguistic boundaries, thereby connecting Taiwan and America. This has resulted in the creation of an emerging transnational Empress of Heaven community in San Francisco’s Chinatown. Tianhou, the Empress of Heaven, known as Mazu (Mother Ancestor) in Taiwan, is represented as Meiguo Mazu (American Mazu) and resides at the Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. in San Francisco. This essay asks two main questions: How is traditional religion adjusted to meet the demands of contemporary life? What is the role of religion in the formation of a community in the diaspora?

To answer these questions, I focus on two community rituals. The first is the adaptation of the civic Chinese New Year Parade in San Francisco to accommodate the performance of an annual “inspection tour” (raojing) ritual by the Empress of Heaven. My second case study looks at developments in transnational pilgrimage rituals linking San Francisco to Beigang, where Taiwanese American pilgrims return with their “American Mazu.” These two community rituals speak to one of the primary themes of Chinese religious expression—community harmony—and the importance of maintaining patterns of being “Chinese.” The Taiwanese American Mazu cult that revolves around the ritual calendar of the Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. is a diasporic Chinese American community. Their appropriation of the San Francisco Chinese New Year Parade for the performance of a religious ritual, and their periodic trans-Pacific pilgrimage are two examples of diasporic religious practices.

Paul C. Johnson defines “diasporic religion” as “. . . composed on the one hand of memories about space—about places of origins, about the distances traveled from them, and physical or ritual returns imagined, already undertaken, or aspired to” (2007, p. 2). This essay explores changing religious rituals, representations, and meaning making in the Taiwanese diaspora in America.

THE GODDESS OF THE SEA, THE EMPRESS OF HEAVEN, AND NEW IMMIGRANT TAIWANESE AMERICAN MAZU

The sea goddess, styled “Empress of Heaven” (Tianhou), and popularly venerated by people from Taiwan as Mazu, meaning something akin to “Granny,” began her life and career as a human. According to the lore that has been passed down, she was born to a fisher-family in the first year of the Song Dynasty (960-1127 c.e.) on the island of Meizhou located along the coast of Fujian Province.

After a pious life devoted to religious learning and service to others, she died in her twenties, but only after demonstrating exceptional powers: she was able to help fishermen, imperial envoys, and her father and brothers to survive storms at
sea. Accordingly, she is a patroness of the sea that protects all her devotees in ocean voyages, and, in general, responds to those in distress. Similar to other female divinities in China, such as the Buddhist Bodhisattva Guanyin, she is also a goddess of procreation. After receiving numerous officially sanctioned titles of divine rank, as well as Daoist and Buddhist association and recognition, today, she is the highest-ranking female deity in the vast and patriarchal celestial Chinese pantheon. Additionally, she is worshipped throughout China’s coastal provinces, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and within the global Chinese diaspora.

As a result of increasing coastal trade during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, pioneers, largely from coastal Fujian, the original home of the Tianhou/Mazu cult, immigrated to the islands of Penghu and Taiwan. Consequently, the cult of the goddess was well established by the time the Qing authorities made their presence felt by 1683 c.e. Since this early period, pilgrimage from Taiwan to Meizhou was important because Mazu’s "miraculous power" (ling) was determined by it. As the Mazu cult developed in Taiwan, a hierarchical network of temples emerged based on kin relationships: temples were either understood to be "mother-daughter" (munü) or "sisters" (jiemei). Pilgrimage is thus expressed as Mazu "returning to her natal home" (hui niang jia), which reflects the mother-daughter relationship and implies a hierarchical pecking order vis-à-vis the miraculous power and status of various temples’ Mazus.

**The Source: Chaotian Temple in Beigang, Taiwan**

The rural township of Beigang, located in Yunlin western Taiwan, is one of the principle Mazu cultic site on the island. It is home to one of Taiwan’s oldest and in the mind of a good number of Taiwanese people the most miraculously responsive (lingying) Mazu temple—Beigang Chaotian Temple. The primary economy of the town revolves around the pilgrimage festival season of Chaotian Temple. Each year, beginning on Chinese Lunar New Year (first lunar month) until sometime in April (third lunar month) Beigang is transformed from a sleepy township to the site of a lively carnivalesque pilgrimage center. Hence, religious tourism and other tourism related businesses is its foundational economic source of revenue (Hsu, D., 2008). The vernacular dialect of Beigang is Minnan Hokklo, colloquially known as Taiwanese. We can observe a great sense of local identity from residents who live within Beigang’s boundaries, who follow the ritual calendar of Chaotian Temple, and who refer to themselves using local Taiwanese as “people of Beigang” (Pakkang lang).

The chief community cult ritual in Beigang is Mazu’s annual inspection tour (raojing), held for two full consecutive days during the third lunar month. At this time, six of Chaotian Temple’s principle Mazu images (together with other temple gods) are taken on a ritual procession around the town’s perimeter. This procession originally marked Mazu’s return from an annual pilgrimage across the sea to her natal temple in Meizhou, Fujian. This cross strait pilgrimage from Beigang to Meizhou became sporadic after Japanese colonial rule began in 1895 and ceased completely after 1949. Yet, the inspection tour ritual continues to be held and is by far the most important ritual event of the year in Beigang. Through the physical act of inspecting the town in a ritual procession its streets, alleyways, and thoroughfares are confirmed as under the religious territorial sovereignty of the god-
and her temple. By extension, through participating in temple ritual activities Beigang’s residents are authenticated as members of Beigang Mazu’s community. People who identify themselves as Pakkang lang (Beigang people) therefore, live within the ritual territory of Beigang, the spatial area which Mazu traverses on her inspection tour. On a more macro level, Mazu’s procession throughout the island authenticates Mazu as Taiwanese and Taiwan as her sovereign territory. By extension, the group of American Mazu pilgrims, by participating in the pilgrimage, authenticate themselves as members of Beigang Mazu’s community.
EMERGING LANDSCAPE OF TRANSONAL TAIWANESE AMERICAN RELIGION

A large number of Taiwanese immigrants arrived in the U.S. armed with well-developed technological sophistication and wealth, markedly changing the immigrant experience in America. Kwong and Miscevic (2007) describe them as high-tech transnationals of today’s booming Chinese American “ethnoburbs.” They reflect what Aihwa Ong categorizes as “flexible citizens” who are able to utilize their political, educational, and economic capital to circumvent bureaucratic red-tape. This capital enables them to benefit from different nation-state regimes by selecting multiple sites for investments, work, and family relocation (1999, pp. 18–19). Ong emphasized that their success is not a quality exclusive to being Chinese, but rather, is the expression of a habitus that is finely tuned to the turbulence and logic of late capitalism (pp.1–8). They also resemble what Maria Chee calls “Taiwanese American transnationally split families” (2003, 2005). Chee’s ethnographic study examined non-working class subjects, whereby the wives and children are dispatched to the U.S. with the objective of providing educational opportunities for their children.

