Jack London Reporting from Tokyo and Manchuria: The Forgotten Role of an Influential Observer of Early Modern Asia

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Jack London Reporting from Tokyo and Manchuria: The Forgotten Role of an Influential Observer of Early Modern Asia
By Daniel A. Métraux, Ph.D.

Abstract
Jack London is regarded as one of America's most popular writers for his novels and short stories. Less known today is the fact that he was also a first-rate observer of East Asian politics, societies, and peoples. Working as a journalist for several newspapers and magazines, he filed numerous articles and essays covering the Russo-Japanese war and even foresaw the rise of Japan and China as world powers. This paper provides an overview of his journalistic and literary contributions about Asia, his insights into Asian ethnic and political complexities, and his vision for pan-Asian/American cooperation.

Jack London (1876-1916) remains one of the most popular and beloved American writers nearly a century after his death. He is famous for his adventure stories in the Yukon, Polynesia and across America, but he was also a renowned socialist and fabled journalist whose brilliant work *The People of the Abyss* depicts the poverty and squalor of the low end of life in the capital of the British Empire. What is certainly less known about Jack London is that he was also a first-rate observer of Asia. His journalistic coverage of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and his essays and short stories provide not only excellent coverage of the war, but also a detailed view of social and political conditions in East Asia at the turn of the last century. What makes London even more interesting is his ability to discern the potential power of both Japan and China and to predict their rise to dominance later in the twentieth century.

London's firsthand essays and photographs on the Russo-Japanese War present a very clear in-depth picture of the early phase of the conflict. He filed at least twenty-four articles, each several thousand words long, to the Hearst newspapers. He not only presents his own views of the development of the war, but also analyzes the development of Korea, Japan, and China in their struggle to modernize and thus defend themselves from the onslaught of Western imperialism. London's Russo-Japanese War articles, if ever published as an anthology, might well be the best contemporary work on the subject. His analyses of East Asian development, especially his views on the down-trodden state of China and its potential for greatness, are especially perceptive. London made uncanny predictions of a future Japanese invasion first of Manchuria and later China and of China's rise as a world power. Any student of early twentieth century Asian Studies would do well to read London's insightful analyses that cover political, economic, social and cultural themes.

London was a very prolific essayist and fiction writer who prided himself on composing at least a thousand words a day. A great many collections of his essays appeared during his lifetime, but, oddly, he never published his Asian essays except for a couple in other anthologies. A much later collection of his journalism essays includes some of his war correspondence in Asia and Mexico, mixed in with his avid sports reporting, but makes no effort to actually highlight London's Asian pieces. A full in-depth study of London's Asian writings would be an invaluable contribution to the field of early modern East Asian history.

It is important to note, however, that London was much more of a journalist, novelist, and essayist than a scholar of Asian affairs. He was certainly not ignorant of the complexities of Asian culture and history. A dedicated reader of scholarly works on Asia, he also consumed everything he could find by writers like Lafcadio Hearn (1850-1904), whose work he lavished with praise in his essays. London very correctly focuses on the role that China's conservative governing “learned classes” had on slowing the modernization of the country. London writes that China would only progress when its masses rose up and overthrew their masters. On the other hand, London formulated several stereotypical views of various Asian societies that left out certain important elements. For example, he wrote that the Japanese were a nation of warriors who decried commerce, totally ignoring the critical role of the merchant class throughout Japanese history.

London made two trips to Japan and East Asia during his brief lifetime. In 1893, at age 17, he signed on to the sealing schooner *Sophie Sutherland*, bound for the coast of Japan. He spent a raucous time in the Bonin Islands and had a chance to explore Yokohama when his ship stopped there on its return to San Francisco. London vividly describes the trip itself in his acclaimed novel *The Sea Wolf*, but does not mention anything in the novel about his stops in the Bonin Islands, Tokyo and Yokohama while on the voyage. After his return he wrote several short stories based on his time in Tokyo and Yokohama including “Story of a Typhoon,” “Sakaicho, Hona Asi and Hakadaki,” “A Night's Swim in Yeddo Bay,” and “O Haru.” These stories reflect a deep affection for Japan and its people, especially those from the lower classes. They are also among the first pieces composed by the young writer.

London demonstrated his ability to depict the lives of ordinary Japanese in “OHaru” where he described the Japanese geisha:

> The *geishas* or dancing-girls are the brightest, most intelligent and most accomplished of Japanese women. Chosen for their beauty they are educated from childhood. Not only are they trained in all the seductive graces of the dance and of personal attraction; but also in singing, music, and the intricate etiquette of serving and entertaining; nor are their minds neglected, for in wit, intelligence and repartee, they excell. In short, the whole aim of their education is to make them artistically fascinating. In class, they occupy much the same position as do our actresses, and though many are frail beauties that grace the tea house festivals, here and there will be found gems of the purest luster.

A decade later, when he had already achieved fame as a novelist and short story writer, he became the premier American correspondent covering the Russo-Japanese War. His services as war correspondent and photographer for the
forthcoming conflict between Japan and Russia had been sought by Collier’s, the New York Herald, Harper’s Magazine, and the Hearst Press. The latter had made the best offer and going off to war had definite advantages for him besides financial gain. He would be well-paid, have a splendid adventure, and would be able to develop considerable material for future novels and stories.

London was both a keen observer and, as already noted, hugely prolific writer. The only Western reporter to reach the front in northern Korea, along the Yalu River, and later in Manchuria, London’s many lengthy dispatches describe not only the travails of war, but also provide fascinating descriptions of people and life in Korea and Manchuria. Later when the Japanese brought his reporting to a halt, he wrote a series of lengthy essays where he compared the modernization process of Japan, Korea and China and made bold but surprisingly accurate predictions about the rise of China as a modern superpower in the late twentieth century.

London’s essays on Korea, Japan, and China provide a penetrating analysis of the state of each of these nations a century ago. London clearly saw the stirrings of a new Asia, one that when fully awakened would directly challenge the West for world supremacy. He had little use for Koreans, whom he found to be a physically powerful but immensely ignorant and servile people totally unable to save their own country from wrack and ruin. London admired the Japanese not only for their unique ability to modernize so quickly, but also for what he forecasted as their potential to awaken Asia from its sleep and to lead it to its renaissance vis-à-vis the West. But it was China, once awakened by the Japanese, which he predicted would thrust small Japan aside and itself rise as the world’s preeminent superpower by 1976.

London’s View of Korea and Koreans

London actually spent most of his time in Asia traveling through Korea. When he arrived in Tokyo aboard the S.S. Siberia after a difficult three-week passage across the Pacific on 25 January 1904, he discovered to his horror that the Japanese had no intention of permitting foreign correspondents to travel to the front lines. Very strict censorship rules were in force, but London was not going to let a few Japanese censors get in his way. While other foreign correspondents hung out in Tokyo-area bars and begged Japanese officials to let them join Japanese forces marching north in Korea, London caught two rattle-trap steamers in early February that took him to the southern port city of Busan and then along the Korean coast to Chemulpo where he began a long march to Manchuria in tandem with Japanese forces.

The Japanese military was surprised when London suddenly showed up in Korea, but they were preoccupied with the movement of their own forces and tended to ignore London as long as he kept a low profile and did not interfere with Japanese military operations. London employed a Japanese civilian translator and a young Korean assistant as they moved north just ahead of the Japanese army.

London wrote numerous reports as he traveled from Seoul to Manchuria where he offered his in-depth analyses of Koreans, Japanese and Chinese. London was writing in an era when many of his fellow Californians had developed a strong sense of racial prejudice against Asians, especially those Japanese and Chinese immigrants who had settled in the San Francisco area and elsewhere. London on occasion reflected some of these prejudices in his novels and essays, especially when he was writing about Koreans, but he more often shows genuine sympathy and respect for the Asians he encountered. In that sense, most of London’s writing differs greatly from the anti-Asian diatribes found in many newspaper articles and books of the period.

London had little faith in the ability of Koreans to save their nation, but was full of praise for the Japanese and Chinese whose rise he predicted in his early writings:

The menace to the western world lies not in the little brown man [the Japanese], but in the four hundred millions of yellow men should the little brown man undertake their management. The Chinese is not dead to new ideas; he is an efficient worker; makes a good soldier, and is wealthy in the essential materials of a machine age. Under a capable management, he will go far. The Japanese is prepared and fit to undertake this management.

One of London’s first dispatches in early March 1904 belittled the Koreans:

A stalwart race are the Koreans, well muscled and towering above their masters, the [Japanese] “dwarfs” who conquered them of old time and who look upon them today with the eyes of possession. But the Korean is spiritless. He lacks the dash of Malay which makes the Japanese soldier what he is. The Korean has finer features, but the vital lack in his face is strength. He is soft and effeminate when compared with the strong breeds, and whatever strength has been his in the past has been worked out of him by centuries of corrupt government. He is certainly the most inefficient of human creatures, lacking all initiative and achievement, and the only thing in which he shines is the carrying of burdens on his back. As a draught animal and packhorse he is a success.

London developed an even more damning view of Koreans by the time he reached Manchuria in June 1904:

War is to-day the final arbiter in the affairs of men, and it is as yet the final test of the worth-whileness of peoples. Tested thus, the Korean fails. He lacks the nerve to remain when a strange army crosses his land. The few goods and chattels he may have managed to accumulate he puts on his back, along with his doors and windows, and away he heads for his mountain fastnesses. Later he may return, sans goods, chattels, doors, and windows, impelled by insatiable curiosity for a “look see.” But it is curiosity merely—a timid, deerlike curiosity. He is prepared to bound away on his long legs at the first hint of danger or trouble.

Northern Korea was a desolate land when the Japanese passed through. Villages and towns were deserted. The fields lay untouched. There was no ploughing nor sowing, no green things growing. Little or nothing was to be purchased. One carried one’s own food with him and food for horses and servants was the anxious problem that waited at the day’s end. In many a lonely village not an ounce nor a grain of anything could be bought, and yet there might be standing around scores of white-garmented, stalwart Koreans, smoking yard-long pipes and chattering, chattering—ceaselessly chattering. Love, money, or force could not procure from them a horseshoe or a horseshoe nail...They have splendid vigour and fine bodies, but they are accustomed to being beaten and robbed without protest or resistance by every chance foreigner who enters their country.
London wrote about the material poverty of the Korean people. He especially disliked the yangban aristocracy which he claimed to be ruthless in its suppression of the Korean people. He gives several examples where the Japanese would pay for food and supplies taken from a Korean village. The local aristocrat would collect the money from the Japanese, but would only give a quarter to the villages, pocketing the rest for himself. Some of London’s most compelling articles and photographs from the war are of Korean refugees, dressed in white, showing the devastating plight of war on civilians. One is especially impressed by a very poignant description of a young girl, perhaps no more than six or seven, carrying a younger sister on her back, a bandage covering the younger girl’s hand, a terrible, worried expression on her sister’s face.12

**Jack London on Japan**

As a journalist, London was quite annoyed with Japanese government officials because they refused to allow Western reporters to actively cover the war at the front and because Japanese army officials and police detained him several times when he took pictures in sensitive areas or wandered too close to the front lines. Nevertheless, despite his distain for Japanese officialdom, he certainly respected Japan’s ability to modernize so quickly and he often befriended ordinary Japanese. He employed a string of Japanese menservants during the last dozen years of his life and developed close friendships with each of them. London was sure that Japan was headed for greatness as a major world power, equal to the West not only in military and industrial power, but also in terms of the depth of its religious and cultural heritage. He reported an exchange with a Japanese civilian after his visit to the battlefront in Japan: “You people did not think that we could beat the white. We have now beaten the white.” as evidence of Japan’s self-confidence in its efforts to gain great power status.13

Americans, London notes, were infatuated and often surprised by Japan because of their total ignorance of Japanese history and civilization.14 They had created an image of the Japanese based on our own culture and then expected Japanese to behave in a manner predictable to Americans. The reality, however, was that “we know nothing (and less than nothing in so far as we think we know something) of the Japanese. It is a weakness of man to believe that all the rest of mankind is moulded in his own image, and it is a weakness of the white race to believe that the Japanese think as we think, are moved to action as we are moved and have points of view similar to our own.”15

London respected Japan’s extraordinary ability to modernize while other Asian states had not. “Japan is the one Asiatic race, in that alone among the races of Asia, she has been able to borrow from us and equip herself with all our material achievement. Our machinery of warfare, of commerce, of industry, she has made hers.”16 London reflected that Japan had also developed a taste for empire building much like the West. The Japanese are

…”a race of mastery and power, a fighting race through all its history, a race that has always despised commerce and exalted

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fighting. To-day, equipped with the finest machines and systems of destruction the Caucasian mind has devised, handling machines and systems with remarkable and deadly accuracy, this rejuvenescent Japanese race has embarked on a course of conquest the goal of which no man knows. The head men of Japan are dreaming ambitiously, and the people are dreaming blindly, a Napoleonic dream. And to this dream the Japanese clings and will cling with bull-dog tenacity.17

London commented frequently on the collective nature of Japanese culture. While he admired and respected many individual Japanese, especially certain Japanese generals who showed great courage and fighting skill, he was amazed at the Japanese ability to coalesce and at the high degree of patriotism he found. Writing in late 1904, he stated that:

“The Japanese is not an individualist. He has developed national consciousness instead of moral consciousness. He is not interested in his own moral welfare except in so far as it is the welfare of the State. The honor of the individual, per se, does not exist. Only exists the honor of the State, which is his honor. He does not look upon himself as a free agent, working out his own personal salvation. Spiritual agonizing is unknown to him. He has a “sense of calm trust in fate, a quiet submission to the inevitable, a stoic composure in sight of danger or calamity, a disdain of life and friendliness with death.” He relates himself to the State as, amongst bees, the worker is related to the hive; himself nothing, the State everything; his reasons for existence the exaltation and glorification of the State. The most admired quality to-day of the Japanese is his patriotism. The Western world is in rhapsodies over it, unwittingly measuring the Japanese patriotism by its own conceptions of patriotism. “For God, my country, and the Czar!” cries the Russian patriot; but in the Japanese mind there is no differentiation between the three. The Emperor is the Emperor, and God and country as well. The patriotism of the Japanese is blind and unswerving loyalty to what is practically an absolutism.18

It is interesting that London’s observations here come from an article that he entitled “The Yellow Peril.” “The Yellow Peril” was a very derogatory term of the period meant to demean the squalor and poverty that so typified Asia in the eyes of so many Western writers and political leaders. Although London uses this expression in his title, his writing contradicts the typical view of Asians. London respects the determination of the Japanese to save their nation through modernization and the hard work and endurance of the Chinese that he had encountered.

**Jack London and China**

London also had considerable admiration for Chinese civilization and predicted that when its people “woke up,” it would become a world superpower, becoming so powerful by 1976 that the nations of the West would rally together to curtail China’s dominance. He found the Chinese to be intelligent, clever, pragmatic and extremely hard-working. Tragically, however, China had been held back by a conservative governing elite who feared innovation and who looked to the glories of their nation’s past and shunned chances to learn from the technologically superior West or from the recent achievements of the Japanese. London believed that the only hope for the Chinese is a revolution from below, because the lethargic literati who governed China did so with an iron hand. The rulers would make no concessions to modernize
China, for to do so would cause them to lose their power and wealth. The real tragedy, notes London, is that so little had changed in China for centuries because “government was in the hands of the learned classes, and that these governing scholars found their salvation lay in suppressing all progressive ideas.” He continues:

The Chinese is the perfect type of industry. For shear work no worker in the world can compare with him. Work is the breath of his nostrils. It is his solution of existence. It is to him what wandering and fighting in far lands and spiritual adventure have been to other peoples. Liberty to him epitomizes itself in access to the means of toil. To till the soil and labour interminably with rude implements and utensils is all he asks of life and of the powers that be. Work is what he desires above all things, and he will work at anything for anybody...