The subjects described by these scholars are from an elite class of economically privileged groups of new “transnational subjects” with “flexible citizenship” living between and/or among several nation-state boundaries. I emphasize this because, although wealthy Taiwanese-transnational subjects represent a considerable portion of the new Taiwanese American community, they do not reflect the community that worships at Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. Its patrons are not the “so-called Hong Kong money elites” who reside in the exclusive communities in San Francisco’s Peninsula Peak (Ong, 1999, p. 87). Further, temple participation does not reflect the profiles of the pilgrims I accompanied in their return to Beigang in 2006, escorting MeiGuo Mazu. Instead, the pilgrims and worshippers at the Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. are working-class families, retired seniors, widows, and widowers who live on a fixed income. Moreover, several of the pilgrims I know well live in low-income housing units across the Bay in Oakland, or in low rent rooms on the fourth floor of the Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. They do not possess the educational, economic, or social capital that Kwong and Miscevic’s, Ong’s, and Chee’s elite transnational subjects are privileged to have. As such, their ability to gather the resources necessary to establish a temple is all the more remarkable, and communicates the importance of Mazu in their American experience.

Taiwanese American religious life in contemporary America is distinctive because of the forces of globalization and modernization, particularly due to immigration. The shifting composition and trend in Chinese immigration to the U.S., coupled with advances in telecommunication and transportation has resulted in the production of a uniquely transnational religious Mazu community. Moreover, these transnational connections are not necessarily monopolized by wealthy Taiwanese subjects (e.g., technocrats or successful businesspersons). We see similar connections being forged by transnational subjects of lower socio-economic status in other diasporic communities as well. For example, Roger Rouse’s (2002) documented how many Aguilillans living in the U.S. invest considerable amounts of money in an attempt to obtain their legal “papers,” but without the ultimate goal of obtaining permanent naturalized citizenship because it is as "Mexican citizens
with right to ‘permanent residence’ that they will be best equipped to move back and forth between the two countries” (ibid., p. 163). Rouse also cited the increasing importance of telephone access, especially in Aguililla, as a medium for cementing “spatially extended relationships” that will allow Aguilillans in both the U.S. and Mexico to not only keep in touch, but manage to contribute and participate in the decision-making process of daily familial events (ibid., p. 162).

Although the Taiwanese American community in this discussion is working-class, people frequently return to Taiwan. For instance, the majority of the pilgrims informed me that they return to Taiwan annually, some for a couple of weeks, others for several months. Slightly more than half the pilgrims returned to Taiwan before the actual pilgrimage and convened as a group in Beigang. And after the pilgrimage only a small fraction actually returned to San Francisco while the majority stayed in Taiwan or traveled over to mainland China to visit with family. Similar to the Aguilillans who have benefited from low-cost telecommunications, these working-class Taiwanese Americans are dependent on it as well. However, it should be clarified that, although the majority of people I directly encountered in my research experience are working class and/or on a fixed income, it does not imply that wealthier Taiwanese Americans do not also make their presence felt.

The Taiwanese American community is complex in that there are many wealthy transnational members, just as there are financially robust transnational religious organizations, both of which are able to deploy their wealth to augment their transnational connections. From a religious perspective, consider the Taiwanese Buddhist organizations and temples that have benefited from extensive global growth since 1945 as a result of increasing wealth and social mobility in the post-WWII era (Jordan, 1994, p. 138). One example is the Hsi Lai Temple, which is ranked as the largest Buddhist monastery in North America. This temple was completed in 1988 at a cost of $26 million dollars. It is situated on fifteen acres of a hillside at Hacienda Heights in Los Angeles County, near "Little Taipei," a rapidly growing community composed primarily of new Taiwanese Americans. Hsi Lai is a satellite community of the mother temple, Foguangshan, located at Kaohsiung in southern Taiwan. Foguangshan has established branches across the U.S., in Denver, New York, San Francisco, and San Diego, as well as in other major cities worldwide. Another example is Tzu Chi Compassion Relief Society, a worldwide network of actively engaged Buddhist social and medical outreach, founded in 1966 in rural Taiwan by a nun, Dharma Master Cheng Yen. Today it has centers throughout Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia, North America, and even in South Africa. Tzu Chi’s American headquarters is in San Dimas, California (within greater Los Angeles County), with chapters throughout the U.S.

As can be seen, Taiwanese American identity and religion have become increasingly global and transnational in scope, utilizing the latest technology in telecommunications and travel to establish imagined communities across borders and oceans. Therefore, upon arrival on American soil, Taiwanese Americans are capable of creatively adapting to their new surroundings and transplanting their religious rituals and lifeways, especially in the pluralistic religious landscape of San Francisco.
Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A.: History and Community Formation

On March 12, 1986 two immigrant Taiwanese Americans, Mr. Gao and Mr. Zhen, founded the Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. On this day, a divination and blessing ceremony was performed at the Chaotain Temple in Beigang, Taiwan, inviting an image of Mazu to move to America. Mazu arrived on March 14, and her temple was established as a branch and/or daughter temple in San Francisco. Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. officially opened its doors on September 13, 1986. It has its beginnings in a small rented apartment located at 554 Vienna Street, near the predominantly Latin@ Mission District of San Francisco. They relocated on November 22 that same year to a larger site on 562 Grant Avenue, a thoroughfare of San Francisco’s touristic Chinatown. Then on January 12, 1996 the temple relocated once again, when the new immigrant community purchased property at 30 Beckett Street, on a small alley between Jackson Street and Pacifica Avenue. The community was able to finance this endeavor not only with donations from the Taiwanese American community, but from other patrons of different ethnic Chinese American backgrounds (e.g., Indo-Chinese immigrant-Americans).