Here we have the Chinese, four hundred millions of him, occupying a vast land of immense natural resources—resources of a twentieth-century age, of a machine age; resources of coal and iron, which are the backbone of commercial civilization. He is an indefatigable worker. He is not dead to new ideas, new methods, new systems. Under a capable management he can be made to do anything. Truly would he of himself constitute the much-heralded Yellow Peril were it not for his present management. This management, his government, is set, crystallized. It is what binds him down to building as his fathers built. The governing class, entrenched by the precedent and power of centuries and by the stamp it has put upon his mind, will never free him. It would be the suicide of the governing class, and the governing class knows it.19

London predicted that the Chinese Revolution and future ascendency would be triggered by a Japanese invasion of China. Looking to the future in 1905, London conjectured that Japan would never be satisfied with control over Korea. Just above Korea lay Manchuria, with its huge deposits of coal and iron, the very ingredients that Japan would need to expand its industrial empire. South of Manchuria lay 400 million highly disciplined workers who, if harnessed by the Japanese, could become the factory workers and miners who would make Japan a truly great world power. London’s predictions for the future of East Asia are found in his 1906 short story, “The Unparalleled Invasion.”20 London presents an Orwellian drama where he tells of the rise of China in 1976 as a threat to world peace and how the Western powers combated this threat through the use of biological warfare. Japan, after its victory over Russia, had moved into Manchuria and then China and had persuaded the Chinese to work with the Japanese as kindred brothers. This collaboration included the building of a vast modern Chinese army that was to be at the beck and call of the Japanese, but then something happened that the Japanese had not counted on. The Chinese woke up. They realized their great power and own potential. It was time for China to throw the Japanese out and to seek its own fortune in world affairs! London writes:

China rejuvenescent! It was but a step to China rampant. She discovered a new pride in herself and a will of her own. She began to chafe under the guidance of Japan, but she did not chafe long. On Japan’s advice, in the beginning, she had expelled from the Empire all Western missionaries, engineers, drill sergeants, merchants, and teachers. She now began to expel the similar representatives of Japan. The latter’s advisory statesmen were showered with honours and decorations, and

such was the unparalleled invasion of China. For that billion of people there was no hope. Pent in their vast and festering charnel-house, all organization and cohesion lost, they could do naught but die. They could not escape. As they were flung back from their land frontiers, so were they flung back from the sea. Seventy-five thousand vessels patrolled the coasts. By day their smoking funnels dimmed the sea-rim, and by night their flashing searchlights ploughed the dark and harrowed it for the tiniest escaping junk. The attempts of the immense fleets of junks were pitiful. Not one ever got by the guarding sea-hounds. Modern war-machinery held back the disorganized mass of China, while the plagues did the work.

But old War was made a thing of laughter. Naught remained but patrol duty. China had laughed at war, and war she was getting, but it was ultra-modern war, twentieth century war, the war of the scientist and the laboratory, the war of Jacobus Laningdale. Hundred-ton guns were toys compared with the micro-organic projectiles hurled from the laboratories, the messengers of death, the destroying angels that stalked through the empire of a billion souls. During all the summer and fall of 1976 China was an inferno. For that billion of people there was no hope. Pent in their vast and festering charnel-house, all organization and cohesion lost, they could do naught but die. They could not escape. As they were flung back from their land frontiers, so were they flung back from the sea. Seventy-five thousand vessels patrolled the coasts. By day their smoking funnels dimmed the sea-rim, and by night their flashing searchlights ploughed the dark and harrowed it for the tiniest escaping junk. The attempts of the immense fleets of junks were pitiful. Not one ever got by the guarding sea-hounds. Modern war-machinery held back the disorganized mass of China, while the plagues did the work.

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starvation weakened the victims and destroyed their natural defenses against the plagues. Cannibalism, murder, and madness reigned. And so perished China.22

It is highly ironic that London so clearly foresaw Japan’s eventual seizure of Korea and Manchuria, and its long, difficult invasion of China. Most importantly, he saw that Japan would not be satisfied with the mere defeat of Russia and the seizure of Korea and small parts of southern Manchuria. He foresaw that the Japanese would want to become the powerhouse of Asia and that they would come to realize that they would benefit if they could employ the power of four hundred million Chinese working on their behalf. History tells us that Japan did indeed invade Manchuria for its fertile land and rich natural resources in 1931 and that it invaded China later in the 1930s and 1940s to force the Chinese to accept Japanese supremacy there. A number of Japanese industrialists did indeed build profitable factories in several Chinese cities employing cheap Chinese labor and the Japanese military even installed its own puppet Chinese government in China. London correctly predicted that Japan’s incursion into China would so enrage the Chinese that they would rise up and expel the Japanese. This awakening of the “sleeping dragon” of China which in turn would lead to that nation’s emergence as a major world power.

London and “Racism”

Many writers have accused London of being a racist and white supremacist. His essays after leaving Manchuria have frequent references to “The Yellow Peril.” He wrote in an essay of that title that the “yellow” Chinese and “brown” Japanese might one day embark on an adventure that would shatter the domination of the West.

His many political speeches as the Socialist Party candidate for mayor of Oakland and elsewhere made it clear that socialism would only work in advanced societies and would fail in less developed societies until the inferior races were able to advance themselves sufficiently.

While London may well have harbored some beliefs about white supremacy, he clearly admired many of the Asians he encountered and strongly urged a forum where East and West could exchange views and ideas on an equal basis. These are hardly the thoughts of a racist; rather, they are the words of a true internationalist. He resolved that Hawaii was the ideal place for this encounter to take place and in 1915 urged the creation of a Pan-Pacific club where people of all races could meet to discuss the issues of the day.

In one of his last essays, “The Language of the Tribe,” London describes what he perceives to be some of the reasons for cultural misunderstanding between Japanese and Americans. He saw the Japanese as a patient and calm people while Americans are hasty and impatient in their daily lives. These and other extreme differences have made it difficult for Americans to understand Japanese and difficult to accept their immigrants to the United States as citizens. There had to be a place where both Americans and Japanese could come together and better understand their respective cultures: He wrote:

A Pan-Pacific Club can be made the place where we meet each

other and learn to understand each other. Here we will come to know each other and each other’s hobbies; we might have some of our new made friends of other tribes at our homes, and that is the one way we can get deep down under the surface and know one another. For the good of all of us, let’s start such a club.23

Jack London traveled extensively over the course of his short life. He encountered people of many cultures and empathized with the suffering of downtrodden people not only in the United States, but also in Europe, East Asia and the South Pacific.

He lived in California at a time when many of his neighbors supported openly racist legislation against the many Japanese and Chinese immigrants who had settled there. London took the time to know many foreigners as individuals and realized their potential worth as fellow human beings. Even as a very young writer he wrote stories and essays where he sympathetically portrayed the suffering and aspirations of Japanese, Chinese and Inuit characters. His reporting in Manchuria emphasized the great progress that the Japanese had made in the late nineteenth century as well as the Chinese potential for greatness. His writing on the squalor in London showed the disdain that people in Britain had for unfortunate persons in their own country.

London, unlike many writers of his time, was an internationalist who made a genuine effort to get to know the people and cultures in the lands that he traversed. His “Pan-Pacific Club” essay is his final appeal for the West to remove its stereotypical view of Asians as inferior peoples who needed Western domination for their own good. He wanted his readers to get to know persons of other cultures as real people. He also correctly foresaw the rise of a powerful new Asia and hoped that the West would develop peaceful and respectful relations with emerging nations like Japan and China.

ENDNOTES

4. These stories were published in the Oakland High School literary magazine Aegis in 1895 and later in other literary journals and anthologies. London attended Oakland High School upon his return from the Sophie Sutherland adventure.
6. There were many other renowned journalists sent over to cover the war including Richard Harding Davis, but London was the only one who managed to actually provide first-hand coverage of the war from the front lines. Davis and other reporters found themselves marooned in Tokyo because they lacked London’s boldness in actually finding passage from Japan to Korea.
7. London was also a respected photographer whose detailed pictures of the Japanese army in Korea and Manchuria were published in many newspapers.
8. Japanese officials frequently warned London to stay away from the front lines in Korea and Manchuria. They frequently detained London, took away his camera, and finally expelled him from Korea-Manchuria in the summer of 1904 because of his failure to follow Japanese censorship laws.
9. Quoted in O’Connor, 220.
11. Quoted in London, The Yellow Peril, The San Francisco Examiner, 25 September, 1904. Korea’s weakness was exposed when it proved unable to defend itself against forced entries by the Japanese in the 1870s and 1880s and by both Japanese and Russian forces between 1895 and the start of the Russo-Japanese War a decade later. The Korean government fell victim to several intrigues launched by Japanese, Chinese and Russian forces between the mid-1880s through the early 1900s.
13. Jack London, “Give Battle to Retard Enemy.” Dispatch to Hearst papers written in Antung, Manchuria on 1 May 1905. During China’s Qing dynasty (1644-1911) Manchuria became a part of China, but the Qing court, which was Manchurian in origin, reserved their ancient homeland for ethnic Manchurians only. Manchuria caught the attention of imperialists in Russia, Japan and elsewhere because of its fertile land, abundant resources, and its sparse population.

14. London gained his understanding of Japan not only from his own experiences in Japan and with the Japanese army in Korea, but also from his avid reading of books and articles by Lafcadio Hearn, who had just died when London arrived in Tokyo in early 1905.
16. Ibid.
20. Written at the end of 1906, “The Unparalleled Invasion” was published in book form in 1910 with the same title together with several other short stories.
22. Ibid.

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Gender Ideology Crossing Borders: A ‘Traditional’ Spouse in the U.S. International Migration Context
By Suzanne M. Sinke, Ph.D.

Abstract
Images, even false ones, can create desire. In the case of U.S. citizens and residents seeking marriage partners across borders, ideas about female purity, male dominance and women’s rights, marriage arrangement patterns, and family responsibilities contributed to an (often inaccurate) juxtaposition of foreign, especially Asian, women as “traditional” compared to U.S. counterparts, just as it marked foreign, especially Asian, men as more patriarchal than men in the U.S. Immigration law, which favored dependent female spouses from the outset, helped foster this image. The stereotypes of current “foreign bride” websites reflect ideas that are more than a century old, ideas found in migrants’ letters and soldiers’ stories, though they are now used for more commercial purposes. This paper illuminates how gender ideals shaped marriage patterns across borders, encouraging more cross-national matches by the late twentieth century, and how migration helped shape U.S. gender roles related to marriage.

Female Purity
Many cultures past and present place a high value on women’s virginity at marriage and sexual propriety after-
As a major part of the turn of the twentieth century campaign against “white slavery” (Slocum, INS, 1910). These laws had the effect of making it more difficult for European women to arrive alone. Marriage, or promised marriage, could be a way to avoid these restrictions.

Such was even more the case for Asian women in the same period, who faced restrictive laws and a much stronger presumption among immigration authorities of having come for prostitution. As an immigration inspector in San Francisco wrote in 1908 about incoming “picture brides” from Japan: “. . . if past experience is any guide. . . at least fifty per cent of such women will lead immoral lives in this country” (North, 1908). For some Japanese, however, it was American women who deserved scorn. As the Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. noted in 1919: “whereas the Japanese woman when she is married obeys her husband, is chaste, gentle and submissive in his service, the American woman, as seen by us Japanese, is generally willful and selfish in her conduct” (Ishii, 1919).

The stereotype of America as a land of sexual promiscuity could work in the opposite direction. Persons who wanted to escape sexual proscriptions might turn to the U.S. as a presumed land of freedom. The “American marriages”—bigamous marriages of men who had left their first spouses in the homeland—reported by social workers among Jewish families at the turn of the twentieth century were not the norm, but the idea of being able to start over by moving was not (Friedman, 1982). Many microstudies of migration point to personal crises such as pregnancy when unmarried, a broken engagement, an unwanted marriage proposal, or the refusal of a marriage proposal, as the precipitating factors in getting individuals to move (Hoerder, 1996: 218; Puskás, 1991: 225).

In the wake of World War II in Germany or Austria, or in Korea during the Korean War, economic conditions were poor and work close to U.S. military forces was one of few options available. Yet women who associated with U.S. soldiers would automatically gain an unsavory reputation. The terminology locals used to refer to them typically denoted prostitution. In Korea some faced familial excommunication for loss of honor. In former Nazi lands, mobs would sometimes attack interethnic couples if they appeared in public. Such women might seek marriage to an American as the most palatable option under major economic, demographic, and social duress (Yuh, 1999: 2; Moon, 1997: 7; Biddiscombe, 2001: 615-616).

In the later twentieth century the migrant might be a Guatemalan woman who was raped by military forces prior to emigrating (Kohpahl, 1998: 50). Migration might not have to be international in order to escape the negative association, but the possibilities of evading detection or putting distance between negative cultural evaluation of women who were victims of military attacks and military policies were often greater in the U.S. context or potential immigrants assumed they were. Further, the impression of the U.S. as a land where those associations would not exist, or at least not as strongly, relates more generally to images of women as having more rights in the U.S., and of the U.S. as a land of freedom and wealth at least for some (Kim, 1996: 29).

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Rights were less likely to be granted de facto if not de jure to foreign groups with less cultural proximity to a dominant U.S. pattern, who not coincidentally were often considered non-white. Two visa petition cases before the immigration authorities in 1952 illustrated the pattern. In one, an Air Force officer was allowed to marry a German woman, despite having a mail-order divorce from Mexico—not legal in the U.S.—to dissolve his first marriage. The officials argued that the marriage was legal in Germany, where it took place, hence they would allow it in the U.S. In a second case a U.S. serviceman arranged for a “proxy” marriage in Japan, where he had been stationed until recently and where his fiancée lived. Though the marriage was legal in Japan, the officials ruled it was not legal in the United States and refused entry to his spouse (INS Decisions, Vol. 4, 56324/762 and VP4-7802). In other words the principle that a marriage that was valid where it took place should be accepted in the U.S. as well had various exceptions.

Changing images of male dominance in marriage imbued immigrant and migrant life. Songs of Gold Mountain, an early twentieth century anthology of Cantonese language folk songs/ poems included chapter titles such as “Too Much Freedom for Women Leads to Oppression of the Husband” and “Freedom for Women Upsets the Moral Order” (Wong, 1991: 254-255). At the same time some images of foreign men, such as of Chinese men in New York City in the nineteenth century, could be less “manly” than an American standard. This feminization of men from Asia illustrated the malleability of gender images mattering on the context (Teng, 2000: 96). Orientalism, the study of “others” by those in the “West” in the context of colonial relationships, contributed extensively to the stereotyping of foreign men. And yet the racial discrimination which placed men in servile positions could counter the patriarchal images found elsewhere, and sometimes make them more appealing partners. In the case of New York City in the nineteenth century, it was sometimes Irish immigrant women who were attracted. On a national scale, however, matches across national lines for Chinese men were often illegal and in most locations rare (Tchen, 2001; Ruggles and Sobek, 1997).

The stereotype of American women as less submissive than foreign women was part of the challenge to male dominance, particularly for foreign born men in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By the mid-twentieth century native born men increasingly adopted a similar stance. A post World War II correspondent in Paris explained that U.S. women would expect to be equal partners in a conversation at a restaurant, while French women would sit and listen and laugh at appropriate points (Dallaire, 1946: 15). It was the same kind of association which led many immigrants of earlier years to look for spouses from the “old world” rather than the more Americanized second generation available locally. Though many of the women who came from Japan early in the twentieth century were non-conformists in a number of ways, all had still been trained as “Meiji women,” a term which embodied “impressions of extreme dedication, enormous strength of will, patient self-sacrifice, and duty to family” (Sarasohn, 1998: 17). Many did not want to marry Meiji men, a term with negative connotations about a lack of household participation and strict patriarchal rule. The most desirable women were unavailable to migrants because such women would not leave Japan. Hence the men sometimes chose women who had characteristics undesirable in Japan: women with more education than average, with aggressive personalities, women who had converted to Christianity or otherwise were atypical in their homeland. They were part of an international marriage market (Sinke, 1999).

In A.R. M. Around Moscow (1994) film makers Jeanne C. Finley and Gretchen Stoeltje interviewed the U.S. men and Russian/former Soviet women meeting in the context of an arranged matchmaking opportunity in the 1980s. Fifteen men paid handsomely to meet over 500 potential spouses. The numerous Russian women quickly recognized that many of the Americans were not necessarily their ideal: divorced and bitter, with few social skills, sometimes blatantly racist and sexist; likewise the men recognized that they were trading on “cultural capital” as one anthropologist describes the gender associations tied to national identities (Robinson, 1996). The men were U.S. citizens who could afford to go overseas to look for a spouse, and the impression the women had was often one that saw such men as less likely to be alcoholics, poor providers, or physically abusive than the Russian men caught in deteriorating economic conditions. For all the U.S. men’s social ineptitude from an American perspective, marriage to one of these men could still be a ticket to the U.S., and out of conditions the women evaluated as even more undesirable.

One of the paradoxes of the late twentieth century “mail order bride” phenomenon has been that many of the women seek more enlightened spouses while men were often looking for more conservative women. As one well-educated woman from Mexico explained when justifying why she listed with a foreign matchmaking company: “Mexican men are very conservative. . . it’s a different culture. The women are getting educated—they’re changing—but the men are staying the same” (Garin, 2000: E-1). At least some women who have come to the U.S. from Mexico agree. In one set of interviews of Mexican-born women in Atlanta in the 1990s, the women cited more egalitarian distribution of housework and legal protection from domestic violence as key features of a reorganization of gender roles (Hirsch, 1999).