The temple’s stated mission is to advocate the virtues of Mazu and Guanyin, teach benevolence, uphold the Buddhist Dharma, teach the principles of human kindness, and promote personal and social morality viz harmony. As such, they regularly sponsor Buddhist dharma lessons, seminars on Mazu and Guanyin, qigong, and Chinese medicine, as well as offer social services such as health care referrals, legal aid, and immigration assistance. Additionally, the temple conducts services and ceremonies for all major and minor Chinese religious holidays (e.g., Guanyin’s birthday, Guandi’s birthday, Mid-Autumn festival, among others). Moreover, they participate in many civic events in the San Francisco area (e.g., Taiwan Cultural Festival, Dragon Boat Festival, Chinese New Year Parade, Sunset District’s Autumn Moon Festival) as a way to establish their presence in America. The temple does not have a head priest, Daoist or Buddhist. Instead, there is a temple caretaker who maintains the temple’s incense and daily ritual activities. The temple caretaker also interprets divination readings for devotees of the goddess.

Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. does not keep detailed demographic data. However, Mr. Zhang, a board member estimated that, as of 2010, there are approximately 1,500 fee-paying lifetime members and perhaps 800 non-fee paying registered members. About 60 percent are multilingual Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese speakers; roughly 30 percent speak only Mandarin Chinese; and 10 percent are Cantonese-speaking ethnic Chinese. Nevertheless, the majority have limited, if any, English-speaking skills. Asian patrons of other ethnicities and languages often visit the temple as well (e.g., Vietnamese). The distribution of age range is as follows: 60 percent are older than 50; 35 percent are between 30 and 49; and 5 percent are 29 or younger.

Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. reflects the changing geography and demographics of Chinese America in the wake of the Immigration Reform Act of 1965 while heralding something new: the appearance of a transnational identity with ties to both Taiwan and the U.S. and both the mortal and divine. For instance, during the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections in Taiwan, many Taiwanese Americans traveled back to the island to vote because absentee voting is not allowed (Lee, F., 2004; Kent, 2008). While approximately 2,000 Taiwanese-New Yorkers returned to vote in 2004 (Lee,
nearly 10,000 Taiwanese Americans from California returned to Taiwan in 2008 to vote (Kent, 2008). Lien (2006) calls this phenomenon "political transnationalism," whereby Chinese Americans from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan actively participate in the politics of their native countries, especially with regard to U.S. foreign policy. Beyond politics, the Taiwanese and Taiwanese American unification in a transnational community is signified by the establishment of Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. Mazu becomes a transcontinental deity in the deterritorialized space of this new community composed of diverse individual devotees sharing not only a common Chinese heritage, but a new American identity as well. Meigu Mazu’s identities—cultural, linguistic, and national—mirror the multiple identities of her devotees, simultaneously Chinese, Taiwanese, and American.

The Mazu enshrined at Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. is referred to as Meigu Mazu (American Mazu) in all religious rituals. Her official Chinese name is Fuzhenma. In the Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A., Beigang Mazu’s honorary shrine is placed in front of Meigu Mazu’s main shrine, indicating Meigu Mazu’s origins and connection to Taiwan, the source of its power, as well as its implicit subordination to Beigang. As daughter temple to the original Beigang Mazu temple in Taiwan, all images of Mazu housed in Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. are from the Beigang Temple, including the ones donated by Taiwanese American devotees. This, however, was not planned, but rather serendipitous, and was understood by many as Mazu’s will. Mrs. A-Hua, a widow and a pious Mazu devotee, and the Wangs invited Mazu to immigrate with them when they relocated to America in the late 1970s early 1980s respectively. Consequently, the goddess lived in their homes, until the founding of Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. in 1986.

**Diasporic Community Ritual: Maintaining Patterns and Creating Community**

In the process of transplanting their religious tradition in America, this emerging transnational community made a significant accommodation to their ritual calendar and sphere. It revolves around the principal festival at Taiwan’s Mazu temples, which generally takes place on her birthday in April, when, as mentioned earlier, she is escorted on an inspection tour known as *raojing*. Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. made temporal accommodations by usurping the Southwest Airlines Chinese New Year Parade in February, which questions the parameters of the civil and religious spheres in Chinese America. The temple’s publications represent this activity, first and foremost, as Meigu Mazu’s inspection tour and, secondarily, as a civic parade and/or cultural exchange. This accommodation reveals the mechanics of a new form of Chinese American culture work, the process that merges Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) “production of locality” in flexible “ethnoscapes” of modernity with Elana Chipman’s (2007) “culture work” that accounts for the production of local cultural, community, ethnic, and religious identities.

By ethnoscapes, Appadurai refers to the fluid landscape of the transnational public sphere, as well as to the people who comprise the shifting world in which we live—the tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other mobile groups and individuals (ibid., p. 33). In the process of producing localities, agents within the ethnoscapes are able to invent new identities and new alterna-
tives not nested in the nation-state. The production of locality results from the performance of a community ritual, such as Meiguo Mazu’s annual inspection tour in San Francisco, which is a "social technique" for the "inscription of locality onto bodies" (ibid., p. 179).

The principal festival at most Mazu temples takes place on her birthday when she is escorted out of her temple for an inspection tour. During the inspection tour, Mazu inspects the condition of the world and the territory in which she is religiously sovereign. In addition, she is believed to drive out evil forces, ensuring peace and security for her believers. In Beigang, Mazu’s inspection tour affirms the identity of the participants as “people of Beigang” (Bakkang lang), who are members of Beigang Mazu’s religious community (Chipman, 2007). Similarly, other Mazu communities reconfirm their local identities as well as their Mazu’s territorial sovereignty (Lu, 2005). Therefore, the inspection tour is a community ritual. For Taiwanese Americans in San Francisco, participation in the inspection tour affirms their membership in Meiguo Mazu’s religious community, and local, ethnic, and national identities. As such, it produces a Taiwanese American religious community in San Francisco.