Migrants and potential migrants have often evaluated gender roles in their decisions about whether or not to move. In 1858 a German newspaper targetting emigrants noted that women in the U.S. could marry the man of their choice for the father was no longer head of the household, and moreover divorce was relatively easy (“Familie,” 1858, 43). The information which chains of migration as well as media offered, created opportunities to think about gender roles beyond a local or national context. Changes in gender roles in marriage associated with migration also went back to sending areas in other ways, particularly with return migrants. Some Sicilian women began attending literacy programs in response to high out-migration rates by men there. American men were less servile than before migration, but the wives who remained in the village also changed their role in the family, becoming more active in decision-making and adopting higher
consumption patterns (Reeder, 1998). Though such changes were often underway in the homeland, experiencing them in the U.S. first, or adopting them faster because of connections to the U.S. provided a mental image of women’s rights that contrasted “traditional” patriarchy.

**Marriage Arrangement Patterns**

A third way in which migration interacted with ideas about tradition and marriage has been in shifting marriage arrangement patterns. For Jewish immigrants of the turn of the twentieth century, it often meant abandoning arranged marriage in favor of marriage for love (Sinke, 1999; Glenn, 1990: 238). Emma Goldman was not alone in “escaping” to America in part in order to avoid an unwanted match (Goldman Papers). Jewish immigrants in the U.S. began organizing social activities to bring those they considered potential spouses into contact (Weinberg, 1988: 206). Similarly in the late twentieth century Indian immigrants often find their children challenging the idea of arranged marriage, and have shifted it to a sort of introduction service (Gupta, 1999).

Women who did come as part of arranged marriages sometimes faced scrutiny by immigration officials who had doubts about the “foreign” customs, particularly at the turn of the twentieth century, when such women were most commonly from Asia. Immigration officials sometimes performed wedding ceremonies for so-called “picture brides” from Japan, though consular officials protested repeatedly that the couples were already married. Groups accustomed to polygyny for the elite, found that U.S. law refused to honor multiple marriages, despite the general rule of allowing as spouses those who were officially wed according to the laws of another country (Sargent, 1907; Administrative Decisions, 1978, Vol. 16, #2656: 543-544). For those coming from China in the nineteenth century, or Ghana in the late twentieth, such legal barriers to multiple marriages meant either leaving a spouse or spouses behind when one migrated, or finding ways to subvert the system.

In the U.S. several practices associated with marriage in other countries had a harder time continuing among migrants. A popular song in Yiddish neighborhoods at the turn of the twentieth century indicated that a young man in the U.S. would marry a woman without a dowry if he loved her. In some cases this was true. Rachel Bella Kahn, an orphan, a Jew, and an older single woman in Russia in the late nineteenth century, had no dowry at all, so her passage to America was paid by her husband-to-be, who brought her to North Dakota to homestead (Calof, 1995: 8-9). The possibility to marry without a dowry, which even in the U.S. context was typical though not necessarily mandatory, was a key selling point which nineteenth-century European immigrants used to entice women to migrate. As one German immigrant wrote: “You write that Roessle is not married yet and lacks sufficient wherewithal, in America one doesn’t need anything, because the husband has to buy everything, here everything is totally different, because one doesn’t need a dowry” (Morn in NABS, 1871). In the U.S. context a formal dowry became less necessary for many groups. While this relieved women and their families of a major financial burden, it also meant less financial leverage for a woman in the marriage, especially in times of dispute, and a poorer economic start to the marriage in some cases. Likewise in the late twentieth century some groups faced a similar challenge to marriage payment expectations. For many Hmong, marriage payment (also known as bride price) signified the linking of two clans and a commitment by both to make the marriage succeed. But at least some young people sought to challenge their elders and choose spouses themselves or simply abandon the practice, which they saw as out-dated (“The Bride Price Community Forum,” Moua, 2000: 19-24).

The absence of parental consent in the U.S. context has often shocked migrant populations. Though required in many parts of the U.S. into the twentieth century even for young adults, parental consent laws were less likely to be enforced among the migrant population. Parents were less likely to be present, and officials did not always concern themselves with transnational family dynamics (Sinke, 2002: 27). Immigrant letters of newlyweds conveying the news to their relatives after eloping sometimes had the undercurrent of justifying what was clearly a step against parental will.

One of the most striking changes for nineteenth-century immigrants in terms of marriage arrangements was the growth of an international marriage market. Most matches took place between those of like national background, but because of sex ratios in the migrant population, men were likely to have to return for a spouse, or send for one. Letters arranging marriage, often with exchanges of pictures if the persons did not know one another previously, were common among many groups by the late nineteenth century. While Japanese “picture brides” were the most well-known, and married prior to leaving Japan, marriages arranged by letter (including by e-mail in the late twentieth century) have become a common way to link those with similar background and interests. Danish immigrant Carl Jensen was typical in his letter from Elba, Nebraska in 1908: “If you can find a nice and reasonably pretty girl, send her over here so that I perhaps can get myself a wife” (Stilling and Olsen, 1994: 140).

Often parents and other relatives were crucial in such exchanges, locating suitable spouses with whom a migrant son (or in more recent times daughter) might finalize nuptial plans through the mail (Ikels, 1985: 258). For those such as Cape Verdeans in the early twentieth century, a quick trip back to marry and then bring the spouse to the U.S. was typical. Because of the regular shipping trade between a key Cape Verdean settlement area in New England and the islands, oral messages as well as letters kept this link strong and fostered transatlantic matchmaking. A key reason for seeking a spouse from the homeland in this case, as in so many others, was the sense that women were more subservient there—they fit the more patriarchal roles with which migrant men were raised. Among Cape Verdean migrants interviewed in the 1960s, men expressed nostalgia for family relations in the homeland, while women generally stressed their preference for the individual autonomy they had achieved in their new setting (Halter, 1993: 84-92). Further, for a group racially “in-between,” marrying someone from the same background was less likely to pose problems.

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Dutch immigrants sometimes turned to classified ads to help find spouses either transatlantically, or across distances within the United States. “Matrimonials” were common in Finnish and Yiddish papers as well. Classified ads have continued in the twentieth century and have moved into major matchmaking enterprises in some cases (Sinke, 2006). While foreign bride web companies may gain more attention, typically the personals of ethnic news services from Laiks (a Latvian weekly in New York) to India Abroad to Islamic Horizons to “Mundohispanica.com” to Iranian Singles Network seek to match those of similar background. Finding a spouse, thus, has shifted from print to electronic media for some. In these cases as well, one element of looking across borders or long distances for a mate of the same national background at least sometimes relates to the perceived traditionalism of women from that area. In cases of U.S. men looking outside their own national background, an element of that traditionalism is the power men hold, at least for a period of time, over a woman’s immigration status if she comes as a spouse. In the late twentieth century laws changed to allow abused women in such cases to still remain in the U.S., and in areas like the Philippines, mandatory counseling informing fiancées of this was part of the paperwork required to marry someone in the U.S.

Inequality in intercultural relationships appears in other ways as well. Spouses who enter a new area without the same cultural background are at a disadvantage and may have to be more reliant on the U.S. spouse for a number of years if not for life. The military brides whose spouses never learned their languages, and who themselves never really became fluent in English, had a hard time trying to maintain authority in the home (Yuh, 1999: 136). Since the 1950s women have been able to sponsor spouses for immigration, just as have men, but fewer have done so. This is more striking in light of female majorities among immigrants. The switch to female majorities among migrants beginning in the mid-twentieth century, though primarily a reflection of economic opportunities for “women’s work,” are related in part to marriage patterns because men consistently imported more “brides” than women did “grooms.” Across time, marriage has been the most common reason for migration in many societies. In virilocal and patrilocal cultures, both men and women or just women respectively, would move to a new location at marriage. These moves were generally within a local or regional context, though there were exceptions. Among the elite, rulers or nobility or the most wealthy, marriage across national borders was more common. Political and economic alliances were key elements in those cases. Further, sex-specific migrations, such as military men stationed outside borders, could produce many local marriages if state policy made this a legal option and the people considered one another suitable (or were desperate enough). Troops carried with them an image of the manly warrior, often a powerful figure. Further, in colonial and occupational settings, these men (and there were few military women) often appeared to have greater wealth than the local population (Enloe, 1989; Moon, 1997; Yuh, 1999).

Technology, whether in the form of the steamship and railroad, or more recently in the form of air travel, has lengthened the distances that some individuals have been willing and able to go to find a suitable spouse. Likewise the development of more widespread literacy and postal systems (not to mention photographic advances) made it possible for potential spouses to correspond and gain images of one another across borders, sometimes filtered through intermediaries like matchmakers and dating services. In the late twentieth century this has gone a further step to include telephone and internet connections.

Family Responsibilities

It is rather ironic that people use the latest in technology to find traditional women, those who “want to keep the house, cook the meals, etc.” and generally embody an ideal of womanhood associated with the 1950s in the United States (Russian American Alliance web page, 1999). The desire in some cases is to maintain a home with male breadwinner and female housekeeper, though not all could afford this. Moreover, the web sites make it clear that the men are seeking women who will not expect a husband to share household work and who generally are more submissive than their idea of “American” women. At the same time women expect to be treated well, perhaps better than what they might anticipate in their homeland and have the economic benefits of an ideal U.S. world. As one woman from Trinidad wrote of her ideal man/husband: “I would like him to be my Prince Charming. Mature, honest, hardworking, tall, sexy and financially stable” (“Island Girls,” 2002). Not surprisingly, many women’s matchmaking ads list children and family as key priorities for themselves. This coincides with the traditional image that wives will handle child care and housework with little or no assistance from a husband beyond his monetary contribution.

In intercultural marriages the stereotypes can be gender reversed as well. More educated Ghanaian men in the late twentieth century, for example, were less likely to expect wifely subordination, and in turn, they were more likely candidates for marriage to American women, particularly African-American women, with whom they would form relatively equal partnerships. These men would be likely to cook, clean, and share child-care, though Akan men in Ghana often expect wives to handle more of these tasks. African women who married African-American men, on the other hand, were more likely to be subordinate to their spouses, and the men were more likely to complain about domineering U.S. women (Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh, 1998: 108-109).

The image of traditional women links in part to the assumed responsibility of women who marry those of similar background to prepare foods common in sending areas, and to maintain elements of ethnic culinary practice, whether eating with chopsticks or making homemade pasta. Food preparation is one of the tasks most likely to be associated with women across a wide variety of cultures. For nineteenth and early twentieth century immigrants, the monetary and labor contribution of the wife through cooking and cleaning was often one of the main reasons men cited for wanting to get married, as did this single Hessian immigrant in 1855: “Here in America it’s better to be married than single, think of all the Board, that is Kostgeld, both husband and wife can

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live on that” (Weitz in Kamphoejner et al., 1991: 349). Taking in boarders or doing laundry were common methods for immigrant families to get ahead economically, contributing as much as a man’s wages in some cases (Morawska, 1986).

For the Paik family, refugees from the Japanese occupation of Korea, making ends meet in Riverside, California in the early twentieth century consisted of cooking for about thirty Chinese citrus workers. Though the entire family helped with the business, preparing food was primarily the wife’s job (In Dublin, 1993: 177). Many migrant men viewed doing housework as a breach of gender roles. The laundry and cooking businesses started by some Chinese immigrants, who had few choices because of the lack of women and poor wages, helped feminize their public image.

Another major responsibility of wives was to provide sex. One of the most potent elements of cultural capital for Asian and Pacific women in the late twentieth century was the association of women with sex to please, an image that had a base in the reality of prostitution surrounding U.S. colonial and military endeavors. This linked back to Orientalist views of Asian women from the nineteenth century to some extent, but was grounded in occupation inequalities and military policies. One study indicated that over a million Korean women provided sex for U.S. military forces, despite the strong cultural value on chastity and on racial purity (Moon, 1997: 1-3). A study of Japanese “war brides” indicated that nine of twelve couples lived together prior to marriage, at a time when this would have challenged existing moral norms in both spouses’ countries (Lark, 1999: 189). The need for American economic and military aid pushed Asian governments to support such programs, such as rest and relaxation stops which have become major sex tour destinations (Enloe, 1989). The connection of military men having sexual contacts with local women on unequal terms, however, was not limited to Asia. Stories of near starvation local conditions contrasted with the abundance accorded American military men abound in Europe in the wake of World War II as well. Relationships under such conditions were prone to difficulty. As one woman in Austria explained about her romance with a U.S. GI: “. . . we wanted to get married. Then, in October, [his] entire division was transferred back to America. . . . I was naive and of course I believed that I would receive some word from him. But I never heard from him again. . . . My daughter was born in 1946” (Gertrude D., in Boltzmann-Institute Collection).

Within marriage (and similar co-habiting unions for some groups) sex was also for procreation, a major life goal for many men and women. New immigrants in the turn of the twentieth century United States had higher fertility on average than their native-born counterparts, though the second generation typically had much lower rates (King and Ruggles, 1990). To be a good Polish Catholic woman in that period, for example, meant forewearing birth control (Bukowczyk, 1987: 24). In the late twentieth century, a medical study indicated pregnant women in an area of high migration in Mexico were more strongly tied to motherhood roles than were Mexican women in the U.S., and Mexican-American women in turn were even more likely to see life plans as combining motherhood with other tasks (Guendelman et al., 2001). Motherhood, in other words, could have different meanings based on migration. Within some Asian cultures the stress on producing a male heir could be particularly strong. For some, the stress on procreation, or at least certain kinds of procreation, went on beyond mid-century. In one Korean family the father named the fourth daughter Chai-Nam—“to be a boy”—in hopes this would promote the next child being male. Two more daughters followed. As the oldest daughter later reminisced: “I could see my mother’s exploitation and suffering because she couldn’t give birth to a male child” (Kim, 1996: 48).

Child care was also heavily gendered in many migrant communities. Widowers in the nineteenth century sometimes sent their children to orphanages if they could not hire housekeepers or remarry rapidly. Among Dutch Protestant immigrants the standard assumption was that a widow with young children might survive on her own, but a widower could not (Sinke, 2002: 40). One of the compensations for strong paternal authority in Italian and Mexican immigrant families in the mid-twentieth century was the centrality of maternal roles to the home. “Traditional” women in these cases gained particularly strong ties to their children (Sánchez, 1993: 146; Johnson, 1978: 237). Conversely, the assumption that American men might be more involved in child care was also an attractive feature to some foreign women. American men would push baby carriages in public, something which shocked the older generation, explained one Austrian woman who married an American GI during the occupation after World War II (Elizabeth C., 1993 in Boltzmann-Institute Collection).

A typical model of late nineteenth century industrial work was for a migrant man to engage in this activity on a temporary basis in the United States while leaving the social reproduction of his family in a homeland, often in the hands of a wife or parents. For Chinese immigrants it was enshrined into law, making it almost impossible to bring in a wife after the Page Act of 1875, and later even to go back to China temporarily (Chan, 1991). High return migration rates from Southern and Eastern Europe attested to the prevalence of this “sojourner” pattern (Wyman, 1993). Transnational fatherhood in this context primarily meant sending funds to support the family, though it also included correspondence or other contact (sending instructions at times about major purchases or decisions), and returning at some point if possible, perhaps temporarily. This model continued to exist in the twentieth century among temporary migrants, though women became a larger part of the group. In the late twentieth century this included many migrant mothers, employed doing child care in the U.S., who shifted care of their own children and other social reproductive tasks to fathers, grandparents or other extended family in a homeland, a pattern labeled transnational motherhood (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001; Parreñas, 2001). In some cases grandmothers (though less likely grandparents) would be sponsored into the United States as well, so that working parents could have more contact with the children (Donato and Tyree, 1986: 227). For the late twentieth century the continuation of the “traditional” ideal of women as child care providers and of the home as the best place for this care combined with the stereotype that “foreign” women were

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more traditional and hence good mothers to create a market for foreign care givers, despite (and some would argue because of) legal barriers.

Another family responsibility of major concern in migration decisions was the need to care for the elderly. While providing elder care within a child’s home was a pattern common in many sending regions, it decreased in the U.S. in the late twentieth century as families relied more and more on commercial homes for the elderly. As Hung Cam Thai has shown, the desire to have a spouse fulfill duties to one’s parents, including caring for the elderly, is part of the reason recent Vietnamese male migrants seek to marry women from their homeland (Thai, 2001). While women may assume they are escaping these duties by migrating, their prospective husbands may assume the opposite. This “ethnic” ethic of care has contributed to the shift in which households are most likely to contain elderly kin (Lavender, 1986). Whereas it was the wealthy in the late nineteenth century who most often had households containing elderly kin, by the late twentieth century it was most often the impoverished (Ruggles, 1994: 125).

For the late twentieth century and beyond men who marry those in sending regions may do so in part because women of like background in the U.S. anticipate careers, and are less wiling to put those careers on hold for children or elderly parents. Such was the late twentieth century case of Rani, a woman from India who came to the U.S. in an arranged marriage and put her nursing aspirations on hold to be a full-time housewife. After returning to India on a visit eleven years later she found that more women were working outside the home there, so she decided to return to her pre-marriage occupation of nursing once back in the United States (Balagopal, 1999, 156-157). Once it was no longer atypical in the homeland, she could justify it. Even with fairly regular contact, images of the gender roles in sending areas can become outdated rapidly. Those who start to think about marriage after a number of years in the U.S. may have a perspective based on their own experiences in the past, rather than the current reality.

At the turn of the twentieth century migrants coming from cultures which practiced family forms other than virilocal residence often found it difficult if not impossible to maintain these patterns in the new setting. Women from Asia sometimes preferred not having to live with a mother-in-law who would control the household activities (Ling, 2000: 50). Dutch immigrant women were more likely to bemoan the loss of consanguine kin, who no longer could fulfill roles of informal care, sporadic assistance, advice and other day-to-day sociability (Sinke, 2002: 42-43). In general transnational migration has made it more difficult to maintain extended family ties.

Yet immigrant households have sometimes had higher ratios of extended family members present than the U.S. population as a whole, at least if they did not face formal legal barriers to bringing in these individuals. Thus at the turn of the twentieth century siblings, cousins, and eventually even parents might sometimes appear on census schedules for a period in the life course of Dutch immigrant households. Many judged the success of migration in familial rather than individual terms. Shifts in transportation have made family reunification even more feasible in the late twentieth century, and U.S. immigration policy has reinforced this. In fact the impression that women come as wives or mothers rather than workers, though they are often both, is in part due to immigration law.

**Conclusion**

Images are not reality. This needs stress, for in many cases the women or men in marital relationships that cross borders do not fit the stereotypical images of “traditional” or “patriarchal,” and at times they would reject them vehemently. Any linkage of less-Western to “traditional” re-inscribes stereotypes, some gleaned from Orientalism, others from a cultural chauvinism based on ideas of American superiority or individual rights. Still, cultural images help create cartographies of desire—who one thinks could be a suitable partner, if one seeks a partner at all (Pflugfelder, 1999). These images work their way into many cultural settings. The popular Chinese soap opera of the 1990s, “Foreign Babes in Beijing,” featured the character Jixia, an American woman who embodied sexual liberation, seducing a married Chinese man (De Woskin, 2005). Popular culture, particularly in the form of American movies and television, have added significantly to these stereotypes in the twentieth century and beyond.

What I have tried to suggest with these examples is the relationship between images of tradition/emancipation and the migration and marriage patterns they create and sustain. The transnational marriage market, both in the form of marriages of persons from the same homeland who unite after one has migrated, and those who marry across national lines, has contributed significantly to the image of foreign individuals, particularly foreign women, as “traditional.” The challenges of U.S. popular culture to ideals of purity have fed into gendered migration patterns and the desire of some men for “traditional” women. Likewise ideas of male dominance, seen most often in images of non-U.S. men demanding submission from wives, and eliciting it at times through force, reinforces the cultural capital of U.S. men in this context. The presence of extended family members in the home, and of stronger commitment to care for the elderly and children within a familial context, and of wives holding sole responsibility for housework are part of the “traditional” image, though like most of these images they are not necessarily accurate for either individuals or groups. U.S. laws, whether in prosecuting abuse, setting up standards of divorce, or determining who qualifies for family reunification, all contribute to a general model of “traditional” being associated with foreign. These are not the only images present, but they are very powerful ones both within migrant communities, and in the general U.S. population. With migrants coming and going from most corners of the globe, they contribute to a global discourse of gender.

**ENDNOTES**


Ambassador Ishii and Photograph Marriage. (June 30, 1919) Files of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, National Archives and Record Administration. Record Group 85, Entry 9. 524224/13-C.


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The Redefinition of Japan’s National Security Policy: Security Threats, Domestic Interests and a Realist-Liberal Approach
By Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, Ph.D.

Abstract
This article examines the redefinition of Japanese national security after the Cold War by emphasizing the role of domestic political interests in security policy-making. It also analyzes the combined impact of international and domestic variables on the process of policy formulation.

The article suggests a realist-liberal perspective and argues that although Japanese national security policy has been underpinned by the goal of “survival” in the anarchic international system, this policy has served the primary interest of the dominant decision-makers to maintain their power. With the emergence of non-conventional security threats after the Cold War, ensuring national security has gradually turned into a tool for strengthening the policy-making power of political actors and hence for a steady expansion of Japan’s security role. However, seeking to avoid jeopardizing their policy-making position, Japanese leaders have pursued policies within the scope of the Japanese public’s anti-militaristic acceptance of their country’s expanded security presence.

Introduction
Japan’s position in the international arena has changed substantially after the Second World War. From a defeated and occupied country Japan turned into a major economic power. From an aggressor it became a pacific state. Under the protective security “shield” of its U.S. ally Japan enjoyed peace and economic expansion during the Cold War. By contrast, the low profile of its foreign policy gave Japan labels such as a “passive” and “reactive” state, which had to respond to gaiatsu/beiatsu, i.e. to foreign and U.S. pressure (Calder 1988; Lincoln 1993; Kuriyama 2000).

In the beginning years of the 21st century, Japan’s anomaly of being a so-called “economic giant” and “political pygmy” appears to belong to the past. Indeed, after 1989, the country has been taking on a new international role for itself, particularly in the military security area. Japan has modernized its military capabilities and expanded its presence in overseas security missions, ranging from the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations (UN PKO) to the fight against international terrorism. This change from passivity to activity seems to be a vindication to the neo-realist expectations that Japan would sooner or later move towards becoming a “great” power, by means of acquiring massive military capabilities (including nuclear weapons) and acting as an assertive power (Kahn 1970; Layne 1993; Waltz 1993). Nevertheless, Japan’s anomaly in neo-realist terms appears to be continuing. Indeed, it has not engaged in autonomous defense, it has deepened its security partnership with the U.S. (including continuing reliance on nuclear protection), and its “active” overseas security role is largely limited to the bilateral alliance and is far from the threat or use of force.

The purpose of this article is to examine the redefinition of Japanese national security policy after the Cold War by taking into account the role of domestic interests, particularly political ones, in the process of policy formulation. Rather than excluding international variables the article seeks to combine them with domestic ones, and thereby offer insight into the complex relationship between the changed international security environment, the policy preferences of Japanese decision-makers, and the country’s security policy. By suggesting a combined realist-liberal perspective, this article will promote an “eclectic” approach (Suh et al. 2004; see also, Kim 2004), which has recently gained prominence in studies on Asian politics and security.

The above considerations limit the scope of analysis. The focus of this article is the conventional military dimension of Japan’s security policy and its evolution from the perspective of the U.S.-Japan alliance rather than in a multilateral context. Indeed, the changes in this dimension in recent years have led some observers to describe Japan as “normalizing.” However, not only has Japan chosen to confine its military security policy to the U.S.-Japan security framework, since the Cold War it has also applied a “comprehensive” and largely non-military approach to national security, which has included the promotion of “human security.” It is clear that the military dimension of Japan’s security policy deserves attention.

The following discussion will first explore Japan’s national security policy during the Cold War by demonstrating how both international and domestic factors shaped the country’s approach to national security. Second, the discussion will examine the post-1989 changes both in the Japan’s strategic environment and the domestic security climate, and address the ways in which Japan has redefined its security role. Finally, the article summarizes findings from several theoretical perspectives and concludes by suggesting a combined realist-liberal approach to understanding Japanese post-Cold War national security policy.

The Yoshida Doctrine and the Norm of Anti-Militarism

Japanese national security policy during the Cold War followed a path which Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida launched in 1951 with the signature of the original U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. What later became known as the “Yoshida Doctrine” meant economic development, pursuit of minimal military rearmament, and alignment with the U.S., with the main goal being Japan’s post-war rebuilding. Yoshida’s policy was formulated in close collaboration with the U.S.-led occupation authorities and evolved with the increasing threat from communist expansion in East Asia. Indeed, a large number of post-war, conservative Japanese politicians and members of the economic elite regarded alignment with the U.S. as the best option for Japan’s economic recovery and, equally important, for provision of defense assistance. The need for U.S. protection against the Soviet threat strengthened the domestic legitimacy of the Yoshida Doctrine and ensured the centrality of the Security Treaty in Japan’s national security policy.
In 1960, the treaty was revised to make clear the division of allies’ roles: the U.S. would provide for Japan’s defense (Article 5), while Japan would provide bases and host-nation support to the U.S. military forces, which would contribute to Japan’s security and to stability in the Far East (Article 6). The asymmetrical arrangements under the revised treaty permitted Japan to minimize its defense spending, forego significant military build-up, and avoid involvement in international security issues. Instead, the country focused on economic growth and expansion.

The limitation of Japan’s security role, which stemmed from Yoshida’s approach, also had a normative basis. The domestic standard of anti-militarism, institutionalized in the 1947 Constitution through the Preamble and, particularly, Article 9, became the main normative guideline for the country’s post-war foreign and security policy. While the Preamble expressed Japan’s desire for world peace, Article 9, known also as the “peace clause,” renounced the use of military force as a legitimate instrument of statecraft (paragraph one) and committed Japan to non-possession of war potential (paragraph two). Since the post-war period the Japanese government has interpreted Article 9 as permitting Japan to maintain only the minimum level of armed force necessary for self-defense. This interpretation has prohibited the country from exercising its right to collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, for this would exceed the scope of the use of military force permitted under Article 9.

Domestic anti-militarism was particularly strong during the Cold War period, which saw fierce public opposition to military activities, particularly those involving Japan’s overseas participation. Indeed, given the devastating consequences for Japan of its pre-war militarism, people were wary of expanding the country’s security role. The anti-militaristic public mood also resulted from a general belief that Japan’s foreign policy should be guided by economic goals, which would ensure the country’s economic well-being and eliminate conflicts at the international level (Dobson 2003).

Civilian Control and Decision-Making Actors

The path set by Yoshida led to, and resulted from, the establishment of a Japanese domestic decision-making system, which significantly constrained the country’s security role through the principle of civilian control of the military (Hughes 2005). The Japan Defense Agency (JDA), created together with the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954, included a significant number of officials from other ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Finance (Katzenstein 1996). The agency was not accorded a ministerial status and was placed within the administrative structure of the Prime Minister’s Office. Furthermore, as the JDA’s role was circumscribed to overseeing SDF activities, it became a subordinate to MOFA. The latter, therefore, emerged as the primary bureaucratic actor responsible for the “making” of Japanese national security policy, while the JDA engaged in implementing it by means of conducting the country’s defense (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993, 104). Overall, the agency’s structure of civilian-bureaucratic control ensured that the military would occupy a low position in security policy-making, which, in turn, would prevent the revival of centralized and powerful military establishments.

MOFA’s central role in the decision-making process, on the other hand, was facilitated by the weak position of the chief executive and the Cabinet. Despite being vested by the Constitution with significant policy-making powers over the three government branches, the prime minister was not able to exercise his authority due to dependence on the party politics of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and institutional weaknesses related to the core executive. The Cabinet was ineffective as a result of frequent reshuffles and, therefore, reliance on bureaucratic expertise for fulfilling its tasks.

Among political actors in the legislative branch, a key player in Japanese security decision-making was the conservative LDP. The one-party governance of the LDP, based on the party’s absolute majority in both houses of the Diet in most of the elections until 1989, became known as the “1955 political system” (55 nen seiji taiset). That political system allowed the LDP to assert its policy preferences over those of the other political parties and to dominate parliamentary politics in Japan. With economic growth being a priority on the government’s agenda, successive LDP administrations continued to strengthen Yoshida’s approach. This is not to say that the Yoshida Doctrine was not challenged by some conservatives who wanted constitutional revision and a more independent defense posture for Japan. However, the consequence was a further institutionalization of that approach, and hence a “renewed emphasis” on both economic expansion and alliance with the U.S. (Green 2003, 13). Indeed, for the Japanese political leadership it was the best way to eschew a major military build-up, while permitting some level of rearmament and providing security protection against the Soviet military threat.

For their part, the political parties of the left wing and, in particular, the leader of the opposition, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), played an important role in promoting domestic anti-militarism. The political opposition demanded strict adherence to the Constitution and Article 9, as well as a withdrawal from the Security Treaty and limitations on the role of the SDF (Dobson 2003). Curtailment of the SDF’s role to the mission of Japan’s territorial defense was also the stance of the centrist Kōmei Party (known as Clean Government Party), which until the end of the Cold War occupied a middle position on the political spectrum between the LDP and the left (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; Stockwin 1999). From 1999 on the Kōmei Party has been a member of the LDP-led coalition governments.

Japan’s Cold War National Security Concepts and Principles

The Yoshida Doctrine, together with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, ensured Japan’s security in the context of the East-West military confrontation and facilitated fast economic growth. Furthermore, the pursuit of economic-related security objectives was a means for Tokyo policy-makers to avoid Japan’s assumption of a larger military security role, which remained highly unpopular at the domestic level. The priority
given to economic growth evolved throughout the Cold War into a policy approach, which embraced a broad conceptualization of national security beyond the traditional military dimension. This “comprehensive security” (sōgō anzen hoshō) policy emphasized economic, social, technological, and political objectives for ensuring national security (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; Katzenstein 1996), as well as environmental security concerns, such as natural disasters and environmental degradation (Hughes 2004). While the pursuit of military security was not altogether substituted by other security objectives, it remained mostly confined to the bilateral security framework with the U.S. and was viewed from the perspective of ensuring Japan’s security protection against the Soviet military threat.

In 1957 Japan adopted its first post-war national security document, titled the Basic Policy for National Defense (BPND, Kokubō no Kihon Hōshin). The document indicated that the objectives of the country’s national security policy were to prevent and repel aggression towards Japan. The BPND stressed Japan’s support for UN activities and the promotion of international cooperation for world peace. It also emphasized the incremental development of Japan’s defense capabilities together with the centrality of Japan-U.S. security arrangements to Japan’s protection from aggression. Based on the Constitution and the BPND, the Japanese government subsequently developed the following four key national security principles: pursuit of an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power, adherence to the three non-nuclear principles of not manufacturing, possessing or bringing nuclear weapons into Japan, and ensuring civilian control of the military.

The domestic climate of anti-militarism limited the expansion of the country’s military capabilities and role. Cases in point were the introduction by the LDP government of the three non-nuclear principles and the placement of restrictions on arms exports in 1967, and the limitation of Japan’s defense spending to one per cent of the country’s Gross National Product in 1976. The decision of the LDP to impose a ceiling on defense spending was a response to the Socialists’ objection to the legitimacy of the SDF as well as their worries about a significant military build-up (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; Smith 1999). In turn, this measure allowed the LDP to achieve domestic acceptance of Japan’s first post-war national security doctrine adopted in 1976, the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO, Bōei Keikaku no Taikō).

Having introduced the “basic defense force” concept (kibanteki bōeiryoku kōsō), the NDPO expressed Japan’s intention to pursue its national security policy in terms of defense and deterrence. Japan would possess the minimum necessary defense capability in order to deal on its own with a limited aggression, while in case of a large-scale attack it would seek the assistance of U.S. forces (Ministry of Defense, Japan 1977). The adoption of the basic defense force concept resolved the problem between the ambitions of some JDA officials to have Japanese military capabilities match those of its regional adversaries and the political demands for restraining the SDF expansion (Smith 1999). A case in point is the 1972-1976 JDA defense build-up plan, which proposed to double defense spending with the strong support of then JDA Director-General Yasuhiro Nakasone. The program failed, not least because of strong domestic opposition to Japan’s potential rearmament (Murata 2000). In this sense, although the NDPO allowed for a qualitative upgrade of the defense forces, their subsequent modernization remained limited in quantitative terms, with no aim of matching the Soviet military strength (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; Smith 1999). In accordance with the principle of an exclusively defense-oriented policy, Japan has refrained from possessing offensive weapons, such as Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), long-range bombers or offensive aircraft carriers.

The LDP’s security ambitions, together with the Soviet military build-up and the onset of the Second Cold War in the late 1970s, played an important role for the incremental strengthening of Japan’s defense posture and the security partnership with the U.S. In 1978, the two sides adopted Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (hereafter, the Defense Guidelines). In line with Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented policy and the basic defense force concept, the Defense Guidelines emphasized Article 5-related joint operations for Japan’s defense (Ministry of Defense, Japan 1979). In addition, they included provisions for exploring bilateral cooperation under Article 6 of the Security Treaty, i.e. in regional contingencies in the Far East. The latter provision remained unexplored during the Cold War, as successive LDP administrations adhered to the principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy and avoided Japan’s involvement in overseas conflicts (Hughes 2004). While the domestic opposition to overseas security missions successfully constrained the LDP policy-makers’ security ambitions, there was no external demand for such participation either. By contrast, from the 1990s on, the growing pressure on Japan to contribute both to the alliance and international security, on the one hand, and the public’s increased awareness of security-related issues, on the other, have led to an alteration of the decision-makers’ approach to Japan’s security role.

### Japan’s Post-Cold War Security Environment

The end of the East-West military confrontation and the collapse of the Soviet Union had a profound impact on Japanese national security policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Produced by the Cold War’s bipolarity, the bilateral security arrangements served a purpose to deter the Communist threat and expansion. The disappearance of the common enemy and the emergence of “non-conventional” security threats, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and international terrorism, questioned the rationale of the U.S.-Japan security partnership. More importantly, the changed external security environment raised the issue of burden-sharing between the allies, thereby pressing for a redefinition of Japanese security policy.