Each spring, in April, the people of Taiwan prepare a large birthday celebration for the goddess. It is the 23rd day of the 3rd month in the Chinese lunar calendar. Over time, Mazu’s birthday became a special cultural characteristic of Taiwanese culture and the focus of religious tourism by devotees of Mazu. As described above, in attempting to find a way for Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. to perform the goddess’ inspection tour in America, it made accommodations by utilizing the Southwest Airlines Chinese New Year Parade in February’s as a vehicle for the goddess’ inspection tour, instead of her actual birthday in April. The temple’s publications represent this activity, first and foremost, as Meiguo Mazu’s inspection tour and, secondarily, as a form of cultural exchange. Meiguo Mazu has resided in America for more than twenty-two years, and has participated in the annual San Francisco Chinese New Year Parade since 1992.

Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A.’s participation in the San Francisco Chinese New Year Parade showcases how a religious community transplants itself on foreign soil. In addition, it showcases how sacred space, the role of rituals, and new representations of a Chinese deity are produced. Emphasizing how Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A.’s ritual accommodation and community formation is part of a larger process of Chinese American culture work—which is the calculated production of local culture and multiple cultural identities (Chinese, Taiwanese, and American)—this unfolding phenomena provides a rare opportunity for understanding the dynamics of how religion functions, in particular, how it is transplanted and transmitted in a diasporic society.

**Meiguo Mazu’s Ritual Inspection of San Francisco**

In 1992 Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. began to participate in the San Francisco Chinese New Year Parade as a means to perform her inspection tour. Just as the inspection tour in Beigang reconfirms her devotees’ membership in a religious community, and their local identity as “people of Beigang,” Meiguo Mazu’s devotees reinforce their local and religious identities. The opening and closing ritual invocation bespeaks this point as the language establishes Meiguo Mazu as an American goddess.
During the opening invocation, the community of Meiguo Mazu devotees and parade volunteers invite Meiguo Mazu out of her temple to participate in the parade. Mr. Gao, co-founder and presiding president of the temple, presents incense to the goddess on behalf of the community of devotees and visitors. He was instructed to kneel and kowtow three times by the ritual announcer, after which everyone in the temple was instructed to place both palms together and kowtow consecutively three times in unison. Several mothers with toddlers hovered over them, held their small hands together and kowtowed with them. Last, but not least, they all raised their right arms and repeated in a chorus-like synchronization:

“In America’s Great State of California,
At the Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A.,
At the Heavenly Chao Sheng Palace,
Dedicated to the Heavenly Mother in the Heaven Above,
During the Year of the Sheep, on the fifteenth day of the first month,
During the celestial inspection of the vicinity and grand parade,
We earnestly pray for favorable weather,
Security for the State and peace for the people,
An abundant harvest of grains,
And four auspicious seasons,
Jin-lo! Jin-lo! Jin-lo!”

This ritual invocation is collectively repeated by participants in the parade as she is placed back on her altar.

The adaptation of the San Francisco Chinese New Year Parade for Meiguo Mazu’s inception tour reflects a common tradition in Chinese religion which emphasizes social relations and ethical practices. This tendency does not follow the pattern established by the European Enlightenment of separating religious from profane or the secular from the sacred. In other words, Meiguo Mazu’s ritual inspection is taking place within a community that does not distinguish between sacred and secular. For the Taiwanese American community, the predominantly secular space of the San Francisco Chinese New Year Parade would not seem an unnatural site for religious rituals to take place.

**Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. Pilgrimage-Tour**

Since its founding, the Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. community has worked to maintain transnational temple relationships through the performance of pilgrimage. Each year, around April, Taiwan’s religious sphere is dominated by Mazu pilgrimage activities: Pilgrims from villages, towns, and cities throughout Taiwan escort their Mazu (daughters) back home to visit the mother temple (zumiāo). The primary religious goal is the rejuvenation of Mazu’s miraculous power, but it also reinforces and re-affirms community, economic, political and kin relations. Since its founding in 1986 in San Francisco, the Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. community has returned to Beigang only five times: in 1988, 1994, 2002, 2006, and 2009 for various reasons—primarily limitations in money and resources. In 1988 only Mr. and Mrs. Gao returned to Beigang with Meiguo Mazu. In 1994 and 2002, however, there were nearly a dozen Taiwanese American pilgrims in attendance, due to serendipitous timing as several pilgrims were already back in Taiwan visiting family.
The pilgrimage in 2006 was groundbreaking for this small transnational religious community: it was attended by the largest group of pilgrims, roughly sixty at the height of the pilgrimage. They commissioned a float with images of San Francisco’s landmarks for Meiguo Mazu’s inspection tour and they had unprecedented media coverage by the Taiwan press. The trans-Pacific pilgrimage involves actively linking the home country to the new host country, cementing relationships through a transnational pilgrimage and the representation of Meiguo Mazu as a transnational Taiwanese American goddess.

Days One and Two: San Francisco to Beigang

Meiguo Mazu, along with her pilgrims, landed punctually at CKS airport in Taipei, Taiwan. In a scattered manner and with passports in hand, they marched toward the customs gate, passing several last-chance duty-free shops. Every pilgrim waited in the “non-citizen” line to have their U.S. passports checked and visas stamped, along with Meiguo Mazu. Like her devotees, the goddess was no longer a national of Taiwan. As Meiguo Mazu cleared the customs gate, she drew attention from other travelers returning to Taiwan, entering the country via the “citizens” gates. The pilgrims headed next toward the baggage claim area, placing the images of Meiguo Mazu on their baggage carts and freeing their hands to retrieve their luggage. The customs agent stopped two of the pilgrims and pointed out that they had too many duty-free cigarettes. Picking up his walky-talky to consult with another agent, he noticed the image of Meiguo Mazu nestled on the cart; with that, he made a slight prostration and then waved them through. As they exited baggage claim, they headed toward their tour guides, one of whom is Mr. Gao’s nephew, holding a banner that read “Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. 2006 Return to Taiwan, Pilgrimage Tour.” Then they gathered together for their first group photo holding a similar banner that read “Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. 2006 Return to Taiwan, Pilgrimage Group.”

Their tour guides, Mr. Liu and Mr. Yang, directed them outside to the bus loading station. Before boarding their chartered air-conditioned tour bus, equipped with spacious leather seats and several television monitors, the three images of Meiguo Mazu were first placed vigilantly on the dashboard of the bus. Once they were in place, incense was relit and the pilgrims were on the road.

The first stop was a Taiwanese breakfast restaurant, then Shilin Presidential Gardens. Afterwards they visited the National Palace Museum, which has the world’s best collection of Chinese imperial art. Several pilgrims were approached by Falun Gong protestors and asked to make contributions and sign petitions. By mid-afternoon, they arrived at a four-star hotel in Taipei, near the main metro-train station. The images of Meiguo Mazu were carried off the bus by three male incense masters and escorted into the hotel’s banquet hall. The hotel staff hastily fetched a plate of fruit and a bouquet of tropical flowers to present to the goddess at her ad hoc shrine. The manager of the hotel lit some incense and kneeled in front of the goddess, prostrated himself three times and presented incense. Several female employees followed suit when everyone else left. Later that evening, several pilgrims reunited with their families who live in Taipei. Those without relatives were invited on a night tour of Taipei 101, the world’s tallest building, as well as several night markets for Taiwanese appetizers.
Day Three: Going to Hualien

The next morning, the pilgrims gathered in the lobby, waiting for Meiguo Mazu’s incense masters to invite her out for our day’s journey to Hualien. They hurried to the train depot to catch an express train. Although the three images of Meiguo Mazu did not have individual seats on the flight to Taipei, they did have them on the train. Upon seeing the images of Meiguo Mazu on the platform, several locals placed their hands together and bowed. Some went as far as prostrating themselves fully, with out-stretched arms and face touching the floor. The smell of incense slowly filled the empty space of the train cabin, mixed with the smell of tiger balm and citrus peel.

Three hours later, the pilgrims arrived at Hualien. Meiguo Mazu was placed on the dashboard of the tour bus. Several local residents walked by the bus and their lips motioned the utterance "Meiguo Mazu" with a look of interest. A few older ladies stopped walking, placed their hands together and watched as the bus drove by. The first stop was a visit to the international Buddhist Tzu Chi Compassion Relief Foundation’s headquarters. The pilgrims were greeted by a novice nun, their Tzu Chi tour guide, who asked if they were familiar with the organization and received a collective “yes” in response. She highlighted Tzu Chi’s founder, Dharma Master Cheng Yen, and the charitable relief that Tzu Chi chapters worldwide are involved in. Walking past the Still Thoughts Abode, A-Hua remarked, "It looks just like it is on television." Our tour of the Tzu Chi complex ended at the gift shop, where the pilgrims busily purchased many Tzu Chi books and paraphernalia, the most popular of which was a pair of reusable traveling chopsticks, which according to the guide, "Will save the earth."
Day Four: Holland Land and Huadong

The next day, pilgrims left the hotel in their usual manner. First, they invited the goddess onto the bus, lit incense, and then drove off. The first destination this day was a specialty foods factory. Even though most pilgrims had just eaten breakfast, it did not stop them from sampling every item that was on display: various pastries, dried fruits, teas, jams, and jerkies. As the bus pulled out of the parking lot, another tour group, with its Mazu sitting on the dashboard pulled in, and they waved to each other joyfully. Meiguo Mazu and her pilgrims headed south, toward an aboriginal village called Holland Land. It started to rain, but that did not stop these pilgrims from exploring the topiary garden. The pilgrims were prepared for the unpredictable weather in Taiwan with umbrellas and raincoats, and some even had rain boots.

They arrived at their next four-star hotel, located on a steep mountain slope with hot springs as its prime attraction. Meiguo Mazu was invited out and placed in the main lobby. As before, a plate of fruits and flowers were presented to Meiguo Mazu. After paying homage to the goddess, a hotel employee asked Mr. Gao about Meiguo Mazu. Mr. Gao explained:

"We are from America, and we’re here because Mazu wanted to come home. Zuma (head mother) and Sanma (third mother) told us they wanted to come home. Erma (second mother) didn’t want to return, so she’s in charge of the temple at San Francisco. This one over here (pointing to Mrs. A-Hua’s Mazu) told us she wanted to come home to get new clothes. We’re going to Beigang in two days. We are pilgrims. This is the purpose of our trip."

Day Five: Gaoxiong

After the mountain retreat, the pilgrims headed further south to Gaoxiong. It was roughly a three hour drive on the expressway. Mr. Yang commented that before the expressway was constructed, it took nearly an entire day to reach Gaoxiong from Hualien. Mr. Liu invited pilgrims to sing karaoke and several pilgrims passed around snacks to share. They drove through downtown Gaoxiong, with its multi-story buildings covered with billboard advertisements, gigantic posters of lean European and Asian models, Starbucks, and what seemed like a 7-11 store on every corner. They exited the bus at a harbor and boarded a ferry for a tour. A-Hua motioned for me to sit next to her, telling me that she will stay with her brother’s family once she gets to Beigang the next day. She then proceeded to tell me her reason for wanting to come on the pilgrimage, saying "You know, I’m not here for the tour. I’m here to present incense, to seek Beigang Mazu’s help in healing my legs." Giggling, she then added, "Mazu has been touring/enjoying the sites with us for several days."