The need for Japan’s presence in the international security arena rose sharply following the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, which exposed Japan’s “checkbook diplomacy” and its inability to deal with global security concerns. Although the LDP government made a U.S. $13 billion financial contribution, its failure to make a “human” contribution of
The result was severe international, particularly American, criticism of Japan. While constitutional restrictions under Article 9 and a strong domestic opposition stalled the LDP government’s attempt to pass a law for the SDF’s dispatch, these domestic constraints did not prevent Japan being described as a “free-rider,” particularly given its dependence on the U.S. for security.

The 1990-1991 Gulf War was followed by the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, which revealed a new military threat, as well as questioned Japan’s role in the bilateral alliance. With the possibility of a military conflict with the North becoming real, Washington demanded that the SDF provide non-combat logistical support for U.S. troops. As was the case during the Gulf Crisis, a human contribution was not possible, for Tokyo did not have the legal authority to engage the SDF in overseas security operations. It became clear that Japan’s inward-oriented security approach and hence the U.S.-Japan security arrangements could not be applied to the post-1989 security environment.

After the 1994 nuclear crisis Japan’s anxieties about the North Korean nuclear threat only continued to be heightened. In 1998, Pyongyang launched a three-staged ballistic missile over Japan, while in 2002-2003 a second nuclear crisis erupted when the North restarted its nuclear program and withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A July 2006 missile launch and subsequent October nuclear test by the North served as further indicators of Pyongyang’s potentially dangerous intentions. The North Korean security threat is additionally complicated because it continues to be associated with the issue of Japanese kidnapped by North Korean agents operating along Japan’s coasts in the 1970s and the 1980s, and the incidents of repeated incursions of North Korean spy ships into Japanese territorial waters.8

For Japan, the post-Cold War external security environment has become even more complicated with the rise of China. Although Japan’s traditional policy towards China has been based on economic engagement through foreign aid and growing trade relations, the 1990s saw a worsening of the bilateral security dialogue. On the part of Japan, concerns have emerged regarding the expansion of China’s naval and air military capabilities, and, particularly, the modernization of its nuclear and missile potential. The 1995 Chinese nuclear tests and the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis have been significant in their negative impact on the Japanese public and pro-China LDP politicians (Berger 2004, 154).

Bilateral tensions were further exacerbated by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s yearly visits to Yasukuni Shrine where fourteen Class A war criminals, in addition to two and a half million soldiers, are enshrined. Having suffered from Japanese militarism, China regarded those visits as Japan’s attempt to legitimize its past aggression. The consequence was Beijing’s refusal to hold summit meetings with Tokyo. While the shrine visits were not continued by Koizumi’s successor, Shinzo Abe, and bilateral diplomatic relations resumed during Abe’s term, tensions between the two neighbors remain. Indeed, territorial disputes over small islands in the East China Sea, believed to have under-sea gas fields in the surrounding waters, continue to be unresolved. In this regard, Japan’s China concerns have intensified as a result of frequent approaches by Chinese ships and aircraft of the Japan-China median line in the contested area. According to the JDA, during fiscal year 2005, approaches into Japanís airspace by Chinese planes increased eight times from 2004, reaching a record-high of 107 sorties (ASDF scrambles up 60% in ’05, 2006). The increase of flights by Chinese reconnaissance planes near the disputed area is believed to be for the purposes of collecting the SDF’s electronic intelligence.

Last but not least, international terrorism has expanded the list of non-conventional security threats that Japan has been facing after 1989. The need to tackle this new threat has placed more demands on Japan for international security presence, particularly in the context of the U.S.-led “war on terror.”

Political and Policy-Making Changes in Japan after 1989

The 1955 political system was established during the period of bipolar confrontation between the East and the West. With the disappearance of the communist versus capitalist ideological division, the domestic political scene in Japan changed. Contemporaneously, the 1955 system was shaken by the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis and its negative consequences for Japan’s diplomacy, by the 1992 split of the LDP due to financial scandals, and by the emergence of new political parties. Although these developments ended the LDP’s one-party dominance in the early 1990s and marked the start of coalition governments, the LDP continued to lead parliamentary politics in Japan. Indeed, this remained so until the last election for the Diet’s Upper House in July 2007. This election deprived the LDP-led coalition government of its majority and resulted, for the first time since 1955, in an opposition party’s becoming the largest party in the chamber.

The collapse of the 1955 system was paralleled by alterations in the opposition camp, as the JSP, the old “guardian” of domestic anti-militarism, significantly declined in popularity during the first post-Cold War decade. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which included former JSP and LDP members among others, became the leader of the opposition in the second half of the 1990s. The DPJ achieved unprecedented success in the 2007 election and became the dominant party in the Upper House, which has led to discussions that a two-party system may eventually emerge in Japan.

One of the most important outcomes of the post-Cold War political changes in Japan has been the increasingly overlapping view on national security of the two largest political parties. From the 1990s on, a priority on the LDP’s policy agenda has been the rededefinition of Japan’s security role and the strengthening of the security partnership with the U.S., which has been linked to Japan’s expansion of its international contributions. The DPJ, for its part, has accepted the existence of the SDF, and has recognised the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and related bilateral security cooperation as central to Japan’s security. The main difference between the two parties boils down to Japan’s international contributions,
with the DPJ advocating Japan’s expansion of its international engagements only under a UN mandate.

The political changes after 1989, which have resulted in a changed composition of the legislature, have been accompanied by alteration of security policy-making. As discussed earlier, the formulation of Japanese national security policy during the Cold War was dominated by MOFA, while the JDA’s role was restricted to ensuring Japan’s territorial defense in the context of the Soviet military threat. With the need to respond to new security challenges and pass relevant legislation, the Diet has expanded its input into security decision-making. Ultimately, both the tasks and importance of the JDA, and in turn of the SDF, have increased as well.

Perhaps the most significant change in Japanese security policy-making has been related to the prime minister’s and the Cabinet’s role. The political and executive leadership was strengthened as a result of the administrative reforms of the 1990s, which reduced the number of ministries. More importantly, the reforms expanded both the prime minister’s authority (by enabling him to initiate policies) and the role of the Cabinet ministers in the policy-making process. Under Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe the trend towards strengthening the prime minister’s top-down executive leadership and weakening the bureaucratic influence has become clear. Abe, in particular, focused on centralizing decision-making on national security by increasing the number of special advisers to the prime minister and assigning them issue-areas considered a priority for his administration, including national security and North Korea’s abductions. Abe also proposed establishing a National Security Council (NSC) in Japan, which would be modelled on the one existing at the White House. As the purpose of the NSC would be to devise foreign and security policy strategies, as well as to discuss responses to national emergencies, the NSC would in essence give more power to the prime minister and the core executive over national security issues.

**Japanese Public Opinion on Security**

As far as Japan’s security protection is concerned, public opinion polls conducted by the Japan Cabinet Office regularly since 1965 reveal continuity in the Japanese people’s support for the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Table 1 (second column) shows that a stable majority of Japanese since the late Cold War period view the best option for Japan’s defense to be the U.S.-Japan security arrangements together with the SDF. Figures have remained above 60 per cent from 1978 on and have increased in the post-Cold War period, particularly since the end of the 1990s, reaching 76.2 per cent in the latest 2006 survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan's defense through the U.S.-Japan security arrangements and the SDF</th>
<th>The Security Treaty as a provider for Japan's peace and security</th>
<th>SDF image: Overall positive</th>
<th>Primary Role of the SDF: To prevent aggression</th>
<th>Primary Role of the SDF**: For disaster relief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2006</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
<td>75.16%</td>
<td>84.50%</td>
<td>69.46%</td>
<td>75.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2003</td>
<td>72.10%</td>
<td>71.46%</td>
<td>80.30%</td>
<td>68.66%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2000</td>
<td>71.20%</td>
<td>71.56%</td>
<td>82.20%</td>
<td>59.96%</td>
<td>67.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.1997</td>
<td>68.10%</td>
<td>69.46%</td>
<td>80.50%</td>
<td>56.66%</td>
<td>66.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.1994</td>
<td>68.80%</td>
<td>68.26%</td>
<td>76.80%</td>
<td>48.96%</td>
<td>23.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.1991</td>
<td>62.40%</td>
<td>62.56%</td>
<td>67.50%</td>
<td>58.36%</td>
<td>15.70%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan.1988</td>
<td>67.40%</td>
<td>68.80%</td>
<td>76.70%</td>
<td>63.36%</td>
<td>10.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.1984</td>
<td>60.20%</td>
<td>71.46%</td>
<td>74.30%</td>
<td>63.06%</td>
<td>13.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.1981</td>
<td>64.60%</td>
<td>65.96%</td>
<td>71.20%</td>
<td>59.36%</td>
<td>13.20%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Dec.1978</td>
<td>61.10%</td>
<td>65.66%</td>
<td>75.40%</td>
<td>56.66%</td>
<td>13.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.1975*</td>
<td>54.30%</td>
<td>69.20%</td>
<td>56.90%</td>
<td>13.00%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1972</td>
<td>40.70%</td>
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<td>37.86%</td>
<td>56.80%</td>
<td>39.96%</td>
<td>15.60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Japan Cabinet Office, Opinion Polls on the Self-Defense Forces and Defense Affairs, various years.

*Where percentages are not indicated means that the question was not included in the questionnaire.

**The question regarding the SDF’s primary role permitted multiple answers.

A similar trend is observed with regard to the support for the Security Treaty as a provider for Japan’s peace and security (Table 1, third column), with figures steadily increasing from 1997 on. Related to the Japanese people’s support for the U.S.-Japan alliance is their overall positive attitude vis-à-vis the SDF (Table 1, fourth column). Despite having shown some signs of instability in the early 1970s and a slight decline during the 1990-1991 Gulf War (a trend also observed in the previous two columns), the public’s support for the SDF has remained above 70 per cent since the end of the 1970s and above 80 per cent from 1997 on.

As far as the primary role of the SDF is concerned (Table 1, fifth column), a stable majority of more than 56 per cent since 1972 (except in 1994) indicates that it should be preventing aggression. Noticeable are the results of the 2003 and the 2006 surveys, which have registered 68.6 per cent and 69.4 per cent respectively. In addition, a clear trend towards viewing the SDF as important in domestic disaster relief activities is observed after 1989 (Table 1, sixth column). Figures show an increase from around 16 per cent in 1991 to a little above 75 per cent in 2006.

In contrast to continuity of the trend in the public opinion regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance and the SDF’s primary mission, the post-Cold War period has seen a major change in the people’s view on the SDF’s participation in overseas security missions, notably in UN PKO. Whereas in 1990 the majority of Japanese opposed the SDF’s dispatch on UN PKO, in 1992 the majority sanctioned this new SDF’s role (Dobson 2003). In the early 2000s more than 70 per cent of respondents approved of the SDF’s peace-keeping operations (Japan Cabinet Office 2000, 2003). At the same time, domestic support for international disaster relief missions increased from 54.2 per cent in 1991 to over 78 per cent in the 2000s (ibid. various years). Despite the gradual acceptance of human contribu-
Cooperation (hereafter, the Revised Guidelines) resulted from U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines. The changed international security environment after the Cold War became the external pressure for Japan to embark on redefining its national security policy. The North Korean nuclear threat, in particular, made it clear to the decision-makers in Tokyo that if they wanted to ensure Washington’s continuing commitment to the country’s defense, they had to expand Japan’s contribution to the bilateral alliance. In addition, after the 1990-1991 Gulf War, demands for Japan’s presence in the international security arena increased, particularly on the part of the U.S. Domestically, the collapse of the JSP, the strengthening of the prime minister’s executive leadership, and the Japanese public’s increased awareness of new security threats facilitated incremental expansion of the country’s security role.

Japan’s first response to the demand for international contribution was the enactment in 1992 of the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL), which enabled the SDF to participate in UN PKO and international humanitarian relief missions. As the IPCL cleared the way for the defense forces’ overseas dispatch, it was followed in 1995 by a revision of Japanese Cold War national security doctrine, i.e. the 1976 NDPO. The new NDPO reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to the four key national security principles and to the concept of the basic defense force, but envisaged a more active response to external aggression in cooperation with the U.S. military (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 1995). The SDF’s role also expanded to include peace-keeping and international humanitarian relief missions. More importantly, the document introduced cooperation with the U.S. in regional contingencies, thereby paving the way for a revision of the Cold War U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines.

Essentially, the 1997 guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (hereafter, the Revised Guidelines) resulted from a series of security crises, notably the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis and the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, which necessitated strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The significance of the new document was that it both defined the “functional” scope of the bilateral security cooperation under Article 6 of the Security Treaty and expanded the “geographical” range of U.S.-Japan operations (Hughes 2004, 178). Japan would now extend non-combat rear-area support to its U.S. ally during regional security crises, defined as “situations in areas surrounding Japan.” Although the Revised Guidelines made the alliance become a “multi-functional” one (Murata 2000, 31), the Cold War asymmetrical structure of the allies’ roles was somewhat preserved, as the prohibition on collective self-defense and on the use of force overseas remained unchanged for the SDF.

In Japan, the implementation of the Revised Guidelines was speeded up by the 1998 North Korean missile launch. Together with the 1994 nuclear crisis, the launch contributed to a realignment of the conservatives and the establishment of an LDP-led coalition at the end of the 1990s, which, in turn, ensured political support for passing a special law in 1999 (Green 2003). The law enabled the SDF to engage in rear-area support, and rear-area search and rescue operations during regional security crises. A direct consequence of the 1998 missile launch was also the Japanese government’s decision of the same year for joint research with the U.S. on ballistic missile defense (BMD). While a joint study on BMD systems was initiated in 1994, until the 1998 launch Tokyo refrained from making a formal commitment to joint development, not least because of Beijing’s objections that this would neutralize China’s nuclear deterrent and involve the Taiwan issue (Green 2003; Hughes 2005). The presence of a clear military threat heightened the domestic security concerns and cleared the way for BMD cooperation. Not surprisingly, 57 per cent of Japanese polled in 2006 supported a defense system against ballistic missiles (Japan Cabinet Office 2006).

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Fighting Terrorism

The expansion of Japan’s security role was accelerated following the 11 September terrorist attacks on the U.S. and during the term of former Prime Minister Koizumi. While Koizumi’s public popularity and leadership abilities were certainly facilitating factors for the SDF’s participation in “the war on terror,” the domestic political and institutional changes of the 1990s had paved the way for Koizumi to exercise his executive authority. Externally, the presence of the North Korean issue, particularly in the context of the 2002-2003 nuclear crisis, meant a pressing need for U.S. support for its resolution. The 1990-1991 Gulf War experience served as a negative reminder from the past. Indeed, already in the early stages of the Afghan campaign a senior MOFA official was quoted as having said that, “How we support the U.S. at this time in comparison with the 1990-1 Gulf War will determine the course of Japan-U.S. relations for the next 20 years...We have to make it possible to send SDF people this time. There is no other choice” (Asakura and Takahashi 2001).

Strongly supported by Koizumi and the LDP, and with the proactive involvement of MOFA, the Anti-Terrorism

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Special Measures Law (ATSML) was enacted in October 2001. The ATSML authorized the dispatch of Maritime SDF ships to the Indian Ocean for rear-area logistical support for the U.S.-led forces fighting in Afghanistan. From the opposition parties, the DPJ expressed support for the dispatch under certain conditions, although it eventually voted against the law. The Japanese public, for its part, showed initial support and a clear preference for SDF non-combat participation, although opinion polls over time revealed fluctuations in the numbers in favor and in those against the dispatch (Midford 2006). Indeed, despite generally approving of Japan’s contribution to the international fight against terrorism, the public was worried about possible negative outcomes.

In contrast to the 1990-1991 Gulf War, however, the concerns now were less about the overseas dispatch per se and more about the form of the SDF’s contribution, as well as its possible integration with the use of force. On the other hand, given the Japanese people’s support for UN-centered activities, UN legitimacy (seen in the references made in the law’s full name to the UN Charter and relevant UN resolutions) must have played an important role for the ATSML support. In its justification for passing the ATSML, the Koizumi government emphasized UNSC Resolution 1368 on eradication of terrorism and hence the need for Japan’s cooperation with other states for elimination of this threat (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2002, 16, 18).

Being a strong advocate of Japan’s participation in the fight against international terrorism, Koizumi also was one of the first supporters of the U.S. policy in Iraq in 2003. Under his executive leadership and despite the opposition of the DPJ, the LDP-led coalition government succeeded in enacting a special law on Iraq, known as the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. The law opened up the way for dispatching in early 2004 the SDF to southern Iraq on a non-combat mission for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes. In comparison with the Afghan case, the Iraq situation clearly showed the link between the LDP’s alliance-based security policy and the need for extending support to the US. Indeed, Koizumi backed President Bush’s actions in Iraq without UN sanction and in the face of 80 per cent domestic public opposition to the war. The North Korea issue was reportedly a crucial factor for the Koizumi administration’s support for the U.S. campaign in Iraq (Berger 2004; Penn 2007). In the early stages of the war, Koizumi stressed that the preservation of the U.S.-Japan alliance was closely linked to Japan’s national interest, to the country’s prosperity in peace, and to the deterrence of potential threats against Japan (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2003). He also emphasized the link between Japan’s pursuit of international responsibilities and the maintenance of the bilateral alliance. Subsequently, Koizumi’s views were echoed in the Japanese government’s official statement made in support of the war (National Institute for Defense Studies 2004, 226).

Despite these initial statements, the law on Iraq (as was the ATSML) was separated from the legislation covering U.S.-Japan security relations (Hughes 2005) and enacted only after UNSC Resolution 1483 on the reconstruction of Iraq had been adopted. The activities of the SDF were restricted to non-combat humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, while the SDF were deployed to less-dangerous southern Iraq. All this suggests that the Koizumi government tried to avoid Japan’s direct involvement in a war not sanctioned by the UN and to respond to the domestic anti-militaristic concerns. Nevertheless, the public’s opposition to the war and its rather mixed attitude towards the SDF’s dispatch played a role for the LDP’s poor performance in the July 2004 Upper House election (Midford 2006). Furthermore, the defense forces’ deployment to a country with ongoing hostilities involved the risk of casualties, which might have significantly jeopardized the position of Koizumi and the LDP. Indeed, this was clear from opinion polls, which showed that the Japanese people would hold Koizumi responsible for casualties and would even demand his resignation (“51.6% Oppose SDF Dispatch to Iraq”; “Public is split over policy not to pull out SDF” 2004). Such an outcome was eventually avoided, for the Ground SDF did not suffer even one single casualty and were withdrawn by the Koizumi government in the summer of 2006.1

The question, however, remains about the fate of the Air SDF, which have been kept in Kuwait to provide logistical support for the U.S.-led multinational forces and the UN, and whose activities have been extended to the more dangerous region of northern Iraq. Given that Abe in June 2007 extended the law on Iraq by two years, it is the current administration of Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda that may have to face possible negative developments. Indeed, the altered domestic political situation has already had its impact on the LDP’s security plans. As a result of the DPJ’s becoming the largest party in the Upper House and due to its opposition to the extension of the ATSML, Fukuda was forced to withdraw the Maritime SDF ships from the Indian Ocean after the ATSML expired in early November 2007. An opinion poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun in mid-November, however, revealed that a majority of 51 per cent favored the continuation of the refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean (while 40 per cent opposed it) and 49 per cent supported the Fukuda administration’s proposal for new anti-terrorism legislation, against 39 per cent who opposed the bill (Majority favor refueling mission for first time 2007). Although the LDP-led coalition government in January 2008 succeeded in enacting a new law on the basis of its majority in the more powerful Lower House of the Diet, it is highly likely that any casualties related to the Iraqi mission may bring an end to Japan’s participation in “the war on terror.”

**Turning Responses into Opportunities: Legislative and Conceptual Changes**

The Koizumi administration’s response to “the war on terror” not only strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance, but also added a global dimension to Japan’s security role. At the domestic level, the need to expand Japan’s international contributions and tackle new security threats created opportunities for more pro-activity on the part of the political actors, including the prime minister. This, in turn, permitted the LDP to achieve long sought security goals through the enactment of several security-related bills.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 2002-2003 North Korean
nuclear vessels’ incursions into Japanese territorial waters, paved the way in 2003-2004 for the enactment of national emergency legislation (yūjī hōsei). Although studies on domestic crisis management systems were launched in the late 1970s, anti-militaristic constraints and fears of re-militarization prevented the enactment of relevant bills during the Cold War. However, the emergence of new security threats created a large domestic coalition in favor of the legislation. Indeed, even though the legislation was promoted by Koizumi and supported by the ruling parties, the largest opposition party, the DPJ, voted in favor as well. The new set of laws established Japan’s crisis management system and strengthened, in particular, the prime minister’s authority in dealing with emergencies and in providing support for the U.S. forces engaged in Japan’s defense.

Similar to the national emergency legislation bills, the LDP government endorsed another bill during the Cold War, yet never moved towards its enactment—a bill for upgrading the JDA to a ministry. Again, the altered external security environment and political situation in Japan gradually created momentum for attaining this goal. The bill was submitted to the Diet by the Koizumi administration, but was passed into law in late 2006, during the administration of Abe. Supported also by the DPJ, it was enacted together with a second bill, which amended the SDF’s law to expand the “primary duties” of the SDF. Before the amendment the SDF’s core duties included only national defense and domestic disaster relief missions, while overseas operations were defined as “supplementary duties.” Reflecting the change in Japanese national security policy towards more international security engagements, the SDF’s primary duties now also include overseas missions, such as UN PKO and those conducted in Iraq.

For its part, the elevation of the JDA to a Ministry of Defense (MOD) will have an important impact on Japanese security policy-making. Not only is MOD equal to MOFA, it also should become the main bureaucratic player in the formulation, not merely implementation, of national security policy. The JDA’s elevation to a ministry has, however, raised the question how civilian control of the military would be maintained in the future. In this regard, calls have been made for strengthening the role of the political actors, notably the prime minister and the Diet, in the system of civilian control. Ultimately, one hopes this would ensure politicians’ final say in security policy-making.

The legislative changes related to Japanese national security policy were reflected in conceptual changes of Japan’s security role made by the Koizumi administration. This was clear from the 2004 National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG, Bōei Keikaku no Taikō), which replaced the 1995 national security doctrine. Although the NDPG reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to the four key national security principles (mentioned earlier in this discussion), the revised document stated that after providing for its own defense, the second aim for Japan would be “to improve the international security environment in view of preventing any threats from reaching Japan” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2004). Likewise, the NDPG introduced a new concept of “multi-functional, flexible and effective” defense forces (takinō de daﬀyokutekina jikōsei no aru bōeiryoku), which would respond not only to a full-scale invasion, but also to “new threats and diverse situations,” as well as actively engage in international peace cooperation activities. In this way, the SDF would be transformed from having a “deterrent effect”-orientation (yokushi kōka) to a “response capabilities”-focus (taiso nōryoku). The 2004 NDPG emphasized that the conceptual changes and, in turn, the strengthening of the defense force structure were deemed necessary due to the altered nature of the threats that Japan was facing. In other words, while the conventional threat of a full-scale invasion decreased, new security threats, such as WMD and international terrorism, emerged. Notable in this context was the first explicit mentioning in Japanese national security doctrine of two specific countries—North Korea and China—as key threats to Japan’s security.

The NDPG opened up the way for expansion of U.S.-Japan alliance’s scope and for finalization in 2006 of bilateral security agreements, notably the adoption of the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation. In line with Japan’s newly defined security role, the U.S.-Japan security cooperation would now include the following two new priorities: “responses to new threats and diverse contingencies” and “efforts to improve the international security environment” (United States Department of State 2005). The first objective, in particular, would supplement the alliance’s missions for Japan’s defense and for responding to regional contingencies. The U.S.-Japan cooperation would be enhanced through integration of the SDF’s functions with those of the U.S. military, and through expanded bilateral cooperation in areas such as BMD and international peace cooperation activities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2006).

The significance of the NDPG and the latest U.S.-Japan agreements is that they may have been the first step towards a new revision of the 1997 Revised Guidelines. The revision was proposed in 2006 by Japan and would reportedly focus on bilateral cooperation in BMD, international peace activities, combating international terrorism and responding to emergencies (Japan, U.S. eye SDF guideline revisions 2006; Yoshida, 2006). If the U.S. and Japan move towards the attainment of that goal, and given that the SDF’s primary duties now include overseas operations, a domestic debate on new security legislation will likely gain momentum in Japan.

**Constitutional Revision**

The legislative and conceptual changes in Japanese national security policy have been paralleled by an intensified domestic debate on constitutional amendment. Given the significance of the peace clause for Japan’s security role, Article 9 has become the center of discussions. For the LDP, which included revision of the Constitution in its policy platform announced at the party’s establishment in 1955 (Green 2003, 13), this domestic debate has represented the first step towards the achievement of that goal. The amendment is no easy task, however, for it requires the support of a two-thirds majority of the Diet members and then a simple majority vote in a national referendum. Indeed, domestic consensus will become a crucial factor for the LDP’s success on the issue.

The strongest advocates of the amendment of Article 9
have been Koizumi and Abe. Although the two ruling parties the LDP and the Komei Party and the DPJ have agreed that paragraph one of the peace clause should be preserved, the parties have not reached consensus with regard to the second paragraph. The debate has focused on how to define the SDF’s existence and role, while maintaining the renunciation of war and the threat or use of force for settling international disputes. The 2005 constitutional proposals of both the LDP and the DPJ have further narrowed the gap between the two major parties, as both expressed support for the legitimization of the SDF and clarification of their right to self-defense. The disagreement between the LDP and the DPJ has thus remained limited to the issue of collective self-defense.

Not surprisingly, it is the LDP, a traditional “guardian” of the U.S.-Japan alliance and a strong proponent of a strengthened bilateral security partnership, which has called for the removal of Japan’s self-imposed ban on collective self-defense (The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan 2004). Koizumi and Abe have openly advocated Japan’s support for the U.S. in collective self-defense arrangements. During his term as prime minister, Abe even established an advisory panel of experts to discuss the following four cases, in which the exercise of that right would be acceptable for Japan: response to attacks on U.S. Navy ships operating jointly with the Maritime SDF in international waters; interception of ballistic missiles headed towards the U.S.; protection of troops of other nations who come under attack during joint international PKO; and provision of logistical support to other nations taking part in international PKO.

In contrast to the LDP, the DPJ has approached cautiously the issue of Japan’s use of military force, particularly for collective self-defense purposes solely in support of the U.S. A strong advocate of Japan’s participation in UN-centered collective security missions, the DPJ has called for a “maximum restriction” on the use of force even in such operations (The Democratic Party of Japan 2005). Nevertheless, current DPJ President Ichiro Ozawa has argued that under the present constitution the SDF may participate in UN-sanctioned military missions, for example, as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that is currently operating in Afghanistan (Ozawa in power would send SDF to U.N. force in Afghanistan 2007). The gap between the positions of the DPJ and the LDP on the right to collective self-defense seems to have further narrowed. This is suggested by the DPJ’s security policy draft of 2006, which reportedly proposed to allow that right in limited situations, notably when Japan “faces a direct, imminent and unjust threat to its territory” (DPJ argues for collective self-defense 2006).

Despite the increasingly converging views of the two largest parties, the Komei Party, the LDP’s junior coalition partner, has expressed a different position. Although the party has approved of the constitutional amendment, it has opposed changing Article 9, allowing the country to exercise its right to collective self-defense. Likewise, the majority of the Japanese people support the revision of the constitution and the legitimization of the SDF, but want to preserve Article 9 and the prohibition on collective self-defense.

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Explaining Japan’s National Security Policy: International or Domestic Variables?

Despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the changes in polarity, Japan has not followed the path expected by neo-realists leading to greater autonomy from the U.S. and ultimately to becoming a power pole in the international system. Indeed, the post-Cold War period has seen a qualitative upgrade of Japan’s military capabilities, including notably enhanced intelligence capabilities, research in BMD and procurement of new military equipment. However, Japan has not acquired massive military capabilities, such as a nuclear arsenal, and has not embarked on autonomous defense. Quite the opposite, Japan has deepened its reliance on the U.S. for security protection. The modernization of Japanese military capabilities and their integration with those of the U.S. ally have made the “national defense build-up” become an “alliance-oriented defense build-up” (Hughes 2005). Finally, Japan has increasingly sought expansion of its international security role through the bilateral alliance rather than independently.

Japan’s security behavior may, to some extent, be explained by a somewhat “softer” variation of neo-realism, which Baumann et al. (2001) defines as “modified neo-realism.” This perspective takes account of security pressures exerted on a state, which, in turn, are related to changes in the nature of security threats, for example, as a result of the development of new, sophisticated military technology. The approach also stresses the importance of exercising influence on one’s allies, which contrasts with neo-realism’s emphasis on states’ autonomy-seeking behavior. For modified neo-realism, Japan’s decision to maintain its security partnership with the U.S. after the Cold War stems from the altered security threats and, consequently, the costs associated with ensuring its survival. Japan’s regional situation, in particular, has become very unpredictable due to the tensions related to North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs, and to China’s expansion of its military capabilities. All these non-conventional security threats could endanger Japan’s survival in the long-term and would require significant military build-up in order to be dealt with. Maintaining the alliance with Washington is thus a way to ensure the U.S. commitment to Japan’s protection and to minimize costs. It also enables Tokyo to exert influence on Washington in order to shape policy outcomes to suit Japan’s interests (for example with regard to North Korea).

As does neo-realism, so too the modified neo-realist perspective cannot account for Japan’s striving to deepen its reliance on the U.S. for security and to assume an international security role largely through the framework of the U.S-Japan partnership. Although modified neo-realism regards the maintenance of the bilateral alliance as crucial to Japan’s survival in a changed international security environment, this approach also expects a realist Japan to seek room for some independent security action both for its own defense and internationally. As noted earlier, changes in the polarity of the international system and Japan’s modernized military capabilities have created the conditions for Tokyo to pursue a more autonomous and active security policy. Indeed, such a policy would not necessarily lead to complete independence
from Washington (as expected by neo-realism), as long as Japan’s actions would not weaken the U.S.-Japan security partnership. Finally, for both variations of neo-realism, Japan’s continuing unwillingness to use force overseas, particularly in regional conflicts directly threatening Japan’s security, remains puzzling as well. Again, the altered polarity and Japan’s expanded military presence suggest that Japan after 1989 should be more ready to use military power overseas than during the Cold War.

A better explanation of Japan’s national security policy after the Cold War may be provided if one adds international variables to the domestic ones. It is not simply Japan as a rational entity that seeks to “survive,” but rather its utility-maximizing decision-makers who, led by policy-making power concerns, “make” the Japanese state behave in one way or another for security-related purposes.

An approach that indicates domestic interests as leading the state’s security policy behavior has been defined by Freund and Rittberger (2001) as “utilitarian-liberalism.” The strength of this theoretical perspective is that, once applied to Japan, it looks inside the Japanese state and indicates who the dominant decision-makers are, what policy preferences they have, and how their priorities eventually translate into Japan’s security policy. According to Freund and Rittberger security policy will change if domestic interests change, which, in turn, may occur either as a result of the alteration in the composition of the dominant domestic actors or of the actors’ preferences. As is illustrated below, policy preferences in Japan have changed due to international and domestic factors. The primary interest of decision-makers, notably politicians and bureaucrats, to maintain and maximize their policy-making power (as well as financial gains) is said to remain the same (ibid.).

**Understanding Japan’s Security Behavior: Security Threats, Policy Preferences and Anti-Militarism**

While after 1989 the composition of dominant domestic actors in Japanese security policy-making has not changed significantly, a power shift from bureaucratic actors towards political ones has been taking place. Notable is the strengthening of the premiership and, in turn, the centralization of security decision-making. Another development is the increased involvment of political actors from the legislative branch, which gives them more leverage vis-à-vis MOFA. Given the Japan Defense Agency’s transformation into a Ministry of Defense, MOFA’s role in national security issues is likely to be further weakened and the role of politicians in the system of civilian control strengthened. These power shifts have been paralleled by changes in the policy preferences of the dominant domestic actors, particularly politicians, regarding Japan’s security role.

During the Cold War, successive LDP administrations supported conducting Japan’s national security policy in the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The incremental strengthening of Japan’s military capabilities and responsibilities was premised on contributing to Japan’s defense on the basis of bilateral security arrangements. Having followed the path set by Yoshida, the LDP managed to eschew significant national military build-up and ensure economic growth, which was certainly popular with the electorate. The strong political opposition coming from the left and the low public support for security-related activities meant that the LDP could have risked losing its power if it had attempted to expand Japan’s security role. In addition, there was no external demand for an overseas security presence.

After the end of the Cold War both international and domestic factors caused a change in Japanese decision-makers’ policy preferences. The emergence of new security threats together with the international demands for Japan’s contribution to multilateral security missions necessitated a redefinition of the Cold War era’s inward-oriented approach to national security. For their part, domestic political changes, notably the collapse of the JSP, and the increased consensus between the LDP and the DPJ on national security issues, facilitated the process. The option of autonomous defense (including development of a nuclear deterrent), a weakened U.S.-Japan alliance, and Japan’s independent involvement in military operations abroad could not have been the preferred one for the LDP because this would have required significant defense spending. Such a policy decision could have cost the LDP its hold on power. Furthermore, Japan’s move towards an independent security role would have raised concerns from the past and thus hurt Japan’s interests at international and regional levels. In contrast, a strengthened alliance with the U.S. would not only continue to give Japan the desired security protection and hence permit lower costs for defense, but would also allow more international security presence (and lead to economic benefits) without raising suspicion among Japan’s Asian neighbors.