Day Six: Heading to Beigang

After the Gaoxiong visit, they headed toward Sun Moon Lake before going to Beigang. On our way, Mr. Gao handed everyone a yellow vest with a red imprint of the likeness of the Golden Gate Bridge and an incense censer with the characters Chaoshen Temple—Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A.’s official chapter name. Mr. Gao goes on to say,
"Everyone, please make sure to wear this vest once we get to Beigang. Today is a very special day for us. Other Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. pilgrims, along with their relatives, will meet us at Beigang. We’re going to have a record number of people participating in this year’s pilgrimage. In 2002 there were only a dozen of us, but that is still better than in 1988, when it was just me and my wife. We have much to celebrate. Last year, we were able to finish paying off the temple’s mortgage. So we have a lot to be thankful for. We’re also going to participate in this year’s parade with a float that we commissioned. It’s a very special float. In the one-hundred-year history of the parade, a foreign pilgrimage group has never participated with their own float. Our float is unique because we have three San Francisco landmarks on it: the Golden Gate Bridge, the Transamerica Pyramid building, and the entry gateway to Chinatown. On top of that there’s a revolving globe that symbolizes Mazu is on the move, moving around the world, protecting the four seas. Please put these vest on and keep it on for the rest of today."

Heading toward Beigang, Linda made a spur-of-the-moment decision to visit her family in Guangzhou. She asked the guides, Mr. Yang and Mr. Liu, to arrange airline tickets for her, saying “I’m so close; it would be a pity if I don’t return to see my mom.”

They finally arrived in Beigang, along with the rain. After checking into the hotel, some pilgrims, who were accustomed to the four-star palaces, grumbled about the inferior quality of their rooms. With umbrellas in hand and raincoats on, they marched from the hotel, over a red bridge, and lined up as a group behind other pilgrimage groups to parade down the main thoroughfare leading to the entrance of the Beigang Mazu temple. The commissioned float awaited them at the start of the parade route, along with a group of pilgrims who arrived to Beigang on their own, some accompanied by their Taiwan relatives. Both A-Hua and the 93-year-old A-ma protested using a wheel chair, insisting that they wanted to walk (roughly one mile) in the rain, through the chaos of the busy street with thunderous crackling firecrackers and honking mopeds. As they approached the temple, an announcer announced, "This is Meiguo Mazu, from San Francisco’s Chaoshen Temple, with her group of pilgrims, returning to present incense."

Temple staff members promptly came over to the American pilgrimage group and guided the three male Meiguo Mazu incense masters into the temple, instructing them to place the goddess over the incense censer in the middle of the courtyard, a ritual called "passing over the incense censer." This ritual rejuvenates the miraculous power of the three images of Meiguo Mazu (guoxiangyan). The images of Meiguo Mazu passed through several pairs of hands, all male, before being placed in the main shrine, alongside her mother and hundreds of sisters from around the world and the entire island. The pilgrims were then given an incense stick and instructed to kowtow three times. Afterwards, they were escorted into a break room and served hot tea, pineapple cakes, and grapes. A team of news reporters, both national and local, streamed in to ask the American pilgrims questions. Being the oldest, 93-year-old A-ma received the most interest and attention. One reporter asked if anyone dreamt about Mazu recently and A-Hua announced, "I have! I dreamt about her and she told me to take a vow of vegetarianism on this pilgrimage. I dreamt that I was with a group of people, they were all ‘eating meat’ (‘ziah hun’), but I choose to ‘eat vegetables’ (‘ziah caî’). This is how Mazu told me to take a vow of vegetarianism."

Community Ritual in a Diasporic Religious Community / Lee • 93
Days Seven and Eight

As they prepared to parade around the town of Beigang, Mr. Gao requested that all A-mas who were not capable of walking the entire distance of the parade board the float. Even though she wanted to walk, A-Hua came and was escorted up. Bingbing was given a sword and asked to perform a taiqi dance leading the group in the inspection tour and parade that circumscribed the perimeters of the town. The pilgrims, followed by the float, slowly moved through the major streets of Beigang. Viewers and pilgrims cheered back-and-forth at each other, waving. Some viewers, with palms together, stood along the streets and alleyways, cheering the pilgrims as they passed. Some mothers would take their children’s hands and place them together, motioning with them in a ritualized manner. At times, some viewers would remark to the next person, “There’s a Mazu in America?”

After the parade through the streets of Beigang, A-Hua said, “You know my legs feel better already. Mazu has lessened my pain.” Although our participation in the parade ended, the parade itself continued well into the next morning. Pilgrimage groups from all over Taiwan, with their floats playing techno music, Canton pop, and American rap, and decorated with Disney cartoon characters made their way through the streets of Beigang. One float in particular caught my attention, as it loudly played a song by Black Eyed Peas, entitled "My Hump." The lyrics to the song are inundated with graphic imageries of sex. For instance, the song starts:

My hump, my hump, my hump, my lovely little lumps. (Check it out).  
I met a girl down at the disco.  
She said hey, hey, hey yea let’s go.  
I could be your baby, you can be my honey.
Let’s spend time not money.
I mix your milk with my cocoa puff,
Milky, milky cocoa,
Mix your milk with my cocoa puff, milky, milky riiiiight.
They say I’m really sexy,
The boys they wanna sex me.
They always standing next to me,
Always dancing next to me,
Tryin’ a feel my hump, hump.
Lookin’ at my lump, lump.

The explanation for why this song was appropriate was that Mazu enjoys whatever her pilgrims enjoy.

While waiting for the evening inspection tour and parade to start, pilgrimage groups from Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, South Africa, and Manila arrived carrying their images of Mazu. Other groups of pilgrims from all over Taiwan arrived as well, carrying the palanquins and images of the goddess into the main courtyard of the Chaotian Temple. Shortly after the pilgrims started their procession in the town of Beigang, Mr. Gao was being interviewed by TV reporters. Mr. Gao told a Niandai TV News reporter that,

"Since 1992, we have participated in San Francisco’s Chinese New Year Parade. We are the only Mazu temple in the world to participate in a foreign parade, which is one of our biggest successes because everyone in America will know about us since it is televised."

The reporter asked a follow-up question, saying "Please tell us about Meiguo Mazu’s history and whether or not Americans worship her in America." Mr. Gao replied:

"We were founded in 1986 after we were divided from the Beigang Temple. We have been in America for over twenty years, and a lot of Americans are aware of our temple and many Americans come to Ma-Tsu Temple U.S.A. to worship."