The relation between altered security threats, domestic interests, and Japanese security policy is significant in two ways. In the first place, it explains why after 1989 Japan chose to expand the U.S.-Japan security cooperation and to assume a larger security role through the bilateral alliance rather than independently. A second, and perhaps more important, observation is that the changed international security environment (together with domestic political changes) has created momentum for strengthening the prime minister’s role and political leadership in security policy-making. Ultimately, the primary aim of ensuring Japan’s security, viewed in the broader perspective of the existing non-conventional security threats, seems to have turned into a tool for generating more policy-making power for political actors.

As noted above, one of the questions that remains unanswered by neo-realist accounts of Japanese post-Cold War security policy is the country’s unwillingness to use force in overseas operations. Some scholars inspired by constructivism have attributed Japan’s so-called preference for peaceful means of foreign policy, and for pursuit of cooperation in humanitarian and non-military areas to domestic anti-militarism and pacifism (e.g., Berger 1993; Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; Katzenstein 1996). Other analysts (Dobson 2003; Midford 2006) have emphasized the constraining influence of Japanese public opinion and, generally, of the norm of anti-militarism on the security policy preferences of decision-makers.

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makers. After 1989, that domestic norm has been weakened, particularly following the collapse of the JSP and the public’s increased awareness of new security threats. The domestic consensus, which has emerged from 2000 on, is on the need for the SDF’s legitimization, a recognition of Japan’s right to self-defense (viewed within the U.S.-Japan security framework) and the defense forces’ overseas dispatch for non-military missions under a UN umbrella.

The Japanese public, as argued by Midford (2006), has become more willing to accept the use of military force for territorial or national defense, but has remained opposed to military power for overseas offensive purposes. If domestic interests in Japan are taken into consideration, it may be argued that the LDP’s (as well as other parties’) lawmakers are disinclined to promote, let alone pass, laws authorizing combat because of strong domestic opposition. As the case of Iraq illustrated during Koizumi’s term, if the SDF suffered casualties, even a mission for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes might potentially jeopardize the position of the prime minister and that of the LDP. Indeed, so far the LDP has been very cautious in defining both the form of the SDF’s contribution and the location of their overseas deployment. This cautiousness may be attributed to a simple “rationalist” concern, which dictates that going against public opinion may cost utility-maximizing policy-makers their power.

**Conclusion**

The present article has analyzed the redefinition of Japanese national security policy after the Cold War by emphasizing the role of both the international and the domestic variables in Japan’s move towards a more active security role. Although Japan has revised its Cold War “basic defense force” concept, modernized its military capabilities and embarked on “improving the international security environment,” it did not avail itself of the disappearance of the Soviet threat and bipolarity in order to seek more independence from the U.S. The changes that Japan made after the Cold War have, in fact, contributed to the continuity of its security partnership with the U.S. Finally, not only has Japan maintained the bilateral alliance, but in the past few years it has also increasingly sought expansion of the alliance’s scope and of its own international security role.

By emphasizing the utility of “analytical eclecticism” (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004) for understanding Japanese post-Cold War security policy, the present article has suggested combining the realist and the liberal research traditions. In other words, while Japanese security policy has been underpinned by the goal of “survival” in the altered international system, it has served the primary interests of the dominant decision-makers to maintain their power. With changed security threats, ensuring national security has gradually turned into a tool for maximizing the political actors’ policy-making power. In turn, this has facilitated a steady expansion of the country’s security role. However, seeking to avoid jeopardizing their policy-making position, Japanese decision-makers have pursued policies within the scope of the Japanese public’s anti-militaristic acceptance of that role.

The crucial importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance for Japan’s security and to its “rational” policy-makers suggests that Japan is unlikely to seek a weakening of the security partnership with the U.S. in the near future. This is clear from the words of former Prime Minister Koizumi:

“We can never be sure when a threat will fall upon Japan. In the event that Japan’s own responses are inadequate, we must make full efforts to ensure the security of the Japanese nations based on the strong relationship of trust under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and Japan-U.S. alliance...

The United States is the only country which clearly states that an attack on Japan would be considered as an attack on the United States. The people of Japan should not forget [this]... (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2003, emphasis added)

The complex regional security situation in Asia and the presence of various security challenges mean that the LDP’s staying in, or the DPJ’s assuming, power will depend on their success in guaranteeing the country’s national interests. As indicated in the 2003 Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan, these interests are “the safety and prosperity of Japan and the Japanese people, first and foremost” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2003). So far, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been considered as the best option for Japan’s security. It seems, however, that the steady expansion of the bilateral security partnership, as well as Japan’s security “normalization” may well have reached a limit accepted by the Japanese people. One can only wonder how the balance among security threats, Japanese decision-makers’ policy preferences, and domestic anti-militarism may change, should the modus operandi of achieving Japan’s post-war “safety and prosperity” be shaken.

**ENDNOTES**


I would like to thank the reviewers and editors of Asia Pacific: Perspectives for their helpful comments and suggestions.

1. On Japan’s approach to human security, see Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, 2005.
3. Ibid.
4. The original Kōmei Party was established in 1964 by the Buddhist organization Sōka Gakkai, which was the only religious organization in Japan to create its own political party. The present New Kōmei Party was formed in November 1998 as a result of a merger including the original Kōmei Party. For the sake of clarity, the party will be referred to as the Kōmei Party throughout the text.
5. See also Katzenstein and Okawara 2004, 101-103.
7. The restrictions on arms exports prohibited the export of weapons or weapons-related technology to countries in the following categories: those in the Communist bloc; those to whom arms export were banned under UN resolutions; and states involved in, or likely to enter into, international conflicts. The ban on arms exports was strengthened in 1976 when its applicability was extended to all countries.

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8. Until the end of the 1990s North Korea refused to address the abductee issue. In September 2002, during a visit by then Prime Minister Koizumi to Pyongyang, Kim Jong Il made a shocking acknowledgement that North Korea had abducted thirteen Japanese citizens out of whom only five were alive. The admission of such a state crime triggered an unprecedented Japanese public backlash and influenced the public’s subsequent support for Shinzo Abe’s “hard-line” policy on the North. While Pyongyang regards the issue as closed, particularly because the five survivors were returned to Japan, Tokyo demands further explanation about the deceased and claims that more Japanese citizens had been abducted. As a result, the abductee issue remains a major obstacle to the normalization of Japan’s relations with North Korea.

9. The reliability of these opinion polls as an indicator of the Japanese people’s attitude towards security issues should be put in the context of the Cabinet Office’s interest in ensuring public support for the U.S.-Japan alliance. The surveys were conducted with 3000 individuals above 20 years of age (with the exception of the year 2000 when the number of polled was 5000). Until the end of the Cold War the valid responses were between 79 and 84 per cent, but after 1988 the percentage of valid responses declined from around 72 per cent in 1991 to a little above 55 per cent in 2006. One of the most important reasons for the decline was the respondent’s refusal to answer. Throughout the years women represented between 52 and 55 per cent of the polled, while the percentage of men fluctuated between 45 and 48 per cent.

10. The full name of the ATSML is: The Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries Aiming to Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response to the Terrorist Attacks Which Took Place on September 11, 2001, in the United States of America as well as Concerning Humanitarian Measures Based on Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations. (Heisei jūjūninen kagatsu fūchinchī no America Gashūkoku ni oite Hasei shita Terorisuto ni yoru Kōeki nado ni Taihōshite Okonawarera Kokuusai Rengō Kenshō no Makuteki Taisei no tame no Shōgakoku ni Katsushū ni Taihōshite Wagakunoni ga jisshi suru Sochi oyobi Kamenn suru Kokuusai Rengō Ketsuiga nado ni Motozoku Jinđōteki Sochi ni Kansuru Tokubestu Sochikoro.)

11. Due to legislative limitations related to the use of weapons by the SDF, the Japanese ground troops carried out their activities in Iraq by relying on the Dutch armed forces for protection. The SDF activities included humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in the form of medical care, water supplies, and restoration and reconstruction of infrastructure, such as schools, roads and health centers. Indeed, the activities of the Ground SDF sharply contrasted with the fact that this overseas dispatch was Japan’s “most heavily armed” (Hughes 2005, 130) one since 1945.

12. On equipment and personnel changes under the NDPG, see Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2004.

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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): An Asian NATO?

by Loro Horta

Abstract

On August 17th 2007, China and Russia conducted their largest ever joint military exercise. The exercise, held under the umbrella of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), led many observers to conclude that the exercises may mark the beginning of an alliance between Beijing and Moscow to balance American and NATO influence in their respective spheres of influence and the world at large. However, expectations of such an alliance may be misplaced and based on a superficial assessment of the interests of the parties involved. While China and Russia may seem to share a wide range of common interests, closer analysis reveals many areas of possible contention that are likely to undermine the prospects for a solid and durable alliance.

Introduction

A strong convergence of interests is essential for the creation and sustaining of any alliance between states. In recent years China and Russia have come to share various interests and concerns towards the current international order and in particular the U.S. role in it. Both Beijing and Moscow are concerned about the growing American influence in their traditional spheres of influence, such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Both governments deeply resent American military deployments in Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and the growing U.S. engagement with Mongolia. Washington’s decision to expand its missile defense system into Eastern Europe and the absorption of former Soviet satellites into NATO is another source of major concern for Moscow. Perceived U.S. support for various democratic revolutions throughout Eastern Europe that led to the removal of pro Russian governments, as in Georgia, further aggravated Moscow’s security anxieties.

China is equally concerned with American missile plans and its growing presence in Central Asia and Mongolia in particular. Chinese officials believe it to be a fact that the United States is engaged in a strategy of containing China. The reinvigoration of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the permanent deployment of an air carrier battle group to Japan are likely to heighten these perceptions. Closer ties between Washington and New Delhi have also raised alarm bells in Beijing. American plans to deploy its missile defense system to Japan and Taiwan are seen by the PRC as a blatant attempt to undermine China’s security which in turn has led the PLA to step up its anti-satellite weapons program and dramatically increase the number and lethality of its missiles.

An alliance with Moscow will allow the PRC to use Russia as a balance for American influence in Central Asia and against a more assertive Japan in the Pacific. In turn China will assist Moscow in countering the American presence in Central Asia while alleviating pressure in Eastern Europe by forcing Washington to be more attentive to Chinese moves in the Asia Pacific region. By cooperating, China and Russia will force the U.S. and its allies to concentrate on various areas and concerns at the same time, therefore mitigating its overall power. While Russia and China accept that at the global level the United States is clearly the dominant power, both countries believe that closer cooperation between them will put significant pressure on America at the regional level where the two countries may maximize such advantages as geographical proximity.

A Sino-Russo alliance allows for a certain reduction in the power asymmetry between the U.S. on the one hand and China and Russia on the other. Economic interests, in particular weapons sales and energy resources, are other highly profitable factors driving Sino-Russo relations.

Contentions and Tensions

While China and Russia share some common interests and concerns, there are many issues in their relationship that have the potential to derail future cooperation. Ironically, the issues that have brought them together are the ones that may in the long run break them apart. While Moscow is apprehensive about the American presence in Central Asia it fears that the Chinese challenge to the region may prove even greater in the future. Due to its massive population and proximity to Central Asia, China looks far more threatening to Russian eyes than a distant America. The Chinese economy is three times larger than the Russian economy and is fast expanding. This has led to fears in Moscow concerning the long term consequences of sharing thousands of miles of border with such a powerful neighbor.

Russia is also concerned over the massive influx of thousands of Chinese immigrants into its resource rich, but sparsely populated Far East. According to some Russian media reports, over a million Chinese have settled in the Russian Far East in the past five years. “Yellow peril” type commentaries have until recently been quite common in the Russian media, with outlandish claims that by the year 2050 half of Russia’s population will be Chinese. While such claims are outright ludicrous the fact that they are commonly made is a reflection of how widespread Russian fears of Chinese encroachment are. Even the Russian and Chinese governments have not been able to agree on the numbers of Chinese citizens living in the region, saying in 2004 that the number is anywhere between 100,000-200,000. While such figures may not be the most accurate, the fact that the Russian Far East, with a population of just 7 million, is next door to China’s heavily populated northern provinces makes such an issue no trivial matter for Moscow.

A common fear of a more assertive Japan is often cited as another point of convergence of interest between the two powers. Moscow still has an ongoing dispute with Tokyo over the ownership of the Kuril Islands seized by Stalin at the end of the Second World War. The dispute has prevented both nations from signing a peace treaty that would put an official end to World War II hostilities. Therefore, Russia and Japan are still at war, at least legally speaking.

Chinese fears and outright hatred towards Japan, brought about by Japan’s military occupation of China from
Alexeyev to categorically deny that Moscow was targeting These accusations led Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander tions in Beijing that Russia was specifically targeting Chinese. of Danqing—was a clear indication of Moscow's intentions to of a major pipeline to Japan instead of China—in contradic- tion to an agreement signed in 2001 under which the pipeline may be used in the future in situations not favorable to Rus- sia. While Russia's main motivation in the post Cold War era, providing New Delhi with fighter jets, tanks, subma- rines, warships, missiles and an array of other advanced weapons. While Russia's main motivation in the post Cold War era to supply weapons to India is simple economics and profit, there is a certain strategic dimension to it that is closely connected to its reservations towards China. While Moscow has provided the Chinese air force with advance fighters such as the MIG-31 and Su-37. Since 2004 Beijing has shown considerable interest in acquiring three to five TU 160 Blackjack strategic intercontinental bombers in order to in- crease its nuclear deterrence and power projection. Moscow has been unwilling to supply such platforms for fear that they may be used in the future in situations not favorable to Russia. With a ceiling of 16,000m and speeds of 2,000km/h, it’s not hard to understand Moscow’s reluctance.

Moscow’s concerns over weapons transfers to the PRC are also reflected in its dealings with India. Russia has been India’s main weapons supplier since the days of the Cold War, providing New Delhi with fighter jets, tanks, submarines, warships, missiles and an array of other advanced weapons. While Russia’s main motivation in the post Cold War era to supply weapons to India is simple economics and profit, there is a certain strategic dimension to it that is closely connected to its reservations towards China. While Moscow has provided the Chinese air force with advance fighters such as the SU-27 and the SU-30, the Russians have delivered to the Indian air force its most advance version of the SU series allowed for export, the SU-30K. The SU-30K has several improvements over the versions in use by the Chinese air force. Its superb capabilities were clearly demonstrated in 2005 when, during an exercise between the Indian and the U.S. air forces, the aircraft perform remarkably well, closely matching the most advance American aircraft the F-16.

It seems clear that Russia is far less reluctant to supply India with technologies it denies to China. Moscow is very well aware of the growing rivalry between India and China, and

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sees a strong India as useful balance against China. Russia’s preference for India is due also to the fact that both countries have never had any history of conflict and have indeed enjoyed good relations for decades. Russia and India also do not have overlapping spheres of influence (as in the case of Moscow and Beijing) particularly in Central Asia, Mongolia, the Russian Far East, and the North Pacific. However, the establishment of an Indian air base in Tajikistan and its closer ties with the U.S. may change Russian attitudes towards India in the future.  

Apart from political and strategic considerations there are also some very practical reasons for Russia’s reluctance to sell certain weapon systems to the PRC. Russia is reluctant to transfer certain technologies to China due to the Chinese tendency to break its legal commitments and transfer these technologies to third parties. Just to cite one example, China is currently producing for the Pakistani air force the Russian jet engine RD 93, to be incorporated into the joint Sino-Pakistani fighter, the JF17. This move led to protests from the Russian Defense Ministry which claimed that China had no right to sell or transfer to third countries technology that was exclusively transferred for its own use. China Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Company is currently embroiled in a similar dispute with France’s Eurocopter over its intentions to sell 40 Z-9 helicopters to the Argentine Army. The Z-9 is a licensed production copy of the Eurocopter AS 365N Dauphin II, sold to the Chinese in the 1980s by the French.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The August 17th exercises have also raised speculation over the possible emergence of a military block centered on the SCO and headed by China and Russia to balance the U.S. and NATO. Expectations of an Asian NATO are rather premature and greatly underestimate the diversity and tensions among the various members of the organization. Apart from the issues limiting Sino-Russo relations discussed above, there are many other contentious issues between the smaller members of the SCO and in their relations with Russia and China. The smaller members of the organization also have suspicions towards each other and do not necessarily share the same interests. To this day Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have not been able to agree on the demarcation of large sections of their common border, while disputes with Kirgizstan continue over sections of Tajik territory in the Isfara Valley. In addition to border dispute conflicts over water resources have been a major obstacle to closer ties between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan and Tajikistan.

While Russia and China are eager to use the SCO to restrict American influence in Central Asia, most Central Asian nations are not as concerned with the U.S. presence. The autocratic governments of the region, while resenting U.S. criticism of their human rights record, actually do see the U.S. as a positive force in the region. Central Asian nations have traditionally seen Russia and China as the main challenges to their security and independence. After all, it was Russia, not the United States, that brutally occupied the region for over a century. To this very day large numbers of ethnic Russians, purposely moved to Central Asia during Soviet times, make up a large portion of the population of the newly independent states of Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, ethnic Russians make up 30 percent of the population, while Ukrainians account for 3 percent. In Kirgizstan they account for 13 percent, 12 percent in Tajikistan, and 6 percent in Uzbekistan.

China is seen in a rather less threatening light than Russia by the Central Asian states. This as to due in large part with the fact that unlike Russia China has never occupied and colonized Central Asia, even at the height of Chinese imperial power in the 16th century. China’s influence in the region was based on the tributary system of nominal allegiance of local tribes to the Chinese emperor. However, China’s growing economic presence in Tajikistan and Kirgizstan is leading to fears that China will one day want to restore the Sino-centric tributary system in Central Asia. The fact that until 2002 China was still claiming that it had historical rights over one third of Tajik territory tended to reinforce such fears.

Despite all the talk of Western imperialism and American meddling in their internal affairs, Central Asian leaders see Russia, and to a lesser extent China, as far greater threats. This has been so for centuries and there seems to be no reason to believe it will not remain the case now and into the foreseeable future. Central Asian states are far more interested in balancing the various powers now engaged in the region rather than bandwagoning with any of them. While being far more apprehensive towards Russia, Central Asian leaders realize that open confrontation with Moscow may have severe consequences. Therefore, local elites have adopted a delicate balancing strategy towards the great powers, trying to please everyone to the largest extent possible, reaping as many benefits from all sides while at the same time preserving their interests as defined by the local authoritarian governments.

Despite their occasional outbursts against the United States, local governments have discreetly encouraged an American presence in their respective countries. Leaders are quite eager to attract American and Western investments, particularly in the oil and gas sector. American energy companies are seen as far more reliable and offering better deals than their Russian counterparts, which have a rather dubious reputation in the region due to corruption and their failure to honor their commitments. Central Asian leaders hope that giving the U.S. a significant economic stake in the region will temper Washington’s enthusiasm for those pesky issues such as human rights, while at the same time minimizing Russian and Chinese encroachment into the local economies.

The case of Tajikistan is a clear example of such a balancing act. The local government has so far been able to maintain good relations with Moscow, Washington, and Beijing. Tajikistan has allowed both Russia and the U.S. to have military bases in its territory in very close proximity to each other—a clear indication of its desire not to take sides and pay for the consequences of such a move. Tajikistan’s flexibility in accommodating great powers was further demonstrated when in 2004 it allowed the Indian air force to establish a military base in its territory. New Delhi is reported to have deployed MIG-29 fighters and helicopter gunships to its air base in Ayni, showing its intentions to play a major role in the region.

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India is currently an observer member of the SCO and, despite China’s objections, has expressed its eagerness to join as a full member. In order to counter India’s possible influence within the group Beijing has been encouraging its close ally and India’s long time enemy Pakistan to join. India’s admission into the SCO is likely to make attempts on the part of Beijing and Moscow to use the grouping against American interests rather difficult. New Delhi’s ever closer ties with Washington and its rivalry with China for regional influence is likely to lead to different policy choices on the part of India and create friction with Beijing and, to a lesser extent, Moscow. The possible admission of Iran is likely to complicate matters even further due to the fact that China, Russia, and India have a great amount of influence and interests in that country.

Until 2005, the United States was leasing an air base in Uzbekistan for major air lift operations and also had a smaller presence in Kirgizstan. These military facilities have been crucial in supporting U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Kirgizstan’s case, like that of Tajikistan, is also quite illustrative of Central Asian states’ balancing act and their discrete willingness to use the U.S. as a counter balance to Moscow and Beijing. Not only has Kirgizstan allowed a U.S. military presence in its territory, it is also hosting a small French military contingent and has resisted both domestic and external pressures for the closure of American facilities in the country. In July 2005, when asked to comment on the issue of closing America military facilities, the Kirgiz Deputy Prime Minister Adakhan Madumarov said: “Any decision concerning the future of U.S. military bases in our territory is an internal matter of our sovereign state and does not concern any one else.”

This is by no means to suggest that American economic interests and its military presence in the region are free of challenges and should be taken for granted. There have been a few instances of friction between Washington and local governments, such as the fatal shooting of a Kirgiz civilian by American military personal at Manas Air port in 2006. The incident led to demands for the lifting of immunity for the American soldier allegedly involved in the killing. Demands for a U.S. withdrawal have also been voiced from time to time in Tajikistan. However, these protests need to be put in a broader context. While there has been some hostility towards American deployments in the region, they pale in comparison with local fears and resentment towards Russia’s military presence. Another issue worth noting is that on many occasions these disputes with the United States tend to be over financial and material issues, with the local governments attempting to obtain better leasing terms and other economic aid in return for their bases. For instance, after the shooting incident, the Kirgiz government still deployed a small contingent to Iraq to support the coalition effort, one of the few Muslim countries to do so.

So far the U.S. has only been forced to close its military facilities in Uzbekistan after the bloody suppression of pro-democracy protests in 2005 leading to the death of an estimated 500 civilians. The decision to withdraw was forced upon the Bush administration due to public outrage in the U.S.

and was not the result of the Uzbek government’s hostility towards the United States. Indeed, President Islam Karimov was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the growing American presence in central Asia. After 9/11, Karimov was the first Central Asian leader to offer military bases to the United States to support its operations in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban terrorists. Before the 2005 crackdown, Karimov was probably one of the most hostile leaders towards Moscow. He was a strong supporter of the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) a grouping consisting of Uzbekistan and the other three central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that excluded Russia from its membership.

Although the justification to exclude Russia from the CAEC was that the organization was aimed at addressing issues peculiar to the five small central Asia states, Moscow seems to believe that its exclusion was aimed at countering Russian influence, while at the same time paving the way for stronger political and economic involvement on the part of the United States. Various reports in the Russian media suggested that CAEC was more of an American creation, aiming at undermining Russian interests in central Asia rather than a genuine initiative for economic cooperation emanating from the region. The fact that in 2002 alone the United States had granted nearly $1 billion in aid to CAEC members further reinforced Russian suspicions. However, the 2005 incident brought an end to the growing cooperation between Washington and Karimov.

Washington’s main challenge in maintaining its presence in Central Asia will be to find the right balance between its commitment to democracy and human rights and its strategic interests. In a free and plural society like the United States, with its many interests groups and lobbies, this is easier said than done. While in the past the United States has sacrificed its concerns over human rights in order to secure its strategic interests, the post cold war era, characterized by an increased availability of information, makes such compromises more controversial. The power of the mass media and the so called “CNN effect” force a reluctant Bush administration to terminate its links with the Karimov regime despite significant U.S. strategic interests in the region.

An Asian NATO

Central Asian states are engaged in a delicate balancing strategy and are unlikely to embark on any initiatives that may jeopardize this delicate equilibrium. Despite the anti-American rhetoric, the U.S. presence in Central Asia is not just tolerated, but actually welcomed by the local elites who perceived it as a fairly manageable risk while at the same time being a source of great economic opportunities and indirect protection. Russia and China have for centuries been seen as threats to the existence of these states and it’s therefore unlikely that these nations will ever become allies of either Russia or China in any way similar to how NATO’S members are allied with the U.S. America, with its prosperity and its free society, has far greater appeal to local elites than an increasingly autocratic Russia with its long history of oppression of Central Asia. As noted by a Tajik army Colonel: “We don’t

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worry much about the Americans because they come and go, but the Russians and Chinese are always here—they never leave. He is always here,” says the Colonel discreetly pointing to an ethnic Russian Colonel serving in the Tajik army.36

NATO is more than a military alliance. Its success and longevity is not just based on strategic considerations and military imperatives. With very few exceptions its members share a common history and culture that has been forged through decades of interaction. Nearly all of its members are part of the Western “Christian” civilization and share such values as democracy and liberty, even though they differ significantly on how these values are practiced as policy. Above all, NATO was founded on a clear and commonly shared threat perception of communism, which stood against the core values of Western civilization.

The SCO on the other hand share no such common values or perceptions. Russia is primarily a white slavic Christian Orthodox nation while China is mongoloid and supposedly atheist. The central Asian nations, however, share Islam and a common Turkic ethnic origin. The only thing SCO members seem to have in common is a form of authoritarian government of some sort. It is rather improbable that such authoritarian links will be able to supplant deep seated historical and political animosities.

China, Russia and the other SCO states share hardly any civilizational and cultural affinities, but above all, neither do they share a common threat perception. On the contrary, as I have asserted, the two most important members of the alliance are actually regarded by the smaller members as greater threats than the one the alliance is suppose to confront. In his pioneering study on alliance formation, Harvard professor Stephen Walt argued that a common threat perception was the main element in determining the formation and sustenance of alliances.36 Therefore, the conflicting threat perceptions among the SCO countries do not augur well for the future of an Asian NATO.

American leadership is another crucial factor for the success of NATO. It allowed the conditions for trust and understanding while at the same time provided the crucial material and financial resources needed for such an endeavor. Above all, American leadership was accepted and respected by NATO members rather than imposed upon them, thus reducing the potential for conflict and misunderstandings between the various members. In the case of the SCO, who shall be the leader? Who shall play the unifying role of the United States? These questions are likely to create serious tensions between Beijing and Moscow. Further, neither Russia nor China enjoy the policy legitimacy for leadership enjoyed by the United States among NATO members. How can an alliance be sustained when its main players are at odds with each other and are both seen by their smaller partners as greater threats than the enemies they are supposed to align against?

Conclusion

On the surface, China and Russia seem to share enough common interests to sustain a durable and cohesive alliance. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals many points of contention and tension between the two giants. In the medium to long term, Russia seems to be far more concerned with the consequences of China’s rise than it is with America. While Moscow’s immediate concern may currently be American and NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and the deployment of missile defense in Eastern Europe, Russia is equally if not more concerned over China’s rise. Moscow fears that Chinese power may become so overwhelming so as to seriously undermine Russian interests, particularly in its vulnerable Asian territories. Therefore, Russia’s overtures to China seem to be a temporary expedient aimed at addressing the current challenge of perceived American encroachment into its sphere of influence, rather than a long term commitment in the lines of the U.S-NATO alliance.

It is unlikely that Moscow would maintain its enthusiasm for such an alliance if Washington was to find some way of accommodating Russian interests. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s visit to Moscow in October 2007 to try to address Moscow’s concerns, while not successful, seems to suggest that such a scenario is not impossible. Russia’s interest in its supposed alliance with China are clearly aimed at countering current actions on the part of the United States, making it more of a temporary arrangement of convenience rather than a true alliance.

As we have seen, alliances tend to be based on a common threat perception shared by the various parties involved. While China and Russia see the United States as a threat, they also see one another as even greater threats. Proximity and a long history of conflict further reinforce such negative perceptions. To complicate matters even further, the smaller SCO members have very different threat perceptions concerning the two great powers and are unlikely to allow themselves to be manipulated for the benefit of their powerful neighbors. Most central Asian states see Russia and China as far greater threats than the United States and are therefore much more interested in using Washington as a balance rather than overtly opposing it. Ironically, the elements that are now bringing the dragon and the bear together have the potential to move them apart in the future.

ENDNOTES

3. These views have been regularly expressed by Chinese officials, particularly from the military. When the author attended the defense and strategy course at National Defense University of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLAN|DU) between August 2006 and July 2007 the view was expressed regularly in lectures and seminars by PLA officers with the ranking as high as Major General.
33. Yom, op. cit.

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America, Don’t Count on Our ‘Followership’
by Masahiro Matsumura, Ph.D.

Abstract
This paper warns against the tendency among policymakers in Washington to take Japan’s “followership” for granted. Among the issues currently in play that could drive Japan to a more independent role in East Asia are the North Korean nuclear and abduction issues, the Six Party Talks, and the question of foreign aid to North Korea if and when it de-nuclearizes its programs. The author believes that the legislative power of the newly ascendent Democratic Party of Japan—a party whose leaders are increasingly critical of U.S. policies—could very well lead to a strategic shift in East Asia that would have lasting consequences for trade and security throughout the region.

With the work to denuclearize North Korea seemingly getting off the ground at last, the United States is walking a tightrope in its attempt to accelerate the Six Party Talks process. Washington’s recent negotiation tactics have increasingly tilted toward appeasement, now to the extent that it is about to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism despite the unresolved issue of the abduction of Japanese and other countries’ nationals. Such a move, if made without close consultation with Japan, will considerably offend the Japanese public, encroaching upon their support for Japan’s alliance with the United States. This in turn will inescapably debilitate the strong bilateral alliance that is essential for a hedging strategy of engagement and balancing vis-à-vis a rising China with a possible consequence of destabilizing the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region.

Denuclearizing North Korea requires not only the temporary disablement of the three nuclear facilities at Yongbyon but also the complete and correct declaration of other nuclear facilities and programs, particularly Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) programs, followed by the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of all these elements. According to the mainstream Japanese perspective, both the nuclear and abduction issues are firmly embedded in the tyrannical nature of Pyongyang’s dictatorship, that is, the regime is struggling to survive the international isolation caused by its grave human rights violations on the strength of nuclear weapons. It may be possible to separate the two issues in analysis, but not in any meaningful manner as a policy matter. Given the established record of Pyongyang’s cheating and betrayal, complete denuclearization cannot be expected to be realized in the near future, a goal that can only be approached in a prolonged process.

The Six Party Talks are no longer an institutional mechanism to terminate the Cold War structure that persists on the Korean Peninsula. It has now metamorphosed into a détente approach predicated on continuous confrontation and coexistence with Pyongyang’s die-hard dictatorship. The aim of this approach is to defuse politico-military tensions created by Pyongyang’s confidence in the efficacy of the threat and use of nuclear weapons. Yet any transformation of the tensions is expected to occur only in the form of a series of concessions made by North Korea in response to large-scale international economic assistance given to it. Such economic assistance would be provided synchronous with the creation of a post-Korean War peace regime and the eventual formation of a regional multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia. This means the resolution of the North Korean nuclear and abduction issues will have to wait until Korean unification takes place.

Japan is practically the only country capable of providing such a massive amount of aid. However, Pyongyang’s impending nuclear threats and indisputable offenses against sovereignty in the form of repeated abductions of Japanese nationals have convinced the Japanese government not to provide aid until Pyongyang has achieved complete denuclearization, scrapped its ballistic missiles, and settled the abduction issue. Since this government policy is rooted in a solid national consensus, Tokyo has little room for making compromises, at least in principle.

Furthermore, the Japanese public is now fully aware that Washington has ceased to speak of complete denuclearization (CVID), the HEU programs and, most crucially, the dozen or more rudimentary nuclear warheads that North Korea is believed to possess. It will not take long before the Japanese public realizes that Washington is extending a de facto, if not de jure, recognition of Pyongyang’s nuclear power status.

Consequently, Washington’s détente approach will sooner or later cause a backlash in Japanese public opinion, which will force the Japanese government to rethink its strategic calculations and alliance policy. Now that the opposition Democratic Party of Japan has seized control of the upper house of the Diet, Washington can no longer take Japan’s “followership” in diplomacy for granted. Tokyo has become increasingly less pliable to U.S. security interests, as demonstrated by the recent failure to renew the legislative measure authorizing Japan’s participation in the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom - Maritime Interdiction Operation.

Should Tokyo perceive that Washington is moving toward normalization with a nuclear North Korea, Tokyo would see itself being forced to coexist with a rogue state. This might lead to a worst case scenario where Japan, surrounded by a nuclear unified Korea, China and Russia, concludes that it can no longer trust and rely on the US nuclear umbrella and turns onto the path of going nuclear. In December 2006, Tokyo leaked some findings of an internal study: it would require only several years to develop effective nuclear weapon systems.

In order to avoid such a disaster, Washington should refrain from isolating Tokyo in the Six Party Talks process by lifting the pressure on Tokyo to provide aid, including heavy oil, to Pyongyang unless there is significant progress in the abduction issue. Rather, what Washington could do at most is to nudge Tokyo to cover a fair share of the costs necessary to denuclearize Pyongyang. In the long run, it would be wise for Washington to give a high priority to the abduction issue, for this would encourage Tokyo to provide economic assistance indispensable to carrying forward the long transformation process of the Korean Peninsula. Last but not least, in the case

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of the process being further prolonged, Washington should take measures to divert Tokyo’s existentialistic imperative to go nuclear by offering minimal but effective deterrence vis-à-vis Pyongyang that would placate the fears of the Japanese public: several hundred Tomahawk cruise missiles without nuclear warheads, for instance. Otherwise, Japan would become a wild card.

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