Evening had arrived and a sea breeze lingered over the city. Besides the bright neon lights of the shops, the colorful floats with flashing Christmas lights glowed. Little boys and girls dressed in traditional costumes, looking like Chinese opera singers, sat on the floats with baskets of candy and flowers to throw out at the eager audience. Offerings of fruits and flowers were placed outside of some devotees’ homes for the goddess, while others burned gold paper. The atmosphere was one of hyper conviviality, induced by the blurring of disco-like techno music, Mickey and Minnie Mouse, Superman, and dancing Buddhas. Red firecracker remains blanketed the streets, combined with betel nut spit, creating a sea of red litter.

Day Nine: Cementing Old Friendships

The Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. pilgrimage group left Beigang and headed south toward Tainan. They visited Mr. Chen, a man of modest means, who had donated $20,000 New Taiwan Dollars (approximately $1000 USD) to the Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. Twenty-eight pilgrims managed to squeeze into his tiny living room, and Mr. Gao reiterated Mr. Chen’s piety. Mr. Yang and Mr. Liu handed out cans of Mr. Coffee and little bags of squid jerky. Mr. Gao then presented Mr. Chen with a gift
from the Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A., a token of their appreciation of his support. The visit was short and ended with a group photo with the host in his courtyard.

**Day Ten: Return to Beigang**

The pilgrims returned to Beigang and checked into the Beigang Mazu Chao-tian Temple hotel. The hotel was own and operated by the Chaotian Temple, so the American guests were treated to a complimentary night stay. It was to be a free day to do whatever they wanted to do in Beigang, so most of them went and shopped around and ate food from the local street vendors.

**Day Eleven: Happy Birthday Mazu**

Dawn arrived and the Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. pilgrimage group had gathered to celebrate Mazu’s birthday known as zhushou, which is also referred to as ”paying respects to one’s ancestor,” yezu. On that day, Mazu turned 1047 years old. A ceremony was performed in honor of her birthday, and an offering of a slaughtered pig and goat were presented to her, indicative of her imperial status. Mr. Gao was one of the principle ministers in the ceremony. At 8 a.m., Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A.’s three Mazu images were invited out of the main shrine. They each were dressed in new imperial gowns, ornately decorated with embroideries of celestial sky-blue dragons and phoehixes, with an imperial yellow backdrop. Their crowns were decorated with emeralds, rubies, and sapphires, mixed with strands of silver and strings of pearls and accented with red velvet balls.

The images named Zuma and Sanma will return to San Francisco with their pilgrims, while Huama (Mazu donated by Mrs. A-Hua) will stay behind. As Meiguo Mazu was being taken out, many temple workers and locals shouted in Taiwanese “don’t turn your head back” (mai-uat-tao). This is an old custom which dictates that when pilgrims and Mazu leave the mother temple, they are not allowed to turn their heads, otherwise Mazu’s newly recharged miraculous power will stay behind and the journey was in vein. On another level, some pilgrims informed me that it may also mean ”don’t let her cry” which reflects Mazu’s feelings about leaving her mother’s home—again. Of the three images of Meiguo Mazu that returned to her mother’s natal home, only two will return with her Taiwanese American pilgrims. Mr. Gao says, ”Huama will stay behind ‘to chitchat with her sisters’ from around the world.” A-Hua jovially said, ”Did you see how happy my Mazu is? She has a big smile on her face. She looks so beautiful in her new imperial gown.”

**Beyond Sacred and Profane: Meiguo Mazu Pilgrimage**

In the Chinese religious field, the secular and the profane, the religious and the commercial have always been blurred because the focus of a religious festival is the community. From a western perspective, as Lutz Kaelber (2002) suggests, “post-modern religious sphere, which includes organized religion as well as civil religion and implicit religion, is much more fragmented than in earlier times” (p. 67). From a Chinese perspective, such ”fragmentation” has always existed because religious experience and expression is focused on the communal, not the individual.

Juan Campo (1998) speaks to the fragmentary nature of pilgrimage in modern society as well, whereby he demonstrates that, while traditional religious pilgrimage remains vibrant in modern America, it has been complemented by cultural
journeys and popular quests to a plethora of national shrines such as Mount Rushmore, Pearl Harbor, Yellowstone, Disneyland, and Graceland to engage in what Kaelber (2002) terms “cultic consumption.” Campo says, “Modernity, rather than displacing pilgrimages, has actually been responsible for globalizing them” (ibid., p. 40). Campo (1998) and Kaelber (2002) are both describing the postmodern experience of religion, which is understood as a form of veneration anchored in consumptive practices. This so-called “postmodern experience of religion” has always been present in Chinese religious community festivals. It is more informative and productive to consider the social relationships that are being highlighted, refigured, and reconstituted in religious rituals, in particular through the practice of pilgrimage.

Meiguo Mazu’s pilgrimage is a ritual demarcation of space, with religious space grounded in the centrality of iconicity in Mazu’s ritual tradition and sphere. Her devotees take her out on ritual processions around the territorial borders within her sovereign reach. Therefore, within the context of the Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. pilgrimage-tour, Meiguo Mazu is literally inspecting her territorial ritual space, while simultaneously reaffirming her sovereignty over Taiwan, as she inspects the highways, byways, allies, and thoroughfares of the urban landscape nested on the dashboard of a tour bus equipped with karaoke.

Meiguo Mazu is able to produce transnational ritual spatiality by establishing new inter-temple bonds, as well as reaffirming old ones. Mazu’s cultic sphere may be inflecting larger transformations in the economic habitus of late capitalism. Mayfair Yang has suggested that capitalism and satellite television have impacted nation-state territorial demarcations and identity qua Mainland China and Taiwan. This has been informed by the “transnational ritual spatiality of Chinese popular religion” which “. . . means that popular religion can no longer be regarded as merely a traditional folk culture that disappears with modernization” (2004, p. 225). And by extension, geo-political and economic transnationalisms are simultaneously shaped and informed by religious transnationalization, which is a product of current political and economic global relationships.

**Transnational Taiwanese American Mazu Cult and the New Terrain of American Civil Religion**

Robert Bellah’s (1967, 1975) first coined the term “American civil religion.” Albeit overwhelmingly white, middle-class, and Protestant, the concept has since been a topic of major discussions and critiques (e.g. Bellah and Hammond, 1980; Treat, 1999; Angrosino 2002; Cloud, 2004). According to Bellah, Americans embrace a common civil religion with certain fundamental beliefs, values, holidays, and rituals, parallel to, or independent of, their chosen religion. The case study just presented calls for a reexamination of American civil religion. In what ways does a Buddho-Daoist goddess cult popular among Taiwanese American new immigrants impact the arena of American civil religion? The post 9/11 atmosphere in America questions the penetration of American Mazu into the public sphere because American national identity is considered by the majority to be threatened by competing ideologies and theologies of social order (Huntington, 2004). This essay has explored the ways in which a non-Protestant goddess has produced an alternative American national identity among its community members that is fluid, reflecting the deterritorialized nature of today’s global society.
But as Samuel Huntington argues, these diasporic cum transnational identities are the singular cause of a weakening American national identity (2004). Ironically, the most influential actor in the production and extension of modern globalization processes seems to be unable to negotiate its own byproduct—namely, the process that Michael Kearney (1995) calls the "peripheralization of the core." Accordingly, diversity is seen as the gravest internal peril to American solidarity and identity. This essay questions the traditional model of American civil society and civil religion and shows that the future contour of American national identities will be multiple when it comes to immigrants from Asia. The process and complexity of Americanization is best exemplified by the comment of one of the pilgrims during the return trip from Taipei. When asked if American Mazu has a U.S. passport, she responded, "Of course!...She’s been living in America over twenty years."

Among the first-generation Taiwanese American immigrants, ritual continuity viz Meiguo Mazu’s participation in the San Francisco Chinese New Year Parade, is the attempt to maintain a pattern of life that informs their understanding of being “Taiwanese.” However, second and subsequent generations of Taiwanese Americans might not feel the psychological need to maintain this pattern. During the 2006 pilgrimage to Beigang, board members of Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. and Beigang Chaotian Temple discussed plans to construct a second Mazu temple in New York. Pilgrims from Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. were excited to hear of these plans, and enthusiastically offered to assist and offer advice. The Beigang Chaotain Temple representatives said it would be another branch from Beigang Mazu, which he said would make Mazu "even more global." Flushing, New York, has a thriving Taiwanese American community known as "Mandarin Park," so it is not surprising that community would be selected. It is interesting to speculate on whether Meiguo Mazu from Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. will be represented in the New York Mazu temple, and if, by extension, the New York Mazu temple will perform annual pilgrimages to San Francisco, to Beigang, or to both? Will New York Mazu be taken out of her temple to participate in New York’s Chinatown Chinese New Year parade? That there are current plans for the construction of another Mazu temple in New York suggests that the life and vitality of this cult will not diminish anytime soon.

ENDNOTES

1. Although the “Taiwanese American” can be subsumed in the category of “Chinese American” there are various Taiwanese ethnic groups (Hakka, Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, several Fujianese, and various "aboriginal- Taiwanese") to distinguish from the "mainlanders" who fled to Taiwan in the wake of the Communist victory of 1949 (Harrell and Huang, 1994, pp. 12–18). This distinction did not stay in Taiwan and/or China, but has been transplanted onto American soil in slightly different forms. New Taiwanese American communities confront older generations of Chinese American communities, and are introduced to the politics of racial identity in American society. Although, the cultural, social, economic, and political backgrounds of Taiwanese immigrants make their experiences different from those of the previous generations or other recent Chinese immigrants (e.g., Sino-Khmer and Sino-Vietnamese), the all-encompassing category of “Chinese American” is capable of usurping them all. However, it creates a myopic view of the situation, obfuscating the diversity inherent in the singular category of “Chinese America.” Therefore, in an attempt to avoid the totalizing implications of the taxon “Chinese America,” this essay will emphasize “Taiwanese American” as opposed to the more general “Chinese American” to stress the complexity
of cultural and ethnic identity discourses among the assortment of “Chinese American” communities.

2. Worldwide it is estimated that 250,000 Taiwanese-expats returned to Taiwan to vote (Kent, 2008).

3. Translation: “Go! Go! Go!”

4. The incense masters are typically male. They did not depart from the Ma-tsu Temple U.S.A. Some met at SFO while others joined the pilgrimage group in Taiwan. Once all the incense masters were available, only they can carry the goddess.

5. The Dutch colonized Taiwan from 1624-1662 C.E. Holland Land is a theme park that mixes aboriginal culture with Dutch gardens and architecture.

6. In spoken Taiwanese, “ziah hun” can also mean “eating cigarettes” which A-Hua would not do because she does not smoke.

7. Depending on the icon, some of the jewelry may be faux or real.

REFERENCES


______. *The Temple of Kwan Tai – Celebrating Community and Diversity*, Mendocino, CA. Mendocino: Published by the Temple of Kwan Tai Inc., 2004a.

______. *Auburn’s Joss House: Preserving the Past for the Future* (*The Auburn Chinese Ling Ying Association House*). Auburn: Published by the Auburn Joss House Museum and Chinese History Center, 2004b.


---

**Jonathan H. X. Lee** is Assistant Professor of Asian American Studies who specializes in Southeast Asian and Sino-Southeast Asian American studies at San Francisco State University. He is the Program Co-chair of the Religions of Asia section for the American Academy of Religion, Western Region (AAR/WR) conference, and is the academic adviser and grant writer for South East Asian Cultural Heritage & Musical Performing Arts (SEACHAMPA) collective. He serves as the Diversity Advocate on the Board of the American Academy of Religion/Western Region. Lee’s publications include *Cambodian American Experiences: Histories, Communities, Cultures, and Identities* (2010); and he is co-editor of the *Encyclopedia of Asian American Folklore and Folklife* (2011). Lee’s research interests are in Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Chinese-Southeast Asian American histories, folklore, cultures, and religions